大般涅槃經疏 21.4

21.4

起卷德王問。「若犯重」下，第二明違因。於中為三，謂問、答、領解。冶城為六問，開善為五問，只是三意：初兩問四罪、次兩問一闡提、三一問不定。初問四罪者，若有佛性，不應墮地獄；如其退落，佛性不持。第二問若有佛性，云何復言無常樂我淨？若無四德，豈有佛性？第三問闡提斷善，應斷佛性。第四問不斷佛性，何名闡提？第五問四罪與闡提等不定，還生善根；涅槃不定，還成凡夫。難文小廣。入涅槃已若還出者，聖還成凡。若爾，佛無四德；若不爾者，闡提亦無成佛之義。前難令涅槃無常，佛答非無常。此中作不定難，一切不定則一切無常，則涅槃亦是一切之限，亦應無常。此難難一切人悉令皆轉（云云）。佛答為兩：先歎問、次答問。初歎問為四：一歎現德、二歎往因、三歎所問超逾人天、四誡聽許說，如文。「善男子一闡提」下，正答，為三：一答第五不定問；第二答第三斷善問，即兼答第一第二罪人問；第三重答第五不定問，兼答第四問。初答第五中三：先標、次答、三結。從「如汝所言」下，第二正答第三，有三番：一約內外、二約漏無漏、三約常無常。佛性中道非此二邊，故不可斷。人天是善、三塗是惡，凡法為外、聖法為內，世間是漏、出世無漏，有為無常、無為是常，佛性悉非此之兩邊，故不可斷。「若是斷者」下，兼答第一第二罪人問。彼雖作罪終不斷性，明罪不定，以不定故得三菩提。本取斷已名一闡提，性非已得，云何可斷？既非定有，豈能遮墮？答第一問。若非定有，遣第二問。又斷已得方名闡提，今性非已得，亦遣第四問。「犯四重」下，第三重答第五問，為三：初汎明不定、二廣明不定、三結不定。初文又四：一明惡人不定、二明諸法不定、三明善人不定、四明如來不定。此即惡人不定也。「色與色相」下，第二明諸法不定，有法、譬。初法如文。次譬中凡三譬三合，如文。而言亦有定相謂常樂我淨者，為其前難不定云如來入已亦應出聖成凡即無常樂，今答不爾，無定之中亦有定相，謂如來常樂我淨，故言亦有定相。「須陀洹」下，第三明善人不定。「如來今於」下，第四明如來不定。方便道中如來不定；法身本地定不為凡，是名為定。二端不可得燒者，兩解：一云襯身譬本地、在外譬迹應，此二不滅；二云襯身譬佛智觀機、在外譬神通應物，物機無窮故神通不盡，是故不燒。襯音者非，應言親音。此衣在裏，名為襯衣。

The fascicle opens with the question of the King of Virtue.

From "If one commits the grave offences..." below is the second [part], explaining the contrary cause. Therein are three: namely, question, answer, and expressing understanding. Yěchéng takes this as six questions, while Kāishàn takes it as five questions; but there are only three essential meanings: the first two ask about the four grave offences; the next two ask about the icchantika; the third single question asks about indeterminacy. The first question on the four grave offences: if there is buddhadhātu, one should not fall into the hells; if one falls back, buddhadhātu does not sustain one. The second question: if there is buddhadhātu, why is it further said that it lacks permanence, bliss, self, and purity? If it lacks the four virtues, how could there be buddhadhātu? The third question: the icchantika severs roots of goodness, so he should sever buddhadhātu. The fourth question: if he does not sever buddhadhātu, why is he called an icchantika? The fifth question: the four grave offences and the icchantika are indeterminate and can regenerate roots of goodness; if nirvāṇa is indeterminate, one would revert to being an ordinary being. The wording of the objection is somewhat extensive: if having entered nirvāṇa one exits again, a noble one reverts to being ordinary. If so, the Buddha lacks the four virtues; if not so, the icchantika also lacks the principle of attaining buddhahood. The previous objection made nirvāṇa impermanent, and the Buddha answered that it is not impermanent. Here he raises the objection of indeterminacy: if all is indeterminate, then all is impermanent, and nirvāṇa would also fall within the scope of "all" and should likewise be impermanent. This objection challenges all persons, causing all to be subject to change (and so forth).

