大般涅槃經疏 15

English (machine translation) 15

Language: English

15.1

Composed by Master Guàndǐng of Zhāng'ān under the Suí

15.2

Re-edited by the Śramaṇa Zhànrán of Tiāntái under the Táng

The beginning of the fascicle extensively clarifies the truth of origin (samudayasatya). The text is threefold: first, clarifying the truth of origin; second, reconciling and harmonizing [teachings]; third, analytical evaluation. The first part is also threefold: first, presenting the headings; second, explaining the essence; third, clarifying what is correct and incorrect. The first, presenting the headings, has two parts: first, restating the chapter heading; second, explaining that the cause of accumulation (samudaya) can produce the fruit of the skandhas, and thus it is said to be the causes and conditions of the skandhas. From 'That which is called accumulation' onward is the second, explaining the essence. Former teachings took karma and affliction to be origin, wherein afflictions fully include the ten messengers (kleśas); now it speaks only of affliction, without clarifying karma, because its root is affliction and affliction moistens karma. Among afflictions, it specifically emphasizes craving and attachment. Craving is the delusion that binds one to the realms; because it moistens karma, birth occurs. The Avataṃsaka Sūtra says: 'Without karma and without affliction, the truth of suffering has no abode; ignorance does not operate, moving through the world with equality.' Furthermore, that the twelve links of dependent origination neither arise nor perish is equality, and only then is it named the truth of origin. If the twelve links of dependent origination arise and perish, it is origin, not the truth. Here there are seven rounds: 1. Clarifying the cause of accumulation: having already arisen in the fruit, this is the five skandhas generating craving, and in turn craving this existence; this is craving the skandhas-body. Next, from 'There are two kinds of craving' onward is 2. clarifying the two kinds of craving: one's own body is the 'self' (ātman), and what is needed is the 'mine' (ātmīya). 3. The two kinds of craving: wishing to attain and having attained. 4. That is, the craving of the three realms. 5. Three kinds: that is, craving through the conditions of karma, whereby due to the retributive cause this suffering fruit is induced—just as the great desires of pigeons and sparrows are all fruits of past karma. Next, craving through the conditions of affliction arises through habitual causes, which is readily understood. Next, craving through the conditions of suffering: in order to escape severe suffering, one gives rise to craving for slight suffering, as when fearing the suffering of death, one undergoes painful treatment to be cured; although acupuncture and moxibustion are truly painful, because one is cured through them, one then generates attachment. 6. Further, there are four cravings, which are the four necessities. 7. Further, there are five kinds of craving, which are the five skandhas. From 'Good son, craving is of two kinds' onward is the third, clarifying what is correct and incorrect. If it is unwholesome craving, then it is origin; if it is wholesome craving, then it is not origin. Within this there are again three rounds of evaluation: first, evaluating the noble against the ordinary; second, raising the bodhisattva against the two vehicles; third, evaluating truth versus non-truth. Hence it says that an ordinary person's craving is called origin and is not called truth, while a bodhisattva's craving is called real truth and is not called origin. A bodhisattva's craving being called real truth and not called origin is taken in terms of their understanding wisdom, hence it is called truth; ordinary people are not like this, so it is merely called origin. If one analogizes to this principle, the conventional is also not the truth; if viewed from understanding, it can be called truth; if one again follows emotional attachment, it is termed the conventional.

15.5

From 'Kāśyapa addressed the Buddha' onward is the second, reconciling and harmonizing. Formerly, karma and delusion were taught to be origin; why now is craving alone spoken of as the cause of suffering? First comes the question, then the answer. In the question, he first cites four sūtras, and next formally articulates the challenge. In the initial citation of the sūtras, the mention of the six contacts refers to the six consciousnesses grasping sense objects, whereby contact and confrontation occur; this too is origin. Conditioned by these conscious minds, one obtains future fruits, just as the four stations of consciousness constitute the five clinging-skandhas. From 'Now on what grounds' onward formally articulates the challenge. Next, in the Buddha's answer, there are also two parts: first, praising his question; second, providing the formal answer. The first is as in the text. In the formal answer, the meaning is that the former teaching and the present teaching do not contradict each other, which is why today craving is spoken of as the root of the skandhas and dhātus. Concerning the present teaching, there are also two parts: first, clarifying that craving is the root; second, clarifying the faults and perils of craving. The root also has two parts: the teaching in terms of phenomena, and next the teaching by analogies. There are three analogies in all: the great king, the greasy garment, and the moist ground, all of which are as in the text.

15.6

From 'Good son, the bodhisattva' onward is the second, clarifying the faults and perils of craving, which also has two parts: first, setting forth the nine headings; afterwards, explaining each extensively. The explanation itself forms nine sections, and within each section one should still distinguish between setting up and applying the analogies: the first one provides an analogy for the two vehicles, and the latter eight provide analogies for ordinary people. As for the first text, the two vehicles have not yet severed the residue of habitual tendencies, like not yet finishing the repayment of wealth. The eight below are for ordinary people, as can be seen by consulting the text.

