大般涅槃經疏 18

English (machine translation) 18

Language: English

18.1

Compiled by Master Guàndǐng of Zhāng'ān under the Sui

18.2

Revised by the Śramaṇa Zhànrán of Tiāntái under the Tang

18.3

Chapter on Pure Conduct, Part Two, Continued

Question: In the emptiness of ultimate truth, how can there be karma and retribution? Answer: This relies on existence to clarify non-existence, and relies on non-existence to clarify existence; neither existence nor non-existence is the ultimate truth. As for the emptiness of emptiness, there are three parts: praise, explanation, and conclusion. Praise: this is the place where ordinary people and followers of the small [vehicle] are bewildered and sink. "Is existent, is non-existent" is the actual explanation. One explanation says: "is existent" and "is non-existent" are two section headings, and the later words "is this" refer back to the above two "is's"; and saying "is not this" means both "is's" are empty. A second explanation says: above it clarifies that both objects—existence and non-existence—are empty, while below it clarifies that both knowledges—provisional and real—are empty; "is this" is provisional knowledge, and "is not this" is real knowledge. Now we further raise three queries: Is it called the emptiness of emptiness because the objective realm is emptied? Is it called the emptiness of emptiness because emptiness comes to empty knowledge? Or is it called the emptiness of emptiness because emptiness comes to empty the dharma that is capable of emptying? If one merely empties the objective realm and empties knowledge, this is still one-sided and cannot yet be called perfect. If one takes emptiness to empty emptiness, this is the empty of the perfect, correct middle way. The Pañcaviṃśati says: "All dharmas are completely empty; this emptiness is also empty." Two masters differ. One says: "All dharmas are empty" means emptiness is not yet marvelous; now one further takes emptiness to empty this emptiness. The second says: Not so; all dharmas before were already marvelous emptiness; now "emptiness is also empty" simply means the dharma capable of emptying is also empty. Héxī agrees with the latter explanation, and thus says: Some say that although all dharmas are empty, the substance of knowledge is not empty; to dispel and break through deluded sentiments, it is called the emptiness of emptiness. "Is existent" is also empty, and "is non-existent" is also empty; the next line says: since the preceding imputation is empty, knowledge does not exist alone; in the principle of true awakening, there is no simultaneous illumination. Although there is no simultaneous illumination, the meaning of dispelling can be known. Regarding the emptiness of the defiled and the emptiness of the undefiled: people mostly value the emptiness of the undefiled and make light of the emptiness of the defiled. The emptiness of the defiled and the emptiness of the undefiled are identical in the substance of the two emptinesses; how could there be light and heavy? Since the myriad dharmas are quiescent and the substance of knowledge is also empty, this is called marvelous emptiness, which is beyond the reach of the two vehicles. Someone said: The great emptiness is the emptiness of prajñā, because form is great, prajñā is great. The Treatise [on the Great Prajñāpāramitā] explains that great emptiness has phenomenal and principle [aspects]. As for the phenomenal: the eastern direction is empty, up to the ten directions being empty. As for the principle: it is the nirvāṇa of the emptiness of ultimate truth. The Pañcaviṃśati points to nirvāṇa; nirvāṇa and prajñā mutually illuminate each other. Now we explain the eleven emptinesses in terms of the three truths. Internal emptiness is the emptiness of ultimate truth. External emptiness is the emptiness of conventional truth. Internal and external emptiness is both being empty. Conditioned emptiness is the conventional emptiness of saṃsāra. Unconditioned emptiness is the true emptiness of nirvāṇa. Beginningless emptiness: the three truths are mutually identical, and no primordial ancestor is seen; hence it is called beginningless emptiness. Nature emptiness: the substantial nature of the three truths is fundamentally empty of itself; hence it is called nature emptiness. The emptiness of ultimate truth: the true is the middle, and the middle is the true; hence it is called the emptiness of ultimate truth. The emptiness of emptiness: one empty, all empty. Great emptiness: all three truths are empty. The subsequent text of praise also praises in terms of the three truths: The three truths are mutually identical, the place where ordinary people and small sages are bewildered and sink. "Is existent, is non-existent": simultaneously illuminating the two truths, hence it says "both are"; each individual truth is fully endowed with the true and the middle, hence it says "the emptiness of emptiness." "Is this, is not this": illuminating a single truth individually, it immediately possesses both empty and provisional; being empty, it "is this"; being provisional, it "is not this"; thus it possesses the middle way, hence it says "the emptiness of emptiness." Whether both or single, whether three or one, all are inconceivable, fully complete without lack, and therefore cannot be deliberated upon by ordinary people or the small [vehicle]. From "Good man, a bodhisattva..." below is the third [part], concluding with praise.

18.5

From "I now in..." below is the third [section], clarifying the benefits. This also has two [parts]: first, clarifying the awakening to emptiness; second, from "having abided in this ground" onward, stating the function, which has the meaning of the preceding separation and subsequent attainment.

