大般涅槃經疏 15.15

15.15

從「知世諦者是名中智」去，是第三結四無量為二無量，又二：先明二諦、次明二諦慧。初文即是二諦。文中直知世諦是中智，分別世諦無量無邊是上智。直知三法印即是中智，知第一義無量無邊不可稱計是上智。世間人但言第一義諦真諦涅槃，只得是一不得有二，況復無邊；今文明第一義諦不可稱計，豈唯一種。此中言無常涅槃等真諦者，與數論不同。數云：四諦十六諦並皆見真得聖，悉是第一義。論家唯無我一種通於真俗，餘皆世諦，而皆相從言是真者，以無常盡於常等倒，苦集隨真相從名真依。《淨名》云「不生不滅是無常義」，盡是實相，皆第一義，又是三法印。「爾時文殊」下，第二明二諦慧者，先出舊解六種二諦：一有空、二虛實、三世流布亦言隨事、四相續、五相待、六因生。空有指《大品》，虛實流布指《阿毘曇》，相續相待因生指《成論》。又解意同名異，一凡聖、二虛實、三空有、四假實、五事理、六親疏。舊釋名云：俗是浮虛，真名真實，世是代謝，第一義是無過。俗待不俗，不俗名真；真待不真，不真名俗。虛實相待，真俗名生。他問：真是真實，可稱為諦。俗是浮虛，何以稱諦？彼解云：審實浮虛。若爾，諦義兩釋。俗以浮虛釋諦，真以審實釋諦。興皇云：諦未曾二，約緣故二。俗於凡為實，真於聖為實，俱用實以釋諦，不用浮虛。今問：真於聖為實，聖有照真實智，可得稱為諦。凡於俗為實，凡無照俗智，安得稱為諦？若凡無照俗智，而於俗為實，得稱俗諦者，凡無照真智，於真亦為實，亦應稱真諦。凡於真無智不稱真諦者，凡於俗無智，安得稱俗諦？又聖於真為實而稱為諦者，聖何以於俗不實不得稱為諦，是則聖人無權智。今言諦者，還是審實。《淨名》云「四諦是菩提，不虛誑故。」即是審實。有隨情審實、隨智審實。隨情智審實故，隨凡隨聖、約真約俗俱得稱諦。喻如一色，凡夫謂有，賢聖為無。亦如一日，醉醒不同，有轉不轉。一諦二諦其義亦爾。舊解二諦一體不異，龍光云：既稱二諦，寧當一體？二諦有二，體亦俱通，緣假法為世體，無相理為真體。雖有二體，而實相即俗，雖名相即無名相，真無名相不妨名相。又言：二諦一體，空為理本故，以真為體，俗是其用。或言從俗取真，俗為其體，真是其用。開善云：二諦共以中道為體。義皆不然。若二諦二體，則世無第一、第一無世，但是不相即，不得有相即。若其一體，但是一諦則無二諦。若其二諦以中為體，取相障真、無知障俗，誰復障中？二諦之智不能見中，焉得為體？若二諦二體，二體各異，不論相即；若二諦一體，只是一諦，與誰相即？《仁王般若》云「二諦不相即，猶如牛二角」，《大品》「即色是空」，《淨名》「五受陰洞達空無所起是苦義」，及此經中皆云二諦相即（云云）。舊云：合四諦為二諦。或言苦集世間是世諦，道滅出世是真諦。或言三諦是世諦，唯滅是真諦。或言四諦皆是世諦，明因果故；無相因果乃是真諦。或言只四諦是世諦，即世諦是真諦。文云「解苦無苦而有真諦，餘三亦爾。」今明非但四諦開合不同，只就二諦開合非一，在後當說。就文兩番問答。初問為三：一直審、次「世尊」下雙定定相有不、三「如其有者」下雙難。難中意者，若言有者，即是一諦，真俗相即故，真中有俗、俗中有真，二諦不異，故言是一。如其無者，即是虛妄。實而言之，定有定無、定一定異，皆是虛妄。皆出經者，互現其文。若定有無，便成斷常虛妄之說。「善男子」下，如來直答二諦相即，不斷不常、定非虛妄。「世尊」下，第二番問答。初問意者，還成一諦，故云則無二諦。如長在短中則失長，真在俗中則失真，只成一諦。佛答有二：初略明大意，理實中道唯有一體，善巧方便為緣說二。「若隨言說」下，第二廣說。凡有八種：一世出世、二名無名、三實不實、四定不定、五法不法、六燒不燒、七苦不苦、八和合。他亦作六種二諦，若言空有虛實等諦，皆言有虛有實，兩理鏗然，故非經意。今文云「隨順眾生說有二諦，如隨醉人說則有轉日。」當用此意以釋經文。一師云：七種一統，隨緣說異。一師言：七種各異。今明智者大師有七二諦，名雖不同，其義可會：一生滅、二無生、三襌俗複真、四襌俗襌中、五複俗襌中、六複俗複中、七圓二諦。若依《法華玄》文，名相稍別，義意必同，讀者應知。就一種中復各三種，謂隨情、隨智、隨情智。今欲以彼七種二諦來釋此文，佛旨難知，且出一師之見。八種不同，即為八文。初約世出世兩人判二諦者，通冠下七，一一二諦各有此意。世情多想束為世諦，聖智多知束為真諦，此即隨情智判二諦。次善男子五陰和合者，約名無名判。攬陰名生即世諦，即陰離陰如性知之性即真諦，此約有作四諦立之。三「復次善男子或有法有名有實」者，他云：世諦有名，名名於體，物應於名。真諦但有名而無實。今文反此，世但虛名而無真實，不生不滅與法相稱即是真諦。不能即色而空故有名無實，能即色是空故有實有名，此依無生四諦立之。四「善男子眾生壽命如旋火輪」，此襌俗複真以論二諦。假名幻化熱焰火輪，但有其名而無其實，稱世流布即是世諦。真與中合，共為真諦。若襌以真為第一義者，不得言苦集滅道是第一義。俱指四諦即真中，合此明無量四聖諦中若真若中同為第一義諦，前文云「第一義無量無邊不可稱說。」五「善男子世法五種」去，此約襌俗襌中以明二諦。上以熱焰火輪五譬以譬人我而為世諦，今以五法而為世諦。五法如焰輪，焰輪譬法，法譬互舉同是襌俗。心無顛倒如實知之，即襌指中道以為如實。此明有作無生等苦集為俗，指下一實諦為真。六「善男子若燒若割」去，此約複俗襌中以明二諦。若燒若死，此明體法始終。若割若壞，此明析法始終。即以兩始為有、兩終皆無，此之有無合之為俗即是複俗。襌指中道非有非無，故無燒割即第一義。明上有作無生之真俗同名為俗，指下一實諦而以為真。七「善男子八苦有無」去，此約複俗複中以明二諦。複俗如向。言複中者非襌指理，即事而理、法界圓備名為複中。此合上來有作無生真之與俗皆名為俗，指下一實不可思議而為真諦。文雖不顯，義推自成。然此一番猶是複俗複中二諦。八「復次善男子」下，先譬、次合，明圓二諦真俗相即皆不可思議，譬如父母和合生子。一人多能以譬圓俗。十二緣和合三道，即是三德、即第一義，以顯圓真。是名不可思議二諦。一切二諦悉入此中，方便隨俗說諸二諦無量無邊，止論七種何足驚怪。能如是知，名慧聖行。古來皆迷此二諦文，今用天台大師七種二諦義來釋八番，義則相應，真順聖慧。

From "knowing worldly truth is called middling wisdom" onward is the third [section], concluding the four immeasurables as two immeasurables, which again has two parts: first explaining the two truths, and next explaining wisdom regarding the two truths. The initial text is precisely the two truths. In the text, simply knowing worldly truth is middling wisdom; distinguishing worldly truth as immeasurable and boundless is superior wisdom. Simply knowing the three Dharma seals is middling wisdom; knowing the supreme truth (paramārthasatya) as immeasurable, boundless, and incalculable is superior wisdom. Worldly people merely say that paramārthasatya, ultimate truth, and nirvāṇa can only be one and cannot be two, much less boundless; the present text explains that paramārthasatya is incalculable—how could it be of only a single kind? The ultimate truth of impermanence, nirvāṇa, and so forth spoken of here is not the same as in the Abhidharmakośa / Sarvāstivāda. The Sarvāstivādins say: The four truths and sixteen aspects all perceive the ultimate and attain holiness, and all are paramārtha. The treatise masters [of the Satyasiddhi] say that only the single item of non-self pervades both the ultimate and the conventional, while the rest are all worldly truth; that they are all collectively spoken of as ultimate is because impermanence exhausts errors such as permanence, and suffering and arising