15.7

From 'Next, good son, for this reason' onward is the third, analytical evaluation. The worldly cause and effect of suffering and origin being concluded, between the four truths he concludes the preceding suffering and origin with-activity, and initiates the subsequent unproduced four truths. Forgetting the preceding is forgetting birth-and-death; forgetting the subsequent is forgetting nirvāṇa. Based on this arising and perishing, the analytical evaluation in the text makes the second, third, and fourth rounds all apparent. Why is this? If one sees that there is suffering, then suffering arises; if suffering arises, then suffering ceases. Once one understands that suffering is without suffering, suffering does not arise; since suffering does not arise, suffering does not cease. The Pañcaviṃśati says: 'Form itself is emptiness; emptiness is not the destruction of form.' The nature of form is inherently empty; within emptiness there is neither arising nor perishing. The Vimalakīrti says: 'Thoroughly penetrating the five clinging-skandhas as empty and without anything arising is the meaning of suffering.' If one can thus understand suffering to be without suffering, then there is the true reality. Now, origin arises from suffering; once one understands that suffering is without suffering, how could there still be origin? Understanding that origin is without origin is itself the true reality. Because suffering and origin are extinguished, it is called the truth of cessation. Since there are no suffering and origin, how could one obtain the truth of cessation? Cessation was originally never so, and now there is no cessation; this is understanding cessation to be without cessation, whereby there is the true reality. The path remedies suffering and origin; since there is nothing to be remedied, nor is there anything capable of remedying, the path is non-dual. Understanding the path to be without a path, there is the true reality. Furthermore, relying on this intermediate point to evaluate the unproduced clarifies that the two extremes are unproduced. Since worldly cause and effect do not arise, supramundane cause and effect also do not arise, and therefore there are no four truths. Merely understanding that worldly suffering and origin are without suffering and origin, and merely understanding that supramundane path and cessation are without path and cessation, is precisely the unproduced four truths. Its meaning is immeasurable; here it is stated briefly. If one wishes to evaluate and bring forth the third round—understanding suffering to be without suffering, yet having the real—this is within the real, which again has two meanings: the gradual real and the non-gradual real. The gradual real is the immeasurable four truths; the non-gradual real is the uncreated four truths. Returning to the evaluation of the four truths, it makes four chapters. First, in evaluating the truth of suffering, there are inherently two editions: according to the old edition, it says that ordinary people, together with śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, all have the truth of suffering. According to the newly revised edition, within the truth of origin it differentiates ordinary people from the two vehicles: ordinary people only have suffering and no truth, while the two vehicles have both suffering and truth; this is granting and withholding with respect to the two vehicles. An old commentary says: suffering is the object, and truth is the wisdom. Ordinary people have no wisdom and only have the object, so they have only suffering and no truth. People of the two vehicles possess a partial wisdom, so they have both suffering and truth. Lacking the real truth, they cannot contemplate suffering and understand that suffering is without suffering, so it is not real. The truth of origin is modeled on this. That the two truths of path and cessation do not discuss ordinary people is because only between the two vehicles and bodhisattvas do the two truths of path and cessation have the difference between the true and the counterfeit: because people of the two vehicles cannot contemplate the truth of cessation as non-truth, it is not real; because bodhisattvas are able to know it, it is real truth.

15.8

From 'Good son' onward is the third, extensively clarifying the truth of cessation. Although cessation and path were evaluated in between arising and perishing, because cessation and path in terms of arising and perishing have not yet been explained, they are explained further here. The three, such as the unproduced, will be extensively explained later. Next, explaining the truth of cessation, the text is threefold: first, stating the two headings; next, explaining them; third, concluding. It states the two headings of seeing cessation and seeing the truth of cessation: seeing cessation is the heading of severance; seeing the truth of cessation is the heading of separation. The two vehicles reduce the body to ashes and extinguish consciousness, possessing only the two matters of severance and separation, whereas the bodhisattva is complete with the qualities of wisdom and virtue, and so forth. Second, from 'That which is called severing all afflictions' onward is the explanation. The first eight characters explain the heading of seeing cessation, which is the non-existence resulting from severing delusion, taking this as severance. From 'If afflictions' onward explains the heading of seeing the truth of cessation, forming two parts: first, function; next, essence. In the first part on function, there are five clauses in all: the first four clauses are the four virtues, or what some call five virtues. For now we consider them the four virtues, speaking in terms of function. From 'Constantly in the presence of form and sound' onward is second, in terms of ultimate quiescence, discussing it in terms of essence. Third, from 'Good son, the bodhisattva' onward is the conclusion, as in the text.

15.9

From 'Good son, how' onward is the fourth, extensively clarifying the truth of the path. The text is twofold: first, clarifying the truth of the path; second, reconciling and harmonizing. The first part is threefold: 1. the heading; 2. explanation; 3. conclusion. Within the explanation, first is the analogy, next the application. In the first, the analogy, the mention of 'due to a lamp' is an analogy for the eightfold path. Now, a lamp illuminates objects; although objects differ as permanent, impermanent, and so forth, it is ultimately a single path differently explained according to conditions. Next, in applying the analogy, the mention of *dravya* (tuoluopiao): Héxī says it is the real truth (paramārtha-satya). *Guṇa* (qiunā) is ornamentation, necklaces, meritorious qualities, and the like. An old commentary says: primary truth and secondary truth. Not being *dravya* means not being the ultimate; not being *guṇa* means not being the conventional.

15.10

From 'Kāśyapa addressed the Buddha' onward is the second, reconciling and harmonizing. Formerly, the Buddha gave various different teachings, but now he speaks only of the eightfold path; therefore, he reconciles and harmonizes them. The text is twofold: first, the question; next, the answer. In the question there are two parts: first, the question; next, the challenge. The initial question has three parts: 1. stating the inconsistency; 2. explaining the inconsistency; 3. concluding the inconsistency. The first is as in the text. Next, from 'Why is this?' onward is the explanation: the fourteen sūtras are mostly teachings of the Āgamas and the like, from faith up to generosity, teaching the path differently. Next, from 'World-Honoured One, if the eight noble paths' onward is the challenge. It is also threefold: 1. challenging the past by means of the present; 2. challenging the present by means of the past; 3. concluding the fault. As for the first text, if the past was correct, then the present is wrong. Second, if the present is correct, why did he not speak of it formerly, and so forth? Third, the conclusion, as in the text. The Buddha's answer has two parts: first, praising the question; from 'Good son' onward is the formal answer, which again has two parts, namely doctrine and analogy. The import in the doctrinal statement is: because capacities differ, the teachings vary; when reconciled together, the principle is the same. From 'Just as an excellent physician' onward is the analogical explanation. In all, six analogies are raised: 1. an excellent physician; 2. drinking water; 3. a goldsmith; 4. lighting a fire; 5. a single consciousness; 6. a single form; all first present the analogy and then apply it. The first analogy of the excellent physician is obvious. Héxī explains: water named *nīvāra* (*niboluō*) refers to boiling harītakī water, named *patrora* (*bozhoulou*). Boiling tree leaves into broth takes its name from the tree. Next, in drinking water, *pānīya* (*pōní*) is a name for water in Kaśmīra. *Utta* (*yutè*) is the name for water in Eastern India; some sūtra manuscripts read *utta*. Currently it is not fixed, but the traditional transmission has it as *uttara-salila* (*yutèlilán*), the name for water in Central India. *Vāri* (*pólì*) is the name for water in grammar treatises (Śabdaśāstra). *Pāyasa* (*pōyé*) is the name for water mixed with medicine. Third, the application of the goldsmith analogy: the text says, 'or he speaks of five kinds, namely those who practice through faith, and so forth.' Those who attain seeing the path refers to the two practices of faith and Dharma; these are people within the path of seeing the truths (darśanamārga). Liberation by faith and attainment through vision are also called seeing-attainment; these two are people within the path of cultivation (bhāvanāmārga). Four persons are across two paths, each distinguished into sharp and dull. A faith-practitioner is dull at the time of seeing the truths; upon entering cultivation, they still become a dull faith-liberated one; the Dharma-practitioner can be known by analogy. Generally, it is like this: with repeated practice one is sharp; without practice one is dull, shifting and unstable. The Abhidharma theorists (Sāṃkhyikās/Sarvāstivādins) say: fifteen mental moments are the path of seeing the truths, and from the sixteenth mental moment onward is the path of cultivation. The Śāstra masters say otherwise: all sixteen are the path of seeing the truths. The Śāstra masters divide sharp and dull within the fivefold mind-stilling meditation; upon entering the path of seeing, there is neither sharp nor dull. Just as riding a boat on calm water has slow and fast, but upon catching the wind and going with the stream there is no longer sharp or dull. The remaining three are clear from the text. From 'Good son, these four truths' onward is the third, the general conclusion.

