大般涅槃經疏 11

English (machine translation) 11

Language: English

11.1

Composed by Master Guàndǐng of Zhāng'ān under the Sui

11.2

Re-edited by the Tiāntái Śramaṇa Zhànrán under the Tang

11.3

Chapter on the Heterodox and the Correct

"Heresy" refers to māras; "orthodoxy" refers to sages. Heretical māras are of multiple kinds, namely: heretical evil, heretical worldliness, heretical onesidedness, and heretical gradualness. "Heretical evil" refers to icchantikas slandering the Dharma, the four grave offenses, the five deeds of immediate retribution, the ten unwholesome actions, and their retributions in the four bad destinies. The [sūtra] text states: "Holding that keeping the eight kinds of impure things is permitted is slandering the Buddha; clinging to the nine genres of scriptures while maintaining there are no vaipulya scriptures is slandering the Dharma; and maintaining that if one wishes to engage in sexual intercourse one should merely take off the Dharma robes is committing the four grave offenses." Such things are termed heretical evil. "Heretical worldliness" refers comprehensively to the twenty-five realms of existence, conditioned origination, afflictions, karma, aggregates, and the māra of the heavens. The text states: "Depending upon the convergence of the parents' passion and desire, this body is conceived and born. Passion is affliction, this body is the aggregates, and using an outflow-tainted form to fabricate an outflow-free body is the māra of the heavens. Austerities in the past are karma," and so forth; such is its meaning. "Heretical onesidedness" refers to the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas viewing things as impermanent, suffering, and empty, resulting in a crooked nirvāṇa, and the like. The text states: "The Tathāgata is impermanent and subject to change, and preaches non-self," which is its meaning. "Heretical gradualness" refers to discriminating successive distinctions, abandoning the two extremes to separately seek a middle way, as well as the māra of samādhi, the māra of the bodhicitta, and the like. The text states: "The Tathāgata knows nothing of the heretical treatises of the non-Buddhists, knows nothing of worldly decoctions and medicines, and because he knows nothing, he is called the Tathāgata. He generates neither hatred nor love toward being slashed with a knife or smeared with incense, and only because he can abide in the middle is he called the Tathāgata." Such is its meaning. Orthodoxy is termed sageliness, and sagely orthodoxy is of multiple kinds, namely: holding to orthodoxy, wholesome orthodoxy, authentic orthodoxy, and upright orthodoxy. One discusses the four orthodoxies in contrast to the four heresies; since the four heresies have already been set forth in the text, inverting the heresies constitutes the orthodoxies, without awaiting further discussion. These four heresies and four orthodoxies correspond to the intents of the four siddhāntas. Heretical evil is particularly grave and is the root of all heresies; this corresponds to the worldly [siddhānta]. The heresy of heretical worldliness—establishing this name for the sake of those who aspire to pure ascent—corresponds to the individual [siddhānta]. Heretical onesidedness onesidedly crushes saṃsāra to enter nirvāṇa; this corresponds to the counteractive [siddhānta]. The destination reached by heretical gradualness is indeed the eternally abiding; establishing this name of heresy from the gateway of successive stages corresponds to the supreme-truth [siddhānta]. Orthodoxy is likewise: holding to orthodoxy is māra, the lord of the desire realm; holding to the orthodoxy of the desire realm corresponds to the worldly [siddhānta]. Wholesome orthodoxy is worldly goodness; completing various good deeds corresponds to the individual [siddhānta]. Authentic orthodoxy is the supramundane Dharma; only in contrast to and by shattering the worldly is it termed orthodox. It is the sequential Mahāyāna capable of reaching dharmatā, and dharmatā is the supreme truth. Such are the general characteristics of heresy and orthodoxy. What the present sūtra refers to as the two dharmas and two persons refers to the scriptures of māra and the vinaya of māra; those who uphold māra's scriptures and vinaya are the four māras. This meaning is broad, encompassing all the preceding heresies. Orthodoxy is also of four kinds: the Buddha's scriptures and the Buddha's vinaya; upholding the Buddha's scriptures and vinaya constitutes the four orthodoxies, which crown the preceding four orthodoxies. It is named on this basis, and is therefore called the "Chapter on Heresy and Orthodoxy." This chapter answers Kāśyapa's preceding question: "How is one to know that the heavenly māra creates difficulties for the assembly? How is one to distinguish and recognize what the Tathāgata and Pāpīyas preach?" Now, the four reliances possess vast virtues, while heresy and orthodoxy possess the capacity for discrimination; although the two meanings complement each other, the four reliances answer [the question of] vastness, and heresy and orthodoxy answer [the question of] discrimination. Both chapters are replete with the two deceptions of form and voice, yet the preceding chapter predominantly clarifies the disturbance of form, whereas the latter chapter predominantly clarifies the disturbance of voice, and so forth.

11.5

The text comprises five parts: first, briefly clarifying heresy and orthodoxy; second, broadly clarifying heresy and orthodoxy; third, debating the meanings; fourth, expressing understanding; fifth, sanctioning and confirming. In the first, the brief section, there are questions and answers. The question cites the four reliances above; the answer sets forth the heretical three jewels. Māra is the heretical Buddha, what he preaches is the heretical Dharma, and those who accept and uphold it are the heretical Saṅgha. Just as in the *Śata-śāstra* Kapila claimed himself to be the Buddha and what he preached [to be the Dharma], his disciples and others were confused and perturbed by this, so one must have the four reliances above. From "Kāśyapa addressed the Buddha" onward is the second part, broadly explaining heresy and orthodoxy. There are questions and answers. In the question, he asks about both the heretical and orthodox three jewels: how are they to be distinguished, as in the text. The earlier question, "How is one to know that the heavenly māra creates difficulties for the assembly?" questioned the disturbance of form. "How is one to distinguish and recognize what the Tathāgata and Pāpīyas preach?" questioned the disturbance of voice. Now, asking about māra and what he preaches comprises both previous questions. When it speaks of "those who practice according to māra," they are the faction that follows māra to create both disturbances of form and voice.

