大般涅槃經疏 31.12

31.12

「若有人說」下，第七雙破兩執：一執空與有並、二執虛空在於物中。先牒兩執；二「俱不然」下，正破。先總倡不然。次「何以故」下，雙破兩執，又二：前破空與有並、次破器中。初文又二：先作三章門、次次第解釋。三章門者，一異業合，如飛鳥集樹，唯鳥來棲樹，樹不來棲鳥。亦如物來合空，空不來合物。二二業共合，如兩羊相觸，空亦合物，物亦合空。三已合共合，如二雙指合者，物用與物已合。物只是體，用是物家，動用此二事體用已合。空用與空已合，空即是空體，用即是空。所容受用，此體用已合。復更以物合空，如兩指先已合，後更兩兩共合。「若言異業」下，次釋上三章。先釋第一，文自有三：一無常難、二常難、三亦常無常難。今初先作無常難中，言一是物業即是動業，二虛空業即是空業。言空業合物，空則無常。物既無常，而空與其合，豈不無常？若物來合空物則不遍者，此既合彼，應隨空亦遍，復應物隨空是常。《百論》中或心神等覺，以覺等神破（云云）。然今在言小異，而其還於此執。正言物既不遍，云何合空？言則是無常者，空亦無常耶？「若言虛空是常」下，第二作常難，又二：先牒執非之、次正難。難意並之，令併無常。「若言虛空亦常無常」下，第三作常無常難。彼意或言：合物之空自是無常，不合物空恒自是常，云亦常無常者。今直難云無有是處，謂法相中無有一法半常半無常者。「若共業合」下，釋第二章門，又二：此初，牒執非之；「何以故」下正破。言若空與業合業亦應遍者，謂空體與用合，用亦應遍。若空用遍，則應遍與物合，不得更有離物之空，不應說有合與不合。「若言已合共合」下，釋第三章門，又二：此先牒章門非之；「何以故」下正破，其中有法、譬、合。言先無後有者，謂空之與物先時不合、後時方合，則是本無今有，應是無常。然此唯破後合，不破前合。所以然者，前空體與空業用、物體與物業用，不有則已有則俱時，豈可得言先時無合、後時方合？而淺識者謂空是體，有若來時方有空用；物亦如是，體移動時方有動用。只此前合亦是本無今有，破則應云無常。只此先無今有，破者即具破於前後二合，正破後雙合、旁破前單合。「若言虛空在物」下，破其後執，明空在物中，又三：初牒執非之、次正難、後結句。此初，牒執非之。「何以故」下正難，又二：初作理責、次作並難。初又為三：此初正責。若言有器空在器中者，本無器時，空在何處？「若有住處」下，第二難應有多空。未有器時已有一空，後有器時復有一空，寧非多空？「如其多者」下，第三結過。凡結三過：一不得言常，謂先是無器之空，今是有器之空，寧得是常？二者不得言一，可解。三者不得言遍，有器時空非無器時空，空寧得遍？「若使虛空離空有住」下，第二並難。若謂無器時空離有器時空而有住處者，物亦離空而有住處。「是故當知」下，第三結句，可見。