15.11

From "Kāśyapa addressed the Buddha" onward, the third [section] clarifies the wisdom of the immeasurable four truths. The text has three parts: first, clarifying the immeasurably immeasurable; second, concluding as the four immeasurable wisdoms; third, concluding as the two immeasurables. Others say this passage harmonizes the four truths, and Kāishàn says it concerns whether or not the teachings are completely subsumed; we now state that it is properly the chapter on the wisdom of the immeasurably immeasurable. In the first passage are questions and answers. In the question, past matters are first brought up. Formerly, the grasses and trees of the great earth were used as an analogy for the immeasurably immeasurable, while the small amount in the hand was an analogy for [the truths of] arising and non-arising. One should know that what was previously spoken was little, and what was not spoken was much; does such a great amount completely get subsumed under the four truths? If the four completely subsume it, one should not call it "much"; if they do not completely subsume it, there should be a fifth truth. The Buddha answered that it is both completely subsumed and not completely subsumed: they share the name of "four truths", and in terms of name, subsumption is complete; but in distinguishing their characteristics, he ultimately did not speak of them, so in that sense, subsumption is not complete. Because the names are the same but the meanings differ, there is both completeness and incompleteness. Now when the Buddha answers it, taking it by name, all is completely subsumed. From "Kāśyapa further addressed [the Buddha]" onward, the second [section] concludes the immeasurably immeasurable as the four immeasurable wisdoms. The text has questions and answers. In the answers are two: first, pointing out faculties to distinguish wisdom; second, directly explaining the characteristics of the truths. In the first text, fully discussing the truths and wisdoms, there should be three grades: the lower is ordinary people, who are not worth discussing and thus not spoken of. Bringing up only the intermediate and superior distinguishes the intermediate and superior among the four types of persons. If speaking in terms of dharmas, one should point to the four kinds of four truths to distinguish the intermediate and superior. The [truths of] arising and non-arising were as explained before; the immeasurable is now to be distinguished. Now as for the immeasurable, it is not something transcending beyond the four truths; it is still the four truths, differing only in kinds and distinctions. Hence the text says: "Analyzing and calculating, there are immeasurable kinds." If discussed in detail: from the hells up to the Buddhas, the five aggregates of ordinary beings and sages differ in kinds; within each aggregate, immeasurable realms and sense bases are further distinguished—how could this be known by śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas? This is the immeasurable truth of suffering. Furthermore, from the hells up to the Buddhas, actions and karmas differ; analyzing and calculating each action and karma, there are immeasurable kinds, which is also not known by śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas—this is the immeasurable truth of origination. Furthermore, from the hells up to the Buddhas, with what body one should appear and what Dharma one should preach to cause them to cultivate and learn—analyzing and calculating each body and teaching, with immeasurable Dharma gates as their retinue, which is also not known by śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas—this is the immeasurable truth of the path. Furthermore, from the hells up to the Buddhas, when liberation is attained, the causes and conditions differ; within each liberation there are further immeasurable liberations; analyzing and calculating, there are immeasurable kinds, which is also not known by śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas—this is the immeasurable truth of cessation. Since these four objects are thus different, [the truths of] arising and non-arising are also beyond the reach of the intermediate wisdom of the two vehicles. Sameness and difference of names constitute the characteristics of the four truths, just as the single name "great earth" is immeasurable. Their characteristics are vast; now they shall be briefly explained. Regarding the direct explanation, the four truths are four: First, within the truth of suffering, the sūtra text only relies on the three—aggregates, sense bases, and realms—and re-clarifies the aggregates, briefly indicating the characteristics of suffering. First, concerning the aggregates, the text says: "Knowing that the aggregates are suffering is called intermediate wisdom; distinguishing that the aggregates have immeasurable characteristics is called superior wisdom." How are they distinguished? The aggregates of the six destinies have the meaning of covering: they cover human and heavenly goodness as well as untainted goodness. Covering human and heavenly goodness, one sinks into the three evil paths; covering untainted goodness, one transmigrates through all existences. The aggregates of the two vehicles cover the virtues of equality and so forth: covering the four equalities, they cannot transform and save sentient beings; covering the four virtues, they cannot reach the jewel abode. The aggregates of bodhisattvas cover saṃsāra and nirvāṇa: covering saṃsāra, through great compassion they pull out suffering; covering nirvāṇa, through great friendliness they bestow joy. The aggregates of the Buddhas cover the phenomena and principle of the dharmadhātu: covering phenomena, with the response body they universally respond to all capacities and faculties; covering principle, with the Dharma body they pervade all places. Furthermore, the aggregates of the six destinies are suffering; the aggregates of the two vehicles are bliss; the aggregates of bodhisattvas are both; the aggregates of the Buddhas are neither. How could such distinctions be known by the two vehicles? Next, knowing the sense bases as gates is called intermediate wisdom; distinguishing that the sense bases have immeasurable characteristics is called superior wisdom. How are they distinguished? The six sense bases of the six destinies are called entry gates, and are also called converging entries: the eye faculty and visual forms converge into the conditioned, up to the mental faculty and mental objects converging into the conditioned. The sense bases of the two vehicles enter impermanence and non-self, converging into the unconditioned. The sense bases of bodhisattvas: the eye faculty enters giving, converging into dānapāramitā, up to the mind also being like this; the eye faculty enters the gates of discipline, patience, vigor, meditation, and wisdom, converging