大般涅槃經疏 31

English (machine translation) 31

Language: English

31.1

Composed by Master Guàndǐng of Zhāng'ān under the Sui

31.2

Re-edited by the Tiāntái Śramaṇa Zhànrán under the Tang

From "Kāśyapa addressed [the Buddha]" onward is the second section, which clarifies the meaning of [nirvāṇa's] difference from space, comprising two rounds of questions and answers. In this first round of questioning, the main point is that buddhadhātu, nirvāṇa, and space alike are not subsumed under the three times. Space is not subsumed under the three times and is designated as non-existent, while nirvāṇa is not subsumed under the three times and is designated as permanent. Since both alike lack the three times, why are they not alike in being existent? The Buddha's answer has three parts: first, stating the topical headings; second, explaining them; third, concluding the reply. First, stating the topical headings, as in the text. From "Why is it called..." onward, next explaining that all three headings have their reasons. The three—nirvāṇa and the like—are spoken of correlatively for the sake of benefit, whereas space provides no benefit and thus has no correlative; it can only be non-existent and is not designated permanent. I privately note: as for the phrase "for the sake of benefit," it is merely to protect those with provisional capacities in the final age who should not hear that saṃsāra is nirvāṇa, that the two vehicles are the Tathāgata, and that rubble is the buddhadhātu. Yet if there happens to be an opportune capacity, it cannot remain unspoken; relying on the answer below, these words have their proper source. The Lotus Sūtra has already stated it; how could one obstinately contravene it? Thus the sūtra says: "The worldly characteristics are permanently abiding." Could the word "worldly" go beyond the five aggregates, realms, and so forth? Furthermore, the aggregates, realms, and entrances, whether matter or mind, in both the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna, are not limited to sentient beings alone. From "All worldly..." onward is the third part, concluding the reply. Because space has no correlative, it is therefore designated as non-existent; because nirvāṇa has correlatives, it is therefore designated as permanent. Question: Nirvāṇa is correlated with non-nirvāṇa, and space is also correlated with non-space; why is it said to have no correlative? The explanation says: This is because they are meant to illuminate each other. Nirvāṇa is inherently absolute, yet is designated as correlative; space is inherently correlative, yet is designated as absolute. Because nirvāṇa is correlative, it can be [termed] existent, clarifying that it is marvelous existence; because space is free of correlation, it can be [termed] non-existent, clarifying that it is marvelous non-existence. Thus this does not serve as a parallel case. In the subsequent round, Kāśyapa, based on the Buddha's preceding answer, sets forth an equal challenge, saying: If the Tathāgata just said that nirvāṇa has a counterpart and is therefore named existent, while space lacks a counterpart and is thus non-existent, then the four great elements, lacking a counterpart, should also be non-existent. If the four great elements lack a counterpart yet are existent, then space, lacking a counterpart, should also be existent. This text is not easy. Therefore, in all the world there is nothing that is not a counterpart to the four great elements; if one still calls the four great elements existent, then all things whatever that exist in all the world are the four great elements and are thus all existent, with nothing that is not the four great elements standing as counterparts to the four great elements. Although he puts forward this equal challenge, the Buddha ultimately does not answer it directly, but merely takes up space in contrast to nirvāṇa to question him. Why did he not answer? There is also a profound meaning. Kāśyapa originally said: The four great elements lack counterparts and are therefore named existent, so space also ought to lack counterparts and be existent. Now it is clarified that although the four great elements have no external notions—in that non-four elements do not come to serve as counterparts to the four elements—yet within the four elements they naturally have mutual counterparts, as earth and water and so forth are each counterparts to one another. Within space, however, there is no other entity whatsoever that can serve as its mutual counterpart; therefore it is non-existent. Since this challenge was set forth in vain, the Buddha does not answer it. The Buddha's answer has three parts: first, taking up the question to refute it. From "For what reason?" onward is the second, an explanation clarifying that nirvāṇa has fifteen clauses and therefore is existent, while space lacks the fifteen clauses and therefore is non-existent. From "If there were something free from..." onward is the third, the direct answer, which contains five clauses. First, it clarifies that if space were existent, it should be like the four great elements, being subsumed under the three times. From "Just as worldly people say..." onward is the second, clarifying that if space were existent, it should be like mental factors, itself containing three clauses. From "If space were like..." onward is the third, clarifying that if it had correlatives, it would be subsumed under the three times. From "If it were subsumed under the three times..." onward is the fourth, clarifying that it would have to be the four aggregates, merely identical to the four aggregates. Setting aside the single factor of form, the remainder are called the four aggregates. The four aggregates are not visible, and space is also like this. If the aggregates are subsumed under the three times, is space also like this? From "Therefore, free from the four aggregates..." onward is the fifth, concluding that it is not existent. This meaning primarily clarifies that if a phenomenon is existent, correlation can be discussed. Since space is already non-existent, to what could non-existence correlate?

31.5

From "Furthermore, non-Buddhists say..." onward is the third section, refuting the non-Buddhists' conceptions of space, which also has two parts: first, directly refuting the attachments; second, concluding their similarities and differences. Within directly refuting, there are again two parts: first, individually refuting the eight attachments; second, generally citing the five great elements to refute them by analogy. First, individually refuting the eight attachments: first, refuting [the view that] space is light; second, refuting [the view that] space is a dwelling place; third, refuting [the view that] space is sequential; fourth, refuting [the view that] space is in three places; fifth, refuting [the view that] space is something made; sixth, refuting [the view that] space is in an unobstructed place; seventh, doubly refuting two attachments; eighth, repeatedly refuting [the view that] space is a dwelling place.

