大般涅槃經疏 17

English (machine translation) 17

Language: English

17.1

Compiled by Master Guàndǐng of Zhāng'ān under the Sui

17.2

Re-edited by the monk Zhànrán of Tiāntái under the Tang

Various masters claim that pure practice takes the four [immeasurable] minds as its essence, while noble practice takes the three grades as its essence, citing the sūtra which states: 'Teaching the four immeasurables is the path of the Brahmā heavens and is called turning the wheel of Brahmā; teaching the four truths is the path of the heaven of the paramārthasatya and is called turning the wheel of Dharma.' Another master says: 'Wisdom, concentration, and precepts constitute the essence of pure practice: knowing all seven kinds of goodness is wisdom; the four minds are the twelve gates of dhyāna, which is concentration; the subsequent explanation of the gains and losses in keeping the precepts is precepts.' If so, how does it differ from noble practice? The difference is that pure practice converts others, while noble practice is one's own practice. Noble practice takes wisdom as primary, with precepts and concentration complementing it; pure practice takes precepts as primary, with wisdom and concentration complementing it. Noble practice is that which is practiced by noble ones; pure practice is the pure path, a path shared by ordinary persons and noble ones alike. Noble practice begins with precepts and ends with wisdom; pure practice begins with wisdom and ends with precepts. This constitutes the difference between pure practice and noble practice. Yet another master says: 'Cause and effect constitute the essence of pure practice. "Pure" means pure; it is the cause of nirvāṇa and able to attain nirvāṇa; therefore, cause and effect are taken as the essence of pure practice.' None of these meanings is correct. If the four minds are the essence, this is merely the path of the Brahmā heavens, not the great nirvāṇa. If the three grades are the essence, although distinct from noble practice, they do not transcend the two vehicles and are not the great nirvāṇa. As for cause and effect being the essence, while cause and effect still remain, how can it be called pure? It is not the great nirvāṇa. If it is not the great nirvāṇa, whose pure practice is it? Their terms and meanings are untenable, so none of them is accepted. Now, 'pure' (brahma) means purified; the meaning of purification is threefold: the purification of the pure, the purification of the impure, and the purification of neither-pure nor-impure. What is the purification of the pure? Namely, the seven kinds of goodness, the four immeasurable minds, the three grades, and the six recollections; such dharmas are all the pure path to supramundane nirvāṇa. Now, by means of pure practice, all purities are universally purified; the text states: 'What is the root of all goodness? One should say it is friendliness.' This is called the purification of the pure. What is the purification of the impure? 'I say that this friendliness has immeasurable gates, namely supernatural powers, taming elephants, taming the mad, healing eyes, and healing wounds.' Friendliness wanders through the world; compassion enters the cauldrons; the power of the wholesome roots of friendliness manifests everywhere, causing all impurities to attain purity. This is called the purification of the impure. What is the purification of neither-pure nor-impure? Namely, the Mahāyāna great parinirvāṇa, which is neither cause nor effect, neither self nor other, neither defiled nor pure, but ultimately pure—that is to say, the Tathāgata's permanence, bliss, self, and purity. The text states: 'If friendliness pertains to existence and non-existence, being existent and non-existent, this is the friendliness of a śrāvaka. If friendliness pertains to existence and non-existence, being neither existent nor non-existent, such friendliness is the friendliness of the Tathāgata.' The friendliness of the Tathāgata is indeed the purification of neither-pure nor-impure. If these three kinds of friendliness were horizontally or vertically separate and distinct, they would be neither subtle nor pure; being precisely three yet one, and one yet three, it is inconceivable, and only then can it be called pure practice. Taking its title from these three, it is called the Chapter on Pure Practice.