11.6

In the broad answer, the text comprises two parts: first, answering the disturbance of form; next, answering the disturbance of voice. The initial mention of "seven hundred years" refers to the one thousand years of the true Dharma being reduced by five hundred years due to the ordination of women. The six-hundredth and seven-hundredth years mark the entry into the period of the semblance Dharma. The *Māyā Sūtra* states: "In the six-hundredth year Aśvaghoṣa appears; in the seven-hundredth year Nāgārjuna appears." At this time māra flourishes, so there are the four reliances. Māra possesses outflow-tainted supernatural penetrations and is able to transform into the four assemblies, the four fruits, and the physical appearance of the Buddha, just like a hunter outwardly donning a kāṣāya while inwardly harboring lethal intent. Māra is likewise: outwardly appearing as a sagely form while inwardly harboring heretical plots. Now, outflow-free realization resides in the mind, not in physical matter; how can one speak of fabricating an outflow-free form? A sage possesses outflow-free deportment, which is also the outflow-free five aggregates; hence māra imitates it. From "that Pāpīyas will make such a statement" downward, the second part clarifies the disturbance of voice. The text comprises five sections: first, disturbing the Buddha's body; second, disturbing the establishment of precepts; third, disturbing the Buddha's virtues; fourth, disturbing the sūtras and vinaya; fifth, disturbing transgressions and merits. First, regarding disturbing the Buddha's body, there are again four aspects: first, disturbing his birth; second, disturbing his deeds; third, disturbing his entering the temple; fourth, disturbing his taking a consort. In the first text, if one says he was actually born, this is māra's preaching; if one says he was born without being born, this is the Buddha's preaching. Next, regarding his deeds, it should likewise follow this pattern. That it is not so here is because clarifying that he did not act is māra's preaching, whereas that he acted is the Buddha's preaching. Why? Heretical māras constantly wish to conceal the Buddha's virtues and display the Buddha's faults; this is called disturbing the Buddha's deeds. Entering the temple and taking a consort are all as in the text. From "when the Buddha was in Śrāvastī" onward is disturbing the establishment of precepts, as in the text. As for the sixty-four abilities, the Buddha has thirty-two marks; non-Buddhists boastfully claimed they were twice as superior as the Buddha, hence they spoke of having sixty-four abilities. Furthermore, the Buddha has thirty-two marks along with their karmic causes; non-Buddhists sought to match them as equals, hence they posited the sixty-four abilities. Third, from "if there is someone who states" onward is disturbing the Buddha's virtues. Herein it clarifies that the Buddha does not know good from bad, does not differentiate enemies from kin, and neither rejoices nor hates when slashed with a knife or smeared with incense—just as people say of an eye being poked without blinking; this is disturbing virtue through a deluded intent. Fourth, from "if there is someone who says the Tathāgata for my sake" is disturbing the sūtras and vinaya. First, it causes disturbance generally with respect to the sūtras and vinaya; subsequently, it causes disturbance with respect to permanence and impermanence, as in the text. Fifth, from "again, there are people who say" onward is disturbing transgressions and merits. The text comprises three rounds: first, clarifying orthodoxy; next, clarifying heresy; third, further clarifying orthodoxy. In the first, a monk knows himself not to be a sage; answering that he is not a sage, there is then no transgression. Next, from "again, there are those who state there is no pārājika" onward is heresy. Third, from "if it is further stated: among all precepts" onward further clarifies orthodoxy. If one transgresses a single dharma, when reciting the precepts, upon being initially asked whether one is pure, if one does not answer after three proclamations, one commits false speech, and so forth. Although all sentient beings possess the buddhadhātu, it must depend on upholding precepts: the buddhadhātu is the direct cause, and upholding precepts is the concurrent condition, and so forth.

11.7

From "Kāśyapa addressed the Buddha" onward is the third part, debating the meanings. The text has three rounds: first, discussing the buddhadhātu; second, discussing exceeding human conditions; third, discussing dreaming and waking. In the first round, he first asks, and so forth. In the subsequent reply, that the Tathāgata sometimes speaks of self and sometimes speaks of non-self is termed the middle way. The *Madhyamaka-śāstra* states: "Within the dharmatā of all phenomena, there is neither self nor non-self." Both self and non-self are conventional designations. Saying "self" is conventional; saying "non-self" is real; neither self nor non-self is the middle way. Next is the second round of questions and answers: first the question, then the reply. In the reply, it first clarifies transgression, next clarifies non-transgression, and later re-clarifies transgression, as in the text, and so forth. In the third round of questions and answers there are two parts: first the question, then the reply. Sexual intercourse in a dream incurs no offense, but upon waking one should repent; if upon waking one praises it, one incurs an offense. The meaning in the *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā* is also like this, and so forth. *Mahālaṅkā*, translated here as "red color," contradicts the subsequent text's "wearing red garments"; how is this reconciled? It is explained: the subsequent text speaks of the time before the precepts were established, whereas here it speaks of the time after the precepts were established. Another explanation: red also has many shades; a deep red is prohibited, like *gandha*; a light red is not prohibited, and so forth.

11.8

From "Kāśyapa addressed the Buddha" onward, the fourth part is expressing understanding. The fifth part is sanctioning and confirming.