31.6

First, refuting [the view that] space is light: The Abhidharma masters also claim that among the twenty-one types of form, space belongs to visible forms of light. In this there are also two parts: first, citing the attachment; second, refuting it. The text states: "It can also be said that space is permanent"; in full it should say, "It can also not be said that it is permanent." Because the text is abridged, it lacks the word "not." Although space is non-existent, it cannot be said to be permanent, for it is ultimately impermanent. It is just that these non-Buddhists do not understand the meaning of space and say that space is form. It is rather that space accommodates the form of light; how could one go so far as to say that space is form? Where it says "can also," it should say "cannot"; this is merely an abridgement of phrasing.

31.7

From "Again, there are people who say..." onward is the second, refuting [the view that] space is a dwelling place, which also first cites it, next refutes it, and third concludes. Guāngzhái says: Since it is said that the ultimate truth has multiple layers, it is also said that space has a location. Just like two rooms, east and west, one full and one empty, one should know that positing a place is also refuted in this same way.

31.8

From "Again, there are those who say..." onward is the third, refuting [the view that] space is sequential. Saying "sequential" refers, for example, to [looking] through the pipes of a flute or inward through a door. The Abhidharma masters say: When looking from inside a window at the space outside, one first sees it through the first window lattice, and then sees it through the second and third; this is sequential. This also first cites it and then refutes it.

31.9

From "If it is further said..." onward is the fourth, refuting [the view that] space resides in three places, which comprises three theories. This also has two parts: first, citing it; second, refuting their theories. The first says: Space resides back in the place of space, and there is no space within existence. The second says: Space resides in the place of existence, and there is no space in the place of non-existence. The third says: It resides in the place of existence and non-existence, just as when a moist and rotting thing is about to rot, before it rots, it is called having space. The refutation of these attachments is as in the text.

31.10

From "As when it is said that space can be made..." onward is the fifth, refuting [the view that] space is a conditioned dharma, which also first cites the attachment and next refutes it. At present, the Abhidharma and Treatises masters and others each hypothesize that digging the earth, felling trees, and the like all obtain space, all of which are [viewed as] making space.

31.11

From "Worldly people say..." onward is the sixth, refuting [the view that it is in] an unobstructed place, which first cites the attachment and next refutes their attachment. Within this there are two parts: first, from "Complete or not complete..." onward, first determining with two clauses; second, from "If complete..." onward, raising the objection. It merely asks: As for the unobstructed place being space, does this space completely accommodate the space of the ten directions, or does it not completely accommodate the space of the ten directions? If it accommodates the space of the ten directions completely, one should know that the ten directions have no space; if they are not conjoined, this also means existence here and non-existence there.

31.12

From "If someone says" downwards, the seventh [section] refutes two attachments together: first, the attachment that space and existence are concurrent; second, the attachment that space exists within objects. First, it cites the two attachments. Second, from "Both are not so" downwards, it directly refutes them. First, it generally proclaims that they are not so. Next, from "Why is this?" downwards, it refutes the two attachments together, again in two parts: first, refuting [the view that] space and existence are concurrent; next, refuting [the view that space is] within a vessel. The first passage again has two parts: first, it establishes three headings; next, it explains them in sequence. As for the three headings: first, conjunction of different actions, like a flying bird roosting in a tree—only the bird comes to roost in the tree, while the tree does not come to roost in the bird; this is also like an object coming to conjoin with space, while space does not come to conjoin with the object. Second, mutual conjunction of two actions, like two rams butting heads—space also conjoins with the object, and the object also conjoins with space. Third, mutual conjunction of what has already conjoined, like the joining of two pairs of fingers—the functioning of the object has already conjoined with the object. The object is merely the essence, and the functioning belongs to the object; with active functioning, the essence and function of these two matters have already conjoined. The functioning of space has already conjoined with space: space is the essence of space, and the functioning is the functioning of space accommodating [things]; its essence and function have already conjoined. Then, furthermore, the object is conjoined with space, like two fingers having first already joined, and afterwards pairs being joined together again. From "If one says that through different actions" downwards, it next explains the three headings above. First, in explaining the first heading, the text itself has three parts: first, a challenge on impermanence; second, a challenge on permanence; third, a challenge on both permanence and impermanence. Now, first, in making the challenge on impermanence, it says that the first is the action of the object, which is active movement, and the second is the action of space, which is the action of space. If it is said that the action of space conjoins with the object, then space would be impermanent: since the object is impermanent, and space conjoins with it, how could it not be impermanent? If the object comes to conjoin with space and the object is not omnipresent, then since it conjoins with the other, it ought to be omnipresent like space, and the object ought to be permanent like space. In the Śata-śāstra, [the opponent posits that] the mind-spirit is equal to consciousness, and it is refuted by using consciousness being equal to the spirit, and so forth. Now, although the phrasing here is slightly different, it returns to this very attachment. It directly states: since the object is not omnipresent, how could it conjoin with space? When it says that it is then impermanent, would space also be impermanent? From "If one says that space is permanent" downwards, second, it poses the challenge on permanence, again in two parts: first, it cites the attachment and rejects it; next, it directly challenges it. The intent of the challenge is to force them into parity, making [space] equally impermanent. From "If one says that space is both permanent and impermanent" downwards, third, it poses the challenge on both permanence and impermanence. Their intention might be to say: the space that conjoins with objects is naturally impermanent, while the space that does not conjoin with objects is ever naturally permanent; hence they call it both permanent and impermanent. Now, it directly challenges them, saying that there is no such thing, meaning that within the characteristics of dharmas, there is no single dharma that is half permanent and half impermanent. From "If they conjoin through shared action" downwards, it explains the second heading, again in two parts: this first cites the attachment and rejects it; from "Why is this?" downwards, it directly refutes it. When it says that if space conjoined with action, action should also be omnipresent, this means that if the essence of space conjoined with function, function should also be omnipresent. If the function of space were omnipresent, it should be omnipresent in conjoining with objects, and there could no longer be space apart from objects, so one should not speak of conjoining and not conjoining. From "If one says that what has already conjoined conjoins together" downwards, it explains the third heading, again in two parts: this first cites the heading and rejects it; from "Why is this?" downwards, it directly refutes it, in which there are the dharma, the analogy, and the application. When it speaks of not existing previously and existing subsequently, this means that space and the object do not conjoin at an earlier time and only conjoin at a later time; thus it previously did not exist and now exists, so it should be impermanent. However, this only refutes the subsequent conjunction, not the prior conjunction. Why is this so? Previously, the essence of space and the action-function of space, and the essence of the object and the action-function of the object, if they do not exist [at all], then they do not, but if they do exist, they are simultaneous. How could one say that at an earlier time there was no conjunction and only at a later time did they conjoin? Yet those of shallow understanding claim that space is the essence, and only when existence comes along is there the function of space; an object is also like this: only when its essence moves is there active functioning. Even this prior conjunction is also previously non-existent and now existent; if refuted, one should say it is impermanent. Simply by this 'previously non-existent and now existent,' the refutation completely refutes both the prior and subsequent conjunctions: directly refuting the subsequent dual conjunction, and collaterally refuting the prior single conjunction. From "If one says that space is in objects" downwards, it refutes the subsequent attachment, clarifying [the view that] space exists within objects, again in three parts: first, citing the attachment and rejecting it; next, directly challenging it; afterwards, the concluding statement. This first cites the attachment and rejects it. From "Why is this?" downwards, it directly challenges it, again in two parts: first, making a logical demand; next, posing a parity challenge. The first again has three parts: this first directly questions it. If one says that when there is a vessel, space is within the vessel, then when there was originally no vessel, where was space? From "If it has an abode" downwards, the second challenges that there should be multiple spaces: when there was not yet a vessel, there was already one space, and later when there is a vessel, there is yet another space—how could there not be multiple spaces? From "If there are many" downwards, the third concludes with the faults. It concludes with three faults in all: first, one cannot say it is permanent, meaning that previously it was the space without a vessel, and now it is the space with a vessel—how could it be permanent? Second, one cannot say it is one, which is easy to understand. Third, one cannot say it is omnipresent: the space when there is a vessel is not the space when there is no vessel; how could space be omnipresent? From "If space had an abode apart from space" downwards, the second is the parity challenge: if one says that the space when there is no vessel exists in an abode apart from the space when there is a vessel, then an object would also exist in an abode apart from space. From "Therefore, you should know" downwards, the third is the concluding statement, which can be seen.

