大般涅槃經義記 8.272

8.272

第三師子乘言救義。「如世人言我共八人」自數數他，「了因亦爾」自了了他。下佛對破。「了因若爾則非了因」准喻破了。了因同彼我共八人，故曰若爾。自色不能自數數他，了因同彼不能自了亦不了他，何成了因？是故說言則非了因。「何以」下釋。「數者能數自色他色，故得言八」辯其數相。標牒數者，智慧能數，自色他色是其所數。就所數中，自色為一、他色有七，故名為八。次定是非。而此八中，自己色性不能辯了己體為一、他色為七，名「無了相」，此顯非也。「無了相故要須智性乃數自他」，此彰是也。下約破了。是此了因同其自色，不能自數及數他故，不能自了亦不了他。上來第一就喻破有。自下第二就法破有，句別有四：一「一切眾生有佛性者，何故修習無量功德」難破有性。此名佛果為佛性性，眾生身中已有佛果，何須修習？二「若言修習是了因者，已同酪壞」難破須了。師子立意：性體雖有，須修了之令現，故舉破之。已同酪壞，指同前酪。前酪喻中，若有性酪應有性了。若性是了，何須外緣以為了因？破此同彼，名同酪壞。三「若言因中定有果」下，重破有性，成上初句。「若言因中定有果者，戒定智慧則無增長」以理正破。前初句中有不須修，此句之中有無增長，左右言耳。「我見世人本無漸增」，舉見驗非。四「若言師教是了因」下，重破能了，成前第二。「若言師教是了因者」舉其能了。前第二中行為能了，此說師教以為能了，言左右耳。「當受教時受者未有戒定智慧」辯其道理。始聞未行，是故未有。「若是了因，應了未有，云何乃了戒定智慧令得增長」就之設難。難意云何？若彼師教是其了因，正應了向所未有者戒定智慧令其使有，云何乃了性戒定慧令得增長？問曰：上來何曾說有性戒定慧而為此難？彼立因中所有果性，即是自性戒定智慧，故為此難。

In the third round, Siṃhanāda seizes upon the words to rescue the meaning: "Just as people in the world say, 'I, together with eight others,'" counting oneself and counting others, "the clarifying cause is also like this," clarifying itself and clarifying another. Below, the Buddha refutes this in response: "If the clarifying cause were like this, then it would not be a clarifying cause," refuting the clarifier based on the analogy. The clarifying cause would be identical to that "I together with eight others," which is why he says "if it were like this." One's own form cannot count itself and count others; if the clarifying cause is identical to that, it cannot clarify itself nor clarify others, so how does it constitute a clarifying cause? Therefore he says it would not be a clarifying cause. From "Why?" below, he explains. "The one who counts can count one's own form and other forms, therefore one can say eight" explains the character of counting. Indicating and stating "the one who counts": wisdom can count, while one's own form and other forms are what is counted. Within what is counted, one's own form is one and other forms are seven, hence it is called eight. Next, he determines right and wrong. Yet among these eight, the nature of one's own form cannot discern that its own body is one and other forms are seven; this is called "lacking the mark of clarifying," which reveals what is wrong. "Because it lacks the mark of clarifying, one must require the nature of wisdom to count oneself and others"; this manifests what is right. Below, he refutes the clarifier accordingly. This clarifying cause is identical to its own form: because it cannot count itself or count others, it cannot clarify itself nor clarify others. The above is the first part, refuting existence with respect to the analogy. From here below is the second part, refuting existence with respect to the doctrine; it has four distinct clauses: First, "If all sentient beings possess the buddha-nature, why do they cultivate immeasurable merit?" challenges and refutes having the nature. Here, the fruit of buddhahood is named the nature of buddha-nature; if the fruit of buddhahood already exists within the bodies of sentient beings, why must they cultivate it? Second, "If you say that cultivation is the clarifying cause, this is already destroyed like the curd" challenges and refutes the need for clarification. Siṃhanāda's intention in establishing this was: although the substance of the nature exists, one must cultivate and clarify it to make it manifest; hence he adduces this to refute it. "Already destroyed like the curd" refers to being the same as the curds earlier. In the earlier analogy of the curd, if there were a nature-curd, there should be a nature-clarifier. If its nature is to clarify, why would external conditions be needed as clarifying causes? Refuting this is identical to that, hence termed "destroyed like the curd." Third, from "If you say that the fruit definitely exists within the cause" below, he reiterates the refutation of having the nature, establishing the first clause above. "If you say that the fruit definitely exists within the cause, then discipline, concentration, and wisdom would not increase" directly refutes it with reason. In the first clause above there was "no need to cultivate"; in this clause there is "no increase"—these are complementary expressions. "I see that people in the world fundamentally lack it and gradually increase it" adduces observation to verify what is incorrect. Fourth, from "If you say that the master's teaching is the clarifying cause" below, he reiterates the refutation of the ability to clarify, establishing the second clause above. "If you say that the master's teaching is the clarifying cause" adduces that which can clarify. In the second clause above, practice was the clarifier; here it says the master's teaching is the clarifier—these are complementary expressions. "When receiving the teaching, the recipient does not yet possess discipline, concentration, and wisdom" explains the reasoning. Because one has just heard it and has not yet practiced, it does not yet exist. "If it is a clarifying cause, it should clarify what does not yet exist; how then does it clarify discipline, concentration, and wisdom, causing them to increase?" frames the challenge based on this. What is the import of the challenge? If that master's teaching is the clarifying cause, it should properly clarify the discipline, concentration, and wisdom that did not exist previously so as to bring them about; how then does it clarify the nature's discipline, concentration, and wisdom, causing them to increase? Question: When before was it ever stated that there are natural discipline, concentration, and wisdom, such that he presents this challenge? Answer: What he posits as the nature of the fruit within the cause is precisely natural discipline, concentration, and wisdom; therefore he presents this challenge.