大般涅槃經疏 33

English (machine translation) 33

Language: English

33.1

Composed by Master Guàndǐng of Zhāng'ān under the Sui

33.2

Re-edited by the Śramaṇa Zhànrán of Tiāntái under the Tang

The beginning of the fascicle concerns the sixth non-Buddhist [ascetic]. The text has two [parts]: first, the debate on doctrines; second, submission. The debate on doctrines has two rounds. In the first round, he asks on account of what dharma sentient beings give rise to the sixty-two views, such as permanence and impermanence. The Buddha replies: Because they do not understand form, they give rise to permanence and impermanence, up to: because they do not understand consciousness, they give rise to permanence and impermanence, and so forth. Now, as for form, past karma is the cause, and in the present life parents, clothing, and food are the conditions; falsely and provisionally combining, one claims that it has a fixed nature, and therefore one is able to give rise to [views of] permanence, impermanence, and so forth; up to: not understanding consciousness, one also gives rise to various views. In the next round, he asks further: Due to knowing what form and knowing what consciousness does one not give rise to various views? The Buddha says: Knowing that form is merely a combination of causes and conditions, without a master and without a self, one is then free of various views; up to: knowing consciousness is also like this. From "The brahmacārin said, 'I only wish that for my sake'" onward is the second [part], submission. Where the text says "abandoning the old", and so forth: "old" refers to ignorance and craving; "new" refers to grasping and becoming. Commentators provide two [explanations]. One says: Ignorance and craving are of the past, so they are called "old"; grasping and becoming are of the present, so they are called "new". [Objection:] Craving belongs to the present; how could it suddenly be called "old"? They then forcibly explain that through karmic formations one obtains craving. This explanation is not so. The second says: If based on afflictions, ignorance and craving are new; if based on karma, grasping and becoming are old. This too is impermissible: grasping is an affliction, so how could it be new? If ignorance and craving are new, how could they belong to karma? This is most impermissible. Yet another explanation says: There is no need to speak of past and present or afflictions and karma; simply discussing it, ignorance and craving are the root of the arising of the body, and grasping arises from ignorance and craving, so it is the branches and foliage—hence it is called "new". This avoids the previous faults. Above it was said that ignorance is the father and covetous craving is the mother; if one reveres them, at death one enters avīci. It is also said that there are generally two kinds of root bounds of saṃsāra: ignorance and craving. How could these not be "old"? Now, in terms of the three periods of time, viewing from the present back to the past, ignorance is old; viewing from the future back to the present, craving is old. This agrees with Master Guan and also does not lose the three periods of time. The text says, "I have now attained the pure eye of the true Dharma," or "the purity of the Dharma-eye"; these should not differ, being merely a difference of phrasing. That he attained arhatship after fifteen days means that awakenings have their earlier and later [times].

33.5

From "The Vātsīputrīya brahmacārin" onward is the seventh non-Buddhist [ascetic]. The text has three [parts]: first, the circumstances of origin; second, the debate on doctrines; third, submission. That silence is also taken as the circumstance of origin cannot be compared to the previous instance indicating scholarly refinement; therefore, [the Buddha] deliberated deliberately and waited until [asked] three times before replying. From "The Vātsīputrīya said" onward is the second [part], the debate on doctrines. Here, he has no personal dogmatism, but merely inquires about the correct doctrine; hence, relying on the Buddha's silence, he first asks about the meaning of the silence. Next, the Buddha reflects upon the meaning of the silence, and thereupon opens the opening for questioning.