18.6

From the passage beginning with "Good son, when a bodhisattva abides in this stage" onwards, it second broadly discriminates knowledge and vision. That knowledge and vision are vast and far-reaching is precisely due to emptiness and quiescence; it is also illuminating directly through quiescence. The text comprises four [parts]: first, explaining knowledge and vision; second, non-attainment; third, harmonising and integrating; and fourth, concluding praise. Illuminating directly through quiescence, it therefore explains knowledge and vision; being quiescent directly through illuminating, it therefore has non-attainment. Since attainment and non-attainment are non-dual in their nature, it therefore harmonises and integrates them. This Dharma is extraordinary, and is therefore praised. The first section has three parts: first, knowing thirteen phenomena; second, obtaining eight kinds of knowledge and vision; and third, obtaining four unobstructed knowledges. The first text states: "Practice is mind; conditions are objects." Nature is internal; characteristics are external. That which is close is the cause; that which is distant is the condition. From "Furthermore, knowing yet not seeing" onwards, it secondly explains the eight kinds of knowledge and vision: (1) knowing what is not the case, (2) knowing what is the case, (3) knowing common practice, (4) knowing cause and effect, (5) knowing the transformation of obstacles, (6) knowing the buddhadhātu, (7) knowing the two truths, and (8) knowing the two wisdoms. Knowing the non-Buddhist heterodox teachings is knowing what is not the case. Knowing retribution of good and evil is knowing what is the case. Knowing permanence, impermanence, the four virtues, and so forth, is knowing common practice. Seeking the Great Vehicle is knowing the cause. Arriving at the other shore is knowing the effect. Body, precepts, mind, and wisdom are knowing the transformation of obstacles. The buddhadhātu has three [applications]: first, based on ordinary beings; second, based on the ten abodes; third, with reference to the buddhas. Neither knowing nor seeing is knowing the real [truth]; both knowing and seeing is knowing the conventional [truth]. Generous giving and so forth is knowing the provisional; not seeing that which is given and so forth is knowing the real. From "Kāśyapa said to the Buddha" onwards, it thirdly explains the four unobstructed knowledges. This also has two parts: first the question, and next the answer. The answer has three parts: first, the proposition; second, the explanation; and third, the critical analysis. The first is as in the text. The subsequent explanation has five [aspects]: first, explaining in terms of conventional truth; second, explaining in terms of the supramundane; third, explaining in terms of non-attachment; fourth, explaining by way of similes; and fifth, explaining in terms of past causes. First, regarding the explanation in terms of conventional truth: "phenomenon" (dharma) means knowing phenomena and the names of phenomena; "meaning" (artha) means knowing the meaning beneath phenomena and the meaning beneath names; "expression" (nirukti) means clear and elegant sounds, distinct and ringing; "eloquence" (pratibhāna) means the ability to adapt and transform without end and without limit. The *Treatise on Following Characters* determines the written characters and is skilled at recognizing the forms of characters. The *Treatise on Correct Sounds* corrects speech and expressions, distinct and articulating precisely. "Chanda" is the *Treatise on Verses* (dharmapada), also called "harmonized sounds", like chanting hymns in harmonized sounds. Héxī says: It is the sound of chanting and singing in this land. It is also said: It refers only to external, non-Buddhist texts. This is not necessarily entirely so; it refers to the sounds of verses common to both internal and external texts. From "Furthermore" onwards, next is the explanation in terms of the supramundane, which is knowing that the meanings of the three vehicles all return to one. Third is the explanation in terms of non-attachment, which has two parts: first the explanation, and next the dialectical discussion. Others say this is an explanation dispelling graspings, but now according to the intent of the objection it is taken as an explanation of non-attachment. From "Kāśyapa" onwards is the dialectical discussion, with first the question and next the answer. First, the sense of Kāśyapa's objection is that knowing is precisely attachment; the Buddha answers that it is precisely because of non-attachment that one knows. Fourth, in the explanation by way of similes, it first adduces six similes to explain the unobstructed understanding of phenomena, and then points back to the six similes to explain the unobstructed understanding of meaning. As for the earth bearing [things], it bears sentient beings and non-sentient beings. The *Śrīmālādevī Sūtra* says: "The great earth bears four heavy burdens, namely mountains, oceans, grasses and trees, and sentient beings." That [text] is broad, while this is brief. Mountains are taken for weighing down the earth, and the earth is taken for steadying the mountains, as they mutually uphold each other. As for the eye being able to hold light, there are two explanations: Ulūka posits that when the light of the eye unites with the mind, it can see; this is borrowed as a simile. The second says it does not borrow a non-Buddhist meaning: the eye possesses the matter of the pure four great elements, and due to external light it can see. From "Good son, a bodhisattva" onwards, fifth is the explanation in terms of past causes.

18.7

From "Good son, śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas" onwards, third is the critical analysis. This also has two parts: first the critical analysis, and later the dialectical discussion. The first has three parts: first, explaining that the two vehicles lack unobstructedness; second, distinct explanations; and third, a general summary. The first is as in the text. In the subsequent distinct explanations, it first explains the pratyekabuddha and next the śrāvaka. From "Kāśyapa" onwards, second is the dialectical discussion, with first the question and next the answer. The answer has three parts: first, the direct answer; second, opening the provisional of the past; and third, revealing the real of the present, as in the text.

