大般涅槃經疏 30.15

30.15

「是七眾生不修身」下，第二明得失，又三：初更結中道不定、次正明得失、三總結大宗。初文又四，此第一明沒人。言七人皆不能修身戒心慧者，四種果人正是能修，云何不能？解云：初皆不修，後時佛菩薩修故得到彼岸，闡提不能修即不到彼岸。佛性亦有亦無，得此亦有亦無，即是兩破（云云）。今謂不應作此解。七人初皆未修，未修之時非是第七人，修已方名第七人。經文現云「七人皆不能修」，云何言初初非第七人。今明此是以別破通，故七人皆不能修身戒心慧。此中以通涅槃為河，明文在此，不須致惑。「是七人中」下，第二明出人。「若有說言」下，第三明偏執不可。「是七種人」下，第四正明中道不定。或一人具七，則始終為語。初雖作惡、後漸修行，成第二三及以第七。或七人各一，則當分為言。「若人心口」下，第二正明得失，又二：初單明失、次雙明得失。初又二：先就三法明失、次結於失。初為三：初就闡提、次就聖道、三就佛性，定皆不可。「是故我於契經」下，第二結失義，又四：初倡二人能謗。「若信心」下，第二倡信慧互無。「不信之人」下，第三結皆是謗。「是故我說」下，第四結互無。「若有說言」下，第二雙明得失，又二：先就闡提成佛不成佛、次就眾生有佛性無佛性，各有三句。初三者，前兩是謗、後一不謗。何故爾？各據一邊取有取無，故兩句成謗。若以從容中道之解，故一句不謗。有人云：闡提不捨惡心即得成佛，是謗義。復言闡提只即此身不得成佛，於異身中乃得成佛，復是謗義。有人云：闡提改惡修善，善心相續不斷，即非謗義。佛性義亦爾。有人云：眾生有佛性，身中已有相好常樂具足，斷惑即得者，亦是謗義。若言眾生全無佛性，亦名為謗。今時有說當果佛性，則墮此中。後之三句，初二是謗、後一不謗，如文。「夫佛性者不名」下，第三總結大宗，又四：一明佛性之理。「未得菩提」下，二明約法，因中說果。三引證，明如來或因中說果、果中說因。「是名如來」下，四結隨自意語。

From “These seven sentient beings do not cultivate the body” below, second, clarifies gain and loss, again with three [parts]: first, further concluding the indeterminate middle way; next, properly clarifying gain and loss; third, collectively concluding the great core principle. The first text again has four; this first clarifies the submerged person. Stating that none of the seven persons can cultivate body, precepts, mind, and wisdom: the four kinds of realized persons are precisely those able to cultivate, so how can they be unable? Explanation: Initially none cultivate; later, buddhas and bodhisattvas cultivate and therefore reach the other shore, whereas icchantikas are unable to cultivate and thus do not reach the other shore. The buddhadhātu also exists and does not exist; attaining this also exists and does not exist, which refutes both sides (and so on). Now I say one should not give this explanation. The seven persons initially all have not cultivated; at the time of not cultivating, they are not the seventh person; only after cultivating are they named the seventh person. The sūtra text presently says “all seven persons are unable to cultivate”; how could it say that at the very beginning they are not the seventh person? Now I clarify that this refutes the general by means of the specific, wherefore all seven persons cannot cultivate body, precepts, mind, and wisdom. Here, general nirvāṇa is taken as the river; the explicit text is here, so one must not harbor doubt. From “Among these seven persons” below, second, clarifies the emerged person. From “If there is anyone who says” below, third, clarifies that one-sided attachment is inadmissible. From “These seven kinds of persons” below, fourth, properly clarifies the indeterminate middle way. Either one person embodies all seven, which is spoken from beginning to end: though initially doing evil, later gradually cultivating, fulfilling the second and third up to the seventh; or the seven persons are each distinct, which is spoken according to their specific categories. From “If a person's mind and mouth” below, second, properly clarifies gain and loss, again with two: first, individually clarifying loss; next, jointly clarifying gain and loss. The first again has two: first, clarifying loss regarding the three dharmas; next, concluding the loss. The first has three: first, regarding the icchantika; next, regarding the noble path; third, regarding the buddhadhātu—definitively fixing any of them is inadmissible. From “Therefore, in the sutras I” below, second, concludes the meaning of loss, again with four: first, identifying two persons able to slander. From “If a faithful mind” below, second, identifies faith and wisdom mutually lacking each other. From “A faithless person” below, third, concludes that both are slander. From “Therefore I say” below, fourth, concludes mutual absence. From “If there is anyone who says” below, second, jointly clarifies gain and loss, again with two: first, regarding whether icchantikas attain buddhahood or do not attain buddhahood; next, regarding sentient beings possessing buddhadhātu or not possessing buddhadhātu, each having three propositions. For the first three: the first two are slander, and the last one is not slander. Why is this? Each relies on one extreme, grasping existence or grasping non-existence; hence both propositions constitute slander. If one holds an understanding of the easy, flowing middle way, then that single proposition is not slander. Some say: An icchantika attaining buddhahood without renouncing evil intention is a slandering meaning. Further saying that an icchantika, merely in this present body, cannot attain buddhahood, but only in a different body can attain buddhahood, is also a slandering meaning. Some say: An icchantika reforming evil and cultivating goodness, with their wholesome mind continuing without interruption, is not a slandering meaning. The meaning of buddhadhātu is also like this. Some say: Sentient beings possess buddhadhātu, already endowed in their bodies with marks, signs, permanence, and bliss, and attain it upon severing delusions—this too is a slandering meaning. If one says sentient beings completely lack buddhadhātu, this is also called slander. Nowadays those who speak of a future-fruit buddhadhātu fall into this. For the subsequent three propositions, the first two are slander, and the last one is not slander, as in the text. From “Now, the buddhadhātu is not named” below, third, collectively concludes the great core principle, again with four: 1. clarifying the principle of the buddhadhātu; from “Not yet having attained bodhi” below, 2. clarifying, in reference to dharma, speaking of the fruit within the cause; 3. citing proof that the Tathāgata either speaks of the fruit within the cause or speaks of the cause within the fruit; from “This is named the Tathāgata” below, 4. concluding speech according to his own intention.