into all pāramitās, up to the mind also being like this. The sense bases of all Buddhas: the Buddha eye is the entry into the universal gate, and the universal gate enters the friendliness, compassion, sympathetic joy, and equanimity of all dharmadhātus; the dharmadhātu fully responds, converging into the ocean of sarvajñā, up to the mind also being like this. In various sūtras it is explained that the six faculties are the gates of quiescence and the gates of equality—this meaning is very extensive (and so forth). Furthermore, the entries of the six destinies are entry into the gate of suffering; the entries of the two vehicles are entry into the gate of non-suffering; the entries of bodhisattvas are entry into the gate of both bliss and suffering; the entries of all Buddhas are entry into the gate of neither suffering nor bliss. Third, knowing that the realms have distinct natures is called intermediate wisdom; distinguishing that the realms have immeasurable characteristics is called superior wisdom. How are they distinguished? The visual realm of the six destinies by nature and distinction only sees form and cannot hear sounds; the realm of form by nature and distinction only confronts the eye, not the ear; up to the mental realm by nature and distinction only knowing dharmas, unable to see or hear; the realm of mental objects by nature and distinction only confronts the mind, not the ear or eye. As for the realms of the two vehicles: the visual realm by nature and distinction is only impermanent, suffering, empty, and non-self, unable to attain the permanent and blissful; up to the mental realm by nature and distinction being likewise. As for the realms of bodhisattvas: the visual realm of a bodhisattva by nature and distinction only sees that form is empty, unable to realize that it is simultaneously empty, provisional, and middle; up to the mental realm by nature and distinction only being able to realize emptiness, unable to realize that it is simultaneously empty, provisional, and middle, also being like this. As for the realms of the Buddha: the eye is the dharmadhātu and dharmatā; by nature and distinction it can see form, hear sounds, smell scents, distinguish flavors, perceive tactile sensations, and know dharmas; it is simultaneously empty, provisional, and middle, inconceivable, fully possessing all immeasurable Buddha-dharmas; up to the mind also being like this. Furthermore, the six destinies take suffering as their realm; the two vehicles take non-suffering as their realm; bodhisattvas take both bliss and suffering as their realm; the Buddhas take neither bliss nor suffering as their realm. From "Furthermore, knowing that the characteristic of form is destructibility is called intermediate wisdom" onward, it re-expands upon the aggregates. The text says: "Distinguishing the immeasurable destructible characteristics of forms is called superior wisdom." The form of the six destinies destroys goodness and destroys dhyāna; the form of the two vehicles destroys cause and destroys fruit; the form of bodhisattvas destroys existence and destroys non-existence; the form of the Buddha destroys all the destructions above: destroying them into the dharmadhātu, neither destroyed nor undestroyed, all are the dharmadhātu. Furthermore, the form of the six destinies destroys bliss; the form of the two vehicles destroys suffering; the form of bodhisattvas destroys both; the form of the Buddha destroys neither (and so forth). Furthermore, knowing that sensation is the characteristic of feeling is called intermediate wisdom; distinguishing that this sensation has immeasurable characteristics is called superior wisdom. Sensation of the six destinies receives disagreeable, receives agreeable, and receives neither disagreeable nor agreeable: regarding the disagreeable, feeling of anger arises; regarding the agreeable, feeling of greed arises; regarding the neither disagreeable nor agreeable, feeling of delusion arises. Sensation of the two vehicles: within each of the three feelings, the fivefold Dharma body arises; a srotāpanna initially experiences the untainted (and so forth). Sensation of bodhisattvas: receiving the Buddha-Dharma, receiving sentient beings. When receiving the Buddha-Dharma, they experience the ten powers, the four fearlessnesses, and all pāramitās; when receiving sentient beings, they experience the four immeasurables of friendliness, compassion, sympathetic joy, and equanimity. Sensation of all Buddhas: awakening oneself and awakening others; being awakened, unawakened, and neither awakened nor unawakened, all are the dharmadhātu. Furthermore, knowing that perception grasps characteristics is called intermediate wisdom; distinguishing that this grasping has immeasurable characteristics is called superior wisdom. Grasping of the six destinies only grasps a person, a self, a sentient being, a life span, form, smell, taste, and touch. Grasping of the two vehicles grasps impermanence, suffering, emptiness, non-self, and grasps nirvāṇa. Grasping of bodhisattvas does not grasp the two extremes, but only grasps the middle way. Grasping of the Tathāgata: grasping is non-grasping; being neither grasping nor non-grasping, all are the dharmadhātu. Furthermore, knowing that mental formations have the characteristic of acting is called intermediate wisdom; distinguishing that these mental formations have immeasurable acting characteristics is called superior wisdom. Mental formations of the six destinies can produce the twenty-five states of existence. Mental formations of the two vehicles can produce nirvāṇa. Mental formations of bodhisattvas produce all pāramitās. Mental formations of all Buddhas: acting is non-acting, being neither acting nor non-acting; acting is equal to the dharmadhātu. Furthermore, knowing that consciousness is discernment is called intermediate wisdom; distinguishing that this consciousness has immeasurable knowing characteristics is called superior wisdom. Discernment of the six destinies grasps this and grasps that, drinking suffering and eating poison. Discernment of the two vehicles loathes saṃsāra and sinks into nirvāṇa. Discernment of bodhisattvas departs from extremes and converges in the middle. Discernment of all Buddhas is neither extreme nor middle. The sūtra text regarding the truth of suffering is finished.

15.12

Second: knowing that craving as cause and condition can produce the aggregates is called intermediate wisdom; knowing all cravings is called superior wisdom. Craving of the six destinies is the cause and condition for subsequent aggregates; craving of the two vehicles is the cause and condition for the fivefold [Dharma body]; craving of bodhisattvas is the cause and condition for unequaled form up to unequaled consciousness; craving of all Buddhas is the cause and condition for liberation of form up to liberation of consciousness.