18.8

From "Kāśyapa addressed the Buddha" onwards, it secondly clarifies knowledge and vision of non-attainment. This also has three parts: first, clarifying non-attainment; second, citing a verse as proof; and third, attaining through non-attainment. The first also has three parts: first the question, second the answer, and third the expression of understanding. The question also has three parts: first, referring back to the previous text. The previous text is already distant, and so it speaks of "pure conduct". Next, from "the bodhisattva's knowledge and vision" onwards is the objection proper. Third, from "How does the Tathāgata" onwards is the concluding objection. The Buddha's answer also has two parts: first, praising his question; next, the direct answer, which also has two parts: first the direct answer, and next concluding what is correct while setting aside what is false. In the first direct answer, there are ten instances of "furthermore". Attainment and non-attainment are set against each other: attainment does not mean attainment within attainment, but rather the attainment of non-attainment. This "non-" is not the non-existence of analytical cessation; it is the non-existence of penetrating comprehension. The ten pairs are: attainment and non-attainment, perversion and non-perversion, wisdom and ignorance, nirvāṇa and realms of existence, Great Vehicle and Lesser Vehicle, vaipulya and the three baskets, true emptiness and saṃsāra, permanence and impermanence, true emptiness and the five views, and bodhi and the two vehicles. From "Next, good son, that which you asked" onwards, it concludes, as in the text. The *Pañcaviṃśati* explains that whatever possesses duality is having attainment, while whatever lacks duality is called non-attainment (and so forth). From "Kāśyapa addressed the Buddha" onwards, third is the expression of understanding, which also has two parts: having an expression of understanding and having the attainment of benefit; next is citing a verse as proof. The Tathāgata previously said "here", directly at the Twin Trees; why does he point again to the Twin Trees? The explanation states: it is merely a manner of speaking, not necessarily pointing to these Twin Trees from a different place. The second says: seeing and hearing differ, so how could there be a fixed place? Even if it were a different place, what harm is there in pointing to this? This verse appears for the second time, explaining attainment and non-attainment. The text has two parts: first, raising the verse to ask; second, explaining the verse in reply. The answer has three parts: first, distinct explanations; second, a general explanation; and third, a concluding explanation. The distinct [explanation] also has three: first, a brief indication; second, a repeated question; and third, the explanation proper. In the explanation there are two parts: first, admonishing and granting permission; next, the direct answer. In the answer there are eight rounds: the first six rounds are explanations proper, while the latter two clarify not attaining the fruit. In each explanation, the first half of the verse is explained first, and the second half of the verse is explained later; one must also look ahead to the meaning of the general explanation below. An old explanation of this verse takes "originally having afflictions" as the past origin, and "now lacking nirvāṇa" as the past "now"; one cannot say it is the "now" of today. Why? Because now there is nirvāṇa. If heavenly Māra or Brahmā says that the Tathāgata has afflictions, there is no such possibility—this is today's buddha-fruit not being subsumed by the three times. Explaining the text in this manner works for an initial reading, but it does not dispel other objections. Precisely because previously there was existence and non-existence, impermanence, and later there is permanence, it is still "originally non-existent and now existent"—how could it dispel doubt? [Master] Xīnghuáng said: "Originally non-existent and now existent" are both in accord with conditions. Originally having afflictions is speaking of existence when it is not existence; now lacking nirvāṇa is speaking of non-existence when it is not non-existence. If heavenly Māra or Brahmā can understand this, then to say that the Tathāgata has afflictions is without possibility. Dispelling objections and explaining the text, both paths are completely resolved. We now say that this is the meaning within the general answer. If applied to the distinct explanations of the text, it still does not work. The intent of this verse is to transform sentient beings: sentient beings form only views of good and evil, thinking that formerly there was evil and now there is good; the two vehicles form the view that the real and the conventional are not unified; bodhisattvas form the view that the three truths are distinct; Mañjuśrī forms the understanding that the three truths are mutually identical, which is also the understanding of the four doors and four siddhāntas, and so forth. How could one adopt only one kind of explanation like the masters above? Privately, I consider: The Tathāgata himself gave an eightfold explanation; the Buddha's intent was to take these eight as a model, and one should know that its meaning extends across all phenomena. If it were as the various masters say, each with a single view, why would the Buddha not have given only one kind of explanation? One might wish to grant that each of the various masters is correct. Yet if one wishes to reject them, even if there are various explanations, how could they attain the Buddha's intent? Briefly, as Zhāng'ān held, because of the four siddhāntas they are all correct; apart from the siddhāntas they are all incorrect. Therefore know that when the four are produced, the four are correct; when each is grasped, the four are also incorrect. Because the four are incorrect, all are incorrect; because the four are correct, all eight rounds are correct. Therefore, he further gives a general explanation, crowning the distinct with the general, so that it only then accords with the Buddha's intent. The four siddhāntas and four doors are fully as explained before.

18.9

From "The Tathāgata universally for the sake of" onwards, second is the general explanation. It generally establishes the previous intent, showing that speaking of existence is not existence, and speaking of non-existence is not non-existence; they are all for the sake of benefit and are entirely unfixed. In accordance with lands and people, their characteristics differ; therefore, severity and lightness, transgression and non-transgression differ. From "Good son, all conventional truths" onwards, third is the general concluding explanation. All take saṃsāra as conventional and nirvāṇa as the paramārtha. Sometimes conventional [truth] is spoken of and taken to be the paramārtha; sometimes the emptiness and quiescence of all phenomena is spoken of, which is precisely saṃsāra taken as speaking of the paramārtha; or wondrous existence and permanent abiding are spoken of as the paramārtha, which people take to be saṃsāra. The Tathāgata speaks of emptiness intending to clarify non-emptiness, and speaks of existence intending to clarify non-existence; conditioned beings all form views of existence and non-existence.

