大般涅槃經疏 16.4

16.4

The opening of the fascicle is the Tathāgata's subsequent extensive answer to the questions raised, refuting the previous four attachments. The text has three parts: first, extensively refuting the conception of permanence; second, briefly refuting [the conceptions of] bliss and purity; third, extensively refuting the conception of self. Permanence and self are the primary roots of attachment, hence they are extensively refuted. First, refuting permanence, the text has three parts: first, clarifying that the heterodox principle is wrong; second, clarifying that their words are erroneous; third, directly answering the question. The first again has three: first, clarifying the error; second, citing the fault; third, concluding the error. In the first part, why is it called an error? They falsely conceive permanence. Permanence is not conditionally produced; what is conditionally produced is impermanent. However, among the heterodox, some conceive of spontaneous nature, which should not arise from conditions. If it were spontaneous nature, this conception arises when mental objects confront the mind—how could this not be conditionally produced? Therefore, the heterodox [views] are all impermanent. From "Good man, the buddhadhātu is unarisen" below, the second cites the fault, which is citing what is right to confront what is wrong. The old [commentary] said: Because it is the future-fruition buddhadhātu, it neither arises nor ceases; if it were conditionally produced, it would be arising and ceasing. This should not be so; here what is right is cited to confront heterodox conceptions. Third, concluding the error: it is precisely that the principle of the single path's purity, the nature of the buddhadhātu, neither arises nor ceases—how could one explain it solely as the future fruition? For this reason, one must conclude the error.