11.9

Chapter on the Four Truths

11.10

This chapter answers the earlier [question]: "Why is the mind of the Tamers joyful in preaching the true truths?" Ancient commentators said: Formerly, following dispositions, the Buddha merely preached the quantifiable four truths, which were confined to the triple realm, so the sage's mind was not fully unburdened; now, due to the eternally abiding, he preaches the unquantifiable four truths, transcending beyond the three realms, so the Buddha's mind is joyful. They are also called the conditioned and unconditioned four truths, and are also called the produced and unproduced four truths. We now question: The quantifiable transcends fragmented [saṃsāra] but does not transcend transformative [saṃsāra]; the unquantifiable likewise does not transcend transformative [saṃsāra]. Since both equally fail to transcend it, both are quantifiable. Quantifiable and unquantifiable are merely relative to the two capacities of the Small and the Great; why should this suffice for joy? Furthermore, if the quantifiable is conditioned, why is it said that three are conditioned and one is unconditioned? If so, the meaning of "conditioned" is not established. If the unquantifiable is unconditioned, how can there still be transformative birth-and-death? They explain: Because it is not produced by a fragmented body and life-span, it is termed unconditioned, yet it is not devoid of the three characteristics. If so, it is not truly unconditioned. If unconditioned is not established, the unproduced also collapses. Although the *Śrīmālādevī-sūtra* contains this nominal teaching, it was formulated for a particular capacity; one cannot use those unquantifiable four truths to interpret this sūtra text, as their meanings do not coincide. Ancient commentators also clarified the four truths of the five periods. In the first period they were defined in terms of concrete phenomena, such as suffering having the characteristic of oppression, and so forth. From the second period to the fourth period they were defined in terms of principle, such as the five grasping aggregates being thoroughly understood as empty and non-existent being the meaning of suffering, "meaning" being the principle. They explain: When entering contemplation, names are eradicated and characteristics extinguished, so these four matters do not exist; relying on the four expedients, they are called the four truths. Just as when seeing the truths and entering reality, there are no eight patiences and eight knowledges, but one merely contemplates the single cessation. Speaking of patiences and knowledges takes its name from expedients. For this reason, the four periods did not clarify the buddhadhātu, and the Buddha's mind was not joyful; in the fifth period, wisdom is taken as the truth. The text states: "There is no suffering, yet there is reality; therefore when the buddhadhātu is preached, the Buddha's mind is joyful." We now question: If this is still the previous quantifiable and unquantifiable, it has already been refuted as above. If it is not quantifiable and unquantifiable, what truth is it then, as there is no distinct name? Since there is no distinct name, there is no distinct principle; why use this again to explain the present sūtra? We now clarify that this chapter has both similarities and differences with the "Chapter on Sagely Practices." "Sagely Practices" fully clarifies the four kinds of four truths; the present text merely clarifies the one true four truths. What are its characteristics? The dharmatā of the buddhadhātu is omnipresent; only when one can clearly comprehend the dharmatā within the four matters can they be termed truths; if one does not comprehend it, it is inversion and not truth. The sūtra has explicit text, so why should one harbor doubts? Knowing the Tathāgata's profound realm as the eternally abiding, immutable, subtle and secret dharmakāya is termed truth. This merely takes the Buddha-fruit as an initial example; in reality it pervades all animals, hells, aggregates, realms, and sense entrances. Fully comprehending the eternally abiding, immutable dharmakāya is the noble truth of suffering; giving rise to true wisdom amidst impurity without destroying the true Dharma is the noble truth of the origin; recognizing the tathāgatagarbha amidst annihilation is the noble truth of cessation; clearly recognizing the three jewels and authentic liberation is the noble truth of the path. Truth is not of the number four; it is called the four truths because one comprehends the truths with respect to the four [matters]. The Tathāgata appeared in the world originally to preach this; now that the veiled characteristics are opened and the applied milk has been washed away, he is said to be joyful in preaching the true truths. It is named on this basis, and is therefore called the "Chapter on the Four Truths."

11.11

The text consists of two parts: first, explaining the four truths; second, acknowledging and understanding [them]. The initial [section on] the four truths constitutes four chapters, each chapter having six [points], differing only in being sequential or non-sequential. The six points of the truth of suffering are: first, explaining delusion; second, explaining the fruit of delusion; third, explaining understanding; fourth, explaining the fruit of understanding; fifth, concluding with understanding; sixth, concluding with delusion. The one is the four and the four are the one, which is called inconceivable; this is clear in this text. The initial explanation of delusion also has two parts: first, directly explaining suffering; second, [explaining] suffering due to non-understanding. Below, it explains that there are three kinds of suffering: first, it is suffering, not a truth, and not real; second, it is suffering, is a truth, and is not real; third, it is not suffering, not a truth, and is real (and so forth). From "You should know that this person must fall..." downward, it explains the fruit of delusion. From "If there is someone who can know..." downward, it explains understanding. From "If it once passes through their ears..." downward, it explains the fruit of understanding. From "If known like this..." downward, it concludes with understanding. From "If one does not know..." downward, it concludes with delusion. Next, the chapter on the truth of accumulation also has six [points], whose sequence is like the preceding. Here it first explains delusion. From "Due to this not knowing..." downward, it explains the fruit of delusion. From "If one has deep wisdom..." downward, it explains understanding. From "By this causal condition..." downward, it explains the fruit of understanding. Furthermore, it refers back to the past, citing the erroneous to reveal the correct. From "If one can know..." downward, it concludes with understanding. From "If a person cannot..." downward, it concludes with delusion. Next, the chapter on the truth of cessation also has six [points], whose sequence is slightly different. First, it explains delusion. The statement "cultivating emptiness excessively" means: first, the two vehicles sinking into emptiness; second, the non-Buddhists denying [the existence of cause and effect]—this is "cultivating emptiness excessively." Next, "cultivating the cessation of suffering" explains understanding; it should also be said that it counters the śrāvakas, yet it speaks specifically of non-Buddhists. There are two meanings: first, the śrāvakas have already been rebuked previously; second, when śrāvakas run contrary to the principle, they are indeed non-Buddhists. From "If one practices..." downward, it explains the fruit of delusion. From "If there is one who does not create..." downward, it explains the fruit of understanding. From "If one can be like this..." downward, it concludes with understanding. From "If there is one who cannot..." downward, it concludes with delusion. The chapter on the truth of the path also has six [points], returning to the previous sequence, only the concluding part is slightly different. The beginning directly explains delusion, first bringing forth the delusion itself. Next, it properly explains delusion. From "By this causal condition..." downward, it explains the fruit of delusion. From "If one can generate the mind..." downward, it explains understanding. From "Relying on this single thought..." downward, it explains the fruit of understanding. From "If someone says the Three Jewels are impermanent..." downward, it concludes with delusion. From "If one cultivates this teaching..." downward, it concludes with understanding. It actually concludes with path and cessation. The mention of the four truths means that path and cessation follow the four truths, corresponding to the fourth [truth]. From "Kāśyapa addressed the Buddha..." onward, the second [part] is acknowledging and understanding.

