大般涅槃經疏 21

English (machine translation) 21

Language: English

21.1

Composed by Master Guàndǐng of Zhāng'ān under the Sui

21.2

Re-edited by the Tiāntái Śramaṇa Zhànrán under the Tang

The fascicle opens with the question of the King of Virtue.

From "If one commits the grave offences..." below is the second [part], explaining the contrary cause. Therein are three: namely, question, answer, and expressing understanding. Yěchéng takes this as six questions, while Kāishàn takes it as five questions; but there are only three essential meanings: the first two ask about the four grave offences; the next two ask about the icchantika; the third single question asks about indeterminacy. The first question on the four grave offences: if there is buddhadhātu, one should not fall into the hells; if one falls back, buddhadhātu does not sustain one. The second question: if there is buddhadhātu, why is it further said that it lacks permanence, bliss, self, and purity? If it lacks the four virtues, how could there be buddhadhātu? The third question: the icchantika severs roots of goodness, so he should sever buddhadhātu. The fourth question: if he does not sever buddhadhātu, why is he called an icchantika? The fifth question: the four grave offences and the icchantika are indeterminate and can regenerate roots of goodness; if nirvāṇa is indeterminate, one would revert to being an ordinary being. The wording of the objection is somewhat extensive: if having entered nirvāṇa one exits again, a noble one reverts to being ordinary. If so, the Buddha lacks the four virtues; if not so, the icchantika also lacks the principle of attaining buddhahood. The previous objection made nirvāṇa impermanent, and the Buddha answered that it is not impermanent. Here he raises the objection of indeterminacy: if all is indeterminate, then all is impermanent, and nirvāṇa would also fall within the scope of "all" and should likewise be impermanent. This objection challenges all persons, causing all to be subject to change (and so forth).

The Buddha's answer is twofold: first, praising the question; next, answering the question. The first, praising the question, has four [points]: first, praising present virtue; second, praising past causes; third, praising the question as surpassing humans and devas; fourth, enjoining him to listen and granting permission to speak, as in the text.

From "Good man, an icchantika..." below is the direct answer, which has three [parts]: first, answering the fifth question on indeterminacy; second, answering the third question on severing goodness, which also answers the first and second questions on sinful persons; third, answering the fifth question on indeterminacy again, while also answering the fourth question.

Within the first answer to the fifth, there are three: first, presenting; next, answering; third, concluding.

From "As you have said..." below is the second, directly answering the third, which has three rounds: first, in terms of internal and external; second, in terms of with-outflows and without-outflows; third, in terms of permanent and impermanent. The buddhadhātu middle way is neither of these two extremes, and therefore cannot be severed. Humans and devas are good; the three destinies are evil. Ordinary dharmas are external; noble dharmas are internal. The mundane has outflows; the supramundane is without outflows. The conditioned is impermanent; the unconditioned is permanent. Buddhadhātu is completely free from both of these extremes, and therefore cannot be severed.

From "If it were severed..." below also answers the first and second questions regarding sinful persons. Although they commit sins, they ultimately do not sever the nature, explaining that sins are indeterminate, and because they are indeterminate, they attain saṃbodhi. Originally, one was designated an icchantika by virtue of what has already been severed; the nature is not something already acquired, so how could it be severed? Since it is not determinately existent, how could it prevent falling into hell? This answers the first question. If it is not determinately existent, this disposes of the second question. Furthermore, only severing what has already been attained is designated an icchantika; now since the nature is not something already acquired, this also disposes of the fourth question.

From "Those who commit the four grave offences..." below is the third, answering the fifth question again, which has three [parts]: first, generally explaining indeterminacy; second, extensively explaining indeterminacy; third, concluding indeterminacy. The first text also has four: first, explaining the indeterminacy of evil persons; second, explaining the indeterminacy of all dharmas; third, explaining the indeterminacy of good persons; fourth, explaining the indeterminacy of the Tathāgata. This is the indeterminacy of evil persons.

From "Form and the characteristics of form..." below is the second, explaining the indeterminacy of all dharmas, which has the principle and similes. The initial principle is as in the text. Next, within the similes, there are three similes and three applications, as in the text. As for saying that there are also determinate characteristics, namely permanence, bliss, self, and purity: because his previous objection on indeterminacy said that once the Tathāgata enters [nirvāṇa] he should also emerge from sagehood and become ordinary, thereby lacking permanence and bliss, now it answers that this is not so: within the indeterminate there are also determinate characteristics, namely the Tathāgata's permanence, bliss, self, and purity; therefore it is said that there are also determinate characteristics.

From "Srotāpannas..." below is the third, explaining the indeterminacy of good persons.

From "The Tathāgata now in..." below is the fourth, explaining the indeterminacy of the Tathāgata. In the path of expedient means, the Tathāgata is indeterminate; on the fundamental ground of the dharmakāya, he is determinately never ordinary, and this is called determinate. That the two ends cannot be burned has two explanations: one says that the undergarment touching the body symbolizes the fundamental ground, while what is on the outside symbolizes the trace manifestations, both of which are unperishing; the second says that touching the body symbolizes the Buddha's wisdom discerning faculties, while being on the outside symbolizes spiritual penetrations responding to beings; since the capacities of beings are inexhaustible, spiritual penetrations are never ended, and therefore they are not burned. The pronunciation *zhě* for *chèn* (lining/undergarment) is incorrect; it should be pronounced like *qīn*. This garment being on the inside is called *chènyī* (undergarment).