18.10

From "Good son, therefore you should not previously have objected, saying" onwards, third is clarifying attaining through non-attainment. This also has three parts: first the presentation, second the question, and third the answer. The initial presentation is as in the text. In the subsequent question there are two parts: first the question, and second the objection. The first question is: If there is attainment, it ought to be impermanent. This naturally contains the principle, simile, and application. From "The path is not material form" onwards, next is the objection: If it is permanent, then there ought to be no attainment. Third, the Buddha's answer has two parts: first answering the initial question, and next answering the subsequent objection. In the first text, he first explains generally that the path has two kinds; although the permanent path is attained, it is not impermanent. From "The path and bodhi are both called permanent" onwards, second is the direct answer. Now he says that the path is definitely perfectly permanent and originally present; being covered by delusion, when delusion is severed and the origin restored, it is metaphorically called attainment, yet what is attained is permanent. Next, from "Good son, although the path has no material form" onwards, he answers the subsequent objection, in three parts: principle, simile, and application. First is the statement of principle. Next, from "Like the minds of sentient beings" onwards is the statement by simile. However, it is truly permanent; those who are able to cultivate it attain it, while those who do not cultivate it do not attain it. From "Good son, seeing has two kinds" onwards, third is harmonising and integrating, which also has two parts: first, harmonising and integrating; and second, dialectical discussion. First, harmonising and integrating harmonises the previously stated dharmas of knowledge, vision, and so forth, as having both the semblance and the real: the semblance is the appearance, and clarity is precisely the real. The real also has two: first, the bodhisattva's clarity; second, the Tathāgata's clarity. From this point to the end of the fascicle are the two sections harmonising and integrating, as in the text.

18.11

Chapter on Pure Conduct, Part Three.

18.12

The beginning of the fascicle is the second [section], discussing the doctrine, which contains questions and answers. The questions are twofold: first, inquiring about being identical with the mundane; second, inquiring about being different, which the mundane does not know. The answers are twofold: first, directly answering; second, concluding. The initial answer is threefold: first, clarifying difference from the mundane; second, clarifying identity with the mundane; third, neither mundane nor supramundane. Because it is different, the mundane does not know it—does not know the twelve divisions of scriptures. As for identity: the mundane arbitrarily presumes arising from minute dust particles and the like, and presumes that the world having an end is termination, while having no end is having no termination, which all fall into annihilationism and eternalism. Formerly it was said that there is neither beginning nor end, which has two interpretations: one says that beginningless nescience has no beginning and no end at all; the other says that beginningless nescience has a beginning and an end, and since there is no single beginning at the inception of this beginninglessness, one therefore knows there is a beginning, which moreover ends at the fruit of buddhahood. Both of these interpretations are identical to arbitrarily presuming annihilationism and eternalism in this context. In the eleven emptinesses, the emptiness of beginninglessness is explained to refute this beginning and also to refute this end. From "Regarding such matters" onward, the third [part] clarifies being neither mundane nor supramundane. If a bodhisattva knows, yet one slanders him by saying he does not know, that is slandering a person. Saying there is no bodhi is slandering the Dharma. Next is the conclusion, as in the text. From "At that time, Kāśyapa" onward, the fourth [part] speaks verses to conclude in praise. Others say: the first half-line praises great friendliness, the next line and a half praises great compassion, and the subsequent two verses conclude in praise. Now I state: the first half-line is as before; the next half-line praises great compassion; the next line and a half, on the "physician of the world", praises great sympathetic joy—because it is separated from by sympathetic joy, it says "does not arise", and because it is attained through sympathetic joy, it says "amṛta". From "Sentient beings, having taken it" onward, the half-line praises great equanimity; the next line concludes in praise, as in the text.

