大般涅槃經疏 27.21

27.21

「有諸外道」下，第三簡邪正，為二：初簡邪我，非外道所計，或言常遍、或言如芥子，並是邪執。次明正我，又二：初明假我、次明真我。初明假我，文為二：初法、次譬。譬中有六：初後有合，中四無合。開善：假名有用，有名無體。莊嚴：名用體俱有。此兩皆不可。若名用體皆有者，何謂為假？開善雖無體，既有名用，亦復非假。觀師引《中論》「無我無無我」，無我破常、無無我破斷，亦破即離。為破此等，故言我與無我。雖說此二皆是假名，故文中舉六譬譬於假我。「如來常住」下，第二明真我。此之真我對破妄我，畢竟清淨，即無我無無我。眾生亦應得此真我。

From “There are heterodox paths” downwards, the third [part] distinguishes the heterodox from the orthodox, divided into two: first, eliminating the false self, which is not what the heterodox paths reckon—whether they say it is eternal and omnipresent, or say it is like a mustard seed, all are heterodox attachments. Next, it clarifies the correct self, again in two parts: first, clarifying the provisional self; next, clarifying the true self. First, in clarifying the provisional self, the text is divided into two: first, doctrine; next, metaphor. In the metaphor there are six items: the first and last have applications, while the middle four have no application. Kāishàn holds: the provisional name has function; there is a name but no substantial entity. Zhuāngyán holds: name, function, and entity are all present. Neither of these is acceptable. If name, function, and entity are all present, how can it be called provisional? Although Kāishàn says there is no entity, since it possesses both name and function, it is also not provisional. Master [Guan] cites the Madhyamakaśāstra: “There is no self and no non-self”; “no self” refutes permanence, “no non-self” refutes annihilation, and it also refutes identity and separation. In order to refute these, it speaks of self and non-self. Although both are spoken of, they are mere provisional names; therefore, in the text six metaphors are adduced to illustrate the provisional self. From “The Tathāgata is eternal” downwards, the second [part] clarifies the true self. This true self counters and refutes the false self, being completely pure, which is neither self nor non-self. Sentient beings ought also to attain this true self.