33.6

Next, from "The Vātsīputrīya said" onward is the debate on doctrines proper. Since he has no personal dogmatism, he merely asks about the correct doctrine. Herein there are two [parts]: first, he asks about the teachings; second, he asks about the persons. In the first, asking about the teachings, there are two [parts]: first he asks, then the Buddha replies. In the reply there are also two [parts]: first he assents, then he directly answers the three kinds and the ten kinds. Herein, he first explains both, and then concludes both. Where it says in the explanation "liberation from desire", this is the root of goodness of non-attachment. In the next [part], asking about the persons who are able to cultivate goodness and sever defilements: one who wishes to cultivate and practice first inquires about those persons, [thinking,] "If there are noble examples, I too shall cultivate in accordance [with them]." Here, he merely asks about the two renunciant assemblies, while implicitly encompassing the four assemblies. "Severing all becoming": this clarifies the arhat, who belongs to the two renunciant assemblies. "Attaining [the stage of] non-returner (anāgāmin)": this inquires about the two lay assemblies. "Crossing over to the other shore of doubt": even a minor degree is called having attained crossing over. Clarifying upāsakas twice here refers to those who are free of desire and those who have wives and children. Where the text says "enjoying the pleasures of the five desires yet having no net of doubt in the mind", this refers to them. Why does the Buddha answer for all [groups] that there are not merely one, two, three, up to five hundred? As the Pañcaviṃśati clarifies a large count of five thousand parts, yet throughout the sūtras five hundred disciples are frequently clarified, this is a colloquial phrasing for enumeration.

33.7

From "World-Honoured One, I now take delight in speaking a simile" onward is the third [part], submission. Herein there are five [steps]: first, he requests to speak; second, the Buddha permits him; third, he finishes speaking; fourth, he requests to leave the household life, and the Buddha orders a four-month probationary period (the Upāsaka Sūtra clarifies that it must be four months; stating "four months" refers simply to one season; their capacities are different and not of one kind, and upon hearing the varied [teachings] he immediately seeks to leave the household life); fifth, the Buddha grants him permission to leave the household life, and after leaving the household life, he cultivates and attains benefit. As for the "two dharmas", some say śamatha and vipaśyanā, and some say samādhi and prajñā. Shamuo and shemo are different phonetic transcriptions, light or heavy. As for "repaying the Buddha's kindness", cultivating in accordance with the Dharma is repaying the Buddha's kindness.