31.13

From "If someone says that pointing to an abode" downwards, the eighth [section] refutes again that space is an abode; it also first cites and next refutes. What is referred to as 'pointing to an abode' means: if one says that one directly points to all abodes as the abode of space, since there are four directions, if the directions are different, space should correspond to the four directions following the abode of space.

31.14

From "If an existent dharma arises from causes and conditions" downwards, the second [section] is a general summary, refuting by analogy the abodes of the five great elements, which can be examined.

31.15

From "Because space is non-existent, it is not of the past" downwards, in refuting the attachments of the non-Buddhists, it next concludes with their similarities and differences. What is meant by similarity is that nirvāṇa and space are alike in lacking the three periods of time. What is meant by difference is that nirvāṇa is permanent, while space is non-existent. There are again three parts: first, clarifying that space is not of the three periods of time; next, citing the rabbit's horns as also not [of the three periods of time]; from "Therefore I say" downwards, third, concluding with the similarities and differences.

31.16

From "Good son, I never contend with" downwards, within clarifying functioning, this is the third: the functioning of habitual understanding in eliminating delusion, also called the functioning of non-contention. Why does it eliminate delusion? Because one has already attained the contemplation of the middle way, one can remove it; if one lacked this contemplation, by what means could one sever it? Broadly, it is divided into two: first, clarifying that the Tathāgata's habitual understanding is fully perfected, so he does not contend with the world; second, clarifying that the contemplation and understanding of all bodhisattvas and others eliminate delusion. The former text again has three parts: first, contemplative understanding; second, debate; third, concluding with the functioning of non-contention. This is the first text. Wise people in the world embody the principle of the middle way and speak of both existence and non-existence; the Buddha is also like this, not contradicting their statements. Furthermore, it is because the Buddha has attained the middle way that he harmonizes with things and therefore does not contend; how could this not be the functioning of the contemplative understanding of the middle way? What worldly fools state violates principle and does not accord with the characteristics of dharmas; in speaking of existence and non-existence, they contradict the Buddha's intent, as though contending with the Buddha, not to mention worldly people.

