大般涅槃經義記 8.276

8.276

上來第一就其乳酪轉變因果破定有性。自下第二就其樹子相生因果破其有性。文別有三：一師子吼當相立者，如來對破。二「如佛說二種因」下，師子以其緣正二因證性本有，佛破明無。三「若尼拘無性，何不出油」下，師子以其不生異證性本有，佛破明無。初中，師子先立有義。「一切無性，云何而得阿耨菩提？以因故得。因謂佛性」法說明有。「一切無性云何而得」破無成有，「以因故得」明有非無。「何等因」下出其因體。「若尼拘」下喻說明有。喻中尼拘正立其喻，「如瞿曇」下轉喻顯喻。「尼拘陀子亦如是」下合喻顯喻。「如世尊」下帖喻顯喻明有佛性，「佛性如是」合喻明者。下佛且就尼拘之喻以破其有。「汝言子中有尼拘陀，是義不然」牒以總非。「如其有者何故不見」略以徵破。「如世間」下廣以徵破。於中，先舉世間八種不見因緣，次明尼拘不同彼八，責其不見。「若言細」下遮其同義，初先正破，「本無麁」下以理教示。破中，「若言細障不見，是義不然」牒以總非。人謂子中尼拘陀樹，同前第五細故不見，亦同第六障故不見，故牒非之。「何以」下釋，先徵、後辯。「樹相麁」等，破前細也。子中之樹必具根莖枝葉等事，故言相麁。「若言性細，云何增長」遮其救義。恐其宣說性細事麁，故為此遮。「若障不見，常應不見」破前障也。汝立性樹障，亦應性有性障，故常應不見。下教示中，「本無麁相今則見」等，明麁本無。「本無見性今則見」等，明見本無。「子亦如是，本無樹」下，類以教之。所生之樹同麁同見，本無今有，竟有何咎。

The above was the first [section], which refuted a definitely existent nature on the basis of the cause and effect of transformation between milk and curd. From here below is the second [section], which refutes an existent nature on the basis of the cause and effect of mutual generation between a tree and its seed. There are three parts to the text: First, Siṃhanāda establishes it in accordance with characteristics, and the Tathāgata counters and refutes it. Second, from "As the Buddha has spoken of two kinds of causes" onward, Siṃhanāda proves that the nature is originally existent by means of the two causes—circumstantial and primary—and the Buddha refutes this by explaining its non-existence. Third, from "If the nyagrodha has no nature, why does it not produce oil?" onward, Siṃhanāda proves that the nature is originally existent on the grounds that it does not produce something different, and the Buddha refutes this by explaining its non-existence. In the first [part], Siṃhanāda first establishes the thesis of existence. "If all have no nature, how can they attain anuttara-bodhi? It is attained on account of a cause. The cause is called the buddha-nature": this explains in terms of doctrine that it exists. "If all have no nature, how can they attain [it]?" refutes non-existence to establish existence; "It is attained on account of a cause" explains that it exists and is not non-existent. From "What kind of cause?" onward, he identifies the essence of the cause. From "Just as the nyagrodha..." onward, he explains existence by means of an analogy. In the analogy, the nyagrodha properly establishes his analogy; from "Just as Gautama..." onward, he shifts the analogy to elucidate the analogy; from "The nyagrodha seed is also like this" onward, he applies the analogy to elucidate the analogy; from "Just as the World-Honoured One..." onward, he attaches the analogy to elucidate the analogy and explain that the buddha-nature exists; "The buddha-nature is like this" is the application of the analogy to explain it. Below, the Buddha temporarily relies on the analogy of the nyagrodha to refute its existence. "What you say about there being a nyagrodha tree within the seed—this meaning is not correct": he cites it to negate it as a whole. "If it is existent, why is it not seen?": he briefly interrogates and refutes it. From "As in the world..." onward, he extensively interrogates and refutes it. Therein, he first adduces eight conditions for not seeing in the world, and next explains that the nyagrodha is not like those eight, censuring him for its not being seen. From "If you say it is subtle..." onward, he precludes his assimilation [to those conditions]: first he refutes it directly, and from "Originally lacking coarse..." onward, he instructs him by means of principle. In the refutation, "If you say that it is not seen because it is subtle or obstructed, this meaning is not correct": he cites it to negate it as a whole. People might claim that the nyagrodha tree within the seed is not seen because, like the fifth [condition] above, it is subtle, or also not seen because, like the sixth [condition], it is obstructed; hence he cites and negates it. From "Why?" onward is the explanation: first he interrogates, then he analyzes. "The tree's characteristics are coarse" and so on refutes the subtlety above: the tree within the seed must possess root, stem, branches, leaves, and so forth, which is why he says its characteristics are coarse. "If you say its nature is subtle, how does it grow?": this precludes his attempt at rescue. Fearing that he might declare that the nature is subtle while the concrete matter is coarse, he therefore provides this preclusion. "If it is not seen because of an obstruction, it should always not be seen": this refutes the obstruction above. If you establish that the tree has a nature, the obstruction should also have an innate nature and an innate obstruction, so it should always not be seen. In the instruction below, "Originally lacking coarse characteristics, it is now seen" and so forth explains that coarseness is originally non-existent. "Originally lacking the nature of seeing, it is now seen" and so forth explains that seeing is originally non-existent. From "The seed is also like this: originally lacking the tree..." onward, he instructs him by analogy. The tree that is produced is likewise coarse and likewise seen: originally non-existent, it now exists; what fault could there ultimately be?