大般涅槃經疏 14.21

14.21

「佛告迦葉」下，第二如來答。大分為二：初歎其所問、次「善男子一切眾生」下正答。答又二：初總答、後別答。總答中二：初答、後論義。初文者，昔隨他意以下苦為樂，今隨自意故一切皆苦。前迦葉作五難相次而來，世尊一答，五難玄解。今昔兩說不復相違，實非是樂，謬情所計橫生樂想。「迦葉白佛」下，第二論義，還難佛解下苦之義。又為兩：初正難、後領解。就初為三：一謬領難、二顛倒難、三據事難。謬難者，佛意以輕為下苦，難意以重為下苦，故成謬領難。迦葉列八苦皆為三品，下受三塗、中人、上天。若下苦有樂者，三塗之中應有樂相。「若復有人」下，次倒難。若下苦生樂想者，亦應下樂生於苦想。何者下樂？且就世間歌姬舞女為上樂，中庸之歡為下樂，於此下樂應生苦想。就其謬領作此謬並。「世尊若下苦中」下，三據事難。如人受千罰，初受一鞭應生樂耶？「佛告」下，答，又二：初且然問、後正答。然其第三一罰之意，明實於下苦而生樂想。若得免多罰，於一罰甘受亦以為樂。從「以是義故」下正答，但答其第三據事難時，前謬領倒難自然懸去。我實不云下是重苦。下是輕苦，汝何謬領？故不答並，亦不然其下樂而生苦想，故不須答。正答第三，應受千罰初得一下即聞放脫，寧非下苦生樂想耶？如人應刑，聞百鞭放，亦是於下苦中而生樂想（云云）。次番領解，先領、後述。或謂此文是一難，謂言此人不於一罰而生樂想，但於脫多生樂想耳。此是得意領解，不名為難。佛述言實不虛者，隨情之說。昔云有樂此是隨情，今言無者道理如然。「迦葉有三受三苦」下，第二別答五難，但有三文：第一答前第二樂體之問、第二答前第三第五樂因兩問、第三答第一第四樂緣之問。此初答前第二樂體問者，又三：第一出兩教、第二點三受、第三結虛實。此初先出兩教：一三受教、二三苦教，可見。「善男子苦受」下，是第二點三受者。但昔教亦點三受，謂苦苦點苦受、壞苦點樂受、行苦點捨受。此乃小乘之教，其義未極，止是單點，即成論人所用；今此極教則複點此初苦受具三苦。苦苦者，心緣苦境、苦境偪心，心境合舉故是苦苦。樂不長有暫時而住，樂緣既謝即是壞苦。無常所侵即是行苦。餘二受各二苦、或云各一苦，故文云二。今解不然，前既複點，今云何單用壞苦點樂受、用行苦點捨受？故知一受具二苦，樂受亦具壞行兩苦，捨受亦具壞行二苦。樂舉體可壞即壞苦，而復有無常所切復具行苦。捨受亦二，捨必離壞故是壞苦，而復未免無常是行苦。但此二苦不須境偪，故無苦苦。「善男子以是因緣」下，第三結虛實，又二：一結昔說妄樂非實，為凡夫言樂；菩薩不爾，皆苦。文云「生死之中實有樂受」，文復云「生死之中實無有樂者，皆是隨情之所妄計。」梁三藏師計生死有樂無樂，並皆爭論如前（云云）。「善男子生死之中」下，二結，今說實苦，可尋。「迦葉白佛」下，第二答前第三第五據因之難。又二：此初，迦葉重牒問以求答。或謂別是新難。今則不然，還是牒前偈中世出世善之問，更飾其詞，非別問也。佛答意者，我說善能感樂，遠得菩提之樂，不言生死中樂。初言菩提根本即是佛果生因，又言長養菩提即是佛果了因。舊云：一向不得有於生因。今謂有因緣，亦得說之。「善男子譬如世間」下，第三答第一第四據樂緣問。又二：先正答、次舉解惑結。正答又兩：先明為樂緣、後明為苦緣。緣既不定，故無樂也。後出諸珍寶等，並皆是苦。且舉一事如多畜寶，初謂是樂；為之失命，復是極苦。「善男子」下，第二舉解惑結，又三：初結菩薩解苦、次結二乘不解故隨情為說、三重舉菩薩結也。

From 'The Buddha addressed Kāśyapa...' onward, second, the Tathāgata's reply. Broadly divided into two: first, praising his question; next, from 'Good son, all sentient beings...' onward, the direct answer. The answer also has two parts: first, a general answer; later, a specific answer. In the general answer there are two: first, the answer; later, the debate on the meaning. Regarding the first text: in the past, adapting to the minds of others, lesser suffering was regarded as pleasure; now, following his own mind, all is suffering. Previously, Kāśyapa raised five objections in succession; the World-Honoured One gave a single answer, and the five objections were fundamentally resolved. The two teachings of now and the past no longer contradict each other: in reality it is not pleasure; it is merely what errant consciousness conceives, generating false notions of pleasure. From 'Kāśyapa said to the Buddha...' onward, second, the debate on the meaning, which turns back to question the Buddha's explanation of the meaning of lesser suffering. It also has two parts: first, directly raising objections; later, expressing understanding. Regarding the first, there are three: first, an objection based on a mistaken grasp; second, an objection based on inversion; third, an objection based on facts. As for the mistaken objection: the Buddha's intention took light [suffering] as lesser suffering, while the objection's intention took heavy [suffering] as lesser suffering; hence it became an objection based on a mistaken grasp. Kāśyapa listed the eight sufferings, all in three grades: lower suffering in the three destinies, medium in humans, and upper in the heavens. If there is pleasure in lower suffering, then there ought to be the appearance of pleasure in the three destinies. From 'If there is another person...' onward, next is the inverted objection: if one gives rise to the idea of pleasure regarding lesser suffering, one should also give rise to the idea of suffering regarding lesser pleasure. What is lesser pleasure? Taking mundane singing girls and dancing women as superior pleasure, and mediocre joy as lesser pleasure, toward this lesser pleasure one should give rise to the idea of suffering. Based on his mistaken grasp, he formulated this mistaken parallel. From 'World-Honoured One, if within lesser suffering...' onward, third is the objection based on facts: just as when a man receives a