18.13

From "Having spoken these verses" onward is the third [section], clarifying precepts as pure conduct. Kāishàn says: "The preceding clarified profound pure conduct; this clarifies shallow pure conduct." This meaning is not so. Taking precepts as the foundation, one is therefore able to transform others. In terms of the text, there are three parts: first, upholding the precepts; second, protecting the Dharma; third, the six recollections. Because of upholding the precepts, one is able to protect the Dharma; because of protecting the Dharma, one is able to cultivate the recollections; sequentially perfecting one another, such is the principle. Upholding the precepts is twofold: first, briefly clarifying upholding the precepts; second, broadly clarifying benefits and faults. The first text has questions and answers. The question is twofold: first, grasping the purport; second, the direct challenge. In the challenge, there are two parts: first, challenging the identity with the mundane—if the mundane does not know, see, or realize, the bodhisattva should also not know, see, or realize; second, challenging the difference from the mundane. The Buddha's answers are twofold: first, opening two chapters; second, explaining the two chapters. From "You say: what difference is there?" onward explains the headings of the two chapters. First, clarifying non-difference explains the chapter on identity. There are identity and difference; it is not purely identical, as in the text. From "When a bodhisattva hears this" onward is the second, explaining the heading of the chapter on difference. This is also twofold: first, clarifying that because of hearing the sūtra one attains the three dharmas; second, clarifying that the three dharmas mutually support each other. The first text completely clarifies the three dharmas, all with precepts as the root. From "Through cultivating wisdom" onward, the second clarifies the mutual support of the three dharmas. The text is brief, so it only mentions two: first, clarifying that wisdom supports precepts; second, clarifying that precepts support wisdom. From "Kāśyapa spoke again" onward, the second broadly distinguishes benefits and faults, with questions and answers. The answers are also twofold: first, adducing impure upholding of precepts as unable to mutually support; second, clarifying pure precepts to directly answer the question. The first text is also twofold: first, clarifying impurity; second, the absence of mutual support. There are four impurities: first, for the sake of existence, like Nanda (and so forth); second, instability of nature—sometimes able to uphold and sometimes unable to uphold; third, not ultimate—unable to hold eternally from beginning to end; fourth, not for the sake of sentient beings—lacking a vast mind, confining oneself to oneself, not simultaneously benefiting others. From "A bodhisattva-mahāsattva" onward, the second clarifies pure precepts to directly answer his question, which is also twofold: first, clarifying pure precepts; second, clarifying mutual support. In the first, on purity, the four purities correspond to the previous four impure precepts; "non-precept" corresponds to the previous lack of beginning and end. Precepts and non-precepts are not the five precepts, prātimokṣa, and the like; rather, taking no precepts and no upholding as the precept—this is the ultimately pure precept. From "In the purity of precepts" onward, the second clarifies the power of mutual support. This is also twofold: first, the mutual support of the three dharmas; second, the auxiliary aid of the five dharmas. In mutual support, it explains the preceding phrases successively and step-by-step. Therein are two parts: first, explaining non-remorse due to precepts, which also has the principle, parable, and application. The parable has three parables. Next, from "Because of pure precepts" onward explains joy. This is also twofold: first, clarifying the three aspects; second, clarifying pleasure. The first text has three parts: first, clarifying the joy of upholding; second, clarifying the distress of violation; third, clarifying both meanings together. In the third, explaining upholding and violating together, there are two parts: first, the parable; second, the application. In the first, the cow exemplifies the scriptural teachings; the woman exemplifies the practitioner; the jar of curd exemplifies breaking precepts; the jar of whey exemplifies upholding precepts; going to the city intending to sell exemplifies both seeking future fruits, using the cause to trade for the fruit (and so forth). Stumbling exemplifies the end of life; both jars breaking exemplifies the disintegration of the body; distress and joy exemplify upholding and violating. As for the jar of whey, the clarified butter has already been churned out, leaving only the remaining liquid; its value is not great, so not having it is also of no concern—this exemplifies the person upholding precepts who has already cultivated and attained the Way, with only the remaining life span left; whether life persists is good, and if it does not persist it is also of no concern. If it were the jar of curd, no butter having yet been churned, losing the curd means the butter is lost—this exemplifies the person breaking precepts who has not yet attained the cultivation of the Way; if this life ends, his Way is also lost, which is why there is distress and fear. Next, from "upholding precepts" onward is the application, as in the text. Next, from "Because the mind is joyful, one then reflects" onward explains pleasure, which is also twofold: first, directly explaining; second, discussing the doctrine. In discussing the doctrine, there is first a question and then an answer. In the answer, there are four levels of explanation, subsequently deepening step by step; accomplishing the great nirvāṇa all derives from precepts. However, among the five feeling faculties, pleasure is shallow and joy is deep; in meditative concentration, joy is shallow and pleasure is deep. Each has its basis; here it accords with the dhyāna factors. Next, in clarifying the auxiliary aid of the five dharmas, saying that one attains five nirvāṇas means liberation from the five aggregates. Nirvāṇa is not five; liberation from the bondage of the five aggregates is called the five nirvāṇas.

