大般涅槃經疏 5.11

5.11

次從「時諸天龍」下，是正請。又為三：初長行及十一行半偈是哀請、次二行是祈請、三長行五譬是譏請。初長行敘語，以毛竪哀泣而為其相。次十一行半偈，為三：初兩行一句略請、次七行一句廣請、三二行結請。初標調御師人仙犢母，即是略舉三事為哀請之端，可見。次「猶如困病人」下，作喪師譬（云云）。「如國無君主」下，作喪主譬（云云）。「長者子」下，作喪親譬（云云）。「如來入涅槃」下兩行，結哀請上文。初明犢失母，今結還明我等，及眾生悉無有救護。護字結無主，救字結無師。次「譬如日初出」兩行，舉日山兩譬是祈請，歎於一佛而具三益。日有三義：一高圓明譬主益，生長萬物譬親益，照了除闇譬師益。而譬文論照了，合文明除暗，正言師義是本，兼有二能。山亦三義，高出水上譬主益，深入水底譬親益，水色同山譬師益。師德如山安處眾海，能宣妙慧照下昏迷，言略意兼矣。舊解日還自照，爭論不同。開善莊嚴云：佛有智，能自照。光宅云：佛果無有自反照智。觀師難光宅云：佛無反照智，亦應不自知作佛不作佛。彼救云：佛雖無智，知作不作。若欲知時，借諸佛智，佛道同故。今更問之：佛道既同，諸佛無智，何所可借？又並但能知他無智自知者，唯應覺他，不名自覺。此是光宅四失，樏隔真諦、牛糞淨土，指端種覺無記如來。次問開善莊嚴：汝用反照智照一切種智者，復用何智照反照智？是則無窮。觀師自云：佛無別反照智，只自有智，智能反照。如此說者，即害兩家（云云）。今明佛有一智三智，三智一智非三非一而三而一。一、道種智，外破諸闇；二、一切智，能反自照；三、一切種智，非內非外非自非他。若即一而三，可難光宅；即三而一，可難開善；三一難思，可難觀師（云云）。此二偈亦名祈請如來在世所益若此，祈佛留光照益我等，故名祈請。從長行去，即第三譏請。先述舊解譏請凡作五譬：初作有始無終譬、二作怖畏譬、三違本擔譬、四不平等譬、五無慈悲譬。初譬有三，開、合、結。國王佛也，諸子四眾也。他云：技藝者，始從鹿苑終至法華，所說諸經巨有所妨。今則不爾，以二乘法合之則可見。端正，正見也。愛念，禪定也。技藝，神通也。旃陀，無明也，亦習氣也。初教三學似如有始，不盡餘惑故言無終。二、怖畏譬者亦三。舊云諸論者譬通達諸經。今謂不爾，譬破四魔，而今不住乃畏死魔。三、違誓譬者，略無結請，有人佛也。作務本誓，誓盡度生。官事譬起應，囹圄譬入生死。人問者，舊云十方佛，或云實智問權，又云假設此問。今以機為旁人，機謝告終，終如出獄，故言安樂。夏曰夏臺，殷曰羑里，周曰囹圄。《白虎通》曰「囹，令也。圄，舉也。令其思愆舉罪（云云）。」四、不平等譬亦三。方藥，十二部法也。祕方，即密教，教文殊諸菩薩也，不教外學二乘也。五、無慈譬亦三，可尋。舊釋譏請但譏請於師，失主親二義。今更會之，初一譬譏法親、次兩譬譏法主、後兩譬譏法師。初譬譏法親者，夫云親者慈念為本，初生教訓似若親慈，付旃陀羅頓乖骨肉。法親亦爾，從佛口生即是養育，得佛法分即是端正。技藝者，學人思惟無學習氣。若大乘意，凡有無明斯皆毒害。棄我而去，是付旃陀（云云）。次兩譬譏法主者，夫云主者，以威伏敵、以恩養民。前譬威武未暢，後譬恩惠不充。通達諸論，如當敵怖畏；今畏此論者，如為敵欺。法王亦爾，除眾生畏，眾生未免，故佛有畏。初學作務，譬民有生業。收閉囹圄，譬民無聊生。業廢譬無惠，閉獄譬無恩。法王亦爾，初令學無學等修道品作務，而復猶在思習無明獄中。百姓有罪在予一人，眾生苦惱云何如來欲受安樂？次兩譬譏法師者，夫師有訓導之德，前譬譏師內惜良方，後譬譏師外祕坦道。觀諸譬文皆有深意，而此譬最明。攀類文殊而恥行險路，豈非譏師意耶？

Next, from "At that time, the devas and nāgas" onward is the main entreaty. This further comprises three parts: first, the prose and eleven and a half verses constitute the entreaty of lamentation; next, two verses are the entreaty of prayer; third, the prose passage with five parables is the entreaty of reproach. First, the narrative prose text takes bristling hair and sorrowful weeping as its mark. Next, the eleven and a half verses comprise three parts: first, two verses and one line are a brief entreaty; next, seven verses and one line are an expanded entreaty; third, two verses conclude the entreaty. First, mentioning the tamer, the sage among humans, and the mother of the calf is a brief presentation of three matters to serve as the opening of the sorrowful entreaty, which is clear. Next, from "Just like an ailing patient" onward, it makes the parable of losing a master (and so forth). From "Like a kingdom without a ruler" onward, it makes the parable of losing a sovereign (and so forth). From "The elder's son" onward, it makes the parable of losing a parent (and so forth). The two verses from "The Tathāgata enters nirvāṇa" onward conclude the preceding sorrowful entreaty. At first, it explained the calf losing its mother; now concluding, it again explains that we and all sentient beings have no salvation or protection. The word "protect" concludes [the loss of] the sovereign, and the word "save" concludes [the loss of] the master. Next, the two verses of "Like the sun first rising" raise the two parables of the sun and the mountain as the entreaty of prayer, praising a single Buddha as possessing three benefits. The sun has three meanings: first, being high, round, and bright is a parable for the sovereign's benefit; producing and nurturing the ten thousand things is a parable for the parent's benefit; illuminating and clearing darkness is a parable for the master's benefit. Yet while the text of the parable discusses illuminating, the text matching it explains dispelling darkness; precisely speaking, the meaning of the master is primary, while concurrently possessing the other two capacities. The mountain also has three meanings: rising high above the water is a parable for the sovereign's benefit; sinking deep beneath the water is a parable for the parent's benefit; the color of the water being the same as the mountain is a parable for the master's benefit. The virtue of the master, like a mountain calmly