33.8

From "The patched-robe brahmacārin" onward is the eighth non-Buddhist. He was also a renunciant non-Buddhist who always wore such patched robes; he was named after his garment. In this land as well there are those like Hemp Coat or Floating Cup. The text has two parts: first, the debate; later, his submission. The debate also has two parts: first, his dogmatic assertions; later, the refutation. Regarding the first, his assertions: [Master] Kāishàn divides the opening text into eight repetitions: first, based on afflictions; second, based on the five great elements; third, based on bangles and bracelets; fourth, based on intrinsic nature; fifth, based on the five sense objects; sixth, based on the five sense faculties; seventh, based on small children; eighth, based on existence and non-existence. [Master] Zhāotí divides this text into two: first, objecting to the orthodox view; later, establishing the heterodox view. Under the first, there are again two: first, denying karmic action; later, objecting regarding afflictions. Master Guān divides it into four: first, one repetition objecting to the doctrine of cause and condition; next, three repetitions establishing the doctrine of intrinsic nature; third, one repetition re-objecting to the orthodox view; fourth, three repetitions re-establishing intrinsic nature. But dividing the text depends on each master; as to who is right and who is wrong, for now we follow Master Guān. Many masters say: The patched-robe [brahmacārin] specifically asked about the origin of sentient beings and how they drift along in the three realms; Hóngguǎng asked about the end, inquiring and resolving about the Tathāgata's nirvāṇa. Asking about the origin is asking about the drifting along; asking about the end is asking about turning around and leaving. Master Guān deduces this based on three passages: First, Kauṇḍinya, like Hóngguǎng, said that if someone comes and asks about permanence, impermanence, and having a beginning, the Buddha remains silent. If the patched-robe [brahmacārin] had asked about the beginning, why did the Buddha answer? Second, his initial objection: Sentient beings in immeasurable lives perform good and unwholesome karma, and in the future receive good and unwholesome retribution in return. This asks about the causes and effects of karmic action—what does it have to do with asking about the beginning? Third, if he had asked about the first drifting along, the Buddha would not have been able to answer. Why? Outside the realms, the very first thought arose and drifted along; where did this drifting along come from in turn? Tracing it forward, it can never be found. Knowing it cannot be answered, because he did not pose this question, the Tathāgata explained it. The patched-robe [brahmacārin] specifically asked about causes and conditions, with craving setting forth the meaning of rebirth: when dying through evil causes and conditions and seeing hell, sentient beings conversely generate craving again and are born therein; when dying through good causes and conditions and seeing the heavens, those who generate craving are born therein. To explain this, the Sarvāstivāda and the Treatise masters differ. The Sarvāstivāda masters say: Before the birth skandha, craving arises and moistens rebirth; possessing a body and possessing defilement, craving arises at the very same time, and one immediately acquires a body. This means the body comes first, and the afflictions follow. The Treatise masters say: After the death skandha, craving arises and moistens rebirth; thus the afflictions come first, and the body follows. The initial objection to causes and conditions also has two parts: first, grasping the point and rejecting it; later, objecting regarding afflictions. The text also has four parts: first, grasping the point; second, a dual objection; third, a distinct objection; fourth, a general conclusion. From here down, it cites what the Buddha said about afflictions and the body, hence it says "grasping the point." From "If because of afflictions" onward is the second part, the dual objection, which also has three parts: first, two determinations; next, two objections; third, two conclusions. The first two determinations are clear. As for the two objections: first it says, if afflictions come first, and as yet there is no body at all, how could there be afflictions? Where would afflictions abide? On what basis would afflictions arise? If afflictions are again caused by afflictions, one knows afflictions are not first, hence it is stated as impossible. Next, objecting to the body being first: then this body would not be obtained from afflictions. Since the body does not come from afflictions, neither do afflictions depend on the body; both of these are impossible. From "If you say at the same time" onward is the third part, the distinct objection. Since they are spoken of as cause and effect, they should not be simultaneous. From "Prior, posterior, and simultaneous" onward is the fourth part, the general conclusion of the three meanings. All three being impossible, therefore one knows that dharmas do not come from causes and conditions. From "Furthermore, Gautama, solidity is the nature of earth" onward is the establishment of the heterodox view of intrinsic nature, which has three repetitions. They explain that the nature of earth is solid, and so forth up to the nature of space being unobstructed; their essential natures being thus, they are not formed by causes and conditions. Since the five great elements are like this, all things are also like this; this is the doctrine of intrinsic nature. Furthermore, mundane things have fixed applications, which corroborates the previous meaning. Being on the forehead is called a garland, and so forth, just like ornaments in this land. Hence it first cites a craftsman measuring timber as an objection: what is straight is suitable for a bed, what is curved is suitable for a loom. It further cites the five destinies as an objection, asserting that one is born in hell and so forth by intrinsic nature. It also cites the land turtle entering the water as soon as it is born, and the clams and mussels in the sea—who carved and painted them? Third, citing greed as one repetition, it further objects to causes and conditions: first it rejects the Buddha's point, and then it raises the objection. The objection has four ideas: First, objecting that greed does not confront sense objects, as when a person is