大般涅槃經疏 26.12

26.12

「爾時六師復作」下，第三邪正合論。凡七番問答，前六番正論、後一番降伏。此即初番。先立邪義，以見者為我，即十六知見中一。佛破有三：初令六根俱用，其上舉向為譬，今還難之。人在向中見色聞聲俱取六塵，汝以我在眼中只能見色不能遍取諸塵者，當知汝非。次令老少不殊，如在向中乃至一百年見外分明，我在眼中百年見物亦應分明。若老我在眼不及少者，何得用向而為譬耶？第三令內外俱見。人在向中內外俱見，我在眼中何不見內？「六師復言若無我者」下，第二番，進問此非正難。為前難甚，故更問我。「佛言有色」下答，又三：一示因緣、二破邪我、三結正我。此即初示，藉諸因緣而得見色，曾非我見但橫見言有。「六師若言」下，第二破其邪我，又三：初標唱不然。次「何以故」下別出諸過。我以自在為義，只應唯作婆羅門種，何故復受六道不同？色既無我，受想行識悉無有我。「以無我」下，三結過六師。「如來」下，第三結示正我，又二：初略示、次對辨。初文意者，前既破色受等無我，其即更問如來為是色等已不？今懸取其意，答云：如來我者無復色縛，亦無受想行識之縛，具於四德。汝所言我，不免四縛。次更結，亦與外對辨。外道言我從因緣故，是故無常。如來我者，非因緣得，故常樂我淨。「六師言瞿曇」下，第三番，外道改宗，或云部別。以偏一切處為我，不取色為我。「佛言」下，如來破之。有二意：初直就遍破、後更就一異檢。初文又兩復次：初復次責遍。我既遍者，不應初不見，應常見也。次責我遍者，應遍五道，何故畏三惡道，為人天身持於戒善？次就一異者，又二：初先唱兩章門、次一一釋。就一責，如文。就多責者，一一身中各有一我，我是自在，云何利鈍愚智不等？「瞿曇眾生我」下，第四番，外道重救。我則是一，又亦恒遍，眾生修業自有差別，業果不同。佛破云：我既遍而且常，豈得善惡迭謝？便應罪福俱有，故言行惡應有善、行善應有惡，若不俱有即是不遍。又我是自在，應善惡自行（云云）。「瞿曇譬如一室」下，是第五番，外道復救以然燈譬。雖同一明而燈體各異，我終是遍，但善惡用異，如一室中然百千燈（云云）。佛破又二：先唱不然。次三種破：一從緣破、二就明出異處破、三就明闇共住破。初破云：汝燈譬於法、明譬我者，明由於燈。多油炷者，燈則明盛。若爾，我由於業，業滅我死。業既陜小，我則不遍。第二責處者，明從燈出。若爾者，我從業出，則業有我，非我有業。第三明初燈時與闇共住。若爾，汝之常我，皆應在於無常我中，無常之我亦應在於常我之中。「瞿曇若無我者」下，第六番，外更請問。佛答又二：一破邪我。我既是常，云何能作？常何有作？設令有作，何不作善而或作惡？既善惡不定則無常也。次明正我，即是如來常住無閡。第七一番，外道歸伏，如來結章，如文。

