大般涅槃經義記 7.43

7.43

就前二中，初句偏就能生設難，後句約對所生設難。初難云何？若彼生相還能自生可名生生，生不自生，云何得名為生生乎？難意如是。然彼生相但能生於色、心等法，不能自生，故今反舉。「若生自生，生無自性」以理難破。若有自性可以生起故可自生；生無自性，云何自生？問曰：前說色等法邊別有非色非心生相，今云何言生無自性？解云：此相判為能生，能生之外更無所生法之自性，故曰無也。

Among the former two: the first line specifically formulates an objection in terms of what produces; the second line formulates an objection in contrast to what is produced. What is the first objection? If that mark of arising could furthermore produce itself, it could be called "arising when arisen"; but arising does not produce itself, so how could it be called "arising when arisen"? Such is the intention of the objection. However, that mark of arising can only produce dharmas such as matter and mind, but cannot produce itself; therefore he now raises the contrary: "If arising produces itself, arising has no intrinsic nature," refuting it through reason. If it had intrinsic nature, it could arise and thus could produce itself; since arising has no intrinsic nature, how could it produce itself? Question: Previously it was said that alongside dharmas such as matter, there is separately a mark of arising that is neither matter nor mind; why does he now say that arising has no intrinsic nature? The explanation states: This mark is determined to be that which produces; apart from that which produces, there is no further intrinsic nature of the dharma that is produced; hence he says "none."