大般涅槃經疏 32.10

32.10

「爾時眾中復有先尼」，是第三外道。外道先尼非止一人，今此非是前卷先尼，如佛弟子中同名迦葉者眾。此章有四：一緣起、二破執、三論義、四歸伏。然佛說不定，自有先明正義使外道得解；自有先須默然待彼立義，然後破之以申正理。今宜先默然，故三問不答。然不答凡有三義：一者根緣所宜，雖復不答，是默然答。二者定問有無皆是邪意，故《大論》中有十四難佛皆不答，有邊無邊、有常無常、如去不如去等，所以不答。三者佛欲對彼自立之義，出其綱宗然後乃破。如來上答恒被彼難，竟未得破，所以默然。有此三意。「先尼言若一切眾生」下，第二破執。其中有二：先立宗、次正破。此下是立宗，凡有三義：一者立我是遍、二者立我是一、三者立我是作者。我即眾生、士夫、壽命，我既被破，人及士夫、眾生自去。作者、知者既被破已，起者即是作者之類亦皆被破。今問外計，為是即陰、為是離陰？今謂計我是作者者，作即行陰，計行為我。若計是知者見者，並是計即陰為我。其計我是作者，所作之業雖復不同，而同是作者。「佛言先尼」下，第二明正破，有二：初正破前三、次別破餘三見者知者受者。就初文為三：初破遍、次破一、後破作。初有四番：此初第一，先定彼義。「佛言若我周遍」下，第二正破，明若我遍者，應在五道，何須修善欲受天報離惡道耶？惡與生天，我應常在，不須修善。先尼言我有二種：一作身我、二常身我者，先尼本計常身之我，為被破故，轉成二我。「佛言如汝說我」下，第三佛更逐破。若常身我在作身中，作身無常，常身之我亦應無常；若常身我不在作身，則非遍義。先尼因此更舉舍譬。舍主譬常身，舍譬作身。舍既被燒，主即出去。如作身無常，常身即去。「佛言如汝說我」下，第四便逐破之。明常身我既其遍在，常即無常，在常此常，在無常中寧不無常？如是遍在色與非色，在非色既即非色，在色寧得不即是色？舍與主異，有燒不燒，不得俱明。舍主可爾，常身作身此則不然，何以得云作身無常我即出去？今當問汝：出何處去？常身既常，常體恒遍，出無去處。「汝意若謂一切眾生」下，第二次破一義，凡有八番。此下初番，我既是一，父我子我，二我何異？次先尼救云，謂一人一我，非一切人同共一我，故有父子二我不同。此即破竟，便轉義宗。「佛言若言一人」下，第二佛便逐破。若一人一我，我有眾多則不名常。先尼若言一切眾生業報應同，汝言一人各一我者，我既是遍，無處不有，如張人我亦來在於王人我中，王人之我亦來在於張人我中。若爾者，我既互通，即無愚智亦無貴賤。亦如天得我既在佛得眼見，佛得之我亦在天得。佛得之我既因眼見，天得之我亦應因佛得眼見。天得、佛得是人名也。先尼救云：我遍一切法，而諸法不相遍，故天得、佛得二作不同。「佛言法與非法」下，第三佛復逐破。法與非法，非業作耶？以定先尼。或釋先尼所計我是作者，業字應作我字。義則可然，不須改字，隨下文業字。既計我是作者，所言業作即是我作。次先尼答可見。「佛言法非法」下，第四又破。既同是我作，故天得作時即佛得作。二作既同，報應不異，下舉業平等果亦應同。次先尼舉燈明救。「佛言汝說燈明」下，第五逐破彼譬。明在炷邊，復照於堂，譬有邊表之處，我亦應有眼識處所。我既遍於法與非法，法與非法亦應遍我，是則相與俱遍。「先尼言汝引燈喻」下，復救於譬。「善男子我所引喻者則是非喻」下，第六又破彼譬。如是喻者則是非喻，故知燈明不得喻我。若喻我者，則於彼不吉，於佛為吉。先尼言：汝先責，我又救，明佛亦不平。「佛言如我不平」下，第七明我之不平破汝不平，令汝得平，即是我平，同諸聖人得平等者始是大平。先尼救云：一切眾生平等有我，即是我平。「汝亦說言」下，第八佛更逐破平等之義。既言當受五道之身，我豈得等？「汝意若謂我是作者」下，第三破作者，有六：「善男子」，此初文者，約受苦破。若我是作者，那自作苦？若苦非我作，一切諸法應非我作。「眾生苦樂」下，第二明憂喜。「汝說我常」下，第三明有十時。「若我作者」下，第四明有盛衰，眾生亦有盛衰。眾生既即我，我應盛衰，豈是常邪？「我若作者」下，第五明不應利鈍。那得此人於書利、於棋鈍，彼人於棋利、於書鈍？餘例皆爾。「我若作者」下，第六明汝自說無我，而疑我有無。

"At that time, there was further in the assembly Śreṇika": this is the third non-Buddhist. The non-Buddhist Śreṇika was not merely one person; this one here is not the Śreṇika of the previous scroll, just as among the Buddha's disciples there were many who shared the name Kāśyapa. This section has four parts: first, the causal background; second, the refutation of attachments; third, the discussion of doctrines; fourth, the submission. Now, the Buddha's teaching is not fixed: sometimes he first clarifies the correct doctrine to enable the non-Buddhist to understand; sometimes he must first remain silent and wait for the other to establish his doctrine, and only then refutes it so as to proclaim the correct truth. Here it is appropriate to remain silent first, hence he does not answer the three questions. Furthermore, not answering has generally three meanings: First, it suits the capacity and conditions; though he does not answer, it is a response through silence. Second, asserting questions of existence or non-existence are all heterodox thoughts; thus in the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa there are fourteen difficult questions that the Buddha did not answer, such as whether [the world] is finite or infinite, permanent or impermanent, whether [the Tathāgata] exists after death or does not exist after death, and so on; that is why he did not answer. Third, the Buddha wished to let him state the core principles of his own established thesis and only then refute them. Previously, when the Tathāgata answered, he was constantly challenged by him and never succeeded in refuting him; therefore he remained silent. It is with these three meanings. From "Śreṇika said, 'If all sentient beings'" downward is the second part, the refutation of attachments. Within this there are two parts: first, establishing the thesis; next, the direct refutation. From here downward is establishing the thesis, which has generally three meanings: first, establishing that the self is all-pervading; second, establishing that the self is one; third, establishing that the self is an agent. 