18.14

From "Good sons, if my disciples" onward is the second [section], clarifying the protection of the Dharma. Protecting the Dharma is precisely protecting the precepts; when protecting the precepts is firm, that is upholding the precepts; unsteady upholding of precepts is due to lacking the mind to protect the Dharma. This is also twofold: first, rebuking the destruction of the Dharma; second, exhorting the protection of the Dharma. The initial rebuking is also threefold: first, directly rebuking the breaking of precepts; second, rebuking the generation of karma in seeking existence; third, rebuking the proper and improper places. Now, the most vile person is none other than one who breaks precepts; he is completely useless. The text says: "It would be better not to receive and not to uphold [them], rather than breaking the precepts while receiving and reciting them." Question: The previous text had one become a servant and be driven to read and recite, while the present text says it would be better not to receive and not to uphold—why are the two statements contradictory? Answer: Each has its intended meaning. The former clarified gathering and guiding by a hundred means to cause them to enter; the present admonishes human teachers to be without flaws or infractions. In the initial rebuking, it does not go beyond the three karmas: the first is rebuking the body; the second is rebuking the mind; the third is rebuking the speech. In the first text: if a person receives and upholds precepts, any disciples will also learn from this teacher; if he himself is not upright, his authority will not be strict. Next, from "should make body and mind upright" onward, the second rebukes seeking existence. Seeking the three existences is called frivolous; not seeking karmic recompense is called calm and deliberate. Cultivating causes in anticipation of existence is called generating karma for the sake of existence. Third, from "Do not speak at improper times" onward, the third rebukes failing to avoid proper and improper places. If one is truly able to broadly propagate, one must avoid all such improper places. "Do not [speak to] those who do not request"—yet this conflicts with the "unrequested friend". The explanation says: Matters must suit the time. At present, a request is precisely required. "Do not speak to destroy the Dharma": speaking without upholding precepts and speaking without protecting the Dharma is speaking to destroy the Dharma. "Speaking so as to inflame mundane dharmas" means speaking while seeking existence and generating karma. Others interpret: mostly adding secular classics, poetry, and documents, causing others not to have faith, is called inflaming mundane dharmas. It is not so now; increasing suffering and its origin in what one speaks is inflaming mundane dharmas. From "Good sons, if one wishes to receive and uphold" onward, the second exhorts and praises the protection of the Dharma. Others say: first listing the ten knowledges, then exhorting the purification of the mind. Now, initially stating that oneself and others wish to receive and uphold: accepting due to faith is called receiving; not forgetting is upholding—this is one's own practice. What is spoken by the mouth refers to transforming others. The essential theme and substance of nirvāṇa are practice, teaching, function, and fruit. Earlier, the buddhadhātu was explained as the theme; later, seeing the nature is explained as the fruit; both paths cause the three karmas to be pure.