11.12

Chapter on the Four Inversions

11.13

An inversion is a delusion. Above, it said that a drunk person's vision is blurred and the sun and moon spin around, which metaphorically reveals the meaning of delusion. However, the number of inversions is indeterminate: sometimes one, two, three, four, eight, or even manifold. One refers simply to avidyā and delusions entrapping and wrapping around oneself. Two refers to grasping at views and conceptions, resulting in harm. Three refers to the inversion of mind due to ignorance, the inversion of thought due to delusion and rashness, and the inversion of views due to discrimination. Four refers to permanence, bliss, self, and purity being fabricated crafts lacking reality. Eight refers to impermanence, suffering, non-self, and impurity being like broken tiles and gravel, not real. Manifold refers to nirvāṇa and the buddhadhātu being ultimately pure, neither inversion nor truth. Inversion and truth are spoken of on the basis of causal conditions of understanding and delusion. When previous Buddhas appeared in the world, their teachings refuting inversions and their bequeathed Dharma remained in the world; with time passing far from the sage, people clung to the letter and lost the essential meaning, unaware that the provisional medicine had turned into poison, whereupon they gave rise to the four inversions of permanence, bliss, self, and purity. When the Buddha first appeared in the world, he administered the medicine of impermanence to purge them; once the sickness departed, the medicine remained, and grasping it as correct, they were deluded about the Buddha's provisional means and gave rise to impermanence, etc. The Buddha, observing this sickness, should apply permanence, etc., to treat their sickness. If in a later final age permanence, etc., becomes the sickness, it is transmitted and entrusted to a future Buddha, who alone can cure it. Extending from the past to the future, they are all called four inversions. If treating permanence, etc., it is like the past teachings; if treating impermanence, etc., it is like the "Chapter on Mourning and Lamentation." This chapter only clarifies the sickness of delusion; if one understands the sickness, one can understand the medicine. Apart from inversions there are no truths; since circumstances call for a separate explanation, the four inversions are clarified. The text explains eight inversions, but entitles the chapter with four, because the sūtra masters followed brevity and combined them into four. Now, in adopting the combined title, it is intended to contrast with the four truths to make them mutually complementary. Discussing the recent three chapters as mutually complementary: the Buddha's speech and Māra's speech broadly discuss heterodoxy and orthodoxy; the four truths specifically explain correct understanding; the four inversions specifically explain heterodox delusions. If one only understands the truths and inversions, like only partially recognizing someone entering, or merely knowing a wooden post rather than knowing fully, it is not called complete achievement of correct goodness and cannot perform good karma. Understanding both heterodoxy and orthodoxy, penetrating both inversions and truths, is complete achievement of correct goodness and the ability to perform good karma; that karma is precisely the nature of the Tathāgata. Since their sequential complementation combines them into four inversions, the meaning is convenient; therefore it is called the "Chapter on the Four Inversions."

11.14

The text consists of two parts: first, explaining the four inversions; second, acknowledging and understanding [them]. First, regarding the four inversions, it comprises four chapters. The first chapter consists of three parts: first, setting forth the sphere of suffering; second, setting forth the essence of suffering; third, concluding. Regarding the fruit of Buddhahood, taking non-suffering as suffering is delusion, which should incur the retribution of suffering. Yet they say this is understanding, which is giving rise to a notion of bliss in suffering. "Impermanence and transformation" refers to the suffering of conditioned existence of the Buddha. "Relinquishing the body and entering nirvāṇa" refers to the suffering of decay of the Buddha. They claim that saying the Tathāgata is permanent is an inversion, and saying he is impermanent is a truth. From "If I were to say..." downward, it is precisely the inverted mind, giving rise to a notion of suffering in bliss (and so forth). Taking impermanence as permanent is the second inversion. In the sphere, it cites both notions; in the essence, it specifically explains one notion. Having already cited both above, not wishing to multiply words, it also sets forth the sphere of inversion; afterward, the explanation of the essence of inversion and the conclusion can be seen. What is called "not cultivating" means not cultivating the empty wisdom of prajñā. The latter two inversions can be traced accordingly. Second, acknowledging and understanding also has two parts: first, acknowledging and understanding; second, recounting delusion. Specifically speaking, taking the denial of cause and effect as wrong view, Kāśyapa has long been free from it; generally taking all inverted minds as wrong, Kāśyapa still possessed it (and so forth).