17.5

The text has two parts: first, clarifying pure practice; second, praising the sūtra. The first part on pure practice has three sections: first, the seven kinds of goodness; second, the four minds; third, keeping the precepts. The first section on the seven kinds of goodness has two parts: first, questioning; second, explaining. Within the explanation there are three parts: indicating, explaining, and concluding. Indicating means stating the heading, declaring the number, and listing the names. Among these seven kinds of goodness, the first three apply to both self and other; the next two pertain exclusively to one's own practice; the last two pertain to converting others. If spoken of in terms of secondary and primary: the primary is converting others, while the secondary is one's own practice. Within the explanation there are two parts: first, explaining the distinct seven kinds of goodness; second, explaining the perfect seven kinds of goodness. Within the distinct seven kinds of goodness, there are seven chapters. In the first, explaining 'knowing the Dharma': Dharma applies to both self and other; because one knows the Dharma, one is able to practice for oneself and convert others. This chapter also has indicating, explaining, and concluding. The initial indication is as in the text. Within the second, the explanation, there are two parts: first, listing; second, explaining. Within the explanation, the twelve divisions of scriptures form twelve sections. First, 'sūtra': formerly it was said to be untranslated, with five meanings glossing it. Some say 'tallying scripture' (qìjīng), using this [Chinese term] to replace that [Sanskrit term]; some say 'tallying scripture' is the correct translation. Kāishàn says: 'It is merely general without distinction.' Zhuāngyán says: 'Having distinctions, these are verse and prose,' citing the Chéngshí Lùn: 'Geya versifies sūtra.' As for geya, in full it should be lokageya; geya is translated as line and also as verse; Kāishàn says 'equal lines'; Zhuāngyán says 'equal verses'; Guāngzhái says 're-versification'; these are verses that versify the prose. As for vyākaraṇa, in Sanskrit it is vyākaraṇa; the treatise calls it 'scriptures explaining the meaning'; here it is translated as prophecy, namely bestowing prophecy upon the six destinies, the three vehicles, and so forth. Regarding the gāthā scriptures, one [view] calls them 'unequal lines,' a second calls them 'unequal verses,' and a third calls them 'direct verses'—that is, isolated verses. What is meant by 'excepting sūtras' is excepting prose that is separately versified. Furthermore, 'and the various vinayas' also excepts such verses found in the vinaya, knowing that prose precedes them; those without prose are isolated verses. Udāna: the treatise calls it prose without verses. The sūtras call it spontaneous teachings without inquiry; this verse comes from the Dharmapada. Nidāna: the treatise calls it the sequence of beginnings and ends, that is, scriptures on causal conditions. Avadāna: the treatise calls it parable scriptures. Itivṛttaka: the treatise calls it *eka-vaṃśa-itivṛttaka; Kāishàn translates it as 'thus-spoken,' and Zhuāngyán translates it as 'past events.' Saying 'the scriptures of realms spoken by me' means that each has its distinction of realms, intending to clarify that each has its seal, hence called 'thus-spoken.' Jātaka: the treatise calls it 'past lives'; however, past lives and past events are not different, so combining the ninth makes it jātaka, and the eighth makes it itivṛttaka. When distinguished separately, the eighth is named past events, and the ninth is named past lives. Vaipulya: the treatise calls it 'broad'; in the present sūtra it is 'correct and broad' (fāngguǎng), and also called vaipulya. Plain 'broad' is the name in the Hīnayāna; 'correct and broad' is the name in the Mahāyāna. Adbhutadharma: that is, unprecedented phenomena. Upadeśa: that is, doctrinal discussion, also called the great teaching, and also called explaining the meaning; in the Mahāyāna, the name 'explaining the meaning' is dropped. Formerly, Guāngzhái termed vyākaraṇa as 'explaining the meaning,' meaning explaining the meaning of prophecy (and so forth). From 'if a bodhisattva can' down is the third, the general conclusion. Next, explaining 'knowing the meaning': that is, knowing the principle expressed by the twelve divisions of scriptures. Now to explain this: the interpretation here is extremely brief; one should say it means understanding the equal meaning of emptiness in the twelve divisions of scriptures, and furthermore understanding immeasurable meanings in a single phrase, and furthermore understanding the meaning of ultimate purity. If one understands these three meanings, the scope of the principle is complete. Third, 'knowing the time': performing the goodness of giving in such a time is converting others, while the remaining phrases mostly pertain to one's own practice. Fourth, from the explanation of 'knowing contentment' downward, the two kinds of goodness pertain to oneself. Fifth, 'knowing oneself': examining closely the good and non-good, as Zengzi said: 'I examine myself three times daily.' Sixth, from 'how does one know the assembly' downward, both kinds of goodness belong to converting others. Regarding 'knowing the assembly': one should fully know the assemblies of the ten dharmadhātus; the text briefly raises humans and the two vehicles. Applying the three karmic transformations to each and every assembly, it only briefly mentions body and speech. Moreover, converting others mostly uses body and speech and rarely uses the mind; therefore it is abbreviated. Seventh, 'knowing the superior and inferior': one should fully know the superior and inferior of the ten realms; the text is also brief. Not having faith is the icchantika, which is the hell realm; this is the most inferior. Not going to the monastery, lacking material merit, is the hungry ghost realm. Not bowing in worship is arrogance, which is the animal realm. Not listening to the Dharma and not accepting the Dharma's instruction, being flattering, crooked, perverse, and stubborn, is the asura realm. Not listening wholeheartedly, having scattered and unfocused goodness, is the human realm. Not contemplating the meaning: although listening wholeheartedly, being unable to contemplate the meaning, is the deva dharmadhātu. Being unable to practice, having only hearing and contemplation without wisdom derived from cultivation, is the expedient path of the two vehicles. Being shallow and inferior, these are all inferior; only seeking the Small Vehicle without great aspiration, even though realizing the truth, is also inferior; if one seeks the Great Vehicle, this is superior; viewing them in sequence up to the perfect and distinct [teachings], these are the realms of buddhas and bodhisattvas; in this way, step by step, they alternate as superior and inferior.

17.6

From 'good son' onward is the second part, clarifying the perfect seven kinds of goodness. Two metaphors are given: the wish-fulfilling jewel illustrates the perfect generation of goodness, while ambrosia illustrates the perfect eradication of evil. One good is all goods, with no goodness unfulfilled; one eradication is all eradications, with no evil uneliminated; therefore, two metaphors are given. First the metaphors, then the application. The metaphors can be seen. Next, from 'thus' downward, applying the metaphor, it says 'most honored and supreme among humans and devas.' If one directly interprets this as worldly humans and devas, it is not yet appropriate. Being honored and supreme among worthy and noble humans and devas truly matches the text.

17.7

From 'good son, this is called' downward is the third part, the general conclusion. Being able to possess the seven kinds of goodness constitutes one item within pure practice.