asleep, they also do not confront sense objects yet generate desire and greed. Second, objecting that a newborn infant makes no distinctions yet still generates greed. Third, objecting that worthy ones and sages dwelling in mountain forests, though separated from the five sense objects, still generate greed. Fourth, objecting that naturally there is greed when confronting sense objects and no greed when confronting sense objects, all of which is intrinsic nature. Fourth, there are three repetitions re-establishing the heterodox doctrine. First, it explains that those whose five sense faculties are incomplete have much wealth, while those whose five sense faculties are complete have little fortune. If the faculties are incomplete, they performed evil in the past; why are they wealthy in this life? If the faculties are complete, they practiced good in the past; why are they poor in this life? All this is by nature so, and does not concern causes and conditions. The second repetition is clear. The third repetition raises an objection based on existence and non-existence. They take space as existing and a hare's horn as non-existing: who made space to exist? Who caused the hare's horn not to exist? Since these two cases are so, all things are likewise; all are intrinsic nature. From "The Buddha said" onward is the reply. Comparing the reply to the questions, there are roughly three differences: first, presence and absence; second, repetition; third, lack of sequential order. Regarding presence and absence: previously there were four objections comprising eight repetitions, but now there are only seven repetitions. Why is this? Once the Buddha finished answering seven objections, [the interlocutor] immediately comprehended and understood; therefore, he did not answer the eighth objection. Regarding repetition: he re-answers the second objection. Why is this? Intrinsic nature is their fundamental thesis, therefore he refutes it twice. Regarding the lack of sequential order: the first replies to the second, the second replies to the third, the third replies to the fourth, the fourth replies to the first, the fifth re-replies to the second, the sixth replies to the fifth, the seventh replies to the sixth, and the eighth replies to the seventh. In the first reply to the second, refuting the establishment of the intrinsic nature doctrine: they took the five great elements as not arising from conditions, and by extension all dharmas as likewise not arising from conditions. The Buddha refutes this point by point: If you establish that the five great elements do not arise from conditions and are therefore called permanent, by extension all dharmas not arising from conditions should also be permanent. From "You say their applications" onward is the second reply to the third, refuting his corroborating meaning. He said that bangles and bracelets have no causes and conditions. The Buddha refutes him, saying: All derive their names from causes and conditions, and also derive their functions from causes and conditions. Being named a garland or a tassel—this is deriving a name from causes; a craftsman making arrows and lances—this is deriving a function from causes. If its nature were an arrow, there would be no need for a craftsman; moreover, what originally was a ring is now hammered into a bracelet, or a bracelet is altered into a ring. What previously was curved was suitable for a loom, but ironing the loom straight makes a bed; what previously was straight made a bed, but now ironing the bed into a curve makes a loom. All are causes and conditions; what intrinsic nature is there? From "You say that like a turtle born on land" onward is the third, refuting his fourth repetition, which contains seven points. It is meant to refute the seven points. This is the first point: Why does it not enter fire and ram its horn? This directly overturns their thesis. From "If you say that all dharmas have an intrinsic nature" onward is the second point; in the repetition above there were no such words at all, only saying 'who could have taught them,' yet now this refutation appears. Since it says sharpness is natural and dullness is likewise, how could there be teaching and development? From "If all dharmas have an intrinsic nature" onward is the third point, explaining that brahmacārins should not perform sacrificial rituals. From "Mundane speech has three aspects" onward is the fourth point, explaining that all involve conditioned speech; how could it be spontaneous? From "If you say that all dharmas have an intrinsic nature" onward is the fifth point: if granted, it would have to be fixed. From "If all dharmas have a fixed nature" onward is the sixth point, explaining that since it is not fixed, it must follow conditions. From "You speak of all dharmas" onward is the seventh point, explaining that because analogies are spoken, one knows there is no intrinsic nature. If understanding were natural, why labor to speak for them? If they do not understand, by nature they do not understand, so even speaking analogies would bring no benefit. From "Good son, you say whether the body comes first" onward is the fourth, refuting retroactively his first repetition. But the earlier objection originally had four parts: first, grasping the point; second, a dual objection; third, a distinct objection; fourth, a general conclusion. The present reply does not correspond one-by-one, but answers in general. And of these four meanings, the main objection originally had three: first, objecting to the body being first; second, objecting to afflictions being first; third, afflictions and body being simultaneous—which was absent in the distinct objection, but present in the concluding objection. Now he also answers three: first, answering the objection of the body being first; next, answering the objection of simultaneity; later, answering the objection of afflictions being first. The first also has two: first, denying both; next, properly answering the three objections. From here down is the first, answering that the body is first. However, the Buddha's original meaning said that afflictions are the cause of the body; then he should properly object to afflictions being first. The reason he also objected to the body being first was merely raised in opposition, not his original intent. Now, wishing to answer, he first dispatches the secondary point, so he first says: 'I made no such statement.' Your own doctrine is also like this; why