11.15

Chapter on the Nature of the Tathāgata

11.16

This title does not specify "Buddha" but says "Tathāgata" because it applies equally to the three periods of time; the Buddhas of the three periods of time are all initially designated as Tathāgata. Moreover, it brings forward the beginning to designate the end. Furthermore, "tathā" (suchness) means non-difference, refuting all deviant assertions. In addition, the Tathāgata is the Buddha, and the Buddha is the Tathāgata; therefore it is called the "Chapter on the Nature of the Tathāgata"—the four siddhāntas (and so forth). Furthermore, "Tathāgata" is the supreme designation for the ultimate fruit, and "nature" is the fundamental name for the ultimate principle. Not only is the ultimate fruit called Tathāgata, the fundamental nature of sentient beings is also called Tathāgata. Moreover, Tathāgata corresponds to the fruit, and nature corresponds to the cause; although both cause and fruit are listed, the intention lies in the cause; therefore it is called the "Chapter on the Nature of the Tathāgata." Moreover, the fundamental nature of the fruit is hidden and difficult to discern; bringing forward the manifest to designate the hidden, it is therefore called the "Chapter on the Nature of the Tathāgata." Moreover, the principle of nature contains and conceals, being fully endowed with various natures: good, evil, and the three vehicles; bringing forward the superior and discarding the inferior, it is therefore called the "Chapter on the Nature of the Tathāgata." Furthermore, the name Tathāgata is universal: whoever possesses mind is a future Tathāgata; the noble beings of the four reliances are just like the Tathāgata; the Buddhas of the ten directions are alike called Tathāgata. With respect to a single Buddha, there are the transformation, response, reward, and Dharma [bodies], which are all called Tathāgata. In the present text, it properly distinguishes the Tathāgata of the tathāgatagarbha. In the twenty-five states of existence, all possess a self; because the self is identical, it is called suchness (tathā); because it manifests suchness to people, it is said to have come (āgata); being permanent and indestructible, it is called nature; named from this, it is called the "Chapter on the Nature of the Tathāgata." One should know that this tathāgatagarbha is precisely the buddhadhātu. Various masters explain the meaning of "garbha" differently. The Treatise Masters say: the fruit of Buddhahood lies in the future and does not exist at present, so it is called a treasury (garbha). They also say: the buddhadhātu is the mental consciousness of sentient beings; since the mental consciousness can naturally avoid suffering and seek bliss, it is precisely the mental consciousness. Kāishàn says: the six dharmas are the buddhadhātu. None of these meanings is correct. This chapter takes the Tathāgata's own nature [as buddhadhātu], not the mental consciousness, nor the six dharmas. Furthermore, the tathāgatagarbha is hidden, while the mental consciousness and the six dharmas are manifest; moreover, the tathāgatagarbha is permanent, while the mental consciousness and the six dharmas undergo change and are impermanent, bearing no relation whatsoever to the nature of the Tathāgata; none of these are accepted now. The Dilun masters say: delusion concealing the principle is called a treasury. This meaning is incorrect. I personally remark: it is not without one aspect, but it does not fit the title of this chapter. They hold that delusion is different from principle, so delusion can conceal the principle; now, relying on the sūtra, within all dharmas there is the nature of peace and bliss; how could natureless delusion conceal the delusionless nature? It does not accord with the sūtra's meaning, so it is not accepted. I personally remark: not only are delusion and nature mutually identical, what does everything not include? What dharma is not present in nirvāṇa? All sentient beings are the mark of nirvāṇa; all lands are the mark of nirvāṇa (and so forth). Furthermore, the Treatise Masters say: the future fruit is the nature, which means it is external; the six dharmas are the nature, which means it is internal. The Dilun masters say: delusion concealing the ālaya[vijñāna], which is also internal. Xīnghuáng says: neither internal nor external, relying exclusively on the correct nature. The Dilun masters rely exclusively on inherent existence; the Treatise Masters rely exclusively on the conditions and manifestation, and also rely on the future fruit, the nature of the fruit, and the nature of the fruit-of-the-fruit; all are rebuked by the sūtra, like the blind touching the elephant, failing to understand the profound purport. Now, it is explained that the four propositions are equal, pure, and non-contentious, hence called suchness (tathā); skillfully demonstrating it to sentient beings via the four siddhāntas, it is called coming (āgata); being permanent and unvarying, it is called nature. How could a single dharma alone be the treasury-nature? Furthermore, someone clings to the view: the tathāgatagarbha cannot but exist. This meaning is not correct. The buddhadhātu is not existent, not non-existent, not both existent and non-existent, and not neither existent nor non-existent; how could one exclusively say it is existent? Although free from these four, when there are causal conditions, one speaks via the four siddhāntas within a single gate; therefore it is said that the tathāgatagarbha cannot but exist, using existence to receive those who hold annihilation, using existence to refute permanence, and using existence to bring about awakening. When one awakens to the buddhadhātu, the buddhadhātu is not existent; the other three gates are also like this. How could one cling to existence and damage the three gates? Like someone asking about a bridge, what is the benefit of excessive disputation? The buddhadhātu explained now has an intention such as this. If one captures this intention, it is also in the fundamental nature, the intermediate stage, and the ultimate fruit; it is both hidden and manifest, both external and internal. As the sūtra says: "The gold treasury in the house, its size is unknown. The person who skillfully digs it out is revered." That is precisely its meaning. Question: As for the three—treasury, nature, and principle—how are they identical or different? Answer: They are just a single meaning. If one wishes to distinguish them: speaking of principle and delusion combined is called treasury; speaking completely without delusion is called principle; being immutable is called nature (and so forth). A certain master presented five similes: first, asking whether the twenty-five states of existence have a self or not? The Buddha cited the poor woman's treasure to answer, clarifying that there is a self, but it is hidden and not manifest. If so, why was it not spoken of earlier? The Buddha used the poison-smeared [drum] to illustrate it: because the sickness of [clinging to] permanence had not yet subsided, one could not wash away the milk. The earlier and later sicknesses are discussed in terms of sentient beings; the hidden, manifest, smeared, and washed are discussed in terms of the Buddha's teaching. If so, since sentient beings possess it equally, why are the six destinies differentiated, rising and falling with immense disparity? The Buddha cited losing the jewel due to fighting, which leads to unequal grief and joy. If so, why was there fighting? The Buddha cited the sweet medicine, true and genuine, abiding in the mountains, but due to lack of virtue, it flowed into salty and sour flavors. If so, since the true flavor is unchanging, who can damage it? If it cannot be damaged, there would be no sin of killing. The Buddha cited the sharp mattock being able to pierce stone and sand without damaging diamond: just as the Buddha cannot be harmed, yet harboring the intention incurs a rebellious sin; so the nature cannot be destroyed, yet destroying the aggregates incurs sin. However, although one answer would suffice, why are they successive? Only because the buddhadhātu is difficult to understand, requiring ten thousand axes to split the tree. The arrangement of the five similes was his ingenious conception, so it is preserved now (and so forth).