17.8

Second, explaining the four immeasurable minds: they are also called the four equalities. 'Immeasurable' is derived from the objective realm; 'four equalities' is derived from the mind. Why? The objective realm before one is not single; hence it is called 'immeasurable'. Although things are manifold in the objective realm, my mind has a single mark; hence it is called 'equal'. Speaking broadly, the objective realm is also called equal, and the mind is also immeasurable (and so on). The text has two parts: first, explaining the four minds; second, explaining the fruit of the minds. First, analyzing the four minds also has two parts: first, explaining the gradual four; second, explaining the circular four. The gradual [four] also has three parts: first, briefly stating the headings; second, debating the meaning; third, receiving and understanding. The initial statement of the headings is as in the text. Next, from 'Kāśyapa' onward, debating the meaning has first questions and next answers. The questions present five challenges: 1. challenging that the four minds should be three; 2. challenging that the four minds should be one; 3. repeatedly challenging that the four minds should be three; 4. challenging that the four minds should be two; 5. repeatedly challenging that the four minds should be one. Combined, they also form three challenges: the first and third challenge the four to be three; the second and fifth challenge the four to be one; and the fourth single challenge challenges the four to be two. Provisionally following the sūtra text, they are divided into five challenges. The first: because two minds are without difference in both being able to counter anger, they should be the same single [mind]. Joy can bestow happiness, and equanimity can eliminate ignorance; therefore there are only three, and there should not be four. From 'Friendliness has three objects' onward, the second: all equally have three, challenging [them] to be only one; first stating the three objects, next explaining the three minds. The depth and shallowness of the three objects serve only as a single meaning. Although differing in terms of the objective realm, the cognitive mind has no distinction: if taking poverty as the object, that is the sentient-being object; knowing that this poor person requires clothing and food is the phenomenon object; and if knowing that sentient beings need to know the Tathāgata's experiencing of the foremost bliss so that there is nothing required, that is the non-objective. Since that which cognizes is already one, there should not be four; hence it is just a single object. The five aggregates being called the sentient-being object: from where do the five aggregates arise? Taking the required things as objects and giving them away is called the phenomenon object. If taking the Tathāgata as the object, these things are not needed, which is the non-objective. This is intended to explain that the mind cognizing the objective realm is all-pervading, even up to taking the Buddha as the object, let alone other objective realms. From 'That which friendliness takes as an object' onward, the third adduces the three objects to challenge. The sentient-being realm is shallow; emptiness of phenomena is deep; and the non-objective lacks both, and is therefore extremely deep. Since there are three objects, how could there be four? There should only be three. The followers of the Chengshi lun say: taking sentient beings as an object is emptiness of sentient beings; taking phenomena as an object is emptiness of phenomena; taking the Tathāgata as an object is emptiness of equality. This misses the sūtra's meaning. The text states: 'Taking sentient beings as an object means taking parents, wives, and children as objects, wishing to give them happiness.' When does it ever speak of emptiness? From 'There are two kinds of people' onward, the fourth challenges that people are of two kinds: those of view-practice with sharp faculties, and those of craving-practice with dull faculties. Sharp people are prone to anger when teaching dull ones; when they do not understand after ten attempts, anger arises. For this reason, one must cultivate friendliness and compassion to relinquish the angry mind. When the dull see the sharp, they constantly produce jealousy; therefore they are made to cultivate joy and equanimity, which eliminates jealousy. If so, only two are seen; there should not be four. From 'Now, as for the immeasurable' onward, the second challenges using the separation and combination of names: since it says 'immeasurable', how could there only be four? Since there are only four, they should not be immeasurable. If they are immeasurable, there should only be one. Next, the Tathāgata's reply has two parts: first, refuting the clinging to a fixed four; next, answering the challenge that there are not four. The first has three parts: 1. explaining that the teaching approaches are unfixed in being broad or brief; 2. explaining that defying the ordinary is unfixed; 3. explaining that curing afflictions is unfixed. Since they are unfixed, why must there be four? The first answers in terms of the twelve links of dependent origination being unfixed: sometimes eleven down to two or one link, benefiting in accordance with capacity, which cannot be fixed. Regarding omitting the single factor of birth: Héxī states that Satyaka Nirgrantha, who was clever and wrapped his belly with iron plates and wore a crown of fire on his head, came to the Buddha's place. His mind was haughty and would not listen to the Buddha's Dharma, until Guhyapada raised his vajra-sceptre to terrify him, whereupon he finally listened to the Dharma. His father was a brāhmaṇa and his mother was a Nirgrantha, and both had gone forth together. Because he was born from illegitimate parents, he felt ashamed of this alone and was not intimidated by anything else. The Buddha accommodated him, and so omitted the single factor of birth, teaching only eleven. For Kāśyapa, because his pratyekabuddha faculties were sharp and moreover had no taboos, he taught all twelve. From 'Good son, the Tathāgata's skillful means' onward, the second is that defying the ordinary is unfixed, also termed the oral secret being unfixed: the Buddha is truly complete with permanence, bliss, self, and purity, yet he also teaches impermanence and impurity. Saṃsāra is truly impermanence and impurity, yet he also teaches permanence, bliss, self, and purity. From 'Good son, there are sentient beings' onward, the third is that curing afflictions is unfixed, termed the bodily secret being unfixed: acting as a wheel-turning king and giving wealth is equanimity; giving the pleasure of the five desires is joy; acting as a servant running errands is friendliness; and rebuking and admonishing is compassion. From 'Good son, these immeasurables' onward, the second answers the question of there not being four. This also has two parts: first general, then specific. The general also has two parts: first, adducing two matters; next, generally negating the previous questions. Adducing two matters: first, adducing difference in essence; next, explaining difference in function. First, difference in essence: obtaining different retributions—friendliness obtains the all-pervading purity, compassion obtains the station of infinite space, joy obtains the station of infinite consciousness, and equanimity obtains the station of nothingness; because the stations differ, their curing of afflictions differs. From 'Such immeasurable companions' onward, the second explains difference in function: greed seizes others' possessions, while friendliness gives others possessions; anger gives others suffering, while compassion eradicates others' suffering; jealousy begrudges others' happiness, while joy gives others happiness; ignorance increases hatred and craving, while equanimity eliminates craving and hatred. From 'For this reason' onward, the second generally concludes the previous errors: negating one negates the second and fifth; negating two negates the fourth; negating three negates the first and third. From 'As you have said' onward, the second specifically answers the five questions, forming five sections. This first answers