follow the ultimate, being named ultimate by affiliation. The Vimalakīrti says, "Unarisen and unceasing is the meaning of impermanence"; this completely constitutes dharmatā, all of which is paramārtha, and is also the three Dharma seals. From "At that time Mañjuśrī" below, the second part explains wisdom regarding the two truths: first presenting the six kinds of two truths from old interpretations: 1) existence and emptiness, 2) false and real, 3) worldly circulation (also called adapting to matters), 4) continuum, 5) relativity, and 6) causal arising. Emptiness and existence refer to the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā; false, real, and worldly circulation refer to the Abhidharma; continuum, relativity, and causal arising refer to the Satyasiddhi-śāstra. Another interpretation has identical meaning but different names: 1) ordinary and noble, 2) false and real, 3) emptiness and existence, 4) provisional and real, 5) phenomena and principle, 6) close and distant. Old explanations of the names say: Conventional is floating and false; ultimate is called truly real; the worldly is turnover and change; paramārtha is faultless. The conventional is relative to the unconventional, and the unconventional is called ultimate; the ultimate is relative to the non-ultimate, and the non-ultimate is called conventional. The false and the real being mutually relative, the names 'ultimate' and 'conventional' arise. Others ask: The ultimate is truly real and may be called 'truth' (satya). The conventional is floating and false; why is it called 'truth'? They explain: It is judging truly that it is floating and false. If so, the meaning of 'truth' has two explanations: the conventional explains 'truth' through floating and false, while the ultimate explains 'truth' through judging truly. Xinghuang [Falang] says: Truth has never been two; it is two only with respect to conditions. The conventional is real to ordinary people, and the ultimate is real to the noble; both employ 'real' to explain 'truth', without using 'floating and false'. Now we ask: The ultimate is real to the noble, and the noble have the wisdom that illumines the truly real, so it may be called 'truth'. The conventional is real to ordinary people, but ordinary people lack the wisdom that illumines the conventional—how can it be called 'truth'? If ordinary people lack the wisdom that illumines the conventional yet it is real to the conventional and may be called conventional truth, then ordinary people lack the wisdom that illumines the ultimate yet it would also be real to the ultimate, and ought also to be called ultimate truth. If ordinary people lacking wisdom regarding the ultimate does not make it ultimate truth, then ordinary people lacking wisdom regarding the conventional—how can it be called conventional truth? Furthermore, if for the noble it is real to the ultimate and called 'truth', why is it not real for the noble regarding the conventional, such that it cannot be called 'truth'? If so, then the noble would lack provisional wisdom. What we now call 'truth' is still 'judging truly'. The Vimalakīrti says: "The four truths are bodhi, because they are not false or deceptive." This is precisely 'judging truly'. There is judging truly in accord with sentiment, and judging truly in accord with wisdom. Because it is judged truly in accord with sentiment and wisdom, in accord with the ordinary and the noble, and with respect to the ultimate and the conventional, both may be called 'truth'. By analogy, as with a single form, ordinary beings say it exists, while the worthy and noble say it is non-existent. It is also like a single sun: to the drunk and the sober it is different, having movement or non-movement. The meaning of one truth and two truths is also like this. In old explanations, the two truths share a single essence and are not different. Longguang [Sengzhuo] says: Since they are called two truths, how could they have