21.5

From "Good son, you should know that the Tathāgata..." onward, this second [part] broadly clarifies indeterminacy. Old interpretations construed each phrase as having one affirmed and one negated: "not a spirit" negates the dharmakāya, while "not not a spirit" affirms the response body. We now say: to bifurcate the Dharma and the response is still a fixed meaning; how could it be indeterminate? Xīnghuáng says: "'Not a spirit' refers to the indeterminacy of the dharmakāya, so that the dharmakāya is both non-existent and not non-existent. 'Not not a spirit' refers to the indeterminacy of the response body, so that the response body is both existent and not existent. Being existent yet not existent, it can be a spirit and can be non-spirit; being non-existent yet not non-existent, it can be non-spirit and can be a spirit." We now say: none of these avoids fixity. Why is that? If a spirit can definitely be non-spirit, and a non-spirit can definitely be a spirit, although one speaks of indeterminacy, it is still called determinate. We now clarify that a spirit is immediately non-spirit, and is also immediately neither spirit nor non-spirit; non-spirit is immediately spirit, and is also immediately neither spirit nor non-spirit. Neither spirit nor non-spirit is also immediately both spirit and non-spirit. This one is immediately the three, and these three are immediately the one; there is neither one nor three, and one and three are indeterminate—this is the true meaning of indeterminacy. The remaining phrases follow this pattern. Now, we first state the section headings, and next explain them. There are twenty section headings in all, but [the sūtra] explains only sixteen and leaves four unclarified. Regarding the ninth heading, "short and not short," where it speaks of "manifesting a three-foot body," Héxī says: A family had no children, and then bore a son who was three feet tall and died. The parents were overwhelmed by grief and lost their senses. The Buddha manifested the child's image. Seeing the child, the parents regained their senses and said to him: "I said you had died; where did you come from?" He answered: "I come from the place of death. Causes and conditions briefly met; this body belongs to multiple conditions and is a temporary union of the four great elements. Surveying all the conditions, which one is the body?" As he preached the Dharma in various ways, their deluded minds were instantly cut off. He then manifested the three-foot Buddha body with its radiant physical marks, and the householder attained the stage of anāgāmin. "Neither defiling nor undefiled" is the sixteenth section, yet it is explained at the very end. Why is this so? The Buddha wished to explain this section extensively, so he left it for last. Furthermore, I personally consider that among the various sections, if it concerns defiling and undefiled, ordinary beings find it much easier to understand upon hearing. Again, there are two parts: first, clarifying "not defiling," the text of which is extremely extensive; second, clarifying "not undefiled," the text of which is very brief. The contrast between extensive and brief should also be evident. First, regarding "not defiling," the text is twofold: first, clarifying the three defilements; second, clarifying the seven defilements. Question: Why not take the defilements of the three realms as the three defilements, but instead take the form and formless [realms] as the defilement of existence, and universally take ignorance as the defilement of ignorance? Answer: The Buddha's teaching is not fixed; sometimes he transforms the three defilements into the four floods. However, in formulating the three defilements, because desire is heavy, it alone forms one; the form and formless [realms] are slightly lighter, so they are combined into one; and ignorance is the root common to all, so it forms one. However, the Abhidharma masters call it "leaking and falling into birth-and-death," while the treatise masters call it "leaking away the principles." The meaning of the present sūtra is simply that afflictions are called defilements (āsrava).

21.6

From "Furthermore, all ordinary beings..." onward, this second [part] clarifies the seven defilements: first, views; second, thinking; third, sense faculties; fourth, evil; fifth, association; sixth, appropriation; seventh, mindfulness. The first two are the substance of defilement; the latter five are the conditions of defilement. Views are the sharp afflictive drivers; thinking is the dull afflictive drivers; sense faculties are the five internal sense faculties; evil is external evil phenomena; association is bad companions; appropriation is appropriating form, desire, and other phenomena; mindfulness is continuous thought day and night without interruption. The present text lacks the defilement of thinking. Furthermore, the defilement of evil is named "defilement of renunciation": that which can renounce is the path, and that which is renounced is evil. First, in explaining the defilement of views, it should fully possess the ten afflictive drivers, yet it only adduces doubt and views because it wishes to clarify that the four drivers of greed, anger, ignorance, and arrogance extend universally to views and thinking, the five views, and doubt, but within the gates of seeing the truth and thinking, they are subsumed under arrogance. The text also has two parts: first, broadly clarifying the doubting mind; second, separately clarifying the driver of views. Doubt is not in itself a view, but because doubt and views are interrelated, it speaks of "doubt-views." Generating the six kinds of mind fully enumerates the various views. Zhuāngyán says: "These are simply the five views, with the extreme [view] opened into annihilationism and eternalism, hence called six." Kāishàn says: "'Determining that there is a self' and 'determining that there is no self' are not yet the count of six, but merely a general announcement of determination." From "'I see that I am one...' onward, there is the count of six: first, I see self; second, I see non-self; third, non-self sees self; fourth, I act; fifth, I experience; sixth, I know. Regarding these six: first, grasping a true self upon the provisional self, hence called 'I see self.' Second, grasping that this self does not exist upon the provisional self, hence called 'I see non-self.' Third, grasping a true self upon the bodily aggregates, hence called 'non-self sees self.' The three beginning with 'I act' are three among the sixteen views. Héxī takes determining existence and non-existence as two. Regarding 'I see self': having originally grasped that there is a self, upon entering meditation one sees a wonderful light resembling the sun and moon, and then takes what is seen as proof that there is definitely a self; hence it says 'I see self.' Regarding 'I see non-self': grasping that there is presently a self but no self in the past and future, which is the non-Buddhist view of annihilationism. 'Non-self sees self' refers to positing that all sentient beings are completely devoid of self, yet apart from the five aggregates one separately sees a self, resembling a hemp seed or grain of wheat, and so forth. Regarding 'I act' and 'I experience': positing that it exists permanently from beginning to end, which is the eternalist view, asserting that the self can create causes, the self can experience results, and that it is capable of knowing.

