大般涅槃經義記 7.45

7.45

Among the latter two: the first line refutes having arising with respect to the time when it has not yet arisen; the latter line refutes lacking arising with respect to the time when it has not yet arisen. What is the first line? If at the time when it has not yet arisen it already had arising, the Tathāgata could speak of it as "arising when not [yet] arisen"; but at the time when it has not yet arisen it cannot have arising, so how could the Tathāgata speak of "arising when not [yet] arisen"? Such is the intention of the objection. However, dharmas such as matter are called "arisen" when they appear; when they have not yet appeared, they cannot be called "arisen"; therefore he now raises the contrary: "If when not [yet] arisen there is arising, why only now is it called arising?" refuting it through reason: if at the time when it has not yet arisen it already previously had arising, why only now, at the time of its present appearance, is it called arising?