the first challenge on curing afflictions, that there are only three and not four. Here it explains that although they equally counter anger, anger has lightness and heaviness, and so they form four. There are six successive points, as in the text. From 'Therefore, Kāśyapa, these immeasurables' onward, this answers the second challenge on sharing objects: curing afflictions differs and there are four companions, so how could they be made identical? There are three objects, but they only combine into one. From 'Furthermore, by vessels' onward, this answers the third challenge on depth and shallowness, which challenged them to be three. Here it explains that in accordance with function there are four; how could they follow practice and be three? Or it is said that 'vessels' refers to the objective realms. From 'Distinguished by practice' onward, this answers the fourth challenge based on people's sharpness or dullness. It intends to explain that although there are two people, there are four practices, and they cannot be made into two. From 'Because of being immeasurable' onward, this answers the fifth challenge on names, having two parts: first, listing the four section headings; next, explaining them at length. It intends to explain that 'immeasurable' has four propositions, so what prevents there being four kinds of immeasurables? From 'Kāśyapa said to the Buddha' onward, the third is receiving and understanding, as in the text. From 'World-Honoured One, are there bodhisattvas' onward, the second explains the non-gradual, namely the circular four minds, also having two parts: first, sorting out small friendliness; next, revealing great friendliness. Concerning these small and great: the small is also not small; one cannot take ordinary beings as small and the two vehicles as great, or the two vehicles as small and bodhisattvas as great. Why is this? Because ordinary beings and the two vehicles alike do not abide in the great nirvāṇa. Here, gradual friendliness is taken as small, and non-gradual friendliness is taken as great, because both of these abide in the great nirvāṇa. Some take the semblance as small and the true as great. This too is not so: gradual semblance and true are both small; non-gradual semblance and true are both great. Therefore, sorting out the small has two questions and answers. The first asks whether there are bodhisattvas abiding in the great nirvāṇa who have the mind of friendliness and compassion, yet it is not the mind of great friendliness. This directly asks about the gradual pure practice. Next, the Buddha's reply has three parts: 1. stating that there are; 2. explaining that there are; 3. concluding that there are. The initial statement is as in the text. Next, in explaining that there are, there are two parts: first, presenting the objective realms; next, explaining the contemplation. First, the objective realms have nine grades: enemies, kin, and neutral persons each have three grades. Some say neutral persons are only one, so there are only seven, because neutral persons are neither enemies nor kin to me, so there is no need to expand into three; at first glance this is so. However, these neutral persons are not without differences of foolishness and wisdom, nobility and baseness, so they can be divided into three, thereby forming nine objective realms, and thus there are nine friendlinesses. Next, from 'This bodhisattva' onward, directly explaining the cultivation of contemplation: if one has not cultivated at all, one only wishes to give the three kinds of kin the three kinds of happiness, the three kinds of enemies the three kinds of suffering, and to the three kinds of neutral persons neither give suffering nor happiness. If one begins cultivating friendliness, among the three kinds of kin one gives three grades of happiness, to the three neutral persons one gives three grades of happiness, and to the three enemies, to the highest enemy one gives lower happiness, to the middle enemy middle happiness, and to the lower enemy higher happiness. When cultivating for the second time, to the highest enemy one gives middle happiness, and to both the middle and lower enemies one gives higher happiness. When cultivating for the third time, to all three enemies together one gives higher happiness, which is not yet the three kinds of happiness of kin and neutral persons. When cultivating for the fourth time, one then takes the lower happiness of neutral persons and gives it together to the three enemies. When cultivating for the fifth time, one takes the middle happiness of neutral persons and gives it together to the three enemies. When cultivating for the sixth time, one takes the higher happiness of neutral persons and gives it together to the three enemies. When cultivating for the seventh time, one takes the lower happiness of the three kinds of kin and gives it together to the three enemies. When cultivating for the eighth time, one takes the middle happiness of the three kinds of kin and gives it together to the three enemies. When cultivating for the ninth time, one takes the higher happiness of the three kinds of kin and gives it together to the three enemies; this is called giving superior happiness to the highest enemy, and at that time it is called the fulfillment of the mind of friendliness. Furthermore, directly taking the three grades of happiness and giving them to the nine kinds of objective realms: when first entering the contemplation, to the three kinds of kin one gives the three happinesses; the second time, to middle kin one gives higher happiness, and to lower kin middle happiness; the third time, to lower kin one gives higher happiness; the fourth time, to lower neutral persons one gives lower happiness; the fifth time, to lower neutral persons one gives middle happiness; the sixth time, to lower neutral persons one gives higher happiness; the seventh time, to the highest enemy one gives lower happiness; the eighth time, to the highest enemy one gives middle happiness; the ninth time, to the highest enemy one gives higher happiness; this is called the fulfillment of the mind of friendliness. Now the text is merely brief, having four rounds of entering contemplation. The first round: to the three kinds of kin equally giving higher happiness—this combines the three kinds of kin into one round, and separately opens the three kinds of enemies into three rounds. If explaining the cultivation of contemplation, there are truly nine grades of different cultivation, but now the text only explains three grades. From 'Good son, this is called attaining friendliness' onward, the third concludes that there are. From 'World-Honoured One, for what reason' onward, this is the second round, which also has first questions and next answers. The answer has three parts: 1. stating it is difficult to accomplish; 2. explaining; 3. concluding. The initial text states it. Next, from 'Why is this?' onward, explaining: first phenomena, next similes. In all, it adduces four similes, as in the text. When afflictions are strong and friendliness is weak, it cannot be called great; only when afflictions are penetrated and friendliness is accomplished is it called great friendliness. From 'For this reason' onward, the third concludes. From 'Good son, when a bodhisattva abides in the first bhūmi' onward, this is the second, revealing the great: explaining that only the circular four minds are great friendliness. The text has two parts: 1. explaining great friendliness; 2. explaining the provisional and the real. First, great friendliness also has three parts: 1. directly explaining great friendliness; 2. explaining combined function; 3. explaining the root of goodness. First, directly explaining great friendliness also has three parts, namely stating, explaining, and concluding. The initial statement is as in the text. Next, regarding the meaning in the explanation: previously, to the highest enemy one gave higher happiness, but had not yet given higher happiness to icchantikas. Now this circular friendliness takes icchantikas as its object, seeing only the dharmatā and not seeing their faults, and therefore does not generate anger; only this is great friendliness. The third, concluding, is as in the text.