11.17

However, this one chapter answers the two questions above: first it answers how one performs wholesome karma, and next it answers being able to see the nature that is difficult to see. These two complement each other, for it is solely due to wholesome karma that one can see the nature. The nature depends on wholesome karma; karma is the beginning and the nature is the culmination, so the chapter is titled from the culmination. As for the treatise masters who explain the meaning of wholesome karma, a practitioner of nominal designation can regulate good and evil, and by regulating the good, one refines the mental consciousness to attain true awakening. The Mādhyamika masters ask: within saṃsāra there is a nominal person; is this person the buddhadhātu or not? The others answer: it cannot be the buddhadhātu, nor then can it be the self. Since there is no self, who regulates wholesome karma? Furthermore, according to your explanation, nominal entities are not autonomous, while the self is autonomous; the two contradict each other. The Daśabhūmika masters explain: the essence of the dharmadhātu has wholesome and unwholesome functions; with essence and function fully present within delusive afflictions, just as earth covers gold without anything being able to ruin it. If delusive afflictions are like that, this function would be useless; how could it perform karma? Now we clarify this meaning: as the sūtra states, when the gold treasury cannot be seen, at that time one cannot perform wholesome karma; once the treasury is excavated, why would one need wholesome karma to weed out grass and filth? The activities of the Hinayana are not wholesome karma. The extraordinary person using skillful means shows the child the gold treasury in the house to dig it up; this is precisely the meaning of being able to perform wholesome karma. If classified by the six stages, the initial stage is unable and the final stage has no need; the four intermediate clauses are the stages of performing karma. If classified by the four clauses, when hidden it is unable, when manifested it has no need, and when both hidden and manifested it can truly perform karma. Regarding the answer about wholesome karma, there are again two parts: first, clarifying that the buddhadhātu serves as a condition for wholesome karma; second, clarifying that the buddhadhātu genuinely gives rise to wholesome karma. In the first part on serving as a condition for wholesome karma, there are again two: first, clarifying the conditions of karma; second, debating the meaning. In the first part on the conditions of karma, there are further questions and answers. The question closely arises from the "Chapter on the Four Inverted Views": although all worldly realms speak of a self, it is not called the buddhadhātu; the supramundane true self is called the buddhadhātu. For this reason the question is raised. If the twenty-five realms of existence definitely have a self, having it means it is not nonexistent; if they definitely have no self, who performs wholesome karma? Therefore it is asked: do the twenty-five realms of existence have a self or not? The Buddha answers with two similes. The first simile clarifies that what is fundamentally present cannot be seen; the second simile explains that it cannot be spoken of immediately, thereby resolving doubts. In the first simile, there are the doctrinal principle, the simile, and the application. The doctrinal statement has two parts: first, fundamentally present; second, cannot be seen. However, the buddhadhātu is neither fundamentally present nor future; it is spoken of for the sake of conditions. Next, the simile's text has four parts: first, illustrating fundamental presence; second, illustrating invisibility; third, illustrating the response to conditions; fourth, illustrating explicit teaching. The meaning of the first passage is: being destitute of conditional and revealing causes is why it says "poor"; having the capacity to produce is why it says "woman"; residing in the five aggregates is why it says "house"; having the authentic buddhadhātu is why it says "gold"; this nature containing everything is why it says "treasury"; and this nature being vast is why it says "much". Next, as for the family members, great and small, not knowing: former interpretations held that the noble persons of the four fruits are "great" and ordinary beings of the triple realm are "small", all of whom do not know. The Mādhyamika masters say: only bodhisattvas are "great" and only śrāvakas are "small", all of whom also do not know. We now clarify: humans and devas are small, while the two vehicles of analytical emptiness are great; the two vehicles of analytical emptiness are small, while the two vehicles of embodied emptiness are great; the śrāvakas of mere emptiness are small, while the bodhisattvas of mere emptiness are great; the bodhisattvas of mere emptiness are small, while the bodhisattvas who emerge from provisionality are great—all of whom also do not know. Third, from "at that time an extraordinary person" onward illustrates the response to conditions. Within this there is a question and answer: first meeting them with the lesser path, hence it says "weed out grass and filth". When the conditions are unwilling to accept it, hence it says "cannot". If showing the child the gold, the conditions serve as the power of transformation. Wishing to precede others, while "I also wish to see it", means placing oneself behind. Fourth, from "this person then" onward is the explicit teaching. Third, the application of the simile has two parts: first the application, and next the line-by-line commentary. The application is evident. The second simile has two parts: first the simile, next the application. The first simile has four parts: first, clarifying the arising of the sickness of positing a self; second, teaching the medicine of non-self; third, the cessation of the sickness of a false self; fourth, the flourishing of the teaching of the true self. The meaning is the same as in the "Lamentation Chapter"; that simile was manifest, while this simile is hidden. For the former interpretations of the woman and the good physician, four masters gave explanations. One says: the woman illustrates the dharmakāya, and the physician illustrates the nirmāṇakāya. The second says: the woman illustrates real wisdom, and the physician illustrates provisional wisdom. The third says: the woman illustrates the previous Buddha, and the physician illustrates the subsequent Buddha. The fourth says: the woman illustrates the Buddha's wisdom, and the physician illustrates the capacities and conditions. In the passage above, the poor woman illustrated the bodies of sentient beings; since this woman is not said to be poor, she illustrates the Buddha's wisdom and superior response. Giving birth to a single son illustrates sentient beings receiving the teaching and giving rise to understanding; because their understanding is slight, it says "infant". Because they cling to a false permanence, it says "fell ill". Next, from "this woman was grieved and distressed" downward illustrates teaching the medicine of non-self, which again has three parts: first, the Buddha's wisdom contemplates capacities; second, finding the capacity to establish transformation; third, cutting off the false self. In the first passage, provisional wisdom gives rise to compassion, hence it says "grieved and distressed". Searching for the capacity for non-self is why it says "sought a physician". Next, when the good physician arrives, he immediately finds the capacity to administer transformation. Setting forth three kinds of medicine illustrates the three cultivations of impermanence. Third, from "thereupon he told the woman" downward cuts off the teaching of a false self. Here, the milk illustrates the true self. Because it is not the time for the true self, it says do not give it. Smearing the breast with a bitter taste illustrates covering the true self with non-self, just as bitter and sweet are opposed in nature. Why was milk also included when compounding the three medicines previously? This too is the bitter taste of non-self, opposing permanence. Third, from "the child was thirsty" downward illustrates the cessation of the sickness of a false self. First, clarifying the cessation of the sickness; next, clarifying the digestion of the medicine. Because the conditions for the true self arise, it says "thirsty"; because self and non-self are mutually opposed, it says "toxic energy". Non-self remedies the false; when the false is eliminated, the medicine ceases, hence it says "the medicine was digested". Fourth, the mother then washing her breast illustrates the flourishing of the teaching of the true self. Again there are four parts: first, speaking for them; second, conflicting with inclinations; third, reiterating; fourth, accepting and practicing, which are evident. Next, "the Tathāgata is also like this" is the application of the simile. It only applies the two medicines and does not apply the two sicknesses. The original intention was doubt concerning the difference between self and non-self, which is why the medicines are applied; curing the sickness is secondary, which is why it is not applied. The "Lamentation Chapter" is also like this. Question: If the hidden is called the tathāgatagarbha and the self is the buddhadhātu, do all sentient beings have the nature of the self? Answer: All sentient beings have the nature, but are not yet Buddhas; therefore they have the self, but do not yet have the virtue of the self. Why is this? Persons are distinct, while the Dharma is universal. Because the Dharma is universal, there is the nature and there is the self; because persons are distinct, they are not Buddhas and do not possess the virtue. Question: Dharma is the Dharma of persons; since previously there was no distinct person, whose Dharma is the Dharma? Explanation: Dharma belongs to dharmatā (and so forth).