suddenly object to this? Originally wishing to object to me, it ends up confirming my position. From "Good son, all sentient beings" onward is the second, answering the objection of simultaneity. In the text, there are three parts: first, explaining simultaneity; next, explaining before and after; third, further taking his meaning to reply. First, in speaking of simultaneity, it eliminates the simultaneity he conceptualized. If it were the simultaneity as understood by him, this would be unacceptable. Now, in speaking of simultaneity, this is before-and-after yet simultaneous, and also simultaneous yet before-and-after (and so forth). In the second passage, speaking of before and after, this is before-and-after within simultaneity; there is no before-and-after separate from simultaneity, nor simultaneity separate from before-and-after. Now, only within the meaning of simultaneity do we speak of there being before and after, namely afflictions being before and the body belonging to after. Afflictions are the cause, and the body is the effect; how is it not cause before and effect after? If it is as explained in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā that conditioning is accomplished through the effect, this has a distinct meaning (and so forth). Privately I consider: When the Mahāyāna sūtras say 'beginningless,' they do not speak only of the body, nor only of afflictions; if one were before, the other would have a beginning. The present sūtra speaks in accordance with antidotes and capacities to be converted, hence it says that it is necessarily because of afflictions that there is a body, yet it still speaks with reference to the principle, hence saying 'although there is no before and after.' Although these are inexhaustive words, inexhaustiveness is an incomplete discourse; therefore we know that the real principle is precisely the remainder of the provisional path. Speaking truly, not only in the past is there no before and after, but even in the present when afflictions act as the cause for the body, there is likewise no before and after. Why? Cause and effect are not two; form and mind are of one substance; the three paths and the three virtues do not clash in a single thought; the five skandhas and the five liberations are equal in the principle of a single moment. What is valued is the shattering of the patched-robe [brahmacārin]'s attachment; once shattered, he realizes that their nature is identical with emptiness. In emptiness there is no before or after; where would inside and outside be posited? The thirty-six fascicles solely follow nirvāṇa; the fifty-two assemblies all accomplish buddhadhātu. If one does not comprehend this here, one will ultimately merely form a karmic connection. These two passages are only two lines, but the rest of the sūtra text is the essential resolution of doubts. From "If your mind thinks it is like a person's two eyes" onward is the third, further taking his meaning to refute it. If you say afflictions and the body are simultaneous, they should not have before and after, just as with a cow's two horns, the left does not depend on the right, and the right does not depend on the left. This matter is not so: just as a wick and light exist simultaneously, yet it is necessary to depend on the wick to have light, and never does a wick depend on light. Afflictions and the body are likewise. However, the wick is the lamp vessel; because of the lamp there is light. And speaking of the wick, only that which is burned by fire is called a wick; before being burned it cannot be called a wick (and so forth), showing that this meaning of the Buddha is precisely simultaneous cause and effect. Old commentaries mostly held that this explains the beginning of sentient beings as simultaneous cause and effect; now we say this is not so. This does not explain the beginning of sentient beings, but only explains that sentient beings using karma to obtain a body must depend on afflictions. Naturally there are two kinds: first, moistening karma; second, moistening rebirth. If it is moistening karma, the body's retribution is distant; what is explained now specifically refers to moistening rebirth. If according to the Sarvāstivāda explanation, precisely at the beginning of the birth skandha there is defiled consciousness as the delusion that moistens rebirth, which immediately binds a single period of fruition; this is afflictions and the body existing simultaneously. In terms of meaning this is convenient, but now we follow the later explanation. Master Língwèi also used the birth skandha, saying that craving that moistens rebirth arises first, which is very similar to the Sarvāstivāda meaning. All the other masters say that the craving that moistens rebirth arises within the death skandha; that it can be called simultaneous cause and effect is because earlier in the Kāśyapa chapter it says: 'Due to the two causes and conditions of craving and ignorance, one is able to maintain life.' The Daśabhūmika Sūtra says: 'With outflows and grasping, the mind generates feverish afflictions, and seeds are gradually prepared.' The sūtra says that with outflows and grasping, the mind generates outflow seeds; although the delusion that moistens rebirth arises earlier, precisely because consciousness has outflows, the craving that moistens rebirth binds it, which is the grasping consciousness. The existence of outflows already being present is precisely the meaning of simultaneous cause and effect; hence this meaning slightly adopts Master Língwèi's explanation. Earlier he objected that if you say simultaneous, the meaning is also unacceptable; now answering that it is simultaneous and yet possesses this meaning is especially capable of overturning his heterodox objection. Hence it says: 'If your mind thinks it is like a person's two eyes' onward, directly taking his meaning to refute it. It explains that although both are simultaneous, there is truly the meaning of mutual dependence, just as the wick having light is simultaneous and yet mutually dependent. From "If your mind thinks that the body is not before" onward is the third, answering the objection of afflictions coming first, which also has two: here it first cites his objection; from "Why?" onward it properly refutes it. But in this text, there are two traditions of reading it: One says: 'If because the body is before, having no cause and condition it is called non-existent'—this cites the objection. 