17.9

From 'Good son, for the sake of all sentient beings' onward, this is the second, explaining the combined function of friendliness: if friendliness only gave happiness and compassion only eradicated suffering, then that would not be combined function. Now it explains that friendliness also eradicates suffering, and compassion also gives happiness. Within equanimity there are also two, as in the text.

17.10

From 'Only the four immeasurable minds' onward, the third explains the root of goodness, having three parts: first, being the root of the six pāramitās; next, being the root of generating the aspiration [for awakening]; third, being the root of their own characteristics.

17.11

From "Kāśyapa addressed the Buddha" onward, the second [part] clarifies the unreal and the real. Kāishàn took this to be real contemplation. Here too, there is first a question and next an answer. The question has three parts: first, a destructive challenge; second, a concessive challenge; third, a pre-emptive challenge. In the first, destructive challenge, there are again two parts: first, in terms of Dharma; next, by analogy. First, in terms of Dharma, it clarifies that although one wishes to eradicate suffering, in reality one has not yet eradicated suffering, and these are all empty words; although one wishes to give joy, in reality [sentient beings] do not obtain joy, and this is a provisional statement. Next, an analogy is adduced to illustrate it: it is just like a bhikṣu performing the meditative visualization of provisional images, contemplating soup as impurity when in reality it is not impure; although one speaks of giving joy, in reality [sentient beings] do not obtain joy. From "World-Honoured One, if it is not false" onward is the second, concessive challenge: even granting that there is real benefit, why is no one seen to obtain peace and joy? If joy is truly given, and present buddhas and bodhisattvas are measureless and boundless, why are they not seen to give joy to sentient beings? From "If it were truly real" onward is the third, pre-emptive challenge: if the Buddha were to reply that it is unreal and without reality, the Tathāgata nevertheless became the most supreme and unexcelled Brahmā-lord through practicing friendliness in the past, so how could it be without benefit? Therefore, pre-empting [the reply by saying that] it cannot be without benefit, it is called a pre-emptive challenge. Next, from "The Buddha said: 'Good son'" onward, he answers the preceding three challenges: first, he answers the pre-emptive challenge; next, the destructive challenge; third, the concessive challenge. The first answer to the pre-emptive challenge has two parts: first, praising his pre-emption; next, the direct answer. Within the answer are four verses, which have three parts: the first single line clarifies great friendliness; the next single line, great compassion; the third two lines, evaluation and measurement. Truly being able to give joy, its merit and fortune are immeasurable. From "Good son, one who cultivates friendliness" onward, secondly, he answers the destructive challenge. Here too are two parts: first, proclaiming reality, he thus adduces the deficiency of the śrāvakas' provisional visualization to reveal that the bodhisattvas' is real. How is this known? The second [part] extensively clarifies that it is real. This again has five parts: 1. truly being able to transform the objective realm; 2. truly being able to cure afflictions; 3. truly being the root of goodness; 4. truly being pervasive through all dharmas; 5. truly being inconceivable. The first has three parts: 1. proclamation; 2. explanation; 3. conclusion. The first is as in the text. As for the meaning in the explanation, there are two interpretations of this: first, truly being able to transform the objective realm; second, merely being able to make them see it as such. If transforming gold into earth, it can be truly transformed; if making sentient beings into non-sentient beings, it can merely make them see it as such. One master says: "The sūtra says 'able to accomplish'; why make two interpretations? A bodhisattva not only can transform gold into earth, but also transforms sentient beings into non-sentient beings. Non-sentient beings are grass and trees; he transforms non-sentient beings into sentient beings. If one says sentient beings are originally unreal and non-existent, one should know that sentient beings have non-sentient being [nature]. If one says all dharmas have the nature of peace and joy, then non-sentient beings are also sentient beings. Sentient and insentient, having the nature and lacking the nature, may be understood accordingly by this standard." I privately ask: if sentient beings and non-sentient beings truly transform into each other mutually—the sentient becoming insentient and the insentient becoming sentient—this meaning is difficult to believe; yet if they are not truly transformed, the power of the noble ones is exerted in vain. To sum it up: it is simply that the buddhas and bodhisattvas themselves, regarding their own environment and sentient beings, being not two yet two, two yet not two, can cause sentient beings to be likewise. This is permanent transformation. If it is temporary transformation, such a meaning is not absent, and it also causes the one transformed not to be self-aware of it. How much more so since friendliness is the Tathāgata and the Tathāgata is friendliness; friendliness is buddhadhātu and buddhadhātu is all dharmas! I respectfully request later virtuous ones to reflect upon this and reflect upon this! From "Furthermore, good son" onward, the second [part] clarifies truly being able to cure afflictions. Here too are three parts, namely proclamation, explanation, and conclusion. The old [commentators] said: "The four equalities are merely merits; relying on joy, their characteristics are suppressed, not conclusively severed." Here, the four equalities are prajñā itself, and are capable of severing. From "Furthermore, good son, the four immeasurables" onward, the third [part] clarifies truly being the root of goodness. Here too are two parts: first, clarifying that they can be the root of goodness of the Great Vehicle; next, clarifying that they can be the root of goodness of the three vehicles. The first again has two parts: first, clarifying that they are generally the root of all goodness; next, clarifying that they can be the root of giving. The first passage is evident. From "Good son, a bodhisattva" onward, the second specifically clarifies being the root of giving. Here again are five parts: 1. the fundamental root of giving; 2. signlessness as gain; 3. possession of signs as loss; 4. clarifying that one mind is identical to the four minds; 5. extensively producing vows. First, clarifying the root of giving, he adduces eight matters to serve as the root for the eight matters below. From "When giving in this way" onward, the second clarifies signlessness as gain. This again has three parts: first, general; next, specific; third, conclusion. The first is as in the text. In the second, specific part, regarding not seeing cause and effect: the time of giving is the cause, and obtaining retribution is the fruit; obtaining fruit is permanence, and not obtaining is annihilationism; the bodhisattva does not perform such giving at all. Third, from "Although" onward, is the conclusion, as in the text. From "Good son, if a bodhisattva sees" onward, the third clarifies possession of signs as loss, having three parts: Dharma, analogy, and application. The Dharma is as in the text. In the analogy, the person illustrates a bodhisattva of shallow practice; the arrow illustrates the arising of stinginess; the relatives requesting a physician illustrate good friends urging giving. Saying "Wait a while" illustrates not being willing to give at the proper time. "I shall examine" illustrates grasping signs and discriminating. Who shot the poisoned arrow illustrates discriminating the field of merit, whether keeping or violating [the precepts]. Which arrow, bamboo or willow, illustrates discriminating the objects of giving, what things can be relinquished and what cannot. The poison it contains illustrates the person who grasps at giving never knowing giving. And dying illustrates, since one cannot give, being obscured by stinginess and severing the life of the roots of goodness. The application of the analogy is as in the text. From "Furthermore, good son" onward, the fourth, one mind being identical to four, reveals the characteristics of perfect friendliness, clarifying that when practicing giving, one completely possesses the four equalities: when giving, producing friendliness as well as giving rise to compassion; when giving, the mind rejoices; having given, it is equanimity. From "The bodhisattva, within the mind of friendliness" onward, the fifth extensively produces vows. There are eight tiers in all. First, clarifying the giving of food, down to lamps; the first three are as in the text. Fourth, giving clothing, regarding "one cubit and six inches away from the body": first, relying on principle, it means tearing the clothing of various views and removing the sixteen views; second, relying on concrete matters, it means four inches on each side, which is one cubit and six [inches]. In the fifth, giving flowers and incense, regarding "preceptless", this is the precept of no-precept, not the absence [of precepts] from not receiving or failing to receive them. The Huayan says: "Precepts like empty space, precepts without anything to rely on." The Great Collection says: "Precepts without abidance, because seeing abidance in precepts is wrong." As for the term "unmanifest precept", it is not the unmanifest [matter] that is neither material nor mental, but rather this precept: the precept that does not construct saṃsāra or nirvāṇa. The rest is as in the text.

