大般涅槃經疏 17.19

17.19

起卷是第二明四心果。又為二：初明三心極愛地果、次明捨心空平等地果。舊二解。一云：三心未成，但共一果；一心已成，獨得一果。二云：三心同是有行，故共一果；一心空行，獨得一果。義皆不然。三心未成，何以得果？又四心同緣眾生、同緣於法，同是有行；同緣無緣，同是無行。有無既同，三一應等。今亦一往別圓兩判。別者即理而事，慈悲喜三與愛相扶，故制一果；捨心扶空，故獨一果。若圓判者，上明一慈即悲喜捨，圓慈即遍一切諸法。無法不收，果豈隔別？特是文略，亦是互現（云云）。一子地，文為二：初明地果、後論義。初先倡章門、次解釋。初文，舊云是性地；二云八地已上；三云是初地。今明不然。先明聖行，即是自行，已云初地；此明梵行，即是化他。先之自行已入初地，化他何容但是性地？何容超至八地已上？斯皆若過若不及。正是初地證化他果。「云何此地」去，是解釋。先標兩章，謂極愛一子。然極愛故一子、一子故極愛，不應有異。而今分別，極愛就心、一子就境。子非我內，故言外境。次釋中凡舉五譬：初譬釋極愛，四譬釋一子，結判分明。初如文。「譬如父母」下，第二譬菩薩見諸凡夫起惡，因是生悲。「如人小時」下，第三別譬發心學人起於取著。土塊等譬五陰，下文合云身口意業。左譬實智，右譬權智。又左譬定觀，右譬智拔。捉頭救其身非，挑出救其口過。「譬如父母」下，第四別譬眾生感於苦果，故言同生地獄。「譬如父母」下，第五通譬救因果。「迦葉白佛」去，第二論義，兩番問答，初番論義、次番領解。初中先問、次答。初問為二：一直申不解；次「若諸菩薩」下，正是論義。或云五難，或云三難。一難殺婆羅門、二難罵提婆達多、三舉須菩提為況。初殺婆羅門，又三：一何故殺、二應護念、三何不墮獄。若使等視者，是第二罵調達。三舉須菩提小乘況大。小乘尚乃護生若此，況佛果滿猶有殺罵。若慈，何故令人增長煩惱？「汝今不應」下，第二佛答。答前三問，但不次第。初答況難、次答殺難、三答罵難。問：何故不次？答：只是逐近，何必須次，是例甚多。然況難最劇。何者？說師無慈不及弟子，是故前遣，仍訶責之言其不應。先總訶、次舉七事別別訶之。初言蚊嘴者，鳥口尖者曰嘴，蚊口似此，以類名之。中五可見（云云）。最後文中更有多事。於中云寧與毒蛇等，總寄迦葉誡制愚蒙。