a single essence? The two truths are two, and their essences are also both comprehensive: conditioned provisional dharmas are the worldly essence, and the signless principle is the ultimate essence. Although there are two essences, dharmatā is identical with the conventional; although nominal characteristics are identical with being devoid of nominal characteristics, the ultimate being devoid of nominal characteristics does not obstruct nominal characteristics. It is also said: The two truths share a single essence; because emptiness is the root of principle, the ultimate is the essence and the conventional is its function. Or it is said: Taking the ultimate from the conventional, the conventional is its essence and the ultimate is its function. Kaishan says: The two truths together take the middle way as their essence. None of these views is correct. If the two truths have two essences, then the worldly would have no paramārtha and paramārtha would have no worldly; there would only be non-identity and there could not be mutual identity. If they were a single essence, there would only be one truth and no two truths. If the two truths take the middle as their essence, grasping marks obstructs the ultimate, and ignorance obstructs the conventional—what then would obstruct the middle? If the wisdom of the two truths cannot perceive the middle, how could it be the essence? If the two truths have two essences, the two essences are each different, and mutual identity cannot be discussed; if the two truths are a single essence, it is merely one truth—with what would it be mutually identical? The Humane Kings Prajñāpāramitā says, "The two truths are not mutually identical, just like the two horns of an ox"; the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā says, "Form is itself emptiness"; the Vimalakīrti says, "Completely penetrating the five appropriated aggregates to be empty and unarisen is the meaning of suffering"; and in this sūtra, they all say the two truths are mutually identical (and so on). Formerly it was said: Combine the four truths into two truths. Some say suffering and arising are worldly and constitute worldly truth, while path and cessation are supramundane and constitute ultimate truth. Some say three truths are worldly truth, and only cessation is ultimate truth. Some say all four truths are worldly truth, because they explain cause and effect; only the signless cause and effect is ultimate truth. Some say the four truths are simply worldly truth, and worldly truth is itself ultimate truth. The text says: "Understanding suffering as devoid of suffering is having ultimate truth; the remaining three are likewise." Now we explain: not only are the expansions and mergers of the four truths not uniform, but regarding the two truths alone, the expansions and mergers are not single, as will be explained later. In the text there are two rounds of question and answer. The first question has three parts: first, a direct inquiry; next, from "World-Honoured One" downward, jointly examining whether determinate marks exist or not; third, from "If they exist" downward, a joint objection. The point of the objection is: if you say they exist, that is a single truth; because the ultimate and the conventional are mutually identical, within the ultimate there is the conventional, and within the conventional there is the ultimate; the two truths are not different, hence they are said to be one. If you say they do not exist, that is false and deceptive. Truthfully speaking, determinate existence and determinate non-existence, determinate oneness and determinate difference, are all false and deceptive. Both being drawn from the sūtra, the text mutually reveals them. If they determinately exist or not, this becomes the false assertion of annihilationism or eternalism. From "Good son" downward, the Tathāgata directly answers that the two truths are mutually identical, neither annihilated nor eternal, and