thousand punishments, when he first receives one lash of the whip, should he give rise to pleasure? From 'The Buddha addressed...' onward, the answer also has two parts: first, provisionally affirming the question; later, directly answering. He affirms the intent of his third [point concerning] one punishment, explaining that in reality, regarding lesser suffering, one indeed gives rise to the idea of pleasure. If one gets freed from many punishments, willingly receiving a single punishment is also regarded as pleasure. From 'For this reason...' onward is the direct answer; when he simply answers his third objection based on facts, the earlier mistaken grasp and inverted objection naturally fall away. [The Buddha means:] I truly did not say that 'lesser' is heavy suffering; 'lesser' is light suffering—why did you mistakenly grasp it? Therefore, he does not answer the parallel, nor does he affirm that one gives rise to the idea of suffering regarding lesser pleasure, so no answer is required. Directly answering the third: if one should receive a thousand punishments and upon receiving the very first lash hears that one is released and exempt, is this not giving rise to the idea of pleasure regarding lesser suffering? Just as when a man is condemned to execution and upon hearing of a hundred lashes is released, this too is giving rise to the idea of pleasure within lesser suffering (and so forth). In the next round, expressing understanding: first, grasping; later, elaborating. Some say that this text is an objection, claiming that this person does not give rise to the idea of pleasure regarding the single punishment, but merely gives rise to the idea of pleasure regarding escaping the many. This is actually grasping the meaning and expressing understanding; it is not called an objection. The Buddha's elaboration that it is 'true and not false' refers to teaching according to their inclinations. In the past, saying there was pleasure was adapting to their inclinations; now, saying there is none is how principle truly is. From 'Kāśyapa, there are three feelings and three sufferings...' onward, second, specifically answering the five objections, but having only three texts: first, answering the earlier second question on the essence of pleasure; second, answering the earlier third and fifth questions on the cause of pleasure; third, answering the first and fourth questions on the conditions for pleasure. Here, the first, answering the earlier second question on the essence of pleasure, also has three parts: first, setting forth the two teachings; second, pointing out the three feelings; third, concluding the unreal and the real. Here, first, setting forth the two teachings: first, the teaching of the three feelings; second, the teaching of the three sufferings, which is evident. From 'Good son, painful feeling...' onward is the second part, pointing out the three feelings. However, the past teaching also pointed out the three feelings, saying that the suffering of suffering points to painful feeling, the suffering of change points to pleasant feeling, and the suffering of conditioned existence points to neutral feeling. This is the Hīnayāna teaching, whose meaning is not ultimate; it is merely single pointing, which is used by the *Tattvasiddhi* (*Chéngshí*) masters. Now, this ultimate teaching, by contrast, repeatedly points out that this initial painful feeling possesses all three sufferings: as for the suffering of suffering, the mind conditions painful objects and the painful objects oppress the mind, so combining mind and object is the suffering of suffering; pleasure does not last long and abides only temporarily, so once the conditions for pleasure perish, that is the suffering of change; being assailed by impermanence is the suffering of conditioned existence. As for the remaining