21.7

From "Ordinary persons are unable to properly restrain [their sense faculties]" onward is the third section, explaining the outflow of the faculties. This also has three parts: first, explaining that ordinary persons give rise to outflows because of their faculties; second, explaining that bodhisattvas do not do so; third, concluding that the Tathāgata is free from outflows. For ordinary persons, it is as in the text. From "Bodhisattvas" onward is the second part, explaining that although it is based on the faculties, they do not give rise to the outflows. As for "suffering of conditioned existence" (saṃskāra-duḥkhatā), there are two interpretations: one says it is the suffering of conditioned existence among the three kinds of suffering, which is the most comprehensive of these sufferings; the other says that conditioned existence is impermanence while suffering is only the retribution, so they cannot be taken as identical. Speaking of "twenty-five leagues" is an analogy for the twenty-five realms of existence. The bowl is an analogy for physical form and mind; the oil is an analogy for the precepts; not spilling a single drop is an analogy for not violating a single precept. The king is an analogy for the Buddha; the minister is an analogy for the practitioner; the drawn sword behind is an analogy for impermanence. From "The Tathāgata pulls out" onward is the third part, concluding that the Tathāgata is free from outflows. From "Furthermore, there is the outflow that is abandoned" onward is the fourth section, explaining the outflow of evil. In its own substance it is called evil; with respect to the path of remediation it is called abandonment. This also has two parts: first, explaining the path that is able to abandon; second, explaining the evil that is abandoned. The first also has two parts: first, explaining the cultivation of the bodhisattva; second, citing the past to verify the present. In the first text, there are five kinds of Dharma masters, and saying that "once passing through the ears, for seven kalpas one does not fall [into evil paths]," the preceding chapter "Merits of the Name" states: "If one hears the two words 'permanently abiding', from life to life one will not fall." Hearing has many varieties: if one is able to deeply contemplate and practice according to what is taught, then from life to life one will not fall; if one cannot deeply contemplate and practice, one obtains only slight benefit. As for the "eight māras," ancient [commentators] said: the four [inversions], impermanence and the rest, each have their causes, and these constitute the eight māras. Another interpretation: the four [māras] such as afflictions together with the four such as impermanence constitute the eight. From "Good sons, I recall in the past" onward is the second part, citing the past to verify the present, wherein there is a verse. An ancient commentary explains: the first half explains the fruit, and the second half distinguishes the cause. Realizing nirvāṇa is the fruit; listening with a sincere mind is the cause. Within the fruit there are the two matters of attaining and abandoning: realizing nirvāṇa is attaining, and forever severing is abandoning. The cause also has two: the sincere mind is cultivation, and immeasurable joy is attaining the fruit. Speaking of attaining the fruit of joy: it is not the fruit of permanent joy, but rather, through practicing the cause, one obtains the fruit of joy within the cause. Someone criticized this: this comparison is too narrow and limited, entirely without foundation; if it were only this matter, how could he have sold his body? And how could he have attained Buddhahood through hearing this? Master [Hui]guan said: The meaning of the verse is immeasurable and cannot be exhausted; what it encompasses is exceedingly broad and its flavours of meaning are unending. Let us briefly set forth ten meanings: first, the Three Jewels; second, the Four Truths; third, the three virtues; fourth, the four virtues; fifth, the four propositions of arising and non-arising; sixth, the verse on original existence and present non-existence; seventh, the Himālaya verse; eighth, the meanings of the four siddhāntas; ninth, the verse of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā; tenth, the four kinds of buddha-nature. As for the statement that the verse contains the Three Jewels: this single line alone, "The Tathāgata realizes nirvāṇa," is the Three Jewels of the Buddha-Dharma. The person capable of realizing is the Tathāgata, which is the Buddha Jewel; the Dharma that is realized is nirvāṇa, which is called the Dharma Jewel; the line "forever severing" is merely an auxiliary phrase; if one can have a sincere mind, that is the Saṅgha Jewel. Being able to listen with a sincere mind is the assembly that upholds the practice—how could that not be the Saṅgha Jewel? However, this line can also be viewed in both ways: the sincere mind can also be the Dharma Jewel—arriving at what place, that is listening to the Dharma; for now it is assigned to the Saṅgha. "Attaining immeasurable joy" is also an auxiliary line. Those that explain the Three Jewels are just two lines. Setting aside these two lines: as for the Four Truths, one does not take the meaning of the truths [dogmatically], but only takes practice and realization. Those who realize this Dharma: the Buddha realizing nirvāṇa is the realization of cessation. How is this known? Nirvāṇa translates as cessation; how could it not be the truth of cessation? "Forever severing birth and death" is the elimination of origination; origination is afflictions and binding karma, and here birth and death are also afflictions and binding karma. If one is able to listen with a sincere mind, that is the truth of the path. Because of listening with a sincere mind, one immediately realizes the path. "Constantly attaining immeasurable joy" is the truth of suffering. Why? Once the fruit of suffering is dispelled, one obtains the retribution of joy. Third, the three virtues: they are the three eyes of Maheśvara, and also the three dots of the letter 'I'. "The Tathāgata realizes nirvāṇa" is the virtue of the dharmakāya; "forever severing birth and death" is the virtue of liberation; "listening with a sincere mind" is the virtue of prajñā. Each of these must be explained further. The three virtues explained in the "Chapter on the Four Reliances" are: first, dharmakāya; second, liberation; third, prajñā. In the "Chapter on the Four Characteristics" it is not so: the first is nirvāṇa, the second is liberation, and the third is prajñā, which takes nirvāṇa to substitute for dharmakāya. Now, since nirvāṇa is mentioned here, how could it not be the dharmakāya? As for forever severing birth and death being liberation: when there is birth and death, there are entanglements and no release; now, since they are severed and removed, there are no entanglements, so how could it not be liberation? As for listening with a sincere mind being prajñā: because of listening to the Dharma, one is able to generate wisdom; once wisdom is generated, how could