From "If someone says" downwards, the seventh [section] refutes two attachments together: first, the attachment that space and existence are concurrent; second, the attachment that space exists within objects. First, it cites the two attachments. Second, from "Both are not so" downwards, it directly refutes them. First, it generally proclaims that they are not so. Next, from "Why is this?" downwards, it refutes the two attachments together, again in two parts: first, refuting [the view that] space and existence are concurrent; next, refuting [the view that space is] within a vessel. The first passage again has two parts: first, it establishes three headings; next, it explains them in sequence. As for the three headings: first, conjunction of different actions, like a flying bird roosting in a tree—only the bird comes to roost in the tree, while the tree does not come to roost in the bird; this is also like an object coming to conjoin with space, while space does not come to conjoin with the object. Second, mutual conjunction of two actions, like two rams butting heads—space also conjoins with the object, and the object also conjoins with space. Third, mutual conjunction of what has already conjoined, like the joining of two pairs of fingers—the functioning of the object has already conjoined with the object. The object is merely the essence, and the functioning belongs to the object; with active functioning, the essence and function of these two matters have already conjoined. The functioning of space has already conjoined with space: space is the essence of space, and the functioning is the functioning of space accommodating [things]; its essence and function have already conjoined. Then, furthermore, the object is conjoined with space, like two fingers having first already joined, and afterwards pairs being joined together again. From "If one says that through different actions" downwards, it next explains the three headings above. First, in explaining the first heading, the text itself has three parts: first, a challenge on impermanence; second, a challenge on permanence; third, a challenge on both permanence and impermanence. Now, first, in making the challenge on impermanence, it says that the first is the action of the object, which is active movement, and the second is the action of space, which is the action of space. If it is said that the action of space conjoins with the object, then space would be impermanent: since the object is impermanent, and space conjoins with it, how could it not be impermanent? If the object comes to conjoin with space and the object is not omnipresent, then since it conjoins with the other, it ought to be omnipresent like space, and the object ought to be permanent like space. In the Śata-śāstra, [the opponent posits that] the mind-spirit is equal to consciousness, and it is refuted by using consciousness being equal to the spirit, and so forth. Now, although the phrasing here is slightly different, it returns to this very attachment. It directly states: since the object is not omnipresent, how could it conjoin with space? When it says that it is then impermanent, would space also be impermanent? From "If one says that space is permanent" downwards, second, it poses the challenge on permanence, again in two parts: first, it cites the attachment and rejects it; next, it directly challenges it. The intent of the challenge is to force them into parity, making [space] equally impermanent. From "If one says that space is both permanent and impermanent" downwards, third, it poses the challenge on both permanence and impermanence. Their intention might be to say: the space that conjoins with objects is naturally impermanent, while the space that does not conjoin with objects is ever naturally permanent; hence they call it both permanent and impermanent. Now, it directly challenges them, saying that there is no such thing, meaning that within the characteristics of dharmas, there is no single dharma that is half permanent and half impermanent. From "If they conjoin through shared action" downwards, it explains the second heading, again in two parts: this first cites the attachment and rejects it; from "Why is this?" downwards, it directly refutes it. When it says that if space conjoined with action, action should also be omnipresent, this means that if the essence of space conjoined with function, function should also be omnipresent. If the function of space were omnipresent, it should be omnipresent in conjoining with objects, and there could no longer be space apart from objects, so one should not speak of conjoining and not conjoining. From "If one says that what has already conjoined conjoins together" downwards, it explains the third heading, again in two parts: this first cites the heading and rejects it; from "Why is this?" downwards, it directly refutes it, in which there are the dharma, the analogy, and the application. When it speaks of not existing previously and existing subsequently, this means that space and the object do not conjoin at an earlier time and only conjoin at a later time; thus it previously did not exist and now exists, so it should be impermanent. However, this only refutes the subsequent conjunction, not the prior conjunction. Why is this so? Previously, the essence of space and the action-function of space, and the essence of the object and the action-function of the object, if they do not exist [at all], then they do not, but if they do exist, they are simultaneous. How could one say that at an earlier time there was no conjunction and only at a later time did they conjoin? Yet those of shallow understanding claim that space is the essence, and only when existence comes along is there the function of space; an object is also like this: only when its essence moves is there active functioning. Even this prior conjunction is also previously non-existent and now existent; if refuted, one should say it is impermanent. Simply by this 'previously non-existent and now existent,' the refutation completely refutes both the prior and subsequent conjunctions: directly refuting the subsequent dual conjunction, and collaterally refuting the prior single conjunction. From "If one says that space is in objects" downwards, it refutes the subsequent attachment, clarifying [the view that] space exists within objects, again in three parts: first, citing the attachment and rejecting it; next, directly challenging it; afterwards, the concluding statement. This first cites the attachment and rejects it. From "Why is this?" downwards, it directly challenges it, again in two parts: first, making a logical demand; next, posing a parity challenge. The first again has three parts: this first directly questions it. If one says that when there is a vessel, space is within the vessel, then when there was originally no vessel, where was space? From "If it has an abode" downwards, the second challenges that there should be multiple spaces: when there was not yet a vessel, there was already one space, and later when there is a vessel, there is yet another space—how could there not be multiple spaces? From "If there are many" downwards, the third concludes with the faults. It concludes with three faults in all: first, one cannot say it is permanent, meaning that previously it was the space without a vessel, and now it is the space with a vessel—how could it be permanent? Second, one cannot say it is one, which is easy to understand. Third, one cannot say it is omnipresent: the space when there is a vessel is not the space when there is no vessel; how could space be omnipresent? From "If space had an abode apart from space" downwards, the second is the parity challenge: if one says that the space when there is no vessel exists in an abode apart from the space when there is a vessel, then an object would also exist in an abode apart from space. From "Therefore, you should know" downwards, the third is the concluding statement, which can be seen.