大般涅槃經疏 20.20

20.20

「琉璃光」下，第四結難。於三四中但難不生生等，於不生生等四句中但難生生，欲因生生廣解諸句。就文為三：一難、二解、三領。就難為六隻三雙：初就常無常難、次就自生生他難、三就本有本無難。皆難生生，為常故生、無常故生？為自生、為他生？為本有生、為本無生？初文常無常者，生若是常有漏之法，應無此生。生若無常則有漏，是常生自無常，無常則滅，不能自固，豈生有漏？有漏既其不為生之所生，故應是常。次「世尊若生自生」下，第二結自生生他難。生若自生生無自性者，言生既自是所生，非復能生，無能生性，故言生無自性。二云生本假緣，未有自性，何能自生？若無自性，何能生他？能生他者，等是生他，何故但能生於有漏之他，而不能生無漏之他？有漏無漏，望自俱他。「世尊若未生時」，第三難。若本有者未生之時已是於生，何故於今方名為生？於今乃是緣合之時。若本無生而可生者，虛空是無，那不復云虛空生耶？「佛言」下，第二解釋，為三：先非六問、次釋六非、三答六問。合有六非一是，為七章門。初非六問者，若定如汝問，則皆不可說。初言不生生不可說，即非初難生定是常。生生不可說，非第二難生定無常。生不生不可說，非其第三自生則失自性故是生不生。不生不生不可說，非其第四生他之難。前云若能生他何不生無漏，故言不生，不生不可說。生亦不可說，非其第五本有之難。不生不可說，非其第六本無之難。後一結有因緣亦可得說，即是顯四悉檀因緣而可得說。「云何不生生不可說」下，第二釋上六非章門。釋第一云：自云是生；復云不生，不生即常。兩事相乖，故不可說。釋第二章，生若無常則生復生，生為生所生，舉體皆生；復為滅所滅，舉體皆滅。生生故生，即舉體皆生；生生故不生，即舉體皆滅，故不可說。釋第三章門，生不自生，本取生死。釋第四章門，涅槃亦有生義，不可定言涅槃不生。前難云：等是生他，何不生於無漏？無漏只是涅槃，涅槃亦有生義，如是修道得故，故復是生。是生不為滅之所滅，此生即常，故不可說。釋第五章門，本無有生，豈可言未生已是有？釋第六章門，不可定言有於不生，而復有於可得之事所以復生，不同虛空一向無生。第七可說章門，十因緣者，除後兩支，前十為生而作因緣，故可得說。此只消文，《止觀》中釋四句稍廣。私謂：準彼釋意，與今大經文理雅合，深會彼文無生之觀，咸契涅槃無生之文。莫入空定，大眾鈍故。有二解：一云眾實是鈍，不解空定，故言莫入。二云若作空定之說，眾解則遲，空義深隱取解為難，以遲難為鈍。然經文偈六句皆不可說，有因緣故亦可得說。佛六番釋不可說竟，又指因緣亦可說竟，此義猶略。今更兩番說有因緣皆可得說，具於一句作四句說，所謂不生生、生生、生不生、不生不生四句皆如此說，是為因緣亦可得說。亦應言有因緣故皆不可說。何以故？一句具四，何可偏作一二三說？為此因緣則不可說。乃至四句悉具四句，那可偏作一二三說？為是因緣皆不可說。又四句即事而理，理皆不可說；又四句即理而事，事皆可說。何以故？下文云「若知如來常不說法，是名多聞。」今例此義，若知四句即事而理即是說。地師名前三種四句約教行證。一往而言非無此義，今欲分別此之六句，似如襌複通別惑解。初兩句明通別惑、次兩句明通別解。不生生是別惑襌、生生是通惑複、不生生是通解襌、不生不生是別解複。次生句，結前襌生複生同是惑生。次不生句，結前襌不生複不生同是解故。如此襌複惑解皆不可說，因緣可說，具如前辨（云云）。「善男子有為之法」下，第三答，即正答六問。答前六句為兩：初答前兩問、次答後四問。答前又二：先別就四相、次合就四相。初別就四相即為四。初言生是常者，當其分部守其自性，故得是常。言無常者，住來住生，生即改變復是無常，住亦如是，為生所生不得是常。異亦如是。而言法無常者，前生中云「住若無常，生亦無常。」今舉法對異，還是前生住無常法。異亦有常無常義，具如生住。壞亦如是，文云本無今有壞亦無常者，本無今有只是生義，已生來生壞，壞不得是常，本有今無復是無常。「善男子以性故」下，合明四相各守性分皆得是常，以二義故不得是常。近論念念遷變，遠望涅槃即復非常，為涅槃所斷是故非常。「善男子有漏之法」下，二答後四難，又為二：一正答第五兼答第六、二正答第四兼答第三。此初，答第五問者，上問：若本有者，云何於今乃名為生？今答云：本有生理，非是已有今方是生。即兼答第六，等是無生，何故不說虛空為生？今答亦云：有可生之理方得有生，虛空無可生之理，何得說空以之為生？「無漏之法」下，答第四難，有法、譬、合。初文者，初難云：若能生他，應生無漏。今答：無有生於無漏之理，故不能生。有漏之法有生性故，故可得生。兼答第三生無自性難。若有自性，生能生之；既無自性；豈可得生？兼答兩意，自然懸去。次譬中舉火眼者，各有其性，火性能生、眼性能見。此中言有生性故生能生者，即是破性義竟。然後說性是則無爽，如前非性執竟，後方云有因緣時則可得說。合如文。

From "Vaiḍūryaprabhā" onward is the fourth part, formulating objections. Among the three sets of four phrases, [he] only raises objections against [the set of] "the non-arisen arising" and so on; and among the four phrases of "the non-arisen arising" and so on, [he] only raises objections against "arising arising", intending to broadly explain the various phrases by way of "arising arising". As for the text, it has three parts: first, the objections; second, the explanations; third, the realization. The objections comprise six single items in three pairs: first, objecting with regard to permanence and impermanence; next, objecting with regard to self-arising and arising other; third, objecting with regard to prior existence and prior non-existence. All of them challenge "arising arising": Does it arise because of permanence, or arise because of impermanence? Does it arise from self, or arise from other? Does it arise having existed originally, or arise having not existed originally? In the first text regarding permanence and impermanence: If arising is permanent, being a contaminated dharma, it should be devoid of this arising. If arising is impermanent, then it is contaminated; being permanent, arising is of itself impermanent, and being impermanent, it perishes and cannot sustain itself—how could it produce the contaminated? Since the contaminated is not something produced by arising, it should therefore be permanent. Next, from "World-Honoured One, if arising produces itself" onward is the second objection, formulating the challenge regarding self-arising and arising other. If arising produces itself, arising lacks svabhāva: that is, since arising is itself what is produced, it is no longer an agent of production and lacks an agentive nature of production; hence it is said that arising lacks svabhāva. Second, it is said that