大般涅槃經疏 19.19

19.19

「世尊自我招殃」下，第二廣說，又三：一世王起執、次佛廣破、三王奉教行。初起執有四：一執重罪、二執父王、三執無辜、四執定墮堅執，此四妨於入道，故須破之。「佛告」下，第二佛破，又三：初別破、次總破、三結勸。初別破，即破上四執，但不次第。初破第四定墮，又三：初正破者，殺無定相，如《普賢觀》云「一切諸罪業，皆從妄想生。端坐念實相，眾罪如霜露，慧日能消除。」若達妄想則罪業釋然，無業故無墮。次世王領。三如來述成。「大王如汝所言」下，第二破第二父王之執。雖雙牒父王無辜，而先破父王，先明因緣假有故無父、次明念念生滅故無父。初中以於諸法推求撿覓父不可得。若就世諦天性尊重，父子炳然；若就真空諸法平等，無有差別。既無父子之殊，寧有能殺所殺之色？色有十種者，即五根五塵，乃至應有四大，文略。亦是相攝五塵成四大，四大成五根。四大成五根即是四大攝十色，五塵成四大即十色攝四大，故不廣說。「雖可見縛」下，第二明念念生滅故無罪。「大王一切眾生」下，第三破其第一定重之執，混高下之心、泯分別之見。「大王頻婆」下，第四破其第三無辜之執，又二：先引昔事、次牒執破之。「大王眾生狂惑」下，第二總破，又三：初舉四狂等，袪其定執實有。次「如王宮中」下，破其無慈不等。三「譬如涅槃」下，破其滯邊失理。初四狂中二：先法、次譬。法中，貪狂猛盛倒亂尤甚，藥狂迷悶衝突水火，呪狂被詛縱橫非法，業狂業持令其失心。王無三狂，但有貪狂，貪狂所作，貪之過耳。次譬中二：先醉、次幻。初醉又二：先譬、次合。初舉醉人譬。若本時相瞋，寄酒後罵者，不名為醉。若從此義，作罪得罪；若其醉後全無所知都無避就，如此作罪，是則無罪。「王今」下合，王亦如是，猶如醉人。次「大王譬如幻師」下，次舉幻化等九譬破其實有，皆先譬、次合。初譬正舉幻化以破實有。「如王宮中」下，第二破其無慈不等。重死者，何人重死而輕生？今不言故重於死。莫問人獸，皆以死苦為重，故言保命重死人獸無異。若就結戒者，人犯重、獸犯輕，此就往業善惡別論，不可相類。若就施食，此就施心同緣實相故等，此復別論。「大王譬如涅槃」下，第三破其滯邊失理。又二：先舉涅槃為譬、次將殺來合譬。凡三番合，如文。三番破竟，結勸其觀（云云）。「大王色是無常」下，第三結勸觀行，又二：先勸作無常等觀、次「若殺無常」下勸作常樂等觀。