The Buddha's answer is twofold: first, praising the question; next, answering the question. The first, praising the question, has four [points]: first, praising present virtue; second, praising past causes; third, praising the question as surpassing humans and devas; fourth, enjoining him to listen and granting permission to speak, as in the text.

From "Good man, an icchantika..." below is the direct answer, which has three [parts]: first, answering the fifth question on indeterminacy; second, answering the third question on severing goodness, which also answers the first and second questions on sinful persons; third, answering the fifth question on indeterminacy again, while also answering the fourth question.

Within the first answer to the fifth, there are three: first, presenting; next, answering; third, concluding.

From "As you have said..." below is the second, directly answering the third, which has three rounds: first, in terms of internal and external; second, in terms of with-outflows and without-outflows; third, in terms of permanent and impermanent. The buddhadhātu middle way is neither of these two extremes, and therefore cannot be severed. Humans and devas are good; the three destinies are evil. Ordinary dharmas are external; noble dharmas are internal. The mundane has outflows; the supramundane is without outflows. The conditioned is impermanent; the unconditioned is permanent. Buddhadhātu is completely free from both of these extremes, and therefore cannot be severed.

From "If it were severed..." below also answers the first and second questions regarding sinful persons. Although they commit sins, they ultimately do not sever the nature, explaining that sins are indeterminate, and because they are indeterminate, they attain saṃbodhi. Originally, one was designated an icchantika by virtue of what has already been severed; the nature is not something already acquired, so how could it be severed? Since it is not determinately existent, how could it prevent falling into hell? This answers the first question. If it is not determinately existent, this disposes of the second question. Furthermore, only severing what has already been attained is designated an icchantika; now since the nature is not something already acquired, this also disposes of the fourth question.

From "Those who commit the four grave offences..." below is the third, answering the fifth question again, which has three [parts]: first, generally explaining indeterminacy; second, extensively explaining indeterminacy; third, concluding indeterminacy. The first text also has four: first, explaining the indeterminacy of evil persons; second, explaining the indeterminacy of all dharmas; third, explaining the indeterminacy of good persons; fourth, explaining the indeterminacy of the Tathāgata. This is the indeterminacy of evil persons.

From "Form and the characteristics of form..." below is the second, explaining the indeterminacy of all dharmas, which has the principle and similes. The initial principle is as in the text. Next, within the similes, there are three similes and three applications, as in the text. As for saying that there are also determinate characteristics, namely permanence, bliss, self, and purity: because his previous objection on indeterminacy said that once the Tathāgata enters [nirvāṇa] he should also emerge from sagehood and become ordinary, thereby lacking permanence and bliss, now it answers that this is not so: within the indeterminate there are also determinate characteristics, namely the Tathāgata's permanence, bliss, self, and purity; therefore it is said that there are also determinate characteristics.

From "Srotāpannas..." below is the third, explaining the indeterminacy of good persons.

From "The Tathāgata now in..." below is the fourth, explaining the indeterminacy of the Tathāgata. In the path of expedient means, the Tathāgata is indeterminate; on the fundamental ground of the dharmakāya, he is determinately never ordinary, and this is called determinate. That the two ends cannot be burned has two explanations: one says that the undergarment touching the body symbolizes the fundamental ground, while what is on the outside symbolizes the trace manifestations, both of which are unperishing; the second says that touching the body symbolizes the Buddha's wisdom discerning faculties, while being on the outside symbolizes spiritual penetrations responding to beings; since the capacities of beings are inexhaustible, spiritual penetrations are never ended, and therefore they are not burned. The pronunciation *zhě* for *chèn* (lining/undergarment) is incorrect; it should be pronounced like *qīn*. This garment being on the inside is called *chènyī* (undergarment).