31.17

From "Bodhisattva Kāśyapa said" downwards, the second [section] is the debate, consisting of four rounds of questions and answers. This is the first round, first asking and then answering. The answer has three parts: first, declaring the ten dharmas; next, listing the ten dharmas; third, concluding with non-contention. In both the declaration and the conclusion texts, the character zhan occurs, which must be pronounced with a departing tone. Next is the second round of questions and answers, discussing existence and non-existence as spoken of by worldly wisdom. The question can be seen. In the answer, it determines the essence of dharmas, again in two parts: first, clarifying existence; next, clarifying non-existence. Next is the third round: the question has two parts: first, directly making the question about contradiction; next, concluding that the Buddha has delusions. In the answer, it clarifies that there is no contradiction, each having its own basis: the form of sentient beings arises from afflictions, so form is non-existent; the Buddha's form is not so, so it can be existent. Next is the fourth question and answer, clarifying the characteristics of the permanence and impermanence of form. The question contains two meanings: first, asking how the form aggregate arises from afflictions and yet is impermanent; second, asking how form does not arise from afflictions and can be permanent. In the answer, both meanings are fully explained. Here the question is brief, so it only raises the one side, that form arising from afflictions is impermanent. The Buddha's answer has three parts: first, clarifying that contemplation and non-contemplation are the roots of permanence and impermanence; second, directly clarifying the fruits of permanence and impermanence; third, concluding with the persons to whom they belong. The first text again has two parts: first, generally clarifying contemplation and non-contemplation; next, clarifying only those who contemplate—it can also be said that it is first brief and then broad, and within the broad section it clarifies only one meaning. The former text again has four parts; this is: first, clarifying that generating the three outflows is the object to be contemplated. From "A wise person should" downwards, second, it identifies the person who can contemplate. From "Like a person leading a blind man" downwards, third, it identifies those who cannot contemplate. From "There are four kinds of people" downwards, fourth, it mentions both types of people together. The first two are as in the text. In the third text, as for the person who does not contemplate: the person is an analogy for the three outflows, the blind man is an analogy for sentient beings, and the thorns are an analogy for the evil destinies. It intends to clarify that the three outflows drag sentient beings to fall into the three evil [destinies]; even if they emerge from the evil destinies, their dharmakāya is destroyed. Since the dharmakāya is destroyed, the three bodies are entirely destroyed. In the fourth, concluding both people together, there are four lines: the first two are those who contemplate and do not contemplate, while the latter two are those who resign themselves to karma. From "If a person can contemplate" downwards, second, it exclusively identifies the person who can contemplate, again in two parts: first, exclusively identifying the person; next, broadly clarifying that person, again in two parts: first general, then specific. The general again has two parts: this first directly clarifies contemplating the outflows, having six lines. From "Furthermore, making this reflection" downwards, second, it clarifies that they are personally able to practice diligently, also having five lines. From "Therefore, I regarding" downwards, second, it specifically clarifies contemplating the outflows, also in two parts: first, directly clarifying contemplating the outflows; next, clarifying being personally able to practice diligently. The former text has three parts: this first contemplates the cause, having the dharma, the analogy, and the application. From "A person of wisdom" downwards, next, they contemplate the retributive fruit. From "Having contemplated the retributive fruit" downwards, third, they contemplate the light and heavy. From "If a wise person knows" downwards, second, it clarifies being personally able to practice diligently, also having the dharma, the analogy, and the application. From "There is a person who can know afflictions" downwards, second, it directly clarifies the fruits of permanence and impermanence, again in two parts: first, clarifying that not arising from afflictions attains the permanent fruit; next, clarifying that arising from afflictions attains the impermanent fruit. From "Knowing afflictions and the causes of afflictions" downwards, third, it concludes with the persons to whom they belong, again in two parts: first, concluding that the one who attains the permanent fruit is the Tathāgata; next, clarifying that the one who attains the impermanent fruit is an ordinary person. From "The worldly wise person" downwards, third, it concludes again by establishing the functioning of non-contention.

31.18

From "Kāśyapa addressed the Buddha" onward is the second [section], explaining the bodhisattva's elimination of delusions. This means that the bodhisattvas and others, by practicing this meditative understanding, abandon all fetters and outflows (āsrava). Without the dynamic function of the middle way, how could they extinguish both defilements and latent tendencies completely? This also has four [parts]: first, contemplating the essence of outflows; second, contemplating the causes of outflows; third, contemplating the fruits of outflows; fourth, concluding with the wisdom of contemplation. First, regarding the contemplation of the essence of outflows, there are three exchanges of question and answer. This first text begins by asking about the essence of the three outflows. In the Buddha's answer, the three outflows are treated in three parts. First, explaining the outflow of sensual desire (kāmāsrava), which also has three parts: first, identifying its essence; second, citing proof; third, concluding with the name. First, in identifying the essence, the inner evil discursive thinking is the inner mind, while relying on external conditions is the external object. From "Therefore, in the past I..." onward is the second, citing proof. This verse appears in the Chuyao jing. The Buddha was walking with Ānanda and saw a woman carrying her child to draw water. Seeing a man, she gave rise to an impassioned mind, gazed at him unceasingly, and consequently tied the child's neck and threw the child into the well. Thereupon she spoke a verse in self-reproach: "Desire, desire, I know your root; / Your thought is born from conceptualization. / If I do not conceptualize you, / Then you cannot be born." Commentators may differ slightly, but in explaining the three outflows there are differences in two passages. Previously, the "Chapter on the King of Virtue" considered all afflictions of the desire realm except ignorance to be the outflow of sensual desire; the afflictions of the two higher realms except ignorance to be the outflow of existence (bhavāsrava); and the ignorance of the three realms collectively to be the outflow of ignorance (avidyāsrava). What the present text explains is: attachment within the desire realm is the outflow of sensual desire; attachment in the two higher realms is the outflow of existence; and ignorance combined with the view of self is the outflow of ignorance. From "Therefore, all..." onward is the third, concluding with the name. Next, in explaining the outflow of existence, there are also three parts: first, identifying the essence of the outflow; next, distinguishing it from the outflow of sensual desire; third, concluding with the name. Next, in explaining the outflow of ignorance, there are also two parts: first, identifying the essence; next, explaining its capacity to generate all outflows. This initial line and more identifies the essence. From "Ignorance is all..." onward is the second, explaining its capacity to generate all outflows. The text has three parts: assertion, explanation, and conclusion. From "Kāśyapa said: The Tathāgata..." onward is the second exchange of question and answer. It first asks why there are differing explanations. From "These two dharmas..." onward is the Buddha's answer, which has three parts: first, putting forward the two propositions—one, that they are mutually cause and effect, and two, that they mutually increase each other. From "Improper attention..." onward is the second, explaining the propositions: first explaining their being mutually cause and effect, and from "Its capacity to generate and increase..." onward explaining mutual increase. From "Just as a seed generates a sprout..." onward is the third, conclusion by metaphor. From "Kāśyapa addressed the Buddha..." onward is the third exchange of question and answer. The intent of the question is: the Buddha previously stated that the third outflow is ignorance; now how can it again be said to be generated from ignorance? From "The Buddha said: As I have stated..." onward is the Buddha's answer, also in three parts: first, asserting that there are two kinds of ignorance. From "If one speaks of ignorance..." onward is the second, explaining the two kinds of ignorance, also in two parts: first, explaining that the outflow of ignorance is inner ignorance; next, explaining that what is generated from it are external outflows—inner non-comprehension of the mind is one ignorance, while externally again giving rise to afflictions is external ignorance. From "If one speaks of the outflow of ignorance..." onward is the third, concluding with the two fruits. Saying that the outflow of ignorance is termed "without beginning or end" means obtaining the fruit that has neither beginning nor end. In the twelve links of dependent origination, ignorance is the very first, yet it can generate fruits such as volitional formations and consciousness; such causes and conditions transmigrate through the three times, and this is called "without beginning or end." If one attains the middle contemplation, it can scorch causes and conditions, bringing about a beginning and an end, overturning that saṃsāra to return to the terminus of nirvāṇa. That the aggregates and sense bases are generated from ignorance means that from ignorance all outflows are generated, which also incur the fruit of the aggregates.

