大般涅槃經疏 7.13

7.13

三從「爾時迦葉白佛」去，是論義，凡四番問答。初番，先問、次答。問有三意：一述不解、二謂不應、三正作難。不解者，領長壽業非因非果、非自非他，故言深隱。次不應者，一子之地同體大慈體無愛恚，云何子想？若同子想，即是起愛，起愛云何同體？同體云何起愛？故云不應。三作難者，破戒作逆應須治罰，治罰乖慈，云何等視？等則無罰，云何言治？治偏乖慈，慈之與治二俱乖體，展轉有妨，難從此生（云云）。次佛以一言答其三意，云：我於眾生同一子想。如羅睺羅者，同體之慈。是慈清淨微妙第一，非染愛慈。是慈深隱，非但難解亦復難說。即體而用，不妨等視如羅睺羅。既即體而用，慈亦復然。一言答三，其意在此。然迦葉問菩薩修慈，此問道前；佛以道後果慈答之，云我於眾生亦一子想。舉後答前，前後不異。次從「迦葉復白」去，是第二問答，先問、次答。初問中舉昔事難今義。力士無慈碎聽戒童子，童子命斷，即昔事也。若承佛力，即如來遣害傷慈縱毒，頓乖一子，即難今義。次佛答中明三世之慈為三：初明童子是昔事，若答此事擬過去慈。童子、金剛二皆是化幻人，幻杵以害幻命，寧有實耶？設權懲惡，正是大悲拔其苦因；假設濟危，正是大慈與其樂果。至慈至巧非一子義，何者是耶？他解：見機猶害五百淨行，尚實有害事。若將此釋，都無所損。次從「迦葉」去，明現世慈。本地指三業行慈。又三：初如來之意於諸眾生生一子想，雖謗法闡提、邪見毀戒悉如一子，況復餘人。心常平等，即意慈也。次從「譬如國王」去，明口行慈，又二：一先舉國憲、次明佛法、後結治罪。初、國之嚴刑以酷為本。二、佛之法網以慈為宗。舉非顯是。佛法有三：若擯，永出眾外。若四羯磨不出眾外，唯不得為羯磨之主。十四知事人，今通名羯磨，而實有輕重。初言驅遣羯磨，即是律中驅出羯磨。馬師滿宿二比丘於聚落污他家行惡行，佛令與驅出羯磨出此聚落。訶責者，即律中苦切羯磨。般荼盧伽比丘喜鬪事鬪構兩頭與人鬪競，至城中訴，乃以詞牒結著衣帶數數如是。佛令作苦切羯磨，苦惱切勒。置者，即依止羯磨是。施越比丘為人輕薄，數犯可悔罪，數惱僧。佛令與作依止羯磨，令依剛正有德之人住持教示，不令數犯。舉罪者，即律中下意羯磨。欝多羅比丘為質多居士菴羅寺主，恒得好食。居士後時遇優波斯那，於舍供養，不與寺主相知。欝多羅生瞋，語居士言：「飲食雖美，但無胡麻歡喜丸耳。」此居士少年貧時曾為此業，故以刺之。居士因即說譬，如鷄與烏共生一子，或作鷄鳴或作烏聲，汝或善語或作惡語。而此比丘父母異國，故以譏之。佛知，令與作下意羯磨，僧中遣一人將是比丘往居士所下意懺悔。不可見，即是三擯。八法之中以明三擯：一不見擯、二不懺擯、三惡邪不除擯，此中無不懺之名。是滅擯一事，教門不同。不可見即是不見擯。車匿比丘數數犯罪，諸比丘勸懺悔。答言：「我不見罪。」佛令與不見擯。不懺者還。是車匿數犯，人勸，答云：「我雖見罪，不能懺悔。」佛令作不懺擯。滅即滅擯。未捨惡見，即惡邪不除擯。事起利咤言欲不障道，三諫不從，與作惡邪不除擯。三從「善男子如來所以」去，是結無對治罪之意。使其無復惡因則無惡果，即是大慈施無恐畏。