'You should not say'—this rejects it. 'You should not make such a statement that all things have causes and conditions'—this in turn shows that all dharmas truly have causes and conditions. However, it is not necessary to divide the sentence like this; simply say, 'You should not say that all dharmas have causes and conditions.' Now, his is the doctrine of spontaneity, having no causes and conditions; yet it says, 'You should not say all dharmas have causes and conditions.' However, these three non-Buddhist masters say there are twenty-five principles that all generate one another, which is the meaning of cause and condition, yet it differs from the Buddhist meaning of cause and condition. The Buddhadharma takes the past as the cause and the present as obtaining the fruit; their school directly takes generation within the single present lifetime as cause and condition. Also, like the *Lakṣaṇa* (?), there are supported principles and primary principles: as the five great elements make the five sense faculties, the five great elements are primary principles and the five faculties are supported principles, all of which are causes and conditions. Just as the fire element makes the eye so it can see color, color is the quality (guṇa) belonging to fire; also as the space element makes the ear so it can hear sound, sound is the quality belonging to the ear (and so forth). From "If you say that not seeing" onward, it again takes his meaning to refute it: If you say that because you do not see the cause of the body you do not speak of it, now we presently see a pot coming from clay, so why do you not speak of it? Seeing it yet not speaking of it goes against your own mind. From "Whether seen or not seen" onward, this clarifies: who is discussing whether you see or do not see? It simply states that we are presently discussing that all dharmas come from causes and conditions. From "Good son, if you say that all dharmas possess an intrinsic nature" onward is the fifth, re-refuting the second objection on the nature of the five great elements. First it refutes his earth element; the Buddha overturns his meaning. Clarified butter, wax, and such substances are earth for their school, but clarified butter and wax are not fixed: at times they are water, and at times they are called earth; this is indefinite, and later he refutes it further. White wax and such things are cited for the five great elements (and so forth). Not speaking of three elements or four elements, how are they not causes and conditions? In this there are two pairs: the first refers to your doctrine speaking of five great elements, and later speaking of odor being earth and color being fire, as explained in the treatise's chapter on the characteristics of odor. In the Vaiśeṣika doctrine, it does not say odor is water or color is earth; how is this not causes and conditions? The second pair: the first refers to your doctrine saying that from clay comes a pot and from thread comes clothing; how is this not causes and conditions? The latter refers to your doctrine that moisture is the water element; even if through the condition of cold it freezes, you still follow the condition of moisture, taking it as water and not following the condition of cold as earth. Furthermore, when water freezes it is not called earth, hence it is called water. Why when waves move are they not called wind? This is a cross-corner parallel objection. If it were a typical analogical objection, one should say: water originally has the nature of flowing; when frozen it does not flow yet is still called water; wind originally has the nature of moving, so there should be something that does not move yet is still called wind. But now if this text is taken in the sense of a cross-corner parallel: water originally has the nature of flowing; when frozen it does not flow yet is still water; wind originally has the nature of moving, so since a wave is motion, it should be called wind. Although a wave is motion, it cannot be called wind; since water does not flow, it should not be called water. Another explanation: this is an analogical objection. Just as water originally flows, but meeting the condition of cold freezes and does not flow, yet still follows its origin as water; wind is originally of a moving nature, but meeting the condition of water is agitated into waves, so it should still follow its origin as wind. If moving water follows conditions and becomes water rather than being called wind, then when frozen it should also follow conditions and become earth, for earth is not water; yet parallel meaning takes it as water. Originally it is of a flowing and moist nature; when frozen there is no flowing, yet maintaining its original moist nature it is still called water. When wind is of a moving nature, and wind agitates into waves, it is still called water and not called wind; when water freezes into ice it should be called earth, yet water freezing into ice maintains its original moist nature and is still called water—how is this different from: when waves move, maintaining their original moving nature, they should be called wind? Precisely because moving water is called water, and when frozen it is called frozen, they can be paralleled. Motion is the wind element; when water forms waves, although relying on wind as a condition, it still follows its cause and belongs to water, not following motion to become wind. How is this not causes and conditions? From "You say that it is not due to the five sense objects" onward is the sixth, refuting his fifth, clarifying that the five sense objects are merely external conditions. Furthermore, due to internal causes of good and evil through initial and sustained application of thought (vitarka-vicāra), application of thought immediately generates greed and anger. From "You say having complete faculties" onward is the seventh, refuting his sixth, clarifying that different karmic causes lead to uneven karmic results. From "As you say, mundane small children" onward is the eighth, refuting the seventh, clarifying that because children weep and laugh, one knows there are conditions. As for why he does not refute the eighth, there are two explanations. Kāishàn previously said: the eighth consists of two kinds, non-existent dharmas; there are none that do not come from conditions, hence there was no need to refute it. Second, Yěchéng said: once these seven were refuted, he immediately understood, therefore he did not refute it.