it not be prajñā? For one who is not sincere, it may not arise; now, since one listens with a sincere mind, one is able to generate wisdom and further attains Dharma-joy for self-delight, which is no longer worldly joy. As for the four virtues, they are permanence, joy, self, and purity. "The Tathāgata realizes nirvāṇa" is the virtue of permanence. Question: Is the Tathāgata taken as permanent, or is nirvāṇa taken as permanent? Now it is explained that both person and Dharma are permanent, hence the previous text states: "Because the Dharma is permanent, the person is also permanent." "Forever severing" is the virtue of purity. Birth and death are loathsome, filled with impurity; once impurity is removed, one obtains pure Dharma, so how could it not be the virtue of purity? "Listening with a sincere mind" is the virtue of the self. Because the self is able to listen—if there were no self, who would listen? "Constantly attaining immeasurable joy" is naturally the virtue of joy, and it is also said to re-illuminate the virtue of permanence. As for the four propositions of arising and non-arising, they have already been thoroughly explained previously, so they are not explained again now (and so on). As for corresponding to the verse on original existence and present non-existence: "The Tathāgata realizes nirvāṇa" is originally non-existent and presently existent: not yet having realized nirvāṇa is original non-existence; now, having already realized it, it is present existence. "Forever severing birth and death" is originally existent and presently non-existent: when the Tathāgata had not yet severed birth and death, because afflictions existed, that is the meaning of original existence; once he realized the dharmakāya, there were no more afflictions—how could that not be present non-existence? The lower two lines cannot be separated. It is just that "in these three periods of time there is no such thing," hence they directly combine into "conditioned dharmas of the three periods of time have no such reality." What are the dharmas of the three periods of time? Realizing this Dharma, the permanent fruit of nirvāṇa, means that within the three periods of time [afflictions] have no such reality. As for the Himālaya verse, the text is slightly intertwined and must be carefully distinguished. The upper half does not correspond to the meaning of this passage; taking only the lower half, it still does not fully correspond to the present four lines, but corresponds only to two present lines. "Arising and ceasing having been extinguished" is "forever severing birth and death." "Quiescent cessation is bliss" is "constantly attaining immeasurable joy." Comparing these two verses, each has what the other lacks. Comparing this verse to that one, it lacks "All conditioned things are impermanent, they are dharmas of arising and ceasing"; comparing that verse to this one, it lacks "The Tathāgata realizes nirvāṇa. If one is able to listen with a sincere mind." It also corresponds to the four siddhāntas: "The Tathāgata realizes nirvāṇa" is the ultimate truth (paramārtha-siddhānta)—at times nirvāṇa is described as the ultimate truth. "Forever severing birth and death" is the counteractive (pratipakṣa-siddhānta). A treatise says: "Treating the three outflows with the three contemplations"; here, directly severing birth and death, how could it not be counteractive? "If one is able to listen with a sincere mind" is the worldly (saṃvṛti-siddhānta). In the world, it is sometimes said there is a self, and sometimes said there is no self, all of which should be received with a sincere mind. This self and non-self "constantly attaining immeasurable joy" is the individual (pratyātma-siddhānta). A treatise says: "A single Dharma is divided into two types for exposition: for those who cling to a self, non-self is taught; for those who cling to non-self, self is taught. For those attached to suffering, joy is taught; for those clinging to joy, suffering is taught." Here, in order to eliminate those who cling to impermanence and suffering, the Dharmas of permanence, joy, and so on are explained. As for the verse of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā: "Dharmas that arise from causes and conditions" is "The Tathāgata realizes nirvāṇa"; nirvāṇa is simply a Dharma of causes and conditions; if it were not of causes and conditions, it would become the meaning of intrinsic nature (svabhāva). "I explain as emptiness" is "forever severing birth and death"; having severed birth and death, one therefore attains this emptiness. "Also designated as provisional name" is "listening with a sincere mind"; only if there is a provisional self can one listen and receive. "It is also the meaning of the Middle Way" is "constantly attaining immeasurable joy"; the Middle Way is neither existence nor non-existence, neither permanent nor impermanent, concluding as permanent; having neither suffering nor pleasure, concluding as great joy. Here, this permanence and joy is the permanence and joy of the Middle Way. As for the four kinds of buddha-nature: setting aside the nature of the direct cause, one takes only the four conditional buddha-natures of fruit-fruit and cause-cause. "The Tathāgata realizes nirvāṇa" is the fruit-fruit nature, hence the lower text states: "Fruit-fruit refers to the great nirvāṇa." "Forever severing birth and death" is the cause-cause nature; the lower text states: "Cause-cause refers to the dharmas produced by the twelve links of dependent origination." Also, when one completely severs the afflictions of the twelve links of dependent origination, the understanding of contemplative wisdom arises—how could that not be cause-cause? "Listening with a sincere mind" is the revealing-cause nature (vyañjana-hetu). The thirty-seven factors of awakening, the six perfections, and the four equalities are all revealing causes. "Constantly attaining immeasurable joy" is the fruit of bodhi; because of permanent joy, how could it not be the fruit nature? Master [Hui]guan said: Merely reflecting slightly, one immediately attains these ten major headings of great meaning; therefore one should know that its principle is immeasurable and cannot be fully related. Earlier, in the "Chapter on Pure Conduct," it spoke of pain, whereas here it says no pain; ancient commentaries explain that this is merely a difference of depth (and so on). Next, explaining the evil that is abandoned: it refers to wild elephants, wild horses, and various ferocious beasts that can harm humans, which can give rise to evil thoughts and activate the evils of body and speech. As for evil cities and evil houses, being inanimate objects, how could they commit evil? If one is in a border fortress holding bows and arrows, beating warning clappers, and blocking roads, how would that not give rise to a murderous mind in people? Evil houses are also like this. These are evil conditions. Bad spiritual friends use sweet talk, deceit, flattery, and clever words with prepossessing appearances to draw people into committing evil, therefore one must keep distant from them.