Third, from "At that time Kāśyapa said to the Buddha" onward is the doctrinal debate, consisting in all of four rounds of questions and answers. In the first round, the question comes first, followed by the answer. The question has three points: first, expressing incomprehension; second, asserting impropriety; third, properly posing a challenge. As for the incomprehension, he understands the karma of long life as being neither cause nor fruit, neither self nor other, and thus calls it profound and hidden. Next, as for the impropriety: the stage of a single child is great friendliness of identical essence, in whose essence there is neither love nor hatred; how then can there be the thought of a child? If it is identical to the thought of a child, that is the arising of affection; if affection arises, how can it be of identical essence? If it is of identical essence, how can affection arise? Thus he says it is improper. Third, as for posing a challenge: one who breaks the precepts and commits rebellious acts ought to be disciplined and punished; punishing conflicts with friendliness, so how can there be equal regard? If there is equality, there should be no punishment; how then speak of discipline? Discipline is one-sided and conflicts with friendliness; both friendliness and discipline conflict with the essence; one impedes the other in turn, and the challenge arises from this (and so forth). Next, the Buddha answers these three points with a single statement, saying: "Toward sentient beings, I have the single thought of an only child, like Rāhula." This is friendliness of identical essence. This friendliness is pure, subtle, and supreme, not the friendliness of defiled affection. This friendliness is profound and hidden, not only difficult to understand but also difficult to explain. Essence immediately entails function, which does not impede regarding them equally like Rāhula. Since essence immediately entails function, the same applies to friendliness. Answering three points with a single statement—the meaning lies in this. However, Kāśyapa asked about the bodhisattva's cultivation of friendliness, which was a question regarding prior to the path; the Buddha answered him with the fruit-friendliness following the path, saying, "Toward sentient beings, I also have the single thought of an only child." By citing the subsequent, he answered the prior; the prior and the subsequent are not different. Next, from "Kāśyapa spoke again" onward is the second question and answer; the question comes first, followed by the answer. In the initial question, he cites a past event to challenge the present doctrine. The wrestler lacked friendliness and smashed the youth who was listening to the precepts, and the youth's life was ended—this is the past event. If he relied on the Buddha's power, then the Tathāgata dispatched him to cause harm, injuring friendliness and giving free rein to poison, completely violating the notion of an only child—this challenges the present doctrine. Next, in the Buddha's answer, he clarifies the friendliness of the three times in three parts: First, he clarifies that the youth is a past event; in answering this event, it is aligned with past friendliness. Both the youth and the vajra[-wielder] were magically manifested phantom persons; a phantom vajra was used to harm a phantom life—how could there be anything real? Setting up expedient means to punish evil is precisely great compassion pulling out their cause of suffering; provisionally setting up rescue from danger is precisely great friendliness bestowing upon them the fruit of happiness. Supreme friendliness and supreme skillfulness—if this is not the meaning of an only child, what is? Another explanation says: seeing their receptivity, he still harmed the five hundred of pure conduct, so there were still actual acts of harm. If one takes this explanation, nothing is compromised at all. Next, from "Kāśyapa" onward, he clarifies the friendliness of the present life. His original ground points to practicing friendliness through the three karmas. This also has three parts: First, the Tathāgata's intention generates the thought of an only child toward all sentient beings; even those who slander the Dharma, icchantikas, and those with wrong views who break the precepts are all like an only child, not to mention others. The mind is constantly equal—this is the mental friendliness. Next, from "Just as a king" onward, he clarifies bodily and vocal friendliness—here, vocal friendliness—which also has two parts: first, citing national law; next, clarifying the Buddhadharma; and finally concluding with the discipline of offenses. First, the severe punishments of a state take cruelty as their basis. Second, the legal framework of the Buddha takes friendliness as its principle. Citing what is wrong reveals what is right. In the Buddhadharma there are three kinds: If it is banishment (pravājanīya), one is permanently expelled outside the saṃgha. If it is the four karmas, one is not expelled outside the saṃgha, but one merely cannot serve as the master of a karma or among the fourteen duty-holders; here they are generally called karmas, but in fact there are lighter and heavier ones. First, what is called the expulsion karma (pravājanīya-karman) is the driving-out karma in the Vinaya. The two monks Aśvajit and Punarvasu committed evil conduct and defiled other families in a village; the Buddha ordered that they be given the driving-out karma to expel them from that village. Reproval is the severe rebuke karma (tarjanīya-karman) in the Vinaya. The monk Pāṇḍulohitaka was fond of disputes, stirring up quarrels between both sides and contending with others; he went into the city to lodge complaints, tying written petitions to his belt, and did so repeatedly. The Buddha ordered that the severe rebuke karma be performed to reprimand and restrain him distressingly. Shelving is the dependence karma (niśraya-karman). The monk Śveta was frivolous by nature, repeatedly committing confessable offenses and repeatedly troubling the saṃgha. The Buddha ordered that the dependence karma be performed on him, causing him to rely on an upright and virtuous person for upkeep and instruction, so that he would not repeatedly offend. Raising an offense is the reconciliation karma (pratisāraṇīya-karman) in the Vinaya. The monk Uttara was the abbot of Citra the householder's Āmra Monastery, constantly receiving fine food. Later, the householder met Upasena and made offerings to him in his house without informing the abbot. Uttara became angry and said to the householder: "Although the food and drink are delicious, there are only no sesame modaka sweets." The householder had engaged in this trade when young and poor, so [Uttara] used this to sting him. The householder then spoke an analogy: "It is like a rooster and a crow mating and producing a single chick; it makes sometimes a rooster's crow, sometimes a crow's call; you utter sometimes good words, sometimes evil words." Since this monk's parents were from different countries, [the householder] ridiculed him with this. When the Buddha learned of it, he ordered that the reconciliation karma be performed on him: one person was dispatched from the saṃgha to escort this monk to the householder's place to humble his mind and repent. 'Invisible' refers to the three suspensions (utkṣepanīya-karman). Among the eight dharmas, the three suspensions are explained: first, suspension for not seeing [the offense]; second, suspension for not repenting; third, suspension for not renouncing evil views. Here, the name 'not repenting' is absent. These and total expulsion are one matter, but the instructional gates differ. 'Invisible' is suspension for not seeing. The monk Channa repeatedly committed offenses, and the monks urged him to repent. He replied: "I do not see any offense." The Buddha ordered that he be given suspension for not seeing. 'Not repenting' is the same: Channa repeatedly offended, and when people urged him, he replied: "Although I see the offense, I cannot repent." The Buddha ordered that suspension for not repenting be performed. 'Destruction' is total expulsion. 'Not having abandoned evil views' is suspension for not renouncing evil views. The incident arose from Ariṣṭa stating that desire does not obstruct the path; after three admonitions he did not comply, so he was given suspension for not renouncing evil views. Third, from "Good man, that which the Tathāgata..." onward concludes the intention of having no antidotal punishment for offenses. Causing them to have no further evil causes so that there will be no evil fruits is precisely great friendliness bestowing fearlessness.