大般涅槃經義記 2.41

2.41

In the third section, the text again has three [parts]: first, generally adducing the eight inversions; second, from "There are such..." onward, clarifying that among the eight inversions, those who have the four inversions regarding the conditioned do not know correct cultivation; third, from "All you bhikṣus, regarding conditioned dharmas..." onward, concluding that those four inversions pertain to the bhikṣus. In the first [part], one should first explain the meaning of the eight inversions and then interpret the text; the meaning is as [explained] in a separate chapter. In the text, it first says, "Reckoning suffering as pleasure, and reckoning pleasure as suffering, are inverted dharmas": saṃsāra is truly suffering, yet one falsely reckons it as pleasure; nirvāṇa is truly pleasure, yet one perversely reckons it as suffering; hence they are inversions, and the remaining three are analogous. Previously the four inversions regarding the unconditioned were already preached; why are they discussed again here? It is simply adducing the former to analogize the latter. The bhikṣus are not only fully possessed of the four inversions regarding unconditioned dharmas, but are also fully possessed of the four inversions regarding conditioned dharmas; hence both are adduced together. Furthermore, fearing that upon hearing that permanence, bliss, self, and purity are inversions people would exclusively enter into the four inversions of suffering, impermanence, and so forth, to avert this error, he explains that all eight kinds are inversions. In the second section, "There are such four inverted dharmas": among the preceding eight, it specifically repeats the four inversions regarding the conditioned. "These people do not know the dharma of correct cultivation": they do not know the subtle four cultivations of impermanence, suffering, non-self, and so forth, and they also do not know the four kinds of true cultivation of permanence, bliss, self, and purity. In the third [part], concluding that the inversions pertain to the bhikṣus, "All you bhikṣus give rise to [the notion of] pleasure in suffering, up to giving rise to the notion of purity in the impure": the explanation has two meanings. First, explained in terms of the demarcation of sentient beings: although the bhikṣus contemplate the emptiness of sentient beings and eradicate the active defilements, their residual impressions are not yet extinguished; hence they give rise to notions such as permanence, bliss, self, and purity. Second, discussed with reference to the demarcation of dharmas: because the bhikṣus have not yet attained the emptiness of dharmas, they give rise to the four inverted notions of permanence, bliss, and so forth regarding dharmas. Because they do not know that the intrinsic nature of dharmas is impermanent, they give rise to the notion of permanence; because they do not know that the intrinsic nature of dharmas is the suffering of deterioration and the suffering of conditioned formations that falsely aggregate, they give rise to the notion of pleasure; because they do not know the emptiness of dharmas, they give rise to the notion of self; because they do not know that the pure mark of dharmas is fundamentally quiescent, they give rise to the notion of purity. If these notions are not yet eliminated, how can they praise themselves as having skillfully cultivated [the contemplation of] impermanence, non-self, and so forth?