15.13

Third: knowing the cessation of afflictions is called intermediate wisdom; knowing that the cessation of afflictions cannot be measured or counted, and that cessation is likewise beyond reckoning, is called superior wisdom. Ordinary beings of the six destinies also manage to have cessation, but having ceased, it arises again. Cessation of the two vehicles reduces to ashes and cuts off, not arising again. Bodhisattvas extinguish it themselves and further cause others to extinguish it. Cessation of all Buddhas extinguishes all cessations, which is itself the dharmadhātu.

15.14

The path departs from afflictions is called intermediate wisdom discernment; the path that is capable of departure being immeasurable and boundless is called superior wisdom. The path of the six destinies departs from evil towards goodness, or departs from goodness towards evil. The path of the two vehicles departs from the tainted towards the untainted. The path of bodhisattvas departs from extremes towards the middle. The path of all Buddhas has neither departure nor arrival. Why is that? All dharmas are themselves the Buddha path; therefore, seeing motion cultivates the factors of the path, seeing non-motion cultivates the factors of the path, seeing both motion and non-motion cultivates the factors of the path, and seeing neither motion nor non-motion cultivates the factors of the path (and so forth). Here ends the explanation of the immeasurable four noble truths.

15.15

From "knowing worldly truth is called middling wisdom" onward is the third [section], concluding the four immeasurables as two immeasurables, which again has two parts: first explaining the two truths, and next explaining wisdom regarding the two truths. The initial text is precisely the two truths. In the text, simply knowing worldly truth is middling wisdom; distinguishing worldly truth as immeasurable and boundless is superior wisdom. Simply knowing the three Dharma seals is middling wisdom; knowing the supreme truth (paramārthasatya) as immeasurable, boundless, and incalculable is superior wisdom. Worldly people merely say that paramārthasatya, ultimate truth, and nirvāṇa can only be one and cannot be two, much less boundless; the present text explains that paramārthasatya is incalculable—how could it be of only a single kind? The ultimate truth of impermanence, nirvāṇa, and so forth spoken of here is not the same as in the Abhidharmakośa / Sarvāstivāda. The Sarvāstivādins say: The four truths and sixteen aspects all perceive the ultimate and attain holiness, and all are paramārtha. The treatise masters [of the Satyasiddhi] say that only the single item of non-self pervades both the ultimate and the conventional, while the rest are all worldly truth; that they are all collectively spoken of as ultimate is because impermanence exhausts errors such as permanence, and suffering and arising follow the ultimate, being named ultimate by affiliation. The Vimalakīrti says, "Unarisen and unceasing is the meaning of impermanence"; this completely constitutes dharmatā, all of which is paramārtha, and is also the three Dharma seals. From "At that time Mañjuśrī" below, the second part explains wisdom regarding the two truths: first presenting the six kinds of two truths from old interpretations: 1) existence and emptiness, 2) false and real, 3) worldly circulation (also called adapting to matters), 4) continuum, 5) relativity, and 6) causal arising. Emptiness and existence refer to the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā; false, real, and worldly circulation refer to the Abhidharma; continuum, relativity, and causal arising refer to the Satyasiddhi-śāstra. Another interpretation has identical meaning but different names: 1) ordinary and noble, 2) false and real, 3) emptiness and existence, 4) provisional and real, 5) phenomena and principle, 6) close and distant. Old explanations of the names say: Conventional is floating and false; ultimate is called truly real; the worldly is turnover and change; paramārtha is faultless. The conventional is relative to the unconventional, and the unconventional is called ultimate; the ultimate is relative to the non-ultimate, and the non-ultimate is called conventional. The false and the real being mutually relative, the names 'ultimate' and 'conventional' arise. Others ask: The ultimate is truly real and may be called 'truth' (satya). The conventional is floating and false; why is it called 'truth'? They explain: It is judging truly that it is floating and false. If so, the meaning of 'truth' has two explanations: the conventional explains 'truth' through floating and false, while the ultimate explains 'truth' through judging truly. Xinghuang [Falang] says: Truth has never been two; it is two only with respect to conditions. The conventional is real to ordinary people, and the ultimate is real to the noble; both employ 'real' to explain 'truth', without using 'floating and false'. Now we ask: The ultimate is real to the noble, and the noble have the wisdom that illumines the truly real, so it may be called 'truth'. The conventional is real to ordinary people, but ordinary people lack the wisdom that illumines the conventional—how can it be called 'truth'? If ordinary people lack the wisdom that illumines the conventional yet it is real to the conventional and may be called conventional truth, then ordinary people lack the wisdom that illumines the ultimate yet it would also be real to the ultimate, and ought also to be called ultimate truth. If ordinary people lacking wisdom regarding the ultimate does not make it ultimate truth, then ordinary people lacking wisdom regarding the conventional—how can it be called conventional truth? Furthermore, if for the noble it is real to the ultimate and called 'truth', why is it not real for the noble regarding the conventional, such that it cannot be called 'truth'? If so, then the noble would lack provisional wisdom. What we now call 'truth' is still 'judging truly'. The Vimalakīrti says: "The four truths are bodhi, because they are not false or deceptive." This is precisely 'judging truly'. There is judging truly in accord with sentiment, and judging truly in accord with wisdom. Because it is judged truly in accord with sentiment and wisdom, in accord with the ordinary and the noble, and with respect to the ultimate and the conventional, both may be called 'truth'. By analogy, as with a single form, ordinary beings say it exists, while the worthy and noble say it is non-existent. It is also like a single sun: to the drunk and the sober it is different, having movement or non-movement. The meaning of one truth and two truths is also like this. In old explanations, the two truths share a single essence and are not different. Longguang [Sengzhuo] says: Since they are called two truths, how could they have a single essence? The two truths are two, and their essences are also both comprehensive: conditioned provisional dharmas are the worldly essence, and the signless principle is the ultimate essence. Although there are two essences, dharmatā is identical with the conventional; although nominal characteristics are identical with being devoid of nominal characteristics, the ultimate being devoid of nominal characteristics does not obstruct nominal characteristics. It is also said: The two truths share a single essence; because emptiness is the root of principle, the ultimate is the essence and the conventional is its function. Or it is said: Taking the ultimate from the conventional, the conventional is its essence and the ultimate is its function. Kaishan says: The two truths together take the middle way as their essence. None of these views is correct. If the two truths have two essences, then the worldly would have no paramārtha and paramārtha would have no worldly; there would only be non-identity and there could not be mutual identity. If they were a single essence, there would only be one truth and no two truths. If the two truths take the middle as their essence, grasping marks obstructs the ultimate, and ignorance obstructs the conventional—what then would obstruct the middle? If the wisdom of the two truths cannot perceive the middle, how could it be the essence? If the two truths have two essences, the two essences are each different, and mutual identity cannot be discussed; if the two truths are a single essence, it is merely one truth—with what would it be mutually identical? The Humane Kings Prajñāpāramitā says, "The two truths are not mutually identical, just like the two horns of an ox"; the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā says, "Form is itself emptiness"; the Vimalakīrti says, "Completely penetrating the five appropriated aggregates to be empty and unarisen is the meaning of suffering"; and in this sūtra, they all say the two truths are mutually identical (and so on). Formerly it was said: Combine the four truths into two truths. Some say suffering and arising are worldly and constitute worldly truth, while path and cessation are supramundane and constitute ultimate truth. Some say three truths are worldly truth, and only cessation is ultimate truth. Some say all four truths are worldly truth, because they explain cause and effect; only the signless cause and effect is ultimate truth. Some say the four truths are simply worldly truth, and worldly