21.8

Next is the explanation of the fifth, the outflow of associating with bad companions, as in the text.

21.9

From "Furthermore, all ordinary persons" onward is the sixth section, explaining the outflow of sensation. The text says "feeling and perceiving," which is sensation. The "Chapter on Noble Conduct" says: "Sensation has perception as its characteristic." Because after the three sensations one gives rise to the three afflictions, it is called the outflow of sensation. Therein, it also explains the terms such as śramaṇa, all of which have multiple meanings and must not be rigidly clung to. Here, the six difficulties differ from those in the case of Cunda above: above, dana was taken as difficult; in the "Chapter on Lamentation," the fruit of the arhat was taken as difficult; here, the fearful mind is taken as difficult. Why is it that in three places difficulties are distinguished, yet five are identical and one differs? The "Chapter on Cunda" is addressed to the worldly, hence it says the final dāna is difficult; the "Chapter on Lamentation" is addressed to the path, hence the arhat is difficult; here, it is generally addressed to ordinary persons attached to existence, hence the fearful mind is difficult.

21.10

Chapter on the Noble King of Virtue, Part Three.

21.11

Opening the scroll, the text explains the seventh, the outflow of mindfulness (smṛti-āsrava). This also has two parts: first, clarifying the characteristics of the outflow; second, clarifying that the bodhisattva, being free of outflows, is able to sever the outflow of mindfulness. The mind of volitional formations having erroneous mindfulness constitutes the outflow. In principle, the outflow of mindfulness should be generated amidst all three feelings, but here it specifically relies on the generation of the outflow of mindfulness amidst suffering, which gives rise to faults such as greed and anger. From "The bodhisattva" downward is the second part, clarifying that the bodhisattva is free of outflows, which again has three parts: the doctrinal statement, the parable, and the conclusion. First, the brief doctrinal statement directly clarifies that through reflection the bodhisattva is able to sever the outflow of mindfulness, whereas foolish ordinary persons are unable to reflect and bring about the extinction of its outflows. From "Suppose there was a king" downward is the second part, the presentation through parables, which has two sections: first the parable, and second the application. As for the initial parable, explanations of it differ, counting seven, eight, or nine [elements]; looking ahead to the subsequent text of the application, there should be eight parables: (1) the four serpents, (2) the five caṇḍālas, (3) the feigned friend, (4) the village, (5) the six bandits, (6) the great river, (7) the grass raft, and (8) reaching the opposite shore. Grouping the eight into three: the first six illustrate the conditions for the path; the next one illustrates cultivating the path; and the last one illustrates attaining the fruit. The initial mention of the "king" has three interpretations: the first says that the Buddha speaks of the four great elements within the bodies of sentient beings; the second says that ignorance can construct the body of the four great elements in sentient beings; the third says that this sūtra expounds how the four great elements in sentient beings mutually conflict and harm one another, comparing them to serpents. The "box" illustrates the single body; "feeding and nourishing" illustrates massaging and washing. "According to the law" means [punishing] according to the evil committed, with grades of severity. "To execute him in the city marketplace" means severing the roots of goodness and cutting off the life of wisdom, a matter that is public and evident, hence called "the city marketplace." "Strictly ordering" means strictly demanding that evil not be done and admonishing that good be practiced. "Fleeing" means that if one attained true understanding, one would depart openly and clearly; here, since one is only initially subduing afflictions, it says "fleeing." Next, from "The king then again dispatched" downward, the five caṇḍālas are used to illustrate the five aggregates, and the knives illustrate the suffering of impermanence. "Looking back": joyfully seeking nirvāṇa is "fleeing"; being weary of birth and death is "looking back." Third, from "At that time the five men" downward is the parable of the feigned friend. "Hiding the knife" means using a false self to conceal non-self, and false pleasure to conceal suffering. "Secretly dispatching one man": the one man illustrates craving. In the volitional formations of the five aggregates, this greed and craving can deceive sentient beings, hence it is called "feigned friend." Fourth, from "That man did not believe" downward is the parable of the village, which illustrates the five sense faculties. The five sense faculties are the dwelling and reliance of consciousness, just as people inhabit a village. "Worn vessels" (𬎩器): the old [commentary] says these are narrow-necked jars with double rims, illustrating the heaviness of the five faculties. The character 𬎩 (tà) is pronounced like hóng in the dictionaries. Since one sees no person, that is the emptiness of persons; seeking things and finding none, that is the emptiness of phenomena. "Sitting on the ground" means resting the mind in the realm of emptiness. Fifth, from "Hearing a voice in the air" downward is the parable of the six bandits, illustrating the six sense objects' ability to plunder the wealth of goodness. The "voice in the air" illustrates hearing the Buddha's teaching that explains there are six sense objects. "Coming at night" means the dark mind of ignorance cloaks these six sense objects. Sixth, from "Encountering a river on the road" downward illustrates meeting the stream of afflictions. Sentient beings are constantly in the midst of afflictions, so why