大般涅槃經義記 9.213

9.213

就初段中，先問、後答。問中，迦葉乘前所明斷善根義，即就其人以問佛性，令斷善人於己身性生信解故。於中有二：一就時徵問，「性為過去未來現在」。二「如來亦說佛性六」下，就人徵問，問一闡提佛性有無。此佛別答，宜審記知。前中，初言「若斷三因名斷善根」牒佛前言。「斷善根人即有佛性」牒佛上語。下就徵問，「如是佛性為過、為現、為是未來、為遍三世」進退審定。下就設難。若過徵前，「云何名常」以理徵責，謝往之法何得稱常？「佛性亦常當知非過」以理驗非，以理測尋未敢專決，是以言「亦」。「若未」牒前，「云何名常」以理徵責，現無當有，何得名常？「何故」已下，遮佛無常，成非未來。如來若說性是無常，故在未來。「無常不定，何故佛說一切眾生必定當得」此反徵也。「若必定得，云何言斷」順以難之。定得之法體即常住，云何說言闡提現斷，令在未來。但令未來即是現斷，故為此徵。「若現」牒前。「復云何常」以理徵責。現起之法本無今有、已有還無，故不名常。「何故」已下，遮佛無常，成非現在。若言無常，遷轉不定，何故復言常而可見？

Within the first section, there is first the question and then the answer. In the question, Kāśyapa takes advantage of the meaning of cutting off roots of goodness explained previously, and inquires about the buddha-nature directly with respect to such a person, in order to lead those who have cut off roots of goodness to produce faith and understanding regarding the nature in their own bodies. In this, there are two parts: first, he questions in terms of time, asking whether "the nature is past, future, or present"; second, from "The Tathāgata also says that the buddha-nature is of six [kinds]" onwards, he questions in terms of persons, asking about the existence or non-existence of the buddha-nature in an icchantika. The Buddha answers these separately, which should be carefully noted and known. In the former part, the opening statement, "If cutting off three causes is called cutting off the roots of goodness," repeats the Buddha's previous words. "A person who has cut off the roots of goodness has the buddha-nature" repeats the Buddha's preceding remark. Below, he questions in detail: "Is such a buddha-nature past, present, future, or pervasive throughout the three periods of time?" thus examining and determining it forward and backward. Below, he raises objections. If past, challenging the previous [point]: "how is it called eternal?"—challenging and rebuking by principle: how could a dharma that has passed away be called eternal? "Buddha-nature is also eternal; one should know it is not past" verifies the error through principle, yet tracing it through principle he does not dare decide definitively, and therefore says "also." "If future," repeating the previous [point]: "how is it called eternal?"—challenging and rebuking by principle: what does not exist at present but will exist in the future, how could it be called eternal? From "Why" onwards, he refutes the Buddha's [potential assertion of] impermanence, establishing that it is not future. If the Tathāgata were to say the nature is impermanent, it would therefore be in the future. "[If it is] impermanent and not fixed, why did the Buddha say that all sentient beings will definitely attain it?"—this is a counter-challenge. "If definitely attained, why say it is cut off?"—concurring [with the premise] to challenge it. A dharma that is definitely attained is in its essence eternally abiding; why say that the icchantika presently cuts it off, causing it to be in the future? Merely having it be in the future is just being presently cut off; hence he makes this challenge. "If present," repeating the previous [point]: "how is it again eternal?"—challenging and rebuking by principle. A dharma that arises in the present originally did not exist and now exists, and having existed returns to non-existence; hence it is not called eternal. From "Why" onwards, he refutes the Buddha's [potential assertion of] impermanence, establishing that it is not present. If one were to say it is impermanent, shifting and not fixed, why again say it is eternal and can be seen?