The beginning of the fascicle is the second [section], explaining the fruits of the four minds. It is also divided into two: first, explaining the fruit of the stage of supreme affection of the three minds; next, explaining the fruit of the stage of emptiness and equality of the mind of equanimity. Formerly there were two explanations: The first said that before the three minds are perfected, they only share a single fruit; when the one mind is already perfected, it independently attains a single fruit. The second said that the three minds are alike in being practices directed toward existence, hence they share a single fruit; the one mind is a practice of emptiness, hence it independently attains a single fruit. Neither meaning is correct. If the three minds were not yet perfected, how could they attain a fruit? Furthermore, the four minds alike take sentient beings as their object and alike take phenomena as their object, and are alike practices directed toward existence; they alike take the unconditioned as their object, and are alike practices of non-existence. Since existence and non-existence are identical [for both], the three and the one should be equal. Now, tentatively, we also judge them by both the distinct and the round [teachings]. According to the distinct: approaching the factual from principle, friendliness, compassion, and sympathetic joy, these three, are in harmony with affection, and so a single fruit is established for them; the mind of equanimity is in harmony with emptiness, and so it alone has a single fruit. If judged according to the round: as explained above, one friendliness is itself compassion, sympathetic joy, and equanimity; round friendliness pervades all phenomena. There is no phenomenon it does not gather in; how could its fruits be segregated? It is merely that the text is abridged, and also that they are mutually manifested (and so forth). Regarding the stage of one's only child, the text has two parts: first, explaining the fruit of the stage; later, debating the meaning. In the first part, the headings are first declared, and then explained. Regarding the first passage, formerly it was said to be the nature stage; second, it was said to be from the eighth stage and above; third, it was said to be the first stage. Now we clarify that this is not so. The previous explanation of holy conduct was one's own practice, and it was already said to be the first stage; this explanation of pure conduct is the transformation of others. Since one's own previous practice had already entered the first stage, how could transforming others merely be the nature stage? How could it skip over to the eighth stage and above? These both either overshoot or fall short. It is precisely the fruit of transforming others verified at the first stage. From "What is this stage..." onward is the explanation. First, two headings are indicated, namely supreme affection and one's only child. Yet because of supreme affection there is an only child, and because of an only child there is supreme affection; there should be no difference. But here they are distinguished: supreme affection concerns the mind; an only child concerns the object. A child is not internal to myself, hence it is called an external object. Next, in the explanation, five analogies in all are adduced: the first analogy explains supreme affection; four analogies explain an only child; the concluding determinations are distinct. The first is as in the text. From "Like a father and mother" onward is the second analogy: the bodhisattva sees ordinary persons giving rise to evil, and because of this gives rise to compassion. From "Like a person in childhood" onward is the third analogy, separately illustrating a practitioner who has generated the mind [for bodhi] giving rise to grasping. Clods of earth and the like illustrate the five skandhas; the text below draws the parallel to the karma of body, speech, and mind. The left illustrates real wisdom; the right illustrates provisional wisdom. Again, the left illustrates meditative contemplation; the right illustrates pulling out with wisdom. Grasping the head rescues him from physical wrongdoing; picking it out rescues him from verbal faults. From "Like a father and mother" onward is the fourth analogy, separately illustrating sentient beings feeling the painful fruit, hence it says "born together in hell." From "Like a father and mother" onward is the fifth analogy, illustrating generally the rescuing of causes and fruits. From "Kāśyapa said to the Buddha" onward is second, debating the meaning, with two rounds of questions and answers: the first round debates the meaning, and the next round acknowledges understanding. In the first round, first comes the question, then the answer. The initial question has two parts: first, directly expressing lack of understanding; next, from "If bodhisattvas" onward, the debate of the meaning proper. Some say there are five objections, some say three objections: the first objects to killing the brāhmaṇa; the second objects to scolding Devadatta; the third adduces Subhūti as a comparison. The first, killing the brāhmaṇa, also has three parts: first, why kill him; second, he should be protected with care; third, why did he not fall into hell? "If one views them equally" is the second, scolding Devadatta. The third adduces Subhūti of the Hīnayāna to compare with the Mahāyāna: the Hīnayāna still protects sentient beings to such an extent, how much more should the Buddha, whose fruit is complete, not still engage in killing and scolding? If there is friendliness, why cause people to increase afflictions? From "You should not now" onward is second, the Buddha's answer. He answers the previous three questions, but not in sequence: first, he answers the comparison objection; next, he answers the killing objection; third, he answers the scolding objection. Question: Why are they not in sequence? Answer: He simply follows what is closest at hand; why must it be in sequence? Examples of this are very numerous. Moreover, the comparison objection is the most severe. Why? It says the teacher lacks friendliness and is inferior to his disciple; therefore it is refuted first, and he still rebukes him, saying he should not [speak so]. First, he rebukes him generally; next, he adduces seven matters to rebuke him individually. First, regarding the mention of "mosquito's mouth" (proboscis): a bird's beak that is sharp is called a beak (*zuǐ*); a mosquito's mouth resembles this, so it is named by similarity. The middle five can be understood (and so forth). In the final passage there are still more matters. Therein, saying "Better to be with a poisonous snake," etc., generally uses Kāśyapa as an occasion to admonish and restrain the ignorant.