two feelings, each has two sufferings, or it is said each has one suffering, hence the text says 'two.' Now my interpretation is not so: since earlier there was repeated pointing, how could one now merely use the suffering of change to point to pleasant feeling, and use the suffering of conditioned existence to point to neutral feeling? Hence we know that one feeling possesses two sufferings: pleasant feeling also possesses the two sufferings of change and conditioned existence, and neutral feeling also possesses the two sufferings of change and conditioned existence. Pleasure in its entire essence is perishable, which is the suffering of change, and is further pressed by impermanence, thus also possessing the suffering of conditioned existence. Neutral feeling also has two: neutral feeling must depart and disintegrate, hence it is the suffering of change, and moreover is not exempt from impermanence, which is the suffering of conditioned existence. But these two sufferings do not require oppression by objects, hence they lack the suffering of suffering. From 'Good son, for this reason...' onward, third, concluding the unreal and the real, also has two parts: first, concluding that the past explanation of false pleasure was not real, calling it pleasure for the sake of ordinary beings; for bodhisattvas it is not so, all is suffering. The text says, 'Within birth-and-death there are really pleasant feelings,' and the text also says, 'That within birth-and-death there is really no pleasure is all false conception according to inclination.' The Tripiṭaka Master of Liáng held that there is pleasure or no pleasure in birth-and-death, all disputing as mentioned before (and so forth). From 'Good son, within birth-and-death...' onward, second, concluding that what is preached now is real suffering, which can be verified. From 'Kāśyapa said to the Buddha...' onward, second, answering the earlier third and fifth objections based on causes. It also has two parts: here first, Kāśyapa re-iterates the question to seek an answer. Some say this is a distinctly new objection. Now [we say] that is not so: it is still re-iterating the question from the previous verse regarding mundane and supramundane wholesomeness, merely embellishing its words, not a distinct question. The Buddha's intended answer is: I say that wholesomeness can induce pleasure by remotely obtaining the joy of bodhi, not speaking of pleasure within birth-and-death. Saying first that it is the root of bodhi means it is the generative cause (janaka-hetu) of the Buddha-fruit; also saying that it nourishes bodhi means it is the elucidating cause (vyañjaka-hetu) of the Buddha-fruit. The old explanation said: there can never be a generative cause [for bodhi]. Now I hold that because of conditions, it can also be spoken of. From 'Good son, just as in the world...' onward, third, answering the first and fourth questions based on the conditions for pleasure. It also has two parts: first, directly answering; next, citing understanding and delusion to conclude. The direct answer also has two parts: first, explaining that they are conditions for pleasure; later, explaining that they are conditions for suffering. Since conditions are unfixed, there is no pleasure. Later he brings up the various precious jewels and so forth, which are all suffering. Taking just one matter, such as accumulating many treasures: at first one thinks it is pleasure; but when one loses one's life because of it, it is again extreme suffering. From 'Good son...' onward, second, citing understanding and delusion to conclude, also has three parts: first, concluding that the bodhisattva understands suffering; next, concluding that the two vehicles do not understand, hence [the Buddha] taught according to their inclinations; third, reiterating the bodhisattva to conclude.