say "encountering"? Before cultivating the path, one does not know the faults of afflictions; now, beginning to investigate the mind, one knows they are obstacles, hence it is called "encountering." The impact of [the extremes of] annihilationism and eternalism is illustrated by the rushing torrent. Lacking morality, concentration, and wisdom, there is no boat or raft. Seventh, from "Immediately gathering various [reeds]" downward, the raft illustrates cultivating the path; moving the hands and feet illustrates the functioning of the path. "The raft cannot be relied upon" reflects concern that goodness is weak and cannot overcome [the torrent] and deliver [one]. "Leaning the body [upon it]" means the mind relies on this goodness to cut across the stream and depart. The grass and wood illustrate the manifold wholesome dharmas. The two hands illustrate the two kinds of wisdom, provisional and real. The two feet illustrate the two virtues of morality and concentration. Eighth, from "Immediately reached the other shore" downward illustrates attaining the fruit of nirvāṇa. While here and while in the stream, there is much to fear; having crossed over to the fruit, there is surely nothing to dread.

21.12

Next is the application of the eight parables. First, the application of the four serpents: these are the four great elements. The great elements are internal and external; the four great elements of the internal body precisely correspond to the four serpents. The four great elements together produce the visual faculty, corresponding to the poison of seeing; together they produce the tactile faculty, corresponding to the poison of touch; together they produce the olfactory faculty, corresponding to the poison of breath; together they produce the gustatory faculty, corresponding to the poison of biting. Next, the application of the five caṇḍālas is as in the text. Third, the application of the feigned friend: the "friend" is simply craving; craving can flatter, entice, and harm sentient beings. The preceding three minds [of the aggregates of sensation, perception, and consciousness] cannot generate craving; it is only within the mind of volitional formations that craving-affection can arise. Although all five aggregates can do evil, the arising of craving and grasping resides specifically in the mind of volitional formations, hence it is called "one enemy." The text says: "The enemy who feigns friendship has a beginning and an end, but the mind of craving is not like that; it has neither beginning nor end." This also has two meanings: first, like the twelve links of dependent origination, which are like a cartwheel without beginning or end, the mind of craving likewise has neither beginning nor end. However, the twelve links also have a beginning and an end: ignorance is the beginning, and aging-and-death is the end. As for the meaning of having neither beginning nor end, seeking the place from which craving comes can never be attained, which is the meaning of "no beginning"; the place to which it goes has nowhere to be traced, which is again "no end." Next, the application of the fourth, the empty village: this refers to the six internal sense bases (āyatana). In the external world, a village is a dwelling place for people; being devoid of people, it is empty. The six sense faculties are the dwelling and reliance of the self; seeking [the self] cannot find it, hence they are empty. Just as a person looking at a house thinks someone is inside, but upon reaching it and entering to search finds no one at all, so too the bodhisattva contemplates the six sense faculties as all empty and devoid of self. These six sense bases are the six faculties, which together with the six external sense objects make the internal and external twelve [bases]. The six faculties are also called the six emotions (liuqing), and are also called the six consciousnesses. "Faculty" (indriya) takes "capacity to generate" as its meaning; "emotion" takes its name from the arising of consciousness. However, the six faculties are non-sentient, whereas consciousness is sentient; taking its name from the capacity to experience, it is called the "six emotions." Consciousness grasps and joins together: when the faculties and sense objects join together, they can generate consciousness. Next, the application of the fifth, the six bandits: these are the six sense objects. Bandits come from the outside to rob people of their property; the bandits of the six sense objects rob people of their wholesome dharmas. These six sense objects generate three kinds of dharmas: four items that can generate subtle afflictions are called the "four subtles" (paramāṇu), and what they generate is coarse, hence called the "four great elements." The four items are color-form, smell, taste, and tangible objects. Each of the four great elements has four, or does not fully have four. What five items generate are called the "five desires." The five items add the single sound-object. What six items generate are called the "six sense objects" (guṇa); "dust" (guṇa) is a name for defilement and burden. Next, the application of the sixth, the single river: the river is affliction. However, this relates to the two rivers and the six rivers, which there is no time to detail fully: there are the river of birth and death, the river of nirvāṇa, the river of wholesome dharmas, and the river of the buddhadhātu (and so forth). In this sūtra, three rivers differ: in [the Chapter on] "Siṃhanāda," it explains the river of birth and death; in [the Chapter on] "Kāśyapa," it explains the river of nirvāṇa; and here it explains the river of afflictions. From "Having reached the river, gathering grass to make a raft" downward is the application of the seventh parable: morality, concentration, and wisdom are taken as the three grades. From "Arriving at the other shore" downward is the application of the eighth, reaching the other shore, illustrating the eternal bliss of nirvāṇa.