truth is itself ultimate truth. The text says: "Understanding suffering as devoid of suffering is having ultimate truth; the remaining three are likewise." Now we explain: not only are the expansions and mergers of the four truths not uniform, but regarding the two truths alone, the expansions and mergers are not single, as will be explained later. In the text there are two rounds of question and answer. The first question has three parts: first, a direct inquiry; next, from "World-Honoured One" downward, jointly examining whether determinate marks exist or not; third, from "If they exist" downward, a joint objection. The point of the objection is: if you say they exist, that is a single truth; because the ultimate and the conventional are mutually identical, within the ultimate there is the conventional, and within the conventional there is the ultimate; the two truths are not different, hence they are said to be one. If you say they do not exist, that is false and deceptive. Truthfully speaking, determinate existence and determinate non-existence, determinate oneness and determinate difference, are all false and deceptive. Both being drawn from the sūtra, the text mutually reveals them. If they determinately exist or not, this becomes the false assertion of annihilationism or eternalism. From "Good son" downward, the Tathāgata directly answers that the two truths are mutually identical, neither annihilated nor eternal, and determinately not false or deceptive. From "World-Honoured One" downward is the second round of question and answer. The intent of the initial question is: it still turns into a single truth, hence it says there would be no two truths. Just as long being within short loses its length, the ultimate being within the conventional loses the ultimate, turning into only a single truth. The Buddha's answer has two parts: first, briefly explaining the broad intent, that in reality the middle way has only a single essence, but through skillful means he speaks of two for the sake of conditions. From "If according to spoken words" downward is the second part, explaining at length. There are eight kinds in all: 1) worldly and supramundane, 2) having name and having no name, 3) real and unreal, 4) determinate and indeterminate, 5) dharma and non-dharma, 6) burnt and unburnt, 7) suffering and non-suffering, 8) combination. Others also make six kinds of two truths; if one speaks of truths of emptiness and existence, false and real, and so on, they all assert there is false and there is real, two principles distinctly clashing, so this is not the sūtra's intent. The present text says, "In accordance with sentient beings, I speak of having two truths, just as in accordance with a drunk person one says there is a moving sun." One should use this intent to explain the sūtra text. One master says: The seven kinds are unified into one, spoken of differently according to conditions. One master says: The seven kinds are each different. Now we explain that Great Master Zhizhe has seven [kinds of] two truths; although the names differ, their meanings can be reconciled: 1) arising and ceasing, 2) non-arising, 3) single conventional and double ultimate, 4) single conventional and single middle, 5) double conventional and single middle, 6) double conventional and double middle, and 7) the perfect two truths. If one relies on the text of the Fahua xuanyi, the terminology differs slightly, but the meaning is certainly identical, which the reader should know. Within each single kind there are further three varieties, namely: according to sentiment, according to wisdom, and according to sentiment and wisdom. Now, wishing to use those seven kinds of two truths to explain this text—since the Buddha's purport is difficult to know—we will provisionally present the view of one master. The eight different kinds constitute eight sections of text. First, distinguishing the two truths with respect to the two persons, worldly and supramundane, generally heads the seven below; each and every two truths possesses this meaning. Worldly sentiment has many concepts, collected into worldly truth; noble wisdom has much knowledge, collected into ultimate truth—this is distinguishing the two truths according to sentiment and wisdom. Next, "Good son, the five aggregates in combination" is distinguished with respect to having name and having no name. Grasping the aggregates and naming them 'living' is worldly truth; identical to the aggregates yet detached from the aggregates, the nature known like the nature [of things], is ultimate truth; this is established with respect to the four truths with production. Third, "Furthermore, good son, there are dharmas that have names and have reality": others say worldly truth has names, the name naming the entity, and things corresponding to the name; ultimate truth has only names but no reality. The present text is the opposite of this: the worldly has only empty names without true reality; unarisen and unceasing, matching phenomena, is ultimate truth. Being unable to realize that form is itself empty, it has name without reality; being able to realize that form is itself empty, it has reality and has name; this is established relying on the four truths of non-arising. Fourth, "Good son, the lifespan of sentient beings is like a whirling firebrand": this discusses the two truths through the single conventional and double ultimate. Provisional names, illusions, mirages, and whirling firebrands have only names but no reality; matching worldly circulation, they are worldly truth. The ultimate and the middle combine together to form ultimate truth. If one takes the ultimate alone as paramārtha, one cannot say that suffering, arising, cessation, and path are paramārtha. Both pointing to the four truths as being the ultimate and the middle combined, this explains that among the immeasurable four noble truths, whether ultimate or middle, they are equally paramārthasatya; the previous text says, "Paramārtha is immeasurable, boundless, and incalculable." Fifth, from "Good son, worldly dharmas are of five kinds" onward explains the two truths with respect to the single conventional and single middle. Above, the five similes of the mirage, whirling firebrand, and so on were used to illustrate the self of persons as worldly truth; now the five dharmas are taken as worldly truth. The five dharmas are like the firebrand, and the firebrand illustrates dharmas; dharma and simile mutually mentioned are equally the single conventional. The mind without inversion knowing them as they truly are simply points to the middle way as being truly real. This explains the suffering and arising of production, non-arising, and so forth as conventional, and points to the one real truth below as ultimate. Sixth, from "Good son, whether burning or cutting" onward explains the two truths with respect to the double conventional and single middle. Burning and dying explain the beginning and end of the substantive analysis of dharmas. Cutting and destroying explain the beginning and end of the reductive analysis of dharmas. Taking the two beginnings as existence and the two endings as non-existence, combining this existence and non-existence into the conventional is double conventional. Simply pointing to the middle way as neither existent nor non-existent, hence devoid of burning and cutting, is paramārtha. This explains that the ultimate and conventional of production and non-arising above are together called conventional, pointing to the one real truth below as ultimate. Seventh, from "Good son, whether the eight sufferings exist or not" onward explains the two truths with respect to the double conventional and double middle. Double conventional is as before. As for double middle, it does not simply point to principle: phenomena being identical to principle, and the dharmadhātu being fully complete, is called double middle. This combines the ultimate and conventional of production and non-arising from above, all being called conventional, and points to the one reality, inconceivable, as ultimate truth. Although the text is not explicit, the meaning deduced naturally establishes it. However, this round is still the two truths of double conventional and double middle. Eighth, from "Furthermore, good son" downward, first gives a simile and next applies it, explaining that in the perfect two truths, the ultimate and the conventional are mutually identical and both are inconceivable, just as father and mother combine to give birth to a child. One person having many abilities illustrates the perfect conventional. The twelve links of dependent origination combining into the three paths are themselves the three virtues and are themselves paramārtha, revealing the perfect ultimate. These are called the inconceivable two truths. All two truths completely enter into this; through expedients in accordance with the worldly, the various two truths spoken of are immeasurable and boundless—why be astonished that only seven kinds are discussed? Being able to know in this way is called the noble practice of wisdom. Since ancient times people have been confused about this text on the two truths; now, using Great Master Tiantai's doctrine of the seven kinds of two truths to explain the eight rounds, the meaning accords, truly in harmony with noble wisdom.