11.18

From "Kāśyapa said to the Buddha" onward is the second part: a dialogue discussing the doctrine. As for the first question, previously it was explained that there is a self in the twenty-five realms of existence, and here this doctrine is challenged. First, he generally proclaims nonexistence. Next, from "Why is that?" onward, he separately raises twelve objections, combined into four intended points: the first four objections concern the fruit; the next two objections concern the cause; the third set of four objections also concerns the fruit; and the fourth set of two objections challenges its location. The first comprises two pairs—namely, beginning life and final death, and difference and superiority versus inferiority, as can be seen. Next, the objections regarding the cause also comprise two: the ten non-virtuous actions and so forth concern unwholesome causes, while what follows drunkenness concerns unwholesome conditions, as can be seen. The third set of four objections concerning the fruit comprises: first, based on painful fruit; second, based on painful conditions; third, based on forgetting; and fourth, based on remembering. The fourth set of two objections questions the location: first, challenging where it specifically resides; and second, challenging whether it pervades the entire body. Alternatively, one may simply take them as six pairs making twelve objections; or ten objections challenging its present function, and two objections challenging its location, and so forth. Second, from "The Buddha said" onward is the reply, responding in turn to the twelve objections. First, he raises two parables to reply to the search for its present function, and later, the parable of the sharp pickaxe replies to the search for its location. Regarding what is termed the "present function": his objection was that if the true self is permanent, there should be no arising and ceasing. Next, regarding the objection of difference and superiority versus inferiority, the Buddha's intended reply is that there truly is a true self, but because it is covered by anger and delusion it cannot be seen, and therefore there is final death, rising, and sinking. The former parable illustrates gaining and then losing, while the latter parable illustrates losing and then gaining. Yet as for this wondrous understanding, how can ordinary beings, who have not yet attained it, suddenly be said to have lost it? These are words of the principle's workings: what should have been attained is not attained, hence it is said to be gained and then lost; the gaining is no distinct gaining, but a return to what was lost; the loss is no distinct loss, but a return to what was gained; gaining is devoid of anything gained, and losing is also devoid of anything lost, and so forth. Within the first two parables, the first parable has three points: the parable, the application, and the conclusion. The parable comprises four: first, the principle of the originally existent nature; second, encountering conditions and giving rise to delusion; third, the faculties and conditions evoking a response; and fourth, the holy one responding to shatter delusion. In the first text, "the king's house" refers to the domain governed by the Buddha. "A wrestler" illustrates that sentient beings have the function of subduing māras and overcoming non-Buddhists; hence he is called a "wrestler." "Between the eyebrows" refers to the middle way. "The vajra jewel": some say it is the principle; some say it is understanding; some say the principle and understanding are completely pure, indestructible like a vajra jewel. Next, "with another wrestler" refers to encountering conditions and giving rise to delusion, losing the originally existent principle. This also comprises two: first, giving rise to delusion; and second, losing the principle. In the first text, "another wrestler" refers to heavenly māras, non-Buddhists, and evil companions, and so forth. "Wrestling and grappling with each other": [the views of] annihilation and permanence conflict with right contemplation, and right contemplation shatters [the views of] annihilation and permanence; hence it is called "grappling with each other." "Striking him with the head": this is using the view of self to strike the understanding of the middle way. Next, from "the jewel on his forehead" onward explains the loss of the correct principle, sinking into the body of the wrong views of annihilation and permanence. Third, "there was a wound in that place": this is the faculties and conditions bringing about suffering. The two views wounding the correct understanding is the wound; an ancient commentary says that bringing about the painful fruit of saṃsāra is the wound. "Immediately summoned a skilled physician": the faculties evoke the Buddha. "At that time there was a clear-sighted physician": this is the noble wisdom penetratingly knowing that losing the principle invites suffering. "He then remained there": this clarifies that what was lost was not truly lost. Fourth, from "At that time the skilled physician" onward, teaching the Dharma to shatter delusion, also comprises two: first, an illustration of provisional teaching; next, an illustration of perfect teaching. In the first provisional teaching, using no-self to inspect the false is like searching for the jewel. The wrestler's startled reply illustrates receiving the teaching and cultivating the contemplation of no-self. Moving from confusion to understanding, it is therefore called a startled reply. "Could it not be an illusion?" is the contemplation of no-self. "Where could it be?" is the contemplation of impermanence. "Grieving and weeping" is the contemplation of suffering. This illustrates the provisional teaching. Next, from "At that time the skilled physician" onward illustrates teaching the perfect teaching, which again comprises four: first, preaching it to him; second, his not accepting it; third, preaching it again; and fourth, his accepting it immediately—illustrating preaching the buddhadhātu, which is not accepted right away. In the first text, "under the skin" means hidden within annihilation and permanence. "Its reflection appeared outside": an ancient commentary says that the future fruit is in the future; Xīnghuáng says that it is the Buddha's wisdom silently illuminating. Now it is explained that the principle of the nature is open and pervasive throughout all places—this is "its reflection appearing outside." Next, from "At that time the wrestler" onward is sentient beings not accepting it. An ancient commentary says: under the skin