33.9

From "The brahmacārin said: If all dharmas" below, this is the second [section], yielding and submitting, which has two parts: first, posing two questions in a general manner to seek understanding; next, from "I only pray that for my sake" onward is the actual yielding and submitting. Because the Buddha knew that his faculties were sharp, he directly expounded the two extremes and the middle, and [the brahmacārin] immediately comprehended. Now, refuting positions takes many approaches and is not of merely one kind; applying medicine according to the illness does not follow a fixed order of earlier or later, but if one leaves the general and follows the specific, sequence must be discussed. First, starting beneath the tree of enlightenment, causes and conditions were frequently used to refute intrinsic nature; next, impermanence, suffering, and emptiness were used to refute causes and conditions; next, [essential] identity was used to refute analytical [emptiness]; next, differentiation was used to refute analytical and essential emptiness; next, the middle way was used to refute the two extremes; next, the perfect and eternal was used to refute the partial and gradual. Meanings such as these pervade the sūtras and treatises. Now, the Mahāparinirvāṇa [Sūtra] is the ultimate exposition of the perfect and eternal, yet it uses causes and conditions to refute that patched-robe [ascetic's] attachment to intrinsic nature; this is merely according with his illness, using this initial medicine at a later time. Since this is so for the beginning and the end, the same holds for the middle. In all circumstances, through wise expedients—whether according with desires, according with suitability, according with antidotes, or according with awakening—they are used interchangeably without error, and yet the sequence remains distinct. Personally, I would state: The meaning of the four siddhāntas encompasses both the secret and the indeterminate; although secret and indeterminate, the sequence remains distinct. If one grasps this intention, one should elaborate the rationale fully so that the text and meaning become clear. Although the refutation of intrinsic nature through causes and conditions is fully present in the sūtra text, one must further anticipate and formulate the doctrines of impermanence, analytical emptiness, and so on up to the perfect and eternal, so that the practice of the Dharma is accomplished. The divisions will be distinct, and all will accord with the sūtras. If this principle is established, it refutes the heterodox teachings and heterodox attachments of all non-Buddhists; it refutes all orthodox teachings and orthodox doctrines within the Buddhist tradition; it refutes the teachings, practices, stages, and principles of all Hinayana sages and worthies; it refutes the teachings, practices, stages, and principles of all Mahāyāna worthies and sages. Even the entirety of the Buddha's teachings is encompassed, how much more so the non-Buddhists who grasp at an intrinsic nature? In the passages on the ten ṛṣis, it would make the text cumbersome to record this fully for each one, so this idea is briefly set forth here in the chapter on the patched-robe [ascetic]. Grasping this intention behind the questions, one may apply it flexibly across what comes before and after (and so forth).