31.19

From "Kāśyapa addressed the Buddha" onward is the second, contemplating the causes of outflows, with two exchanges of question and answer. This is the first question. From "A wise person should contemplate..." onward is the Buddha's answer, which has four parts: this first part clarifies external causes. From "By what condition is the inferior transformed into the middling..." onward is the second, clarifying internal causes. From "When the bodhisattva performs this contemplation..." onward is the third, clarifying that through contemplation one attains the Path. From "Therefore, I in..." onward is the fourth, citing proof. From "Kāśyapa said: In a single body of a sentient being..." onward is the next exchange of question and answer. First is the question; next, from "Just as in a single vessel..." onward is the Buddha's answer, first with a metaphor, then the application. In the initial metaphor, saying "as in a single vessel" is a metaphor for a single conscious mind. Having diverse seeds is a metaphor for possessing the various defilements. Receiving rain and each sprouting means grasping signs, each mutually generating [its defilement]. If one grasps pleasant signs, greed arises; if one grasps unpleasant signs, anger arises. Next, the application of the metaphor states that afflictions arise due to the causes and conditions of attachment: this is again grasping signs, which is termed attachment. Alternatively, when attachment is spoken of, it does not necessarily mean grasping signs.

31.20

From "Kāśyapa said..." onward is the third, contemplating the fruits of outflows, also with two questions and answers. Within this first question and answer there are also two parts: first, explaining the fruit of retribution; next, explaining the fruit of habituation. Regarding the three kinds of suffering and three kinds of impermanence within the fruit of retribution, there are two interpretations: One says that the three kinds of suffering are the suffering of suffering, the suffering of conditioning, and the suffering of deterioration; the three kinds of impermanence are: first, arising and ceasing; second, flux; third, the great period [of a lifetime]. The second says that this refers to the three realms as the three kinds of suffering; the three kinds of impermanence mean that the three realms are all impermanent.

31.21

From "Kāśyapa said: Buddha, is there an outflow-free..." onward is the second exchange, distinguishing the outflow-free retribution. The question has two parts: first, brief; next, extensive. The initial brief question also has three parts: first, asserting whether there is an outflow-free fruit; second, clarifying that a wise person severs fruits; third, asking whether one severs the outflow-free fruit or not. From "All those who have attained the Path..." onward is the second, the extensive question, also in three parts: this first asserts the outflow-free fruit. From "If that wise person..." onward is the second, clarifying why one speaks of severing. From "If it is severed..." onward is the third, asking why one speaks of its existence. The intent of the question is: there are fruits with outflows, and there are also outflow-free fruits; if the noble ones were to sever the outflow-free fruit, how could they attain the noble ones' retribution? However, the Buddha's answer has two senses: One says that speaking in terms of its intrinsic nature, the outflow-free has no retribution; now saying it exists is speaking of the fruit in terms of the cause. The Buddha's answer has three parts: first, mentioning that cause and fruit are spoken of reciprocally; next, clarifying that the outflow-free has no fruit; third, clarifying that there is no fruit of affliction. The preceding text has three clauses: first, asserting that the Tathāgata has two ways of speaking. From "Just as worldly people..." onward is the second, clarifying the speech of worldly people. From "I also likewise..." onward is the third, presenting the speech of the Tathāgata. Saying that "the body goes from the mind to the Brahmā heaven" is speaking of the fruit within the cause. That is, the form realm is the body, while the concentration of the first dhyāna is the mind; concentration is mental action, hence it is called mind. Thus usually, the form realm is referred to as mind. The physical body born is caused by the mind of concentration; the mind is not actually the body, but because it can obtain the body, it is called the body. This is speaking of the fruit within the cause. Speaking of the cause within the fruit can be understood. From "All noble ones..." onward is the second, clarifying that the outflow-free has no fruit. "Fruit" refers to obtaining retribution within the three realms solely through karmic actions with outflows; hence it is said that there is no outflow-free fruit. The following clause again mentions "the outflow-free fruit," which is speaking of the fruit within the cause: relying on this outflow-free [cause], one is able to attain the fruit of buddhahood; the cause is not actually the fruit, but because it can obtain the fruit, the cause is called the fruit. From "A person of wisdom..." onward is the third, clarifying that there is no fruit of affliction, which also has two parts: first, clarifying the severing of delusions; next, from "A wise person..." onward, clarifying the cultivation of the Path.