arising fundamentally relies on conditions and does not yet possess svabhāva—how could it produce itself? If it lacks svabhāva, how could it produce another? If it can produce another, since it equally produces another, why can it only produce a contaminated other and cannot produce an uncontaminated other? Both the contaminated and the uncontaminated are "other" relative to oneself. "World-Honoured One, if at the time when it has not yet arisen" is the third objection. If it exists originally, before it arises it already constitutes arising; why is it only now termed arising? Now is merely the time when conditions come together. If what originally has no arising can arise, then space is non-existent—why is it not also said that space arises? From "The Buddha said" onward is the second part, the explanation, having three parts: first, negating the six questions; next, explaining the six negations; third, answering the six questions. Together there are six negations and one affirmation, making seven chapter headings. First, regarding the negation of the six questions: If it were definitively as you ask, then all are inexpressible. The initial statement that "the non-arisen arising is inexpressible" negates the first objection that arising is definitively permanent. "Arising arising is inexpressible" negates the second objection that arising is definitively impermanent. "Arising non-arising is inexpressible" negates the third objection that arising from self loses svabhāva, and is thus arising non-arising. "Non-arising non-arising is inexpressible" negates the fourth objection concerning arising another. Earlier he said that if it can produce another, why does it not produce the uncontaminated? Hence it is termed "non-arising"; non-arising is inexpressible. "Arising is also inexpressible" negates the fifth objection concerning prior existence. "Non-arising is inexpressible" negates the sixth objection concerning prior non-existence. The final one concludes that having causes and conditions it can also be expressed, which reveals that through the causes and conditions of the four siddhāntas it can be expressed. From "Why is the non-arisen arising inexpressible?" onward is the second part, explaining the above headings of the six negations. Explaining the first, it states: You yourself say it is arising, yet you also say it does not arise; not arising is permanence. The two matters contradict each other, hence it is inexpressible. Explaining the second heading: If arising is impermanent, then arising arises again; arising being produced by arising, its entire substance is arising; it is also destroyed by cessation, its entire substance being cessation. Because arising arises, it arises—meaning its entire substance is arising; because arising arises, it does not arise—meaning its entire substance is cessation; hence it is inexpressible. Explaining the third heading: Arising does not arise from itself, fundamentally taking [the perspective of] saṃsāra. Explaining the fourth heading: Nirvāṇa also has the meaning of arising; one cannot definitively say that nirvāṇa does not arise. The earlier objection stated: Since it equally produces another, why does it not produce the uncontaminated? The uncontaminated is simply nirvāṇa; nirvāṇa also has the sense of arising, as it is attained through cultivating the path, and thus is also arising. This arising is not destroyed by cessation; this arising is permanent, hence it is inexpressible. Explaining the fifth heading: Originally there is no arising—how could one say that prior to arising it already existed? Explaining the sixth heading: One cannot definitively say that there is non-arising, and yet there is an attainable matter so that it arises again; it is not like space, which is entirely devoid of arising. Regarding the seventh heading of expressibility: The ten causes and conditions, excluding the last two branches, the preceding ten serve as causes and conditions for arising, and thus it can be expressed. This merely construes the text; the explanation of the four phrases in the *Zhǐguān* is somewhat broader. In my humble view: Following the meaning of that explanation, it elegantly harmonizes with the principles in the text of the present Great Sūtra, deeply agreeing with the contemplation of non-arising in that text, both according with the text of nirvāṇa's non-arising. "Do not enter the samādhi of emptiness, because the great assembly is dull." There are two explanations: One says that the assembly is truly dull and does not understand the samādhi of emptiness, hence it is said "do not enter." The second says that if an explanation of the samādhi of emptiness were given, the assembly's understanding would be slow; the meaning of emptiness being profound and hidden, grasping understanding is difficult; taking "slow and difficult" as "dull". However, the six phrases of the verse in the sūtra text are all inexpressible; because there are causes and conditions, they can also be expressed. The Buddha completed the sixfold explanation of inexpressibility, and also pointed out that through causes and conditions they can be expressed; this meaning is still brief. Now, through two further turns, it is explained that having causes and conditions all can be expressed: fully taking one phrase and explaining it as four phrases, namely, the four phrases of the non-arisen arising, arising arising, arising non-arising, and non-arising non-arising are all explained in this manner; this constitutes that through causes and conditions they can also be expressed. One should also say that because there are causes and conditions, all are inexpressible. Why is this? One phrase contains four—how could one one-sidedly explain it as one, two, or three? Because of this cause and condition, it is inexpressible. Extending to the four phrases, each contains four phrases—how could one one-sidedly explain them as one, two, or three? Because of these causes and conditions, all are inexpressible. Furthermore, the four phrases are phenomena as principle, and principle is entirely inexpressible; again, the four phrases are principle as phenomena, and phenomena can all be expressed. Why is this? As a later text states: "If one knows that the Tathāgata constantly does not preach the Dharma, this is called possessing great hearing." Now drawing an analogy with this principle, if one knows that the four phrases are phenomena as principle, this is preaching. The masters of the Daśabhūmika School previously treated the three sets of four phrases as referring to teaching, practice, and realization. For the time being, one may say this meaning is not absent; but now, if one wishes to distinguish these six phrases, they resemble single and double, general and distinct, delusion and understanding. The first two phrases clarify general and distinct delusion; the next two phrases clarify general and distinct understanding. The non-arisen arising is the single form of distinct delusion; arising arising is the double form of general delusion; the non-arisen arising is the single form of general understanding; non-arising non-arising is the double form of distinct understanding. The next phrase, "arising", concludes the preceding: single arising and double arising are alike the arising of delusion. The next phrase, "non-arising", concludes the preceding: single non-arising and double non-arising are alike because of understanding. Such single and double delusions and understandings are all inexpressible, yet through causes and conditions they can be expressed, fully as distinguished before (and so on). From "Good son, conditioned dharmas" onward is the third part, the answer, which