大般涅槃經義記 8.260

8.260

第二師子乘言執有，如來對彼。師子初言「以是義故乳有酪性」，准刀立有。以人取刀，刀有面性；乳亦如是，定有酪性。「若刀無面，何故取刀」，破無成有。佛答有三：一以所見顛倒來破。「若刀有面，何故顛倒」，欲見南面而覩北像，故曰顛倒。二以所見長闊來破。「有面應定，何故竪刀則見面長、橫刀見闊」。第三約就自他以破。「若是自面，應當似己，何故見長」。亦應責言何故見闊，且責一邊。「若是他面，何得稱言是己面像；若因己面見他面者，何故不見驢馬等像」。

Second, Siṃhanāda follows up on his words to grasp at existence, and the Tathāgata responds to him. First, Siṃhanāda says: "By this reasoning, milk has the nature of curds"—establishing existence by analogy with the knife. Because a person takes a knife, the knife has the nature of a face; milk is also like this, definitively having the nature of curds. "If the knife had no face, why would one take the knife?"—refuting non-existence to establish existence. The Buddha's reply has three points: First, he refutes it by the invertedness of what is seen. "If the knife had a face, why is it inverted?"—wishing to see a southward face yet beholding a northward image, hence it is called inverted. Second, he refutes it by the length and breadth of what is seen. "If it had a face, it should be fixed; why is it that when the knife is held vertically one sees the face as long, and when the knife is held horizontally one sees it as broad?" Third, he refutes it in terms of self and other. "If it were one's own face, it should resemble oneself; why is it seen as long?" One should also censure him by asking why it is seen as broad; here he merely censures one aspect. "If it were another's face, how could one claim it is the reflection of one's own face? If through one's own face one saw another's face, why does one not see the reflection of a donkey or a horse?"