determinately not false or deceptive. From "World-Honoured One" downward is the second round of question and answer. The intent of the initial question is: it still turns into a single truth, hence it says there would be no two truths. Just as long being within short loses its length, the ultimate being within the conventional loses the ultimate, turning into only a single truth. The Buddha's answer has two parts: first, briefly explaining the broad intent, that in reality the middle way has only a single essence, but through skillful means he speaks of two for the sake of conditions. From "If according to spoken words" downward is the second part, explaining at length. There are eight kinds in all: 1) worldly and supramundane, 2) having name and having no name, 3) real and unreal, 4) determinate and indeterminate, 5) dharma and non-dharma, 6) burnt and unburnt, 7) suffering and non-suffering, 8) combination. Others also make six kinds of two truths; if one speaks of truths of emptiness and existence, false and real, and so on, they all assert there is false and there is real, two principles distinctly clashing, so this is not the sūtra's intent. The present text says, "In accordance with sentient beings, I speak of having two truths, just as in accordance with a drunk person one says there is a moving sun." One should use this intent to explain the sūtra text. One master says: The seven kinds are unified into one, spoken of differently according to conditions. One master says: The seven kinds are each different. Now we explain that Great Master Zhizhe has seven [kinds of] two truths; although the names differ, their meanings can be reconciled: 1) arising and ceasing, 2) non-arising, 3) single conventional and double ultimate, 4) single conventional and single middle, 5) double conventional and single middle, 6) double conventional and double middle, and 7) the perfect two truths. If one relies on the text of the Fahua xuanyi, the terminology differs slightly, but the meaning is certainly identical, which the reader should know. Within each single kind there are further three varieties, namely: according to sentiment, according to wisdom, and according to sentiment and wisdom. Now, wishing to use those seven kinds of two truths to explain this text—since the Buddha's purport is difficult to know—we will provisionally present the view of one master. The eight different kinds constitute eight sections of text. First, distinguishing the two truths with respect to the two persons, worldly and supramundane, generally heads the seven below; each and every two truths possesses this meaning. Worldly sentiment has many concepts, collected into worldly truth; noble wisdom has much knowledge, collected into ultimate truth—this is distinguishing the two truths according to sentiment and wisdom. Next, "Good son, the five aggregates in combination" is distinguished with respect to having name and having no name. Grasping the aggregates and naming them 'living' is worldly truth; identical to the aggregates yet detached from the aggregates, the nature known like the nature [of things], is ultimate truth; this is established with respect to the four truths with production. Third, "Furthermore, good son, there are dharmas that have names and have reality": others say worldly truth has names, the name naming the entity, and things corresponding to the name; ultimate truth has only names but no reality. The present text is the opposite of this: the worldly has only empty names without true reality; unarisen and unceasing, matching phenomena, is ultimate truth. Being unable to realize that form is itself empty, it has name without reality; being able to realize that form is itself empty, it has reality and has name; this is established relying on the four truths of non-arising. Fourth, "Good son, the lifespan of sentient beings is like a whirling firebrand": this discusses the two truths through the single conventional