resting in the ocean of the assembly, can proclaim wondrous wisdom to illuminate the confusion below; the phrasing is concise, but the meaning embraces [all three]. Older explanations debated back and forth on whether the sun illuminates itself, disagreeing with one another. Kāishàn and Zhuāngyán said: "The Buddha has wisdom that can illuminate itself." Guāngzhái said: "In the fruit of Buddhahood, there is no wisdom that reflects back upon itself." Master Guān challenged Guāngzhái: "If the Buddha has no wisdom that reflects back upon itself, he should also not know himself whether he has become a Buddha or not." The latter defended: "Although the Buddha lacks [such] wisdom, he knows whether he has become [a Buddha] or not. If he wishes to know, he borrows the wisdom of all Buddhas, because the path of the Buddhas is identical." Now I ask further: "Since the path of the Buddhas is identical, and all Buddhas lack [such] wisdom, what could be borrowed? Furthermore, if one can only know others and lacks the wisdom to know oneself, one should only awaken others and cannot be called self-awakened." These are the four errors of Guāngzhái: compartmentalising the ultimate truth, the cow-dung pure land, the seed-awakening on the fingertip, and the indeterminate Tathāgata. Next, I ask Kāishàn and Zhuāngyán: "If you use self-reflecting wisdom to illuminate the sarvākārajñatā, then what wisdom do you use to illuminate that self-reflecting wisdom? That would go on ad infinitum." Master Guān said himself: "The Buddha does not have a separate self-reflecting wisdom; he merely has his own wisdom, and this wisdom can reflect back on itself." Speaking in this way refutes both schools (and so forth). Now I clarify that the Buddha has one wisdom and three wisdoms; the three wisdoms are one wisdom, neither three nor one, yet three and one. First is the wisdom of the aspects of the path, which externally shatters all darkness; second is the all-knowledge, which can reflect back to illuminate oneself; third is the sarvākārajñatā, which is neither internal nor external, neither self nor other. If taken as the one being three, one can refute Guāngzhái; if taken as the three being one, one can refute Kāishàn; the unfathomability of three and one can refute Master Guān (and so forth). These two verses are also named the entreaty of prayer, [saying] that what the Tathāgata benefited while dwelling in the world was like this, praying that the Buddha leave his light to illuminate and benefit us; hence it is called the entreaty of prayer. From the prose onward is the third, the entreaty of reproach. First, I recount the older explanations, where the entreaty of reproach generally makes five parables: first, the parable of having a beginning but no end; second, the parable of fear; third, the parable of abandoning the original burden; fourth, the parable of inequality; fifth, the parable of lacking compassion. The first parable has three parts: expansion, matching, and conclusion. The king is the Buddha, and the sons are the fourfold assembly. Others say: "The arts and crafts refer to all the sūtras spoken from the Deer Park up to the Lotus Sūtra, which present a huge impediment." Now, it is not so: if matched with the dharma of the two vehicles, it can be understood. Well-proportioned means right view. Dearly loved means dhyāna concentration. Arts and crafts mean supernatural powers. Caṇḍāla means ignorance, as well as lingering habit energies. Initially teaching the three trainings seems to have a beginning, but because it does not exhaust the remaining afflictions, it is said to have no end. Second, the parable of fear also has three parts. Formerly it was said: "All the treatises is a parable for thoroughly comprehending all sūtras." Now I say this is not so: it is a parable for destroying the four māras, yet now not abiding and instead fearing the māra of death. Third, the parable of breaching the vow briefly