illustrates the present; inside the sinews illustrates the future. If it is in the present, why does it not break through delusion and emerge? If it is in the future, it should not be visible. Xīnghuáng says: light delusion is called the skin, and heavy delusion is called the sinews. Third, from "The physician then held up a mirror" onward is the Tathāgata preaching it again. The mirror illustrates the perfect sūtra, illuminating the face of faithful understanding: the text is clear, the principle is revealed, and faithful truth is plainly evident. Fourth, after the wrestler saw it, this is his faithful acceptance. Next, from "Good sons" onward is the application of the parable. It applies only three, not applying the first. First, it applies the second: encountering conditions and giving rise to delusion. In the parable there were two aspects, but here it applies only one: giving rise to delusion applies to grappling. Next, from "therefore falls into hell" onward applies the third: inviting suffering and experiencing loss. Here it also provides a thorough answer to the previous ten objections. Third, "just like that wrestler" applies the fourth: the noble one responding by preaching the Dharma. First, it applies the provisional teaching. Previously there was the Buddha preaching and sentient beings practicing the contemplation of no-self; here it applies only the latter. The intent again has two parts: first, applying the practice of contemplation; and next, clarifying non-understanding. Within this, the parable is reiterated, which is the direct application. From "Just as an ignoble person" onward means that although one contemplates no-self, one still cannot understand. Why is that? If one understands the true self, only then does one recognize no-self; since one does not understand the self, no-self is not established. First, the parable is reiterated, and then it is applied. Next, from "The Tathāgata is also like this" onward applies the preaching of the perfect teaching. Previously the parable had four parts, but it applies only the last two. Here first, it applies the third: the Tathāgata preaching again. From "All these sentient beings" onward applies the fourth: faithful acceptance; first it applies it, and then it adduces the parable to correspond. In the direct application, first it clarifies that when there is delusion they do not believe, and next it clarifies that when delusion is removed they faithfully accept. Third, it concludes by praising its inconceivability. Next, from "Furthermore, good sons" onward is the parable of the sweet medicine on the Snowy Mountains. An ancient commentary says that it assists in replying to the previous question. Master Guān says that it illustrates losing and then gaining again. This is divided into the opening of the parable and the application of the parable. The opening comprises four: first, losing; second, gaining; third, losing again; and fourth, gaining again. In the first, clarifying the loss comprises two: first, the nature of the principle; second, explaining the loss. In the first text, the Snowy Mountains illustrate the bodies of sentient beings; the medicine of a single flavor illustrates the non-duality of the middle way, hence it is called "a single flavor." This principle can eliminate inverted delusions, hence it is called "medicine," and is named "the flavor of bliss." "Its flavor is extremely sweet": the teaching and the principle correspond, meaning the teaching is blissful and the principle is sweet. Next, "under a deep thicket" explains that defilements cover it, which is why the principle is lost. The defilements are deep, and inverted delusions intermingle, causing it to remain unseen. Next, from "a person smelled its fragrance" onward is the second: clarifying the attainment, which also comprises two: first, partial attainment; and next, complete attainment. In the first partial attainment, regarding "smelling its fragrance," one explanation says: knowing through faith based on the sūtra, hence it is called "smelling its fragrance." A second explanation says: the bodhisattvas of the ten abodes see it without full clarity, hence it is called "smelling its fragrance." From "In past ages" onward is the second: clarifying complete attainment. This refers to past buddhas having already realized this principle. "Fashioned wooden tubes": this is the expounding of the teaching. It illustrates the clarifying causes of the ten stages; using the cause to receive the fruit, it is therefore called "catching the medicine." "In various places": in life after life in the past, cultivating the causes of the ten stages. "Flowing out from the ground and gathering in the wooden tubes": cause and fruit correspond, and the clarifying cause attains realization; hence it is said to "flow out." Third, from "After the king passed away" onward explains the loss again. This is when the past buddha passed away, and sentient beings indulged in laxity and produced various defilements, causing them to lose it. The six flavors illustrate the six realms. The original flavor is true and genuine; after giving rise to delusion, it flows into the six realms and becomes either sour or salty. That the true flavor of the medicine remains on the mountain illustrates that the true nature of the bodies of sentient beings does not differ, yet as it flows along with the six realms, differences arise. "Ordinary beings of meager merit applying effort without obtaining it" illustrates having an attached mind in asceticism, meditation, and wisdom, seeking the true principle but unable to attain it. It also illustrates all kinds of digging and excavating, desiring to find the nature of the principle, yet being completely irrelevant. Fourth, from "Again there was a holy king" onward is gaining it again. This refers to the present Buddha realizing this principle again. From "Good sons" onward is the second part: applying the parable, but it applies only the two losses and does not apply the two gains. Here first, it applies having the principle yet losing it. Previously it said "under a deep thicket"; here it is applied as being "covered by the thickets of defilements." Previously in the parable it said "no one saw it"; here it is applied as "sentient beings of ignorance do not see it." From "Because of defilements" onward applies the third: explaining the loss again. This corresponds to "either sour or salty," directly answering the earlier question regarding difference and superiority versus inferiority.

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大般涅槃經疏 — Classical Chinese