15.16

From "Mañjuśrī [said to the Buddha]" below, the third [section] clarifies the noble practice of the wisdom of the one real truth. If the preceding text set forth four [truths] and set forth two [truths] together to reveal the one real, why did it not go from four to three, but instead skipped ahead to two? It is not that there are no three truths, but rather that in this passage, bundling the four into two makes the sense convenient; bundling the four into three would make the sense somewhat inconvenient, so it does not speak of three. Interpreters differ [on this]. Those of this region take the eternally abiding Buddha-fruit to be the one, and relying on the one real truth, cite the Śrīmālādevī Sūtra: "The one truth of the cessation of suffering is the real." The Dilun masters say: Eliminating the false and revealing the ālayavijñāna is the real truth. The masters of the middle and provisional say: Eliminating extinction and permanence and revealing the middle way is the one real truth. Xīnghuáng rejects them all: How could the Buddha-fruit's support and what it supports be the one real? Are false delusion and the ālayavijñāna identical or different? If they are identical, when false delusion is eliminated, the ālayavijñāna would also be eliminated; if they are different, it posits the real in dependence on the false, so how could it be the one real? If one posits the middle against the extremes, the middle is still an extreme, and also not the one real. However, all dharmas are originally nonexistent and ultimately pure; since they are genuinely nonexistent, when was there ever the real or the unreal? Truth and non-truth are expedient designations and verbal teachings set up for the sake of conditions. According to the text, it takes the purity of the single path to be the one real truth, which is the correct and true Dharma; hence the Avataṃsaka Sūtra says: "The dharmatā is far removed [from all characteristics]." Therefore, it is now clarified that if one negates that and affirms this, it is not the one real truth. If one explains differently according to conditions, there is no error as long as one grasps the intended meaning. The text's revealing of the one real is exceedingly clear. Dividing the text, there are two parts: first, stating the main thesis; second, discussing the meaning. First, in stating [the thesis], there are questions and answers. In the answers there are eight occurrences of "good man"; the first two together establish the first meaning, thus yielding seven differences: first, in terms of the objective realm; second, in terms of the mind; third, in terms of speech (privately I think it could also be in terms of speech and practice); fourth, based on persons; fifth, in terms of teaching; sixth, in terms of the essence of the cause; seventh, in terms of the essence of the fruit. From "Mañjuśrī said to the Buddha" below, the second part discusses the meaning, likewise discussing seven topics. First, discussing the meaning in terms of the objective realm, there are questions and answers. In the question, he first summarizes the inquiry. At first glance, it seems to ask what difference there is among the three: the Tathāgata, space, and the buddhadhātu. Examining the meaning of the answer below, it is precisely asking what difference there is between these three and the one real truth. The Buddha's answer has three parts: first, proposing two thematic headings; second, explaining them; third, concluding. First, proposing the headings also has two parts: first, proposing the former four truths; next, proposing the present one real [truth]. Xīnghuáng called the first the heading of the "real cessation" and the next the heading of the "cessation real," taking teaching as the "real cessation" and principle as the "cessation real." He also held that the real within the teaching of the four truths is the "real truth," and that if space and the buddhadhātu are both the reality of principle, they are the "truth-real," and therefore called "truths." Now, in this initial proposing of the headings of the former four truths, each has three phrases: "suffering" is the realm of suffering; "truth" is the teaching of suffering and also the wisdom of suffering; "real" is the principle of the truth of suffering, being non-dual and thus real. It is also said: excluding the phrase "suffering," the other two can also be determined as real. Also, one may take only "real" and exclude two phrases, using only "real" as the truth. Next, from "the Tathāgata is not suffering" below, the second proposes the heading of the one real, that all three are real. "Not suffering" means not the realm; "not truth" means not the teaching; "is real" means it is the principle. The latter three truths are also like this. The Tathāgata, space, and the buddhadhātu are also like this: when revealed, it is called the Tathāgata; when concealed, it is called the buddhadhātu; space takes their non-duality whether concealed or revealed. From "That which is called suffering" below, the second explains the two headings. Simply in terms of the four truths, there are four distinctions; within each truth, it first explains the "real truth," the real truth being the real within the former four truths. Next, it explains the "truth-real," all as in the text. From "Furthermore, that which is called the real is the Tathāgata" below, the third concludes the headings, again having two parts: first, concluding that the three dharmas are identical with the real and have no different essence; next, from "there is suffering, there is the cause of suffering" below, it further concludes what is right and wrong, again having two parts: first, concluding that the three dharmas are different from the four truths and therefore are the truth-real; next, concluding that the three dharmas are different from the conditioned and contaminated, and therefore are real. What is called "there is suffering" is the truth of suffering; "the cause of suffering" is the truth of the origin; "the exhaustion of suffering" is the truth of cessation; "the counteractive to suffering" is the truth of the path. Question: If that which is neither unreal nor real is called real, then that which is neither unreal nor real should also be called truth. Answer: It is as you ask. Question: If the two meanings are equal, why do the two vehicles call it truth, while the Tathāgata calls it real? Answer: It is the difference between granting and stripping: the two vehicles know thoroughly that it is suffering. Another explanation: [seeing that] suffering lacks suffering is given the name of truth; since they have not plumbed the reality of principle, its [status as] real is stripped