21.13

From "How is the Tathāgata not free of outflows?" downward is the second part, explaining "not free of outflows," a half-sentence. As for the text stating that the Tathāgata constantly practices that which has outflows, the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharmikas (shu ren) say: outflows and the absence of outflows are determined according to the cognitive object; if one takes an object with outflows as an intentional object, it is called "having outflows"; if one takes an object without outflows as an intentional object, it is called "without outflows." Here, explaining that the Tathāgata has outflows resembles the interpretation of the Sarvāstivādins. Why is this so? The text says "The Tathāgata constantly practices that which has outflows"; "having outflows" refers to the twenty-five states of existence, so we know it takes its name from the realm of the twenty-five states of existence. The Sautrāntika/Madhyamaka treatise masters (lun ren) follow the mind: when would they ever follow the cognitive object? When my essence is pure and free of afflictions, even though I take an object with outflows as an intentional object, the mind does not become an outflow. These two interpretations are the root of dispute. Here it fully explains that the Tathāgata is neither with outflows nor without outflows. "Not with outflows" clarifies that the Tathāgata no longer has any outflows. "Not without outflows" clarifies that the Buddha still has outflows. Regarding these outflows and absence of outflows, it intends to clarify that the Buddha is neither with outflows nor without outflows—a double negation of outflows and freedom from outflows. How could it ever say that he has outflows or is without outflows?

21.14

From "Good man, for this reason" downward is the third part, concluding that it is indeterminate.

21.15

From "At that time King of Virtue" downward is the third part, expressing understanding (and so forth).

21.16

From "As the Buddha stated above" downward is the second part, where the King of Virtue requests once more an answer to the earlier question regarding the fruit; because the previous question was distant, he reiterates it here. In the second part above on the paired questions regarding causes and conditions, first there was a paired answer on cause and fruit, and next a separate answer on cause and fruit. In the separate answer, after the Tathāgata broadly finished answering regarding the cause, now the King of Virtue presents again the question on the fruit. The text has two parts: first, he presents the question on the fruit; from "At that time the Buddha praised" downward is the second part, the Tathāgata's answer. This also has two parts: first, praising the question; second, the direct answer. First, the praise of the question contains two intentions: first, praising his ability to remember and retain without forgetting. Even after a long time, he still remembers the previous question and can request the Buddha to answer; this is the power of attaining mindfulness and dhāraṇī. Second, in this nirvāṇa much is contained, and now you wish to retain all of it together; therefore it again says "attaining mindfulness and dhāraṇī." From "As worldly people say" downward is the second part, the direct answer, which also has two parts: first, raising the contrast between the great and the small, which answers in terms of relative dependence (saṃketa); second, answering his question about the great nirvāṇa in terms of absolute transcendence (atyanta). First, clarifying relative dependence has ten pairs. As for the meaning of absolute transcendence, it is as the subsequent text states: "Just as space is not called great space because of small space; nirvāṇa is likewise: it is not called great characteristics because of small characteristics." Within relative dependence, it first raises ten pairs as ten parables, and next applies them. In the application there are two parts: first, the general application; second, separately raising the parables to match and apply them. The general application also has two parts: first, listing the two chapter headings of "great" and "small"; next, from "What is nirvāṇa?" downward, explaining the two headings, first explaining the small, and next explaining the great. First, explaining the small also has two parts: first, raising five matters that partially have the meaning of extinguishing suffering and are called nirvāṇa, but are not the great nirvāṇa. From "If an ordinary person" downward is the second part, raising the extinction of severing and subduing as being called nirvāṇa. It first sets out the two chapter headings of ordinary persons and noble ones. Next, in the explanation there are two parts: first the explanation, and next explaining and establishing it. First, from "Or by worldly..." downward explains the ordinary persons above. From "Or by the noble path..." downward explains the śrāvakas above. "Worldly" refers to externalists who attain dhyāna and subdue afflictions; "noble path" refers to Hinayāna practitioners who sever afflictions. From "Why is this?" downward, the second part explains and establishes the above two. "Again generating afflictions" explains the ordinary persons. "Having latent traces (vāsanā)" explains the Hinayāna. Next, the text fully sets forth the meaning of latent traces. Speaking generally, all ten fetters have latent traces, as in the cases of Śāriputra, Nanda, Pilindavatsa, etc. (and so forth); here it specifically explains the traces in terms of the view of self. "Without self and without bliss, only having permanence and purity": "without self and bliss" is granting them permanence and purity; if negated, then all are devoid of permanence, bliss, self, and purity. From "Permanence, bliss, self, and purity" downward, these three phrases total twelve characters, explaining the chapter heading of the great nirvāṇa above. From "Good man, for example..." downward is the second part, raising the parables to match and apply them. Above there were ten parables; here it separately applies only seven, and the remaining three are combined. The three matters of the king, the city, and the earth share one single application; these three matters are mutually inclusive: a king has a city, and a city has land, their conceptual import accompanying one another. Human and deva are also combined in one application. Among the separate applications: first is the application of the ocean, second the application of the river, and third the application of the mountain. As for mahānāgaprakāṇḍa (摩訶那伽鉢建提), the Dàzhìdù lùn says: "A great dragon, a great elephant, a champion among devas." Emperor Wu of Liang translated it as "supreme male." From "Subordinate to a minor king" downward is the fourth, combining the application of the three parables of the great king, the great city, etc. From "The fourfold army" downward is the fifth, applying the previous seventh parable of sentient beings and great sentient beings. From "If there is a person who can..." downward is the sixth, combining the previous two parables of the person/great person and deva/great deva. From "Universally showing sentient beings the one reality" downward is the seventh, applying the previous parable of having a path and the great path.