18.15

From "Furthermore, good son" downward, the third [part] explains the six recollections. The Pañcaviṃśati explains ten recollections and eight recollections, and the Hīnayāna also has six recollections, which are what are recited in the early morning: first, recollecting what year, month, and day it is; second, recollecting the years and months of one's monastic age; third, recollecting the rule for offering food; fourth, recollecting that surplus three robes must be declared for purification; fifth, recollecting not eating apart from the monastic community; sixth, recollecting that when there is illness it should be treated—all have their respective meanings. Here these six recollections are taught because practitioners of pure conduct living in forests and wildernesses harbor fear, in order to have them cultivate the six recollections: the first three recollect others, and the latter three recollect oneself. Precepts and giving are one's own causes; being born in heaven is one's own result. Precepts are goodness of restraint; giving is goodness of practice. Heaven has proximate results and distant results (and so forth). In the text there are two parts: first, stating the number and enumerating the section headings; from "How" downward, explaining the six recollections, which constitutes six sections. The section on recollecting the Buddha has two parts: first, recollecting the Buddha's result; second, recollecting the Buddha's cause. Recollecting the cause is recollecting past causes; recollecting the result is recollecting the present result—by what cause the present result was obtained. Recollecting the result has four [parts], namely two headings and two explanations. First, the two section headings of the ten titles and the multitude of virtues are established; next, the two sections of the ten titles and the multitude of virtues are explained. Explaining the ten titles explains the meaning beneath the names; explaining the multitude of virtues explains the meaning beneath the essence. First, the section heading of the ten titles is listed. The *Tattvasiddhi* and the *Āgama* both combine "Unsurpassed Person" and "Tamer of Men" into one title, reaching ten only with "World-Honored One." The present sūtra and the *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa* split "Unsurpassed Person" and "Tamer" into two, reaching ten titles with "Buddha." Summarizing the above virtues into ten titles, being fully endowed with them, he is honored by the world; in the specific explanations, he is not called "World-Honored One" (Bhagavat), but simply called "Bhagavān"—this is the general name of the Buddha, taken here to substitute for "World-Honored One." From "Eternally unchanging" downward, the second [part] lists the section headings of the multitude of virtues. Third, from "Because of knowing phenomena" downward, the section on the multitude of virtues is explained. The preceding passages all directly explain in brief; the final item on the "great Dharma master" is explained again using the previous seven kinds of goodness. Knowing that I can uphold the precepts, can speak the Mahāyāna, and furthermore knowing the middle way is called a "great Dharma master." Knowing the Hīnayāna and all paths are not Dharma masters. From "How is he called Tathāgata?" downward, the fourth [part] explains the ten titles. In Sanskrit, *tathāgata*. Formerly, it was explained only by the single meaning of "riding the path of suchness to come and realize right awakening." The *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa* explains tathāgata with four meanings: namely tathāgata (thus-come), tathāgata (thus-gone), tathā-avabodha (thus-understood), and tathā-vādin (thus-spoken). Relying on the Buddhas of the three periods, studying the twelve divisions of the scriptures, and cultivating the eleven emptinesses to attain buddhahood, he is therefore called tathāgata. Going away from birth and death and eternally escaping all evils is "thus-gone." Understanding in accordance with suchness, and speaking in accordance with suchness. It is also speaking what I have understood, and understanding what I have spoken. Here there are three "furthermore" clauses: the first and last two clauses have the meaning of "thus-spoken," and the middle one has the meaning of "thus-come"; "thus-gone" is under sugata, and "thus-understood" is under lokavid. "How is he arhat?" In Sanskrit, *arhat*. It has three meanings: namely slayer of the foe, non-arising, and worthy of offerings. Here it only says "worthy" (應) and does not say "offerings" (供). There are five "furthermore" clauses, divided into two: the first four explain it by "slayer of the foe," and the latter one explains it by "worthy of offerings." The former "slayer of the foe" also encompasses "non-arising," because shattering the skandha-māra is itself non-arising. From "How is he samyaksaṃbuddha?" downward is the third title. It also has two parts: first, the direct explanation; next, from "How is he not universally knowing?" downward, the reverse explanation. As for the first passage, in Sanskrit, *samyaksaṃbuddha*. There are five "furthermore" clauses; the first four are because the Buddha is able to know the four phenomena completely and universally. Stating that due to ascetic practices one definitely attains painful results refers to non-Buddhist ascetic practices. The latter one refutes the Hīnayāna. "How is he vidyācaraṇasaṃpanna?" is the fourth title. In Sanskrit, *vidyācaraṇasaṃpanna*. There are four "furthermore" clauses: the first one explains in terms of feet (*caraṇa*); the latter three explain in terms of complete endowment (*saṃpanna*). All first cite a worldly metaphor and next apply the Buddha's match. "Clarity" (*vidyā*) is called dhāraṇī/mantra; prajñā is the great vidyā-dhāraṇī; due to the vidyā one attains liberation, which is vimukti. "Auspiciousness" is bodhi; the result is called nirvāṇa, because based on bodhi one attains nirvāṇa. As for the three vidyās: the bodhisattva's vidyā is the cause; the Buddha's vidyā is the result. There are three explanations of avidyā-vidyā: the first says that avidyā is delusion and vidyā is understanding; using vidyā-understanding to cut off avidyā is why it is called avidyā-vidyā. The second says that the objective sphere of ultimate emptiness corresponds neither to vidyā nor avidyā, yet can generate vidyā as well as avidyā; therefore it is called avidyā-vidyā. Another explanation is: the former distinction between bodhisattva and Buddha makes a differing explanation; the subsequent mention of avidyā-vidyā makes a non-differing explanation. Both Buddha and bodhisattva are avidyā-vidyā; avidyā is itself vidyā (and so forth). "How is he sugata?" is the fifth title. The Sanskrit name is *anuttara*, also said to be *sugata*, also said to be *sugata*. There are three "furthermore" clauses; the last clause has the doctrine, metaphor, and match. In the first it says "su" (good) is called high, discerning what is exalted and superior. "Gata" (gone) is called not high: though emerging from birth and death, he does not abandon it; this is spoken from the perspective of the Buddha's mind. "Good friend" is the limbs of the path. "How is he lokavid?" is the sixth title. In Sanskrit, *lokavid*. There are three kinds of worlds: namely the five aggregates, sentient beings, and lands. Here there are six "furthermore" clauses, which are the six worlds: first, the five aggregates; second, the five desires; third, lands; fourth, sentient beings; fifth, designating the Buddha as the world; sixth, illuminating the world is called the world. "How is he anuttarapuruṣa?" is the seventh title. In Sanskrit, *puruṣa*. There are five "furthermore" clauses, opening up the meanings of severing afflictions and not severing afflictions. The text says that the essence of great nirvāṇa has neither new nor old: because the past Buddhas have already achieved it, it is called old; sentient beings will achieve it, so it is called new. Having neither new nor old means having neither already nor future; this is the essential realization in accord with principle. If spoken for the sake of conditions, it is said that there are new and old, already and future. From "How is he tamer" downward is the eighth title. In Sanskrit, *damyasarathi*. First it explains the person (*puruṣa*); next it explains the taming. The person also has two parts: first, explaining the one who tames, opening two section headings—the one who tames is the Tathāgata, and those who are tamed are sentient beings; next, explaining the two headings. From "The Tathāgata is truly not" downward explains that the one who tames is truly not a person, but expediently manifests as a person who can tame. From "All men and women" downward explains those who are tamed. Only when a person is fully endowed with the four dharmas is he called a person; if he lacks the four dharmas, his conduct is the same as that of animals. The *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa* also says: "Deer with human heads, humans with deer heads (and so forth)." Like a horse tamer, using these four dharmas explains that the one who tames handles the sharp and the dull differently: like a swift horse seeing the whip, a dull horse feeling pain in the hand, to the sharp person he speaks of birth, and to the dull he speaks of old age and death. Like the jackal in the *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa* (and so forth). "How is he śāstā devamanuṣyāṇām?" is the ninth title. In Sanskrit, *śāstā devamanuṣyāṇām*. There are twelve "furthermore" clauses: the first two clauses explain "teacher"; the next five clauses explain "deva," all using the superior sense to explain "deva"; the next four clauses explain "human." The mention of "arrogance" is not evil arrogance; wanting to establish a person to propagate and protect the Three Jewels, he can also destroy arrogance. The next single clause summarily explains teacher of devas and humans, as in the text. "How is he called Buddha?" explains the tenth title; first it explains the name, and next it praises the virtues. In Sanskrit, *buddhāya*, also called *buddhasiya*. This is translated as "Awakened One," and also said to be "enlightening through teaching." The previous pratyekabuddha also shares this meaning; therefore "awakened" should be correct, just as pratyekabuddha is translated as "solitary awakened one" and not as "solitary teacher." The Di masters say "awakening oneself and awakening others," and further say "awakened by others"—this is far too verbose. From "Bhagavān" downward explains the eleventh. Some say this is the difference between "World-Honored One" in different places. Why? Because earlier the heading listed "World-Honored One" and the explanation of the heading explains "Bhagavān," hence one knows it is so. I fear this is not so. "World-Honored One" in Sanskrit is *lokanātha*; this is rendered World-Honored One. Nāgārjuna explains bhagavān with four meanings: first, able to destroy afflictions; second, possessing virtues; third, skillfully distinguishing; fourth, good reputation. Here all four meanings are complete: the first "furthermore" clause explains destroying afflictions; the next clause explains possessing virtues; the third clause explains skillfully distinguishing; the fourth clause explains good reputation. The first explains destroying afflictions, which is evident. Next, from "Moreover, able to accomplish" downward explains possessing virtues: accomplishing wholesome dharmas is precisely virtue. Third, from "Moreover, able to skillfully understand" downward explains skillfully distinguishing. Fourth, from "Having great renown" downward explains reputation. The remaining three "furthermore" clauses belong to explaining virtues. One should know that the Bhagavān possesses immeasurable virtues; virtues are based on the internal, while "World-Honored One" means honored by the world, which is based on the external. Here Bhagavān is taken to replace "World-Honored One"; it does not mean it is itself named "World-Honored One." The text has two meanings: the former seven explain the four meanings, and the latter one clause encourages practice.