31.22

From "The noble path..." onward is the fourth, concluding with the wisdom of contemplation.

31.23

Kāśyapa Chapter, Part Five

31.24

The opening of the fascicle is the third [division], solely explaining the generation of goodness, with two exchanges of question and answer. The first has three parts: first, the contextual arising; second, the question proper; third, the concluding question. Within the contextual arising are the dharma, metaphor, and application (and so forth). From "If according to this meaning..." onward is the second, the question proper. Defilement is taken as sentient beings, and sentient beings in turn are defilement. Defilement being sentient beings means that it is causal suffering and devoid of goodness; sentient beings in turn being defilement means that it is fruitional suffering and unwholesome. If so, both being unwholesome, how can wholesome dharmas be generated? How could there again be a wonderful king of medicines? From "If it is said..." onward is the third, the concluding question. The Buddha's answer has three parts: first, praising the question; next, applying the previous metaphor; third, concluding with the person capable of cultivating it, namely the power of the buddhadhātu. The initial praise is as in the text. From "The Snow Mountains..." onward is the second, applying the previous metaphor. Now, previously the wonderful medicine was a metaphor for the buddhadhātu, whereas here it says the king of medicines is pure brahma-conduct; there is a slight difference in expression. From "If there are sentient beings..." onward is the third, conclusion, as in the text. From "Kāśyapa addressed the Buddha..." onward is the second question and answer, directly presenting the practice that is generated. This further inquires into the previous intent: which sentient beings possess pure brahma-conduct? The Buddha's answer has two parts: first, an overall answer to what was asked; next, a specific answer. In the initial overall part, first is a metaphor, then the application. The intent of the Buddha's answer is that sentient beings also do not all fully possess this brahma-conduct. Just as with fruit in the world, it is already a fruit, but this fruit does not necessarily also produce seeds: if eaten by birds, burned by fire, or rotted by water, it cannot produce them; if unaffected by these three things, it can produce seeds. Sentient beings are also like this: those who cannot cultivate are the fruit of defilements, and upon this fruit they further generate the cause of delusions. If one cultivates goodness, then one only has the fruit of delusions and does not have the cause of delusions; this sentient being possesses pure brahma-conduct within their body.