17.12

From "Good son, all śrāvakas" onward, the second [part clarifies] being the root of the three vehicles. Here too are three parts: first, clarifying the three vehicles; next, all dharmas; third, a general conclusion. Because this section uses friendliness to subsume all dharmas and there is no dharma it does not pervade, the meaning of perfect friendliness becomes even more apparent. Now, the root of goodness is benefiting others; among benefiting others, friendliness and compassion are supreme. The first passage is the three vehicles. From "Bodhisattva Mahāsattva" onward, the second individually enumerates all dharmas. Impurity and inhalation-exhalation are the two gates of nectar. As for the seven expedients, the Sarvāstivādin masters say: 1. impurity, 2. specific characteristics, 3. general characteristics, 4. heat, 5. summit, 6. patience, 7. supreme mundane dharma. The treatise masters say: 1. form is suffering, 2. form is origination, 3. form is cessation, 4. form is the path, 5. form is fault, 6. form is taste, 7. form is escape. As for the three loci of contemplation, they refer to suffering, impermanence, and non-self, which are Hīnayāna designations; in the Great Vehicle, contemplating the suffering, karma, and afflictions of the twelve links of dependent origination constitute the three contemplations. Furthermore, the Yingluo sūtra clarifies three contemplations: contemplation of the two truths, contemplation of equality, and contemplation of the middle way paramārthasatya (and so forth). Non-contention has three interpretations: 1. non-contention because the mind of friendliness is perfected; 2. non-contention because the understanding of emptiness is clear; 3. non-contention with things through mindfully being aware and illuminating in accord with the mind. As for knowledge of the original limit, there are two interpretations: 1. the understanding of emptiness is the original limit, which is why Ājñāta-Kauṇḍinya is named 'Having Understood the Original Limit'; 2. taking the knowledge of the boundary limit, which has mastery over extending and shortening [lifespan], as the knowledge of the original limit.

17.13

From "By this meaning" onward is the third, general conclusion.

17.14

From "Good son, being able to perform goodness" onward is the fourth, [clarifying that] truly pervading is identical to all goodness, and also pervading all wholesome dharmas, clarifying that perfect friendliness becomes even more manifest. Here too are two parts: first, clarifying that it is identical to all Great Vehicle goodness, in fifteen phrases; next, clarifying that it is identical to all Hīnayāna goodness, in sixteen phrases. In the first fifteen phrases, each and every phrase concludes that it is the Tathāgata's friendliness. From "If friendliness were impermanent" onward is the second, pervading the sixteen phrases of Hīnayāna wholesome dharmas, where each and every phrase likewise concludes that it is the śrāvakas' friendliness.