18.16

From "Good son, for what reason" downward is the second [part], recollecting the Buddha's cause. Wishing to explain the attainment of the result refers to having long cultivated causes. The text has two parts: first, raising the question; next, the direct explanation. In the explanation there are two parts: first, explaining the six perfections and four equalities as causes; next, explaining the fifty-four minds as causes. Among them, the "mind of non-action" does not mean eternal abidance, but means having nothing to do or create. "Neither mind nor non-mind" abandons both of these. Not only is there no mind, there is also no non-mind, and no indeterminate mind. Guāngzhái says: "The eternal Buddha-result has two indeterminates: first, the indeterminate of knowledge and understanding; second, the indeterminate of karmic retribution." This contradicts the present sūtra. At the time of cultivating the cause there is not even an indeterminate, so how could the Buddha-result still have an indeterminate? The "mind without retribution" does not seek karmic retribution. The "non-abiding mind" has no clinging. The "non-constant mind" has no fixed attachment. The "mind without more or less" does not favor one over the other. The "mind that knows realms" distinguishes that all phenomena each have their realms and boundaries. The "mind that knows the realm of arising" is the realm of arising and ceasing. The "mind that knows the realm of abidance" knows the realm of eternal abidance and non-cessation. The "mind of the autonomous realm" is completely non-arising and penetrates with mastery regarding both the permanent and the impermanent. The realm of arising knows the conventional; the realm of abidance knows the true; autonomy knows the middle.

18.17

From "How does one recollect the Dharma?" downward is the second recollection. Ancient commentators said there are two: first, recollecting the Dharma of distinct essence; from "Only this true Dharma" downward, recollecting the Dharma of identical essence. Now we say this is not so. The text says: "Supreme and most wonderful, able to cause sentient beings to attain the present result." If judged by the Tripiṭaka and Shared teachings, they can attain the present result but are not supreme and wonderful; the Distinct teaching is supreme and wonderful but does not attain the present result, easily taking immeasurable asaṃkhyeya kalpas. Only the supreme and wonderful of the Perfect teaching can attain the present result; one should know this is the Dharma of identical essence of the Perfect [teaching].

18.18

From "How does one recollect the Saṅgha?" downward is the third recollection. Ancient commentators also made it into two: first, explaining the conventional harmony saṅgha of distinct essence; from "Invisible" downward, next explaining the principle harmony saṅgha of identical essence. Now we explain that it is not so. The text says: "Receives the straight and upright Dharma." The three teachings are not straight; only the saṅgha of the Perfect [teaching] is the straight and upright Dharma.

18.19

"What is mindfulness of morality?" is the fourth recollection. As for "though without shape or form, it can be upheld and guarded," some take it to be non-informative morality (avijñapti-śīla), on which there are three interpretations: First, one says that the Mahāsāṃghika school holds that there is no non-informative matter, so in itself there is no non-informative [form]. The non-informative is likewise formless; there is only its mental state, and therefore it says, "it can be upheld and guarded." Second, the Sarvāstivāda holds that the non-informative is matter, which is what the masters of the Abhidharma follow; hence in itself there is the non-informative. Furthermore, it is material: although matter is not tangible obstruction, there is nominal form consisting of non-informative instruction, and therefore it must be upheld and guarded. Third, the Dharmaguptaka school, followed by the *Tattvasiddhi*, holds that the non-informative is neither matter nor mind. Such explanations as these are all contentious debates—merely the Hīnayāna arguing among themselves about existence and non-existence—and none of this is explained in the Mahāyāna. Thus the text above states that tainted phenomena are of two kinds in all: matter and non-matter. Non-material phenomena are mind and mental factors; material phenomena are earth, water, fire, and wind. When did it ever say that there is non-informative matter?

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大般涅槃經疏 — Classical Chinese