大般涅槃經疏 24.5

24.5

「復次生死本際」下，第二明不生不死中道之義。文為二：初明中道、次舉解惑。初為三：一唱中道、二明能破生死、三結是。「佛性無明有愛」下，但中間只是行識名色六入等，何以云有生老死耶？解云：後文云現在世識名未來生，現在六入等名未來老死，中間即是生死義。言中道者，兩因夾一果，一果居中，如此論中方是妙中，破生死義。云何只以因緣因果不生不滅名為中道？今作易解。無明與愛即現過見，煩惱道也。點煩惱道即是般若，中間是苦道即是法身，法身即中道。若是中道則無生死，無生死故名破生死。「以是義故」下，第三結為佛性。既是中道，寧非佛性？「以諸眾生」下，第二舉解惑，有法、譬、合。法中初明惑者，不見則是無常；後明解者，能見則非無常。正用此語兼答第三難。難云：以何義故名常樂我淨？以見佛性故常樂我淨。「譬如」下，為惑解者作譬，與上貧女譬同。合如文。

From "Furthermore, the original limit of birth and death" below is the second [section], clarifying the meaning of the middle way that neither arises nor dies. The text has two [parts]: first, clarifying the middle way; next, presenting understanding and delusion. The first has three: first, proclaiming the middle way; second, clarifying its ability to destroy birth and death; third, concluding with [the assertion that this] is [the buddhadhātu]. From "buddhadhātu, ignorance, and the existence of craving" below, [one might ask:] since the middle is merely compositional factors, consciousness, name-and-form, the six sense bases, and so forth, why does [the sūtra] say there are birth, aging, and death? The explanation says: a later passage states that consciousness in the present life is called future birth, and the present six sense bases and so forth are called future aging and death; the middle is precisely the meaning of birth and death. As for stating "the middle way": two causes flank one fruit, with the one fruit dwelling in the middle; to discuss the middle in this way is the wonderful middle, the meaning of destroying birth and death. Why is it that merely causes and conditions, cause and fruit, neither arising nor ceasing, are called the middle way? Now we make an easy explanation: ignorance and craving are present and past views—the path of afflictions. Pointing to the path of afflictions, it is prajñā itself; the middle is the path of suffering, which is the dharmakāya itself; the dharmakāya is the middle way itself. If it is the middle way, then there is no birth and death; because there is no birth and death, it is called destroying birth and death. From "For this reason" below is the third, concluding it as the buddhadhātu: since it is the middle way, how could it not be the buddhadhātu? From "Because all sentient beings" below is the second, presenting understanding and delusion, which has doctrine, simile, and application. Within the doctrine, it first clarifies the deluded: not seeing it, it is impermanence; next it clarifies those with understanding: being able to see it, it is not impermanence. This statement is properly used to concurrently answer the third objection. The objection stated: for what reason is it called permanent, blissful, self, and pure? Because one sees the buddhadhātu, it is permanent, blissful, self, and pure. From "For example" below, a simile is made for those with delusion and understanding, the same as the earlier simile of the poor woman. The application is as in the text.