17.15

From "Good son, whether friendliness is existent or non-existent" onward, the fifth [part] clarifies that it is truly inconceivable. Here too are four parts: 1. praising the essence of great friendliness; 2. praising the person who practices friendliness; 3. praising the teaching explaining friendliness, which is the great nirvāṇa; 4. praising the master who expounds friendliness. First, regarding praising the essence of friendliness, formerly there were three interpretations. The first says: "Friendliness towards sentient beings takes existence as its object; friendliness with dharma as object takes non-existence as its object; objectless friendliness takes neither existence nor non-existence as its object." The second says: "From the first stage to the third stage, because the mind of emptiness is predominant, it is non-existence; from the fourth stage to the seventh stage, because the mind of existence is predominant, it is existence; from the eighth stage to the tenth stage, existence and non-existence are contemplated simultaneously, hence it is called neither existence nor non-existence." The third says: "Jointly based on the wondrous existence of the Buddha-fruit, it is existence; having no realm of saṃsāra, it is non-existence; coalescing with reality, it is neither existence nor non-existence." Now we say this is not so. Taking the dharmas of the five aggregates as objects, how could it be non-existence? If it were non-existence, it should immediately enter the real; since it does not enter the real, how could it be non-existence? If existence were non-existence, how would it differ from objectless? Furthermore, from the first stage to the third stage, how could it be exclusively empty? And how could neither existence nor non-existence pertain solely to the Buddha stage? Now the text praises the person who practices friendliness: all who practice friendliness possess both negations, not necessarily only the Buddha; this precisely clarifies the intent within the Brahmā practices. If one takes purity as object, purity is non-existence; if one takes impurity as object, purity is existence; if one takes neither purity nor impurity as object, it is neither existence nor non-existence—neither combined nor separate. Furthermore, taking the three truths as objects: taking the real truth as object, hence non-existence; taking the conventional truth as object, hence existence; taking the middle as object, hence neither existence nor non-existence. The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā says: 'Dharmas arisen from causes and conditions are identical to emptiness, identical to provisional designation, and identical to the meaning of the middle way.' Question: the four alternatives are conceptual proliferation; why use them to explain the sūtra? Answer: the four alternatives of fixed nature are conceptual proliferation; the four alternatives of provisional designation are not conceptual proliferation.

17.16

From "The bodhisattva abides in" onward, secondly, he praises the person who practices friendliness. From "This great nirvāṇa" onward, thirdly, he praises the teaching explaining friendliness. From "All buddhas, Tathāgatas" onward, fourthly, he praises the master who expounds friendliness.

17.17

From "Kāśyapa said to the Buddha" onward is third, answering after the fact the second hypothetical objection. The previous objection stated: "If friendliness and compassion are real, they ought to bring benefit;" therefore he repeats the question and requests an answer. He again raises a dilemma: First, he raises an objection concerning cultivating friendliness in reality. If the Buddha truly cultivates it, he should bestow it upon sentient beings; why then do sentient beings not receive the benefit of friendliness? If friendliness cannot benefit sentient beings, then friendliness is useless. The answer also has three parts: first, explaining that there truly is benefit; second, citing occurrences as evidence; third, concluding with praise of the inconceivable. The first also has three parts: first, declaring that there is benefit; next, from "Good son" onward, explaining the benefit; third, from "For this reason" onward, concluding the benefit. The first is as in the text. In the next part, explaining the benefit: if fixed karma is not transformed, then one does not receive benefit; if it is unfixed karma, one does receive benefit. Even though it is fixed karma, if one cultivates the good, it turns into unfixed. Just as a fixed lifespan of eighty [years] cannot be changed, but if there is an untimely accident in the interim, friendliness benefits them. What is fixed karma? For example, when one first initiates killing, generating severe and virulent malice, at the time of killing one is resolute, and after killing one feels gratified, all while giving rise to anger. When this karma is fixed, then one cannot bestow joy. If it is unfixed, friendliness can bestow joy. Question: If the karma is itself unfixed, one should naturally obtain joy; why is it necessary for friendliness to bestow it? Answer: Although the karma is unfixed, it might transform into fixed. If one receives the benefit of friendliness, the heavy is turned into light. Regarding "seeing tigers, leopards, and the like, fear naturally arises": this is an analogy for people feeling joy upon seeing someone who practices friendliness. From "Good son, I say that this friendliness has immeasurable approaches" onward is second, citing occurrences as evidence. In all, eight occurrences are cited, where friendliness sets supernatural powers in motion to rescue sentient beings. In the text of the first occurrence, regarding "saying it was blood," there are three explanations: First, this was prior to the twelfth year, before dyed robes of improper color were prescribed, so they wore pure red. Second, the five schools differ: the Daśabhāṇavāra has one robe with three kinds of mixed spots; the Mahīśāsaka and Dharmaguptaka wear one of three colors—namely, blue, mud, and mangosteen—mangosteen being a red color. Third, among the three colored robes, a single robe was dotted with three colors, each like the size of a large bean; but the disciples all wore dotted robes, and although the dots were small, from afar they still appeared red. The next five occurrences can be understood. In the seventh occurrence, where it first says "Kauśala and Śrāvastī," some say they are different names for one country. Others say Kauśala is a tributary state, and since that country had bandits, Prasenajit dispatched troops. From "Good son" onward is third, concluding with praise. Now, "immeasurable" means inconceivable; it is a general praise of the bodhisattva's practice. "Inconceivable" praises gradual friendliness. "The practice of all buddhas" praises round friendliness. "It is a Mahāyāna classic" praises the teaching. All being inconceivable, they all converge into the one roundness; the path of words is cut off, the realm of mental activity extinguished, ineffable and immeasurable.