31.25

From "a sentient being contemplates sensation" onward is the second part, which provides specific answers, clarifying the cultivation of meditative contemplation and understanding. The text has five sections: first, contemplating sensation; second, contemplating conception; third, contemplating desire; fourth, contemplating karma; and fifth, contemplating the twelve links of dependent origination. These five contemplations constitute only two headings: the first four contemplate the five aggregates, and the last contemplates dependent origination. Within contemplating the five aggregates, why are the two aggregates of consciousness and form not contemplated? When consciousness first arises, it has not yet distinguished suffering and pleasure. Masters of the treatises say: consciousness apprehends actual entities, whereas conception apprehends nominal designations; because it cannot yet make differentiations, it is therefore not contemplated. The aggregate of form is coarse and shallow, so it is also not contemplated. The three aggregates are intensely prominent, which is why they are contemplated. Among the three aggregates, sensation and conception are not divided, while the aggregate of volition is divided into two, namely desire and karma. The reason for this is that the faults of the aggregate of volition are grave; hence it is divided. Within each contemplation there are four items: first, contemplating the essence of sensation; second, contemplating the cause of sensation; third, contemplating the fruit of sensation; and fourth, clarifying the cultivation of the path. First, contemplating the essence of sensation: the mind of sensation is merely retributive fruition. Regarding the "proximate cause": because sensation is the last of the five fruits, from here the three causes arise anew to generate all afflictions; this is called "contact as condition." Regarding "condition": the designation "contact" is unfixed and has no separate self-essence; consciousness can also be called contact, and conception can also be called contact; this is the sequential condition. "Ignorant contact" refers to the preceding mind of affliction. "Luminous contact" refers to the preceding mind of the uncontaminated. "Neither luminous nor ignorant contact" refers to the preceding mind of all contaminated wholesome states. From "one should further contemplate" onward is the second part, contemplating the cause of sensation. First, inquiring into the cause of sensation, it has nowhere from which it arises; later, it clarifies that it arises from harmonious combination. Next, from "contemplating retributive fruition" onward is the third part, contemplating the fruit. From "if a person can act thus" onward is the fourth part, cultivating the path. The text says that contact is of three kinds: First, ignorant contact: if the volitional mind produces evil, the three—consciousness, conception, and sensation—are called ignorant contact; if the volitional mind gives rise to good, these preceding three mental states are called luminous contact; if the volition is in the indeterminate, neither good nor evil, then the preceding three mental states are called neither luminous nor ignorant contact. Another explanation says: as the following text states, "Through luminous contact one enters the noble path; the other two contacts increase all evils." From "Furthermore, good son" onward is the second part, contemplating conception, which by analogy with the preceding has four items. What is here called "conception" does not refer to the aggregate of conception, because within the volitional mind there are separate cognitive perversions. Furthermore, in the realm of reflection it is called cognitive perversion and mental perversion, while in the realm of the vision of the truth it is called view perversion. Here it is discussed in general: it cannot be designated as "views," but is generally called "conceptions." Furthermore, it is said that the formless realm is "all conceptions"; within the formless realm there is indeed the stage of nothingness, so it does not literally mean all; but because the first two are "all," it is named accordingly. Within contemplating the essence of conception there are also two parts: first, directly contemplating the essence; next, the questions and answers, and so forth. In the first question, it says that the cessation of sensation and conception is called liberation. The Sarvāstivādin masters say: one who attains liberation does not merely cease these two mental states; only by ceasing all mental states does one attain liberation. Now, mentioning these two mental states in particular is because their faults and perils are numerous. With the mind of sensation one cultivates dhyāna; with conception one cultivates the formless states. With the mind of sensation one relishes dhyāna; with conception one grasps the formless states and takes them to be nirvāṇa. The Sautrāntika treatise masters do not hold this: perceiving conventional truth is called conception and sensation; perceiving ultimate truth is called the mind of wisdom. The conventional mind of conception can be eliminated to attain liberation, whereas the mind of wisdom directed toward ultimate truth cannot be eliminated; this is largely the same as the Sarvāstivādins. Therefore Kāśyapa objected: "Liberation is called the cessation of all dharmas; how could the cessation of two mental states be called liberation?" The Buddha answered that one must eliminate everything before attaining liberation. Sometimes the Buddha speaks generally, thus subsuming everything; sometimes he speaks specifically. Now he speaks of the cessation of the two—sensation and conception—as attaining liberation; this is speaking generally, already encompassing everything. In the text, it first says that explaining the teaching to sentient beings leads listeners to understand: this means explaining wholesome and unwholesome dharmas based on sentient beings, which upon hearing leads them to understanding. It also says that explaining sentient beings based on the Dharma leads sentient beings to understand: first explaining that wholesome dharmas should be drawn close to and unwholesome dharmas abandoned, sentient beings upon hearing this are able to understand. These two senses directly respond to the preceding question. Next, contemplating the cause of conception also has two parts: first, directly contemplating the cause; next, two rounds of questions and answers. Third, contemplating the fruit; fourth, cultivating the path; all are as in the text. From "Furthermore, a wise person contemplates desire" onward is the third part, contemplating desire, which is the gateway of affliction, and likewise has four items. Here, first contemplating the essence of desire: this is properly the internal mind. Now, merely mentioning external sense objects is because they can generate desire in the mind; hence sense objects are called desire. This is speaking of the effect in terms of the cause. From "through the condition of perverted conception, sensation is generated" onward is the second part, contemplating the cause of desire. Next, from "next contemplates" onward is the third part, contemplating retributive fruition. From "therefore" onward is the fourth part, cultivating the path. From "Furthermore, a wise person" onward is the fourth part, contemplating karma, which also has four items. First, contemplating the essence. The text says that sensation, conception, contact, and desire are afflictions. The Sarvāstivādins and treatise masters have two explanations. One says: when the primary mind of sensation, conception, contact, and desire arises, the mental factors arise along with it. Here, mentioning sensation and conception refers to four factors among the ten universal mental factors; sensation is the factor of feeling. Since they belong to the universal factors, they are shared by both good and evil: when the mental factor gives rise to good, it is called good; when the mental factor gives rise to evil, it is called affliction. Here it is spoken with respect to the arising of evil. The treatise says that there is no distinction between primary mind and mental factors. Here, speaking of the four from sensation and conception means the four mental aggregates, merely omitting the aggregate of form: contact is consciousness, and desire is the aggregate of volition. If the volition produces good, it is called good; if the volition produces evil, it is called affliction. Here it directly clarifies the sense of doing evil. Furthermore, regarding the statement that it can perform generative karma but does not perform karma of experiencing retribution: there are two explanations. One says: because the causes and conditions of this affliction are uninterrupted, it is called generative karma; but because it cannot discriminate the different sensations of the retributions of the five hindrances, it does not perform experiencing retribution. The second says: because this affliction moistens karma so that it can be born, it is said that it can perform generative karma; yet it cannot summon it. Among the two indifferent sensations, how could an indifferent mind, being an affliction, moisten birth? Toward sensations, a pleasant sensation is precisely a mind of pleasure, which again cannot moisten. These all discuss the meaning of moistening karma for birth. Regarding "operating together with karma, there are two kinds": in seeking to elucidate the essence of karma, in comparison, when discussing karma there is still delusion present; hence it is said to "operate together with karma." However, the dharmas of karma are not the same, so it completely comprises the two karmas of generating and experiencing. It is also said