lacks a concluding entreaty; the certain person is the Buddha. The business is the fundamental vow, vowing to ferry across sentient beings completely. The official duties are a parable for manifesting responsive incarnations; the prison is a parable for entering birth-and-death. As for the person asking, formerly it was said to be the Buddhas of the ten directions, or that the real wisdom questions the provisional, or that this question is a hypothetical construction. Now, taking sentient capacity as the bystander: when their capacity has waned, the Buddha announces the end, and this ending is like leaving prison, hence called peace and bliss. In the Xià it was called Xiàtái, in the Yīn it was called Yǒulǐ, and in the Zhōu it was called língyǔ. The *Báihǔ tōng* says: "*Líng* means to command; *yǔ* means to raise up. It commands them to contemplate their faults and raise their guilt (and so forth)." Fourth, the parable of inequality also has three parts. The medicinal formulas are the twelve divisions of scriptures. The secret formula is the esoteric teaching, teaching Mañjuśrī and the bodhisattvas, and not teaching outsiders and the two vehicles. Fifth, the parable of lacking compassion also has three parts, which can be examined. Older explanations of the entreaty of reproach only reproached [him as] a master, losing the two meanings of sovereign and parent. Now I harmonize them again: the first parable reproaches [him as] a dharma parent; the middle two parables reproach [him as] a dharma sovereign; the latter two parables reproach [him as] a dharma master. The first parable reproaches him as a dharma parent because 'parent' takes loving care as the basis; initially giving birth and teaching seemed like parental love, but handing them over to a caṇḍāla completely betrays flesh and blood. A dharma parent is also like this: being born from the Buddha's mouth is nurturing; obtaining a share of the Buddha-dharma is being well-proportioned. Arts and crafts mean the habit energies of non-learning in the reflections of learners. From the perspective of the Mahāyāna, wherever there is ignorance, it is wholly poisonous and harmful. Abandoning us and departing is handing us over to a caṇḍāla (and so forth). The next two parables reproach him as a dharma sovereign because a sovereign subdues enemies with majesty and nourishes the people with benevolence. The former parable is that majestic might was not fully exerted, and the latter parable is that benevolent kindness was not bountiful. Thoroughly comprehending all treatises is like being terrified when confronting an enemy; now fearing this treatise is like being deceived by the enemy. The Dharma King is also like this: he dispels the fear of sentient beings, but sentient beings are not yet exempt, so the Buddha has fear. Initially learning business is a parable for the people having livelihood. Being arrested and locked in prison is a parable for the people having no means of livelihood. Ceasing livelihood is a parable for having no kindness; imprisonment is a parable for having no benevolence. The Dharma King is also like this: he initially made learners and non-learners cultivate the business of the limbs of the path, yet they are still in the prison of ignorance and habit energies of thought. 'The guilt of the common people rests upon me alone'—when sentient beings suffer distress, how can the Tathāgata wish to enjoy peace and bliss? The next two parables reproach him as a dharma master because a master has the virtue of training and guiding; the former parable reproaches the master for inwardly withholding the good formula, and the latter parable reproaches the master for outwardly keeping secret the level path. Examining all the texts of the parables, they all have deep meaning, but this parable is the clearest. Aspiring to rival Mañjuśrī while being ashamed to tread the dangerous road—is this not the intent of reproaching the master?