17.18

Chapter on Pure Conduct, Part Two.

17.19

The beginning of the fascicle is the second [section], explaining the fruits of the four minds. It is also divided into two: first, explaining the fruit of the stage of supreme affection of the three minds; next, explaining the fruit of the stage of emptiness and equality of the mind of equanimity. Formerly there were two explanations: The first said that before the three minds are perfected, they only share a single fruit; when the one mind is already perfected, it independently attains a single fruit. The second said that the three minds are alike in being practices directed toward existence, hence they share a single fruit; the one mind is a practice of emptiness, hence it independently attains a single fruit. Neither meaning is correct. If the three minds were not yet perfected, how could they attain a fruit? Furthermore, the four minds alike take sentient beings as their object and alike take phenomena as their object, and are alike practices directed toward existence; they alike take the unconditioned as their object, and are alike practices of non-existence. Since existence and non-existence are identical [for both], the three and the one should be equal. Now, tentatively, we also judge them by both the distinct and the round [teachings]. According to the distinct: approaching the factual from principle, friendliness, compassion, and sympathetic joy, these three, are in harmony with affection, and so a single fruit is established for them; the mind of equanimity is in harmony with emptiness, and so it alone has a single fruit. If judged according to the round: as explained above, one friendliness is itself compassion, sympathetic joy, and equanimity; round friendliness pervades all phenomena. There is no phenomenon it does not gather in; how could its fruits be segregated? It is merely that the text is abridged, and also that they are mutually manifested (and so forth). Regarding the stage of one's only child, the text has two parts: first, explaining the fruit of the stage; later, debating the meaning. In the first part, the headings are first declared, and then explained. Regarding the first passage, formerly it was said to be the nature stage; second, it was said to be from the eighth stage and above; third, it was said to be the first stage. Now we clarify that this is not so. The previous explanation of holy conduct was one's own practice, and it was already said to be the first stage; this explanation of pure conduct is the transformation of others. Since one's own previous practice had already entered the first stage, how could transforming others merely be the nature stage? How could it skip over to the eighth stage and above? These both either overshoot or fall short. It is precisely the fruit of transforming others verified at the first stage. From "What is this stage..." onward is the explanation. First, two headings are indicated, namely supreme affection and one's only child. Yet because of supreme affection there is an only child, and because of an only child there is supreme affection; there should be no difference. But here they are distinguished: supreme affection concerns the mind; an only child concerns the object. A child is not internal to myself, hence it is called an external object. Next, in the explanation, five analogies in all are adduced: the first analogy explains supreme affection; four analogies explain an only child; the concluding determinations are distinct. The first is as in the text. From "Like a father and mother" onward is the second analogy: the bodhisattva sees ordinary persons giving rise to evil, and because of this gives rise to compassion. From "Like a person in childhood" onward is the third analogy, separately illustrating a practitioner who has generated the mind [for bodhi] giving rise to grasping. Clods of earth and the like illustrate the five skandhas; the text below draws the parallel to the karma of body, speech, and mind. The left illustrates real wisdom; the right illustrates provisional wisdom. Again, the left illustrates meditative contemplation; the right illustrates pulling out with wisdom. Grasping the head rescues him from physical wrongdoing; picking it out rescues him from verbal faults. From "Like a father and mother" onward is the fourth analogy, separately illustrating sentient beings feeling the painful fruit, hence it says "born together in hell." From "Like a father and mother" onward is the fifth analogy, illustrating generally the rescuing of causes and fruits. From "Kāśyapa said to the Buddha" onward is second, debating the meaning, with two rounds of questions and answers: the first round debates the meaning, and the next round acknowledges understanding. In the first round, first comes the question, then the answer. The initial question has two parts: first, directly expressing lack of understanding; next, from "If bodhisattvas" onward, the debate of the meaning proper. Some say there are five objections, some say three objections: the first objects to killing the brāhmaṇa; the second objects to scolding Devadatta; the third adduces Subhūti as a comparison. The first, killing the brāhmaṇa, also has three parts: first, why kill him; second, he should be protected with care; third, why did he not fall into hell? "If one views them equally" is the second, scolding Devadatta. The third adduces Subhūti of the Hīnayāna to compare with the Mahāyāna: the Hīnayāna still protects sentient beings to such an extent, how much more should the Buddha, whose fruit is complete, not still engage in killing and scolding? If there is friendliness, why cause people to increase afflictions? From "You should not now" onward is second, the Buddha's answer. He answers the previous three questions, but not in sequence: first, he answers the comparison objection; next, he answers the killing objection; third, he answers the scolding objection. Question: Why are they not in sequence? Answer: He simply follows what is closest at hand; why must it be in sequence? Examples of this are very numerous. Moreover, the comparison objection is the most severe. Why? It says the teacher lacks friendliness and is inferior to his disciple; therefore it is refuted first, and he still rebukes him, saying he should not [speak so]. First, he rebukes him generally; next, he adduces seven matters to rebuke him individually. First, regarding the mention of "mosquito's mouth" (proboscis): a bird's beak that is sharp is called a beak (*zuǐ*); a mosquito's mouth resembles this, so it is named by similarity. The middle five can be understood (and so forth). In the final passage there are still more matters. Therein, saying "Better to be with a poisonous snake," etc., generally uses Kāśyapa as an occasion to admonish and restrain the ignorant.

First 19 of 25 passages. Read on

Linked texts (1)

大般涅槃經疏 — Classical Chinese