'Self' is just sentient being, person, and life-span; when 'self' is refuted, person, individual, and sentient being naturally fall away. Once 'agent' and 'knower' are refuted, 'initiator'—which belongs to the same category as 'agent'—is also refuted. Now we ask regarding the heterodox tenets: is it identical to the aggregates, or is it distinct from the aggregates? Here we say: holding that the self is an agent means that 'acting' is the aggregate of formations, taking formations to be the self. If holding that it is the knower or the seer, these are all taking the aggregates themselves to be the self. As for their holding that the self is an agent, although the actions performed are diverse, they are all identically an agent. From "The Buddha said to Śreṇika" downward is the second part, clarifying the direct refutation, which has two parts: first, directly refuting the first three; next, separately refuting the remaining three: the seer, the knower, and the experiencer. Concerning the first text, there are three parts: first, refuting all-pervasiveness; next, refuting unity; finally, refuting agency. The first has four turns: this first one begins by ascertaining his thesis. From "The Buddha said, 'If the self is all-pervading'" downward is the second, the direct refutation, clarifying that if the self is all-pervading, it should be in the five destinies; why would one need to cultivate good wishing to receive heavenly retribution and escape the evil destinies? In doing evil and in being born in heaven, the self should be constantly present, without need of cultivating good. Śreṇika said, "My self is of two kinds: first, the self of the active body; second, the self of the permanent body." Originally, Śreṇika posited the self of the permanent body; because he was refuted, he shifted it into two selves. From "The Buddha said, 'As you speak of the self'" downward is the third, where the Buddha further pursues the refutation. If the self of the permanent body is within the active body, and the active body is impermanent, the self of the permanent body should also be impermanent; if the self of the permanent body is not within the active body, then it lacks the meaning of all-pervasiveness. Because of this, Śreṇika further cited the simile of the house. The master of the house exemplifies the permanent body, and the house exemplifies the active body. When the house is burned, the master goes out. Just as the active body is impermanent, the permanent body departs. From "The Buddha said, 'As you speak of the self'" downward is the fourth, where he then pursues the refutation. He clarifies that since the self of the permanent body is all-pervading, the permanent is then impermanent; when in what is permanent, it is permanent, but when in what is impermanent, how could it not be impermanent? In this way, being all-pervading in matter and non-matter, since in non-matter it is just non-matter, how could it not be matter when in matter? The house and the master are different: one is burned and the other is not burned; they cannot be explained together. It may be so for the master and the house, but for the permanent body and the active body this is not the case; how can you say that when the active body is impermanent, the self departs? Now I must ask you: where does it go out to? Since the permanent body is permanent, its permanent essence is ever all-pervading; in going out, there is nowhere to go. From "If your intention is that all sentient beings" downward is the second, refuting the meaning of unity, which has altogether eight turns. From here downward is the first turn: since the self is one, what difference is there between the two selves, the father's self and the son's self? Next, Śreṇika defended, claiming that each person has one self, not that all people share a single self, hence the two selves of father and son are different. Once this was refuted, he immediately shifted his doctrinal thesis. From "The Buddha said, 'If you say that one person'" downward is the second, where the Buddha then pursued the refutation. If each person has one self, then selves are manifold and cannot be called permanent. If Śreṇika says that the karmic retributions of all sentient beings should be identical, and you say that each person has their own self, then since the self is all-pervading and there is nowhere it is not present, just as person Zhang's self would also come to be within person Wang's self, and person Wang's self would also come to be within person Zhang's self. If so, since selves mutually interpenetrate, there