From the passage beginning with "At that time the six masters further spoke..." onward, it thirdly presents the joint debate between the false and the true. In all, there are seven rounds of questions and answers: the first six rounds are the main debate, and the last round is their submission. This is the first round. First, the heterodox position is established, taking the seer to be the self, which is one among the sixteen views of a self. The Buddha refutes it with three arguments: First, he requires the six sense faculties to function together. Above, they brought up the window as a simile, and now he turns it back to challenge them: When a person is inside a window, seeing forms and hearing sounds, they apprehend all six sense objects together; since you take the self to be in the eye and capable only of seeing forms but incapable of universally apprehending all the sense objects, you must know you are mistaken. Next, he requires that the old and the young not differ: just as inside a window, even for up to a hundred years, seeing outside is clear and distinct, so too if the self is in the eye, seeing objects for a hundred years should likewise be clear and distinct; if an old self in the eye does not match a young one, how can a window be used as a simile? Third, he requires both the internal and the external to be seen: a person inside a window sees both the inside and the outside; why then does the self in the eye not see the inside? From "The six masters further said: 'If there is no self...'" onward is the second round; this further inquiry is not a proper objection, but because the previous challenge was severe, they inquire about the self again. The reply from "The Buddha said: 'There are forms...'" onward also has three parts: first, pointing out causes and conditions; second, refuting the heterodox self; third, concluding with the true self. This first part indicates that it is by relying on various causes and conditions that one sees forms; it was never seen by a self, but they merely give rise to false views and claim it exists. From "If the six masters say..." onward, the second part refutes their heterodox self, also in three parts: first, declaring it is not so; next, under "Why is that?", specifically bringing out the various faults: the self takes sovereignty as its meaning, so it should only be born into the brāhmaṇa caste; why then does it further undergo the different destinies of the six paths? Since form has no self, feeling, perception, volitional formations, and consciousness are all without a self; third, from "Because there is no self..." onward, concluding with the faults of the six masters. From "The Tathāgata..." onward, the third part concludes by indicating the true self, also in two parts: first, briefly indicating it; next, distinguishing it in contrast. The meaning of the first text is: since he had earlier refuted form, feeling, and so forth as being without a self, they would then ask whether the Tathāgata is these forms and so forth or not; now, anticipating their intention, he answers: the Tathāgata's self is no longer bound by form, nor is it bound by feeling, perception, volitional formations, or consciousness, and it is endowed with the four virtues; the self of which you speak does not escape the four bonds. Next, he further concludes and also distinguishes it in contrast with the outsiders. The heterodox outsiders say that the self arises from causes and conditions, and is therefore impermanent; the Tathāgata's self is not attained through causes and conditions, and is therefore permanent, blissful, self, and pure. From "The six masters said: 'Gautama...'" onward is the third round; the heterodox masters shift their thesis—or, as some say, it represents a different school—taking omnipresence as the self, rather than taking form as the self. From "The Buddha said..." onward, the Tathāgata refutes it. There are two intents: first, directly refuting it with respect to omnipresence; next, examining it further in terms of oneness and difference. The first text also has two further rejoinders: The first rejoinder questions omnipresence: since the self is omnipresent, it should not be that one initially does not see, but one should see constantly. Next, he questions that if the self is omnipresent, it should pervade the five destinies; why then fear the three evil destinies and observe precepts and goodness for the sake of a human or heavenly body? Next, in terms of oneness and difference, there are also two parts: first, raising the two thematic headings; next, explaining each one. The questioning regarding oneness is as in the text. Regarding the questioning about multiplicity: in each and every body there is a distinct self, and the self possesses sovereignty; why then are sharpness and dullness, foolishness and wisdom unequal? From "Gautama, the self of sentient beings..." onward is the fourth round, where the heterodox masters attempt a rescue again: the self is one, and it is also ever-pervading; sentient beings cultivate karma which naturally has differences, so the karmic fruits are not the same. The Buddha refutes them, saying: since the self is both omnipresent and permanent, how could wholesome and unwholesome deeds alternate? Then both sin and merit should be coexistent; thus it is said that performing evil should entail good, and performing good should entail evil; if they do not coexist, then it is not omnipresent. Furthermore, the self possesses sovereignty, so good and evil should occur of their own accord, and so forth. From "Gautama, just as in a single room..." onward is the fifth round, where the heterodox masters again attempt a rescue by using the simile of lighting a lamp: although they share the same illumination, the physical lamps are each different; the self is ultimately omnipresent, but the applications of good and evil differ, just as in a single room one might light a hundred thousand lamps, and so forth. The Buddha's refutation also has two parts: first, declaring it is not so; next, three kinds of refutations: first, refutation based on conditions; second, refutation based on the illumination emerging from a different place; third, refutation based on light and darkness coexisting. The first refutation says: if your lamp is a simile for phenomena and the light is a simile for the self, the light depends on the lamp; where there is much oil and wick, the lamp's light is bright; if so, the self depends on karma, and when karma is exhausted, the self dies; since karma is narrow and small, the self cannot be omnipresent. The second questions the place: light emerges from the lamp; if so, the self emerges from karma, which means that karma possesses the self, not that the self possesses karma. The third is that when the lamp is first lit, it coexists with darkness; if so, your permanent self should all reside within the impermanent self, and the impermanent self should also reside within the permanent self. From "Gautama, if there is no self..." onward is the sixth round, where the outsiders inquire further. The Buddha's reply also has two parts: first, refuting the heterodox self: since the self is permanent, how can it act? How could that which is permanent have action? Even if it were made to act, why does it not act virtuously, but sometimes acts evilly? Since good and evil are variable, it is impermanent. Next, he clarifies the true self, which is the Tathāgata, permanently abiding and unimpeded. The seventh and final round is the heterodox masters taking refuge and submitting, and the Tathāgata concludes the topic, as in the text.