away. From "Mañjuśrī said to the Buddha: as the Buddha..." below, explaining the second heading based on the mind, there is first a question and next an answer. The initial question means: Does truth subsume inversions or not? If it subsumes them, how can it be said that being non-inverted is real? If it does not subsume them, this contradicts the previous statement that it subsumes all dharmas exhaustively. Looking at both advancing and retreating, both have faults. However, the text below fully clarifies that it is subsumed under suffering and origin; here it only clarifies that it is the truth of suffering, which is biased toward the meaning of the fruition repaying the cause. The third question and answer explains the heading in terms of speech, within which two matters can be seen. Privately I think: according to the Buddha's answer, since it is in terms of cutting off afflictions, one knows it is in terms of practice. From "Mañjuśrī said: As the Buddha has spoken" below, the fourth raises a question based on persons, asking: Is what the two vehicles speak real or not real? The Buddha does not definitively judge it as real or unreal. In terms of cutting off afflictions it is real, but since it is not eternally abiding, in sense it should be unreal. From "Mañjuśrī [said]: What Māra speaks..." below, the fifth raises a challenge based on teaching: Is what Māra speaks subsumed under the noble truths or not? The Buddha's intended answer is: Among the four truths, it is subsumed under the truths of suffering and origin. Question: To which truth do the heterodox twenty-five or [twenty-]six truths belong? Furthermore, among the four truths, how many truths does what the heterodox speak destroy? Now it is clarified that they only destroy suffering and origin, not destroying the path and cessation. Why? They say that from primal nature first arises intellect, and thereafter arise the five great elements, the five subtle elements, and so forth. The arising of intellect is the cause, destroying the Buddha's truth of the origin. The great and subtle elements are the fruit, destroying the Buddha's truth of suffering. The twenty-five or [twenty-]six truths are subsumed under the Buddha's two truths of suffering and origin. From "Mañjuśrī said: As the Buddha..." below, the sixth explains the heading in terms of the essence of the cause. Mañjuśrī cites the Buddha's [statement] that the purity of the single path is the real truth, [noting that] the heterodox also say that the purity of the single path should be the real truth. The Buddha's intended answer clarifies that the heterodox only have suffering and origin, and lack the path and cessation. As for giving rise to the thought of cessation in what is not cessation, this is falsely conceiving the naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñāyatana to be nirvāṇa. The thought of the path in what is not the path is conceiving the chicken and dog precepts to be the path. The thought of fruit in what is not fruit is conceiving the fruit of the worldly nature of subtle particles of all things. The thought of cause in what is not cause is conceiving that the worldly nature of subtle particles is the cause of all things. Question: Earlier you said they do not destroy cessation and the path; now that they conceive of naivasaṃjñā[nāsaṃjñāyatana] and the chicken and dog precepts, is this not destroying them? Answer: Here they give rise to false conceptions, falsely destroying the path and cessation. Previously it was not so: their explanation of the twenty-five truths merely said that from primal nature first arises intellect, etc.; and among the six categories they only spoke of the substance category and the dependent category, so where did they say they conceive of naivasaṃjñā[nāsaṃjñāyatana] and dog precepts? Therefore we know they do not destroy the two truths of the path and cessation. Another question: If the heterodox have the truth of suffering, why did you say earlier that ordinary beings have suffering but no truth? Answer: It simply says they have the realm of suffering which is taken as the truth of suffering, not that they have the wisdom of suffering. From "Mañjuśrī said: As the Buddha has spoken" below, explaining the seventh heading based on the essence of the fruit, there is first a question and next an answer. The question has three parts: first, stating that the heterodox have the four virtues; second, explaining; third, concluding. This first stating that they have them is as in the text. From "Why is that?" below, the explanation. There are altogether twenty-four occurrences of "furthermore"; conceiving permanence, bliss, self, and purity constitutes four distinctions. First, eight occurrences of "furthermore" conceive permanence; second, five occurrences of "furthermore" conceive bliss; third, three occurrences of "furthermore" conceive purity; fourth, eight occurrences of "furthermore" conceive self. In these first eight occurrences of "furthermore" conceiving permanence, the text at the beginning generally uses cause and fruit to know there is permanence; the second lists that the cause of killing necessarily obtains an evil fruit, hence permanence; the third is based on the ability to concentrate thoughts, hence permanence; the fourth raises recollection based on what is recollected; the fifth raises cultivation; the sixth raises calculation; the seventh is based on recitation; the eighth is based on physical form, all as in the text. Next, conceiving bliss has five occurrences of "furthermore": first, based on cause and fruit; second, based on having desires; third, based on the cause of bliss; fourth, based on the conditions of bliss; fifth, based on the three grades. Third, three occurrences of "furthermore" conceive purity: first, based on the cause of purity; second, based on the conditions of purity; third, based on the vessel of purity. Fourth, eight occurrences of "furthermore" conceive self: first, based on agency; second, based on bodily marks; third, based on distinct tastes; fourth, based on performing activities; fifth, based on seeking milk; sixth, based on names; seventh, based on having obstruction; eighth, based on companions. From "World-Honoured One, all the heterodox..." below, the third summarizes and concludes that the heterodox should have the real truth. From "The Buddha said" below, the second is the Tathāgata's answer. The text has three parts: first, brief; next, extensive; third, concluding. The first part has two: first, negating; later, explaining. The first is as in the text. Next, from "Why is that?" below, explaining the negation.

First 16 of 18 passages. Read on

Linked texts (1)

大般涅槃經疏 — Classical Chinese