and double ultimate. Provisional names, illusions, mirages, and whirling firebrands have only names but no reality; matching worldly circulation, they are worldly truth. The ultimate and the middle combine together to form ultimate truth. If one takes the ultimate alone as paramārtha, one cannot say that suffering, arising, cessation, and path are paramārtha. Both pointing to the four truths as being the ultimate and the middle combined, this explains that among the immeasurable four noble truths, whether ultimate or middle, they are equally paramārthasatya; the previous text says, "Paramārtha is immeasurable, boundless, and incalculable." Fifth, from "Good son, worldly dharmas are of five kinds" onward explains the two truths with respect to the single conventional and single middle. Above, the five similes of the mirage, whirling firebrand, and so on were used to illustrate the self of persons as worldly truth; now the five dharmas are taken as worldly truth. The five dharmas are like the firebrand, and the firebrand illustrates dharmas; dharma and simile mutually mentioned are equally the single conventional. The mind without inversion knowing them as they truly are simply points to the middle way as being truly real. This explains the suffering and arising of production, non-arising, and so forth as conventional, and points to the one real truth below as ultimate. Sixth, from "Good son, whether burning or cutting" onward explains the two truths with respect to the double conventional and single middle. Burning and dying explain the beginning and end of the substantive analysis of dharmas. Cutting and destroying explain the beginning and end of the reductive analysis of dharmas. Taking the two beginnings as existence and the two endings as non-existence, combining this existence and non-existence into the conventional is double conventional. Simply pointing to the middle way as neither existent nor non-existent, hence devoid of burning and cutting, is paramārtha. This explains that the ultimate and conventional of production and non-arising above are together called conventional, pointing to the one real truth below as ultimate. Seventh, from "Good son, whether the eight sufferings exist or not" onward explains the two truths with respect to the double conventional and double middle. Double conventional is as before. As for double middle, it does not simply point to principle: phenomena being identical to principle, and the dharmadhātu being fully complete, is called double middle. This combines the ultimate and conventional of production and non-arising from above, all being called conventional, and points to the one reality, inconceivable, as ultimate truth. Although the text is not explicit, the meaning deduced naturally establishes it. However, this round is still the two truths of double conventional and double middle. Eighth, from "Furthermore, good son" downward, first gives a simile and next applies it, explaining that in the perfect two truths, the ultimate and the conventional are mutually identical and both are inconceivable, just as father and mother combine to give birth to a child. One person having many abilities illustrates the perfect conventional. The twelve links of dependent origination combining into the three paths are themselves the three virtues and are themselves paramārtha, revealing the perfect ultimate. These are called the inconceivable two truths. All two truths completely enter into this; through expedients in accordance with the worldly, the various two truths spoken of are immeasurable and boundless—why be astonished that only seven kinds are discussed? Being able to know in this way is called the noble practice of wisdom. Since ancient times people have been confused about this text on the two truths; now, using Great Master Tiantai's doctrine of the seven kinds of two truths to explain the eight rounds, the meaning accords, truly in harmony with noble wisdom.