would be neither foolish nor wise, neither noble nor base. It would also be like: since Devadatta's self is in what is seen by the eye of Yajñadatta, the self of Yajñadatta would also be in Devadatta. Since the self of Yajñadatta is seen by the eye, the self of Devadatta should also be seen by the eye of Yajñadatta. Devadatta and Yajñadatta are personal names. Śreṇika defended: the self pervades all dharmas, but dharmas do not pervade one another; hence the two actions of Devadatta and Yajñadatta are different. From "The Buddha said, 'Are virtue and non-virtue'" downward is the third, where the Buddha again pursued the refutation. Are virtue and non-virtue not created by karma? This was to pin Śreṇika down. Some explain that in Śreṇika's holding that the self is an agent, the character 'karma' should be the character 'self'. The meaning may well be so, but there is no need to change the character; follow the character 'karma' in the text below. Since he held that the self is an agent, what is spoken of as karma's doing is just the self's doing. Next, Śreṇika's answer is apparent. From "The Buddha said, 'Virtue and non-virtue'" downward is the fourth, refuting again. Since both are identically made by the self, when Devadatta acts, Yajñadatta acts. Since the two actions are identical, the retributions should not differ; below, he cites that where karma is equal, the fruit should also be identical. Next, Śreṇika raised the light of a lamp to defend. From "The Buddha said, 'You speak of the light of a lamp'" downward is the fifth, pursuing the refutation of that simile. The light is beside the wick, yet it illuminates the hall, exemplifying that there is a place with boundaries and surfaces; the self should also have a location for visual consciousness. Since the self pervades virtue and non-virtue, virtue and non-virtue should also pervade the self; thus both would pervade each other. From "Śreṇika said, 'You cited the simile of the lamp'" downward, he again defends the simile. From "Good man, what I cited as a simile is a non-simile" downward is the sixth, again refuting that simile. Such a simile is a non-simile, hence we know that the light of a lamp cannot exemplify the self. If it exemplifies it, it is inauspicious for him and auspicious for the Buddha. Śreṇika said: you challenged first, and I defended again; this shows that the Buddha is also uneven. From "The Buddha said, 'As for my being uneven'" downward is the seventh, explaining that my being uneven breaks your being uneven to cause you to become even, which is my evenness; only when one attains equality together with all noble ones is it great evenness. Śreṇika defended: all sentient beings equally possess a self; that is my evenness. From "You also stated" downward is the eighth, where the Buddha further pursued the refutation of the meaning of equality. Since you say that one will receive bodies in the five destinies, how could the self be equal? From "If your intention is that the self is an agent" downward is the third, refuting agency, which has six parts: "Good man": this first text refutes it in terms of experiencing suffering. If the self is an agent, why would it make suffering for itself? If suffering is not made by the self, all dharmas should not be made by the self. From "Sentient beings' suffering and pleasure" downward is the second, clarifying grief and joy. From "You say that the self is permanent" downward is the third, clarifying that there are ten stages of life. From "If the self is an agent" downward is the fourth, clarifying that there are flourishing and decline, and sentient beings also have flourishing and decline. Since sentient beings are just the self, the self should flourish and decline; how could it be permanent? From "If the self is an agent" downward is the fifth, clarifying that it should not be sharp or dull. Why should this person be sharp in writing and dull in chess, while that person is sharp in chess and dull in writing? The remaining cases are all like this. From "If the self is an agent" downward is the sixth, clarifying that you yourself speak of selflessness, yet you doubt the existence and non-existence of the self.