From "World-Honoured One, I brought calamity upon myself" onward is the second [section], the detailed explanation, which again has three parts: first, King [Ajātaśatru] conceives attachments; second, the Buddha refutes them in detail; third, the king receives the teaching and practices it. First, conceiving attachments has four [aspects]: first, attaching to [the idea of] grave sin; second, attaching to [the fact that the victim was] his royal father; third, attaching to [the victim being] innocent; fourth, rigidly attaching to [the view that he is] destined to fall [into hell]. Because these four obstruct entering the Way, they must be refuted. From "The Buddha told" onward is the second [part], the Buddha's refutation, which again has three parts: first, specific refutations; second, a general refutation; third, concluding exhortations. The first, the specific refutations, refutes the four attachments above, though not in order. First, refuting the fourth, being destined to fall, has three parts: first, the actual refutation—killing has no fixed mark, as the Samantabhadra-dhyāna-sūtra says: "All sinful karmas are born of delusive thoughts. Sitting upright, contemplate dharmatā; the multitude of sins is like frost and dew, which the sun of wisdom can eliminate." If one realizes delusive thought, sinful karma dissolves away; because there is no karma, there is no falling [into hell]. Next, King [Ajātaśatru] understands. Third, the Tathāgata confirms it. From "Great King, as you say" onward is the second, refuting the second attachment, that of his royal father. Although it mentions both the royal father and innocence, it first refutes the royal father: first explaining that because of conditioned, provisional existence, there is no father; next, explaining that because of moment-to-moment arising and ceasing, there is no father. In the first part, searching and investigating among all dharmas, a father cannot be found. If considered in terms of worldly truth and innate nature, father and son are clear; if considered in terms of true emptiness and the equality of all dharmas, there is no distinction. Since there is no distinction between father and son, how could there be the matter of one who can kill and one who is killed? That "matter has ten kinds" refers to the five sense faculties and five sense objects, and should also include the four great elements, which the text omits. Alternatively, they mutually subsume: the five sense objects form the four great elements, and the four great elements form the five sense faculties. The four great elements forming the five sense faculties means the four great elements subsume the ten matters; the five sense objects forming the four great elements means the ten matters subsume the four great elements; hence, it is not explained in detail. From "Although visible binding" onward is the second part, explaining that because of moment-to-moment arising and ceasing, there is no sin. From "Great King, all sentient beings" onward is the third, refuting his first attachment to [the sin being] definitively grave, blending the mind of high and low, and obliterating discriminatory views. From "Great King, Bimbisāra" onward is the fourth, refuting his third attachment, that of innocence, which again has two parts: first, citing past events; next, taking up the attachment and refuting it. From "Great King, when sentient beings are mad and confused" onward is the second [overall part], the general refutation, which again has three parts: first, citing the four types of madness and so forth to dispel his rigid attachment to real existence; next, from "Just as in the king's palace" onward, refuting his lack of compassion and inequality; third, from "Just as nirvāṇa" onward, refuting his clinging to extremes and losing the principle. Within the first, the four types of madness, there are two parts: first, the dharma; next, the parables. In the dharma: the madness of greed is vehement and intensely disordered; the madness of medicine causes stupor, rushing into water and fire; the madness of spells brings curses, behaving lawlessly in every way; the madness of karma is held by karma, causing loss of mind. The king did not have the [latter] three madnesses, but only the madness of greed; what was committed out of the madness of greed was merely the fault of greed. Next, within the parables, there are two: first, drunkenness; next, illusion. The first, drunkenness, again has two parts: first, the parable; next, the application. First, citing the parable of the drunken person: if one previously harboured anger and used wine as an excuse to revile someone afterward, that is not called drunkenness. According to this meaning, committing a sin incurs guilt. If, after becoming drunk, one is entirely unconscious and has no avoidance or approach at all, committing a sin in such a state incurs no guilt. From "Now, O King" onward is the application: the king is also like this, just like a drunken person. Next, from "Great King, just like an illusionist" onward, it cites nine parables such as an illusion to refute real existence, each first giving the parable and then the application. The first parable directly cites an illusion to refute real existence. From "Just as in the king's palace" onward is the second [part], refuting his lack of compassion and inequality. Valuing death: who values death and disdains life? Here, it is not spoken of in this way, hence [the text says] "valuing death." Whether human or beast, all take the suffering of death as grave; therefore it says that in preserving life and dreading death, humans and beasts are no different. If considered in terms of formulating the precepts, violating [the precept against killing] a human is grave, while violating it against a beast is light; this is discussed separately in terms of past karma, good and bad, and cannot be equated. If considered in terms of giving food, this is equal because the mind of giving equally takes dharmatā as its object; this is again discussed separately. From "Great King, just as nirvāṇa" onward is the third, refuting his clinging to extremes and losing the principle. This again has two parts: first, citing nirvāṇa as a parable; next, taking killing to apply the parable. There are altogether three rounds of applications, as in the text. Having finished the three rounds of refutations, it concludes by exhorting him to contemplate (and so on). From "Great King, matter is impermanent" onward is the third, concluding with an exhortation to contemplative practice, which again has two parts: first, exhorting him to contemplate impermanence and so forth; next, from "If one kills impermanence" onward, exhorting him to contemplate permanence, bliss, and so forth.