21.17

From “'Great' means inconceivable” onward, the second [part] explains the great nirvāṇa; that is, the explanation in terms of absolute transcendence. This again has two [parts]: first, general; second, particular. The initial general explanation also has two: first, explaining the unexplainable; second, the explainable. In the subsequent particular explanation, [the sūtra] refers only to the three virtues and does not mention constancy. This has two meanings: first, it is said that previously, in the opening of the essential tenets, constancy was already extensively explained, so it is omitted here; second, it is said that the “Chapter on Names” states, “That which is called great is termed constancy,” so here, further explaining “great,” it does not mention constancy again. Within the three virtues there are also two [aspects] each. In the first, the Great Self, having two [aspects] means: first, explaining “great” through the inconceivable; second, explaining “great” through manifold causes and conditions; that is, the explainable and the unexplainable. Now the text says: “Because there is the Great Self, it is called the Great Nirvāṇa,” and also says, “Nirvāṇa is without self.” Formerly there were two interpretations: The first says that “without self” refers to cutting off names and merging with reality, hence nirvāṇa is without self; conventional truth conventionally borrows names, hence nirvāṇa has a self. The second says that regarding “without self,” there being no self in nirvāṇa means there is no false self of saṃsāra; having a self means having the self of constancy and bliss. Master Guan challenged these two interpretations: If cutting off names and merging with reality is called “without self,” then cutting off names and merging with reality should also be called “inconstancy.” That [opponent] explains: It cannot be inconstancy, for nirvāṇa is constant; hence by merging with reality and the four transcendences, it is called “without self.” [He] further presses: Because it merges with reality and the four transcendences, therefore it is inconstant (and so forth). He challenged the second master, saying: Since you say there is no self within saṃsāra, there should also be no constancy within saṃsāra. That [opponent] immediately countered: Where is there constancy within saṃsāra? One should then ask in return: How could there be knowing within saṃsāra? If he explains that saṃsāra has no true self, but has a provisional self, then [one] also presses: There is no immutable constancy, but there is continuous constancy. If so, not only is there no self of saṃsāra, there is also no constancy of saṃsāra, pressing [the contradiction] endlessly. The eight sovereignties are: one, one and many; two, small and great; three, light and heavy; four, form and mind; five, sense faculties; six, attainment; seven, preaching; eight, vision—as in the text. From “Furthermore, it is like a jewel treasury” onward, the second [part] explains that it is called the Great Self due to manifold causes and conditions. Next, Great Bliss also has two [aspects]: first, explaining inconceivable Great Bliss; second, from “worldly” onward, explaining Great Bliss of manifold causes and conditions. The initial text explains the four blisses, wherein within the first bliss there are three “furthermores,” explaining the bliss of neither suffering nor bliss. Second, from “great tranquility” onward, it explains that neither clamor nor quietude is called great tranquility, termed bliss. Third, from “all” onward, it explains that neither knowing nor non-knowing is called great knowing, termed bliss. Fourth, explaining the body not decaying refers to the body of neither saṃsāra nor nirvāṇa; therefore not decaying is called Great Bliss. Next, from “worldly names” onward, the second [part] explains having causes and conditions. Returning to contrast it with having no conditions to explain it, the text is divided into two—having causes and having no causes—to explain it: first, explaining having causes and conditions; next, distinguishing having no causes and conditions. Nirvāṇa is just the same, having no causes and conditions, which is still the previous meaning of absolute transcendence. In the initial [section on] having causes and conditions, “kāka” is the sound of a crow; “jiūjiū” is the sound of a chicken; “tātā” is the sound of a pheasant. Next, in [the section on] having no causes and conditions, regarding “mandā[rava]” and so forth, Hexi says: *Māndhāva* in the Sanskrit text has one sound for two things: first, an elevated seat in an open hall; second, a medicinal decoction; but the translator of the sūtra rendered it as “palace halls and drinks.” *Sarvachata* is said to resemble *mǎqín* (horse celery), one sound with two designations. *Tilabhāyin* is a swallow or sparrow, also one sound with two designations.

First 17 of 23 passages. Read on

Linked texts (1)

大般涅槃經疏 — Classical Chinese