directly answers the six questions. The answers to the preceding six phrases fall into two: first, answering the first two questions; next, answering the latter four questions. The answer to the former also has two: first, treating the four characteristics separately; next, treating the four characteristics together. First, treating the four characteristics separately makes four parts. First, saying that arising is permanent means that when it abides in its division and preserves its svabhāva, it can be permanent. Saying it is impermanent means that abiding comes to abide in arising, and arising then changes and is again impermanent; abiding is also like this, being produced by arising, it cannot be permanent. Alteration is also like this. As for saying that the dharma is impermanent, it was said above in [the section on] arising: "If abiding is impermanent, arising is also impermanent." Now raising the dharma in contrast to alteration, it is still the previously mentioned impermanent dharma of arising and abiding. Alteration also has the meanings of permanence and impermanence, fully as with arising and abiding. Destruction is also like this: the text says that "existing now having not existed originally, destruction is also impermanent"; "existing now having not existed originally" is merely the meaning of arising; having arisen, it comes to produce destruction, and destruction cannot be permanent; having existed originally and being non-existent now is also impermanence. From "Good son, on account of nature" onward, it collectively explains that the four characteristics each preserve their share of nature and can all be permanent, yet due to two meanings they cannot be permanent. Considered in the immediate term, they change moment to moment; viewed from afar with respect to nirvāṇa, they are again not permanent, because they are severed by nirvāṇa, they are therefore not permanent. From "Good son, contaminated dharmas" onward is the second part, answering the latter four objections, which again has two: first, directly answering the fifth and concurrently answering the sixth; second, directly answering the fourth and concurrently answering the third. This first part, answering the fifth question: Above he asked: If it exists originally, why is it only now termed arising? Now he answers: There is fundamentally a principle of arising, not that it already existed and only now is it arising. This concurrently answers the sixth: Since it is equally devoid of arising, why is it not said that space arises? Now he also answers: Only when there is a principle of can-arise can there be arising; space lacks a principle of can-arise—how could space be said to arise? From "Uncontaminated dharmas" onward answers the fourth objection, having the principle, the simile, and the application. In the first text: The first objection said: If it can produce another, it should produce the uncontaminated. Now he answers: There is no principle that produces the uncontaminated, and therefore it cannot produce it. Contaminated dharmas possess the nature of arising, and thus can be produced. It concurrently answers the third objection, that arising lacks svabhāva. If it had svabhāva, arising could produce it; since it lacks svabhāva, how could it be produced? Concurrently answering both intentions, [the objections] naturally vanish. Next, in the simile, raising fire and the eye: each has its nature; the nature of fire can produce, and the nature of the eye can see. Here, saying that because it has the nature of arising, arising can produce, this comes after having refuted the meaning of nature. Explaining nature afterward is thus without error, just as previously, having refuted attachment to nature, he only then says that when there are causes and conditions, it can be expressed. The application is as in the text.