that the two karmas of body and speech are called karma and are also called fruits: that which is capable of creating action is called karma; further, expressing through speech and intention is called fruit. The mind is merely karma, lacking the sense of self-expression, and hence is not called fruit. It is also said that primary karma is volition, because intention is properly the essence of karma. Taking intended karma as bodily and vocal karma is because body and speech naturally correspond, as if by agreement; hence it is called intended karma. Third, contemplating retributive fruition also has two parts: first, directly explaining the four karmas; next, two rounds of questions, answers, and analysis. The first is as in the text. The first round of questions is as in the text. The answer says that the uncontaminated is called fruit but not called retribution: sometimes it is said that fruit and retribution are not different, but here a distinction is drawn. I personally suggest: the uncontaminated is the fruit of practice; therefore it is only called fruit and cannot be called retribution. The second round of questions is as in the text. The answer says that it is also said that the ten unwholesome actions have higher, middling, and lower grades: severe suffering enters hell, light suffering enters hungry ghosts, and neither severe nor light is among animals. The ten wholesome deeds have four retributions across the four continents; the lifespan and retributive fruit in Jambudvīpa are the most inferior, the fruit of lower karma; yet speaking of it as supreme takes the aspect of cultivating the path and practicing goodness as superior. Fourth, from "a person of wisdom" onward is cultivating the path. From "Furthermore, after a wise person contemplates karma and affliction" onward is the fifth part, which contemplates the twelve links of dependent origination. The text also has four items, namely affliction, karma, existence, and suffering. But the present text, by analogy with the preceding contemplations of sensation, conception, and so forth, completely possesses the four gateways, whereas the present text merely mentions affliction and so forth. I personally say: within the twelve links of dependent origination, the three meanings of essence, cause, and retributive fruition are fully complete. The wisdom capable of contemplating is cultivating the path; relying provisionally on the present text, it is retributive fruition. Inferring from this text, affliction obtains suffering, and karma also obtains suffering; one should not say that affliction cannot summon retribution. The Daśabhūmika Sūtra divides the twelve links of dependent origination into three paths: affliction, karma, and suffering. Ignorance, craving, and grasping are the path of affliction; volitional formations and existence are the path of karma; consciousness through aging-and-death are the path of suffering. Here there are four, adding an extra "existence," pointing to the present five fruits as existence. Birth-and-death is suffering; the distinction between suffering and existence is not fixed. Moreover, the preceding text clarifies the eight sufferings without taking consciousness and name-and-form, taking only aging-and-death; hence it makes this statement. However, for these four phrases, if their characteristics are fully preserved: first, from affliction arises affliction; second, from affliction arises karma; third, from affliction arises existence; fourth, from affliction arises suffering. Next, regarding karma: first, from karma arises karma; second, from karma arises delusion; third, from karma arises existence; fourth, from karma arises suffering. The latter two phrases are also like this; there should thus be sixteen phrases, yet the present text only has nine phrases. There are also sutra manuscripts that speak of twelve phrases; nine phrases are too few, twelve phrases are too many. Conforming to principle, there should be eleven phrases. Why? The twelve links of dependent origination arise sequentially from one another: as formations arise from ignorance, consciousness arises from formations, up to aging-and-death arising from birth; it is not known what aging-and-death gives rise to further. If so, there are only eleven phrases. However, when the translator arranged twelve, the intention was to illuminate the twelve links of dependent origination. The present lack is merely a difference of breadth and brevity. When things arise from one another, there are those where the former produces the latter, where the latter inversely produces the former, and where they arise across intermediate links. Taking the first phrase, "affliction produces affliction": ignorance is the root, which is affliction, and produces craving and grasping. Affliction producing karma is ignorance producing volitional formations. Affliction producing existence is ignorance producing consciousness and so forth. Affliction producing suffering produces aging-and-death. In the second phrase, "from karma arises karma" is from formations arising existence. "From karma arises affliction" is formations producing ignorance. "From karma arises existence" is formations producing consciousness and so forth. "From karma arises suffering" is formations producing aging-and-death. In the third phrase, "from existence arises existence" is consciousness producing the six sense fields and so forth. "From existence arises affliction" is consciousness producing ignorance. "From existence arises karma" is consciousness producing formations. "From existence arises suffering" is consciousness producing aging-and-death. In the fourth phrase, "from suffering arises suffering" is from birth arises aging-and-death. "From suffering arises affliction" is from aging-and-death arises ignorance. "From suffering arises karma" is aging-and-death producing formations and existence. "From suffering arises existence" is the five fruits of consciousness and so forth. The text says that through internal and external craving there is the suffering of craving: the sutra has two variants, one reading "experiencing suffering" and the other "the suffering of craving." The meaning of "craving" is slightly weaker, though both interpretative explanations are coherent. Saying "experiencing" means that on account of this sensation, one experiences suffering. Saying "suffering of craving" is because the sutras often speak of affectionate attachment as suffering. Regarding the contemplation of dependent origination: here too, by analogy with the preceding four contemplations, it is different. Within its essence there are four parts: first, clarifying that cause and fruit arise from one another; second, contemplating that the five destinies are all suffering; third, contemplating that the three realms are all suffering; fourth, contemplating the eight sufferings. The first also has two parts: first, directly distinguishing their mutual generation; later, concluding with the twelve meanings. The nine phrases of mutual generation are all interrelated, as in the text. From "a person of wisdom contemplates the earth" onward is the second part, contemplating the suffering of the five destinies. Within the five destinies, the twelve links of dependent origination are fully possessed: among the four—affliction and the rest—hell is suffering, affliction is affliction, karma is karma, and the essence is existence. By analogy, the other destinies are also like this. From "a wise person deeply contemplates the three realms" onward is the third part, contemplating that the three realms are all suffering. However, the three realms are not necessarily all suffering: only the three evil paths are suffering; from humans and devas up to the third dhyāna is all pleasant, and the fourth dhyāna is neutral indifference; this is one side of the matter. If we rely on the Tathāgata when he first achieved enlightenment, pointing upward and downward with his fingers, the three realms are all suffering. From "if a wise person can" onward is the fourth part, contemplating the eight sufferings. From "a wise person deeply contemplates" onward is the second part, contemplating the causes of suffering. The text says that the cause of suffering is craving and ignorance: in the Hīnayāna, karma and affliction are the causes of suffering; in the Mahāyāna, craving, existence, and ignorance are the causes of suffering. In the Hīnayāna, karma is the root of suffering and ignorance is secondary; therefore the text says that craving is the noble truth of the origin, all using affliction as the root of suffering. The text says that craving and ignorance have internal and external aspects; this has two meanings. First, setting forth the internal and external of craving: seeing external visual objects and generating mental attachment is called external craving; one's own mind giving rise to defilement is called internal craving. Seeing another's body is external craving; seeing one's own body is internal craving. As for ignorance: the internal mind failing to understand is called internal ignorance; not discriminating external things is external ignorance. The text says that craving conditions grasping, and grasping conditions craving: this is like the twelve links of dependent origination; in the forward order, craving conditions grasping; in the reverse order, grasping conditions craving. These two meanings show that grasping and craving mutually depend on one another, just as ignorance conditions formations and formations condition ignorance, being both cause and fruit. Third, contemplating retributive fruition. Fourth, from "a wise person" onward, cultivating the path, as in the text.

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大般涅槃經疏 — Classical Chinese