33.10

From "There was also a brahmin named Vastly Broad" below, this is the ninth non-Buddhist, with two parts: first, debating the meaning; second, yielding and submitting. He held to no position, but simply asked whether [the Buddha] knew the thoughts in his mind or not. Because the Buddha knew his thoughts, he formulated a different exposition. He originally had four thoughts, and the Buddha also answered with four phrases: nirvāṇa is permanent, conditioned things are impermanent, crooked is wrong view, and straight is the eightfold noble [path]. These four principles share the same names [as the non-Buddhist's thoughts] but differ in their meaning; therefore, he questioned [the Buddha] again, and only then did the Buddha expound them for him. He then said that begging for food is permanent, while individual invitations are impermanent; crooked is a door-bolt, and straight is the banner of Indra. This was to test the Buddha silently with the matters he held in mind. Knowing his intention, the Buddha bypassed his literal intent and answered using the principles they symbolized. Because the answers surpassed what was outward, he requested further instruction. However, the character yuè (bolt) should be written within the radical for door; the Shuowen Jiezi says, "A bolt under the lower pillar." In the present sūtra, it is written under the radical for grass, which is the name of a plant; the Shuowen Jiezi says it is wild oats. As for the subsequent question of whether the eightfold noble [path] can cause complete extinction, the Buddha did not answer because the intent of this question was that if sentient beings practice the path and are all completely extinguished, there should no longer be any sentient beings. However, in the ultimate principle, sentient beings are inexhaustible; therefore, he did not answer. If they could be exhausted, then that would entail having a limit. Personally, I would state: Judging by the text, this is probably provisionally based on phenomena. The old [commentators] took this passage to mean that Vastly Broad was inquiring about the end.

33.11

From "Excellent, excellent!" below, the second part clarifies yielding and submitting. In this, the manifestation of his traces and planting of causes were long ago, while in the Present Aeon his completion [of the path] was recent (and so forth). Lingwei used this single person as a rule for all nine non-Buddhists, holding that all of them were provisional manifestations. Master Guan did not accept that all were such, saying: If, seeing one person manifest traces, one generalizes that the other nine were not real [non-Buddhists], one could also say that the nine were real and conversely generalize that this one was not provisional. The various masters merely stated that he realized the fruit, without clarifying that it was a trace. Since this person wished to know the city and know the path, acting as his own gatekeeper, having already brought forth the great resolve, this was no minor matter. One should judge in accord with the text; one need not generalize across all.

33.12

From "At that time the World-Honoured One" below, this is the tenth non-Buddhist. Some say: This section has three [purposes] and differs slightly from the preceding, not being restricted to transforming non-Buddhists: first, to entrust [the teaching]; second, to subdue Māra; third, to transform Subhadra. As for entrusting: because the exposition of the sūtra is completed, it must be entrusted to Ānanda. As for subduing Māra: obstacles to the true Dharma originate from the heavenly māras; now, by subduing them with a dhāraṇī, he ensures the Dharma meets no hindrance. As for transforming Subhadra: earlier, the various non-Buddhists combined in perversity to challenge the Buddha, and the Buddha having subdued them all, Subhadra relied on his own pride and did not come; [the Buddha] looked to Ānanda and commanded him to summon [Subhadra] to come and attain the path. We now clarify that this is not so: it is entirely to transform non-Buddhists; the words differ, but the intent is the same. Why is this? The Buddha's great friendliness is boundless: not only did he break attachments at that time, but he also caused future perversions to be saved; this is why he turned to command Ānanda with the entrustment and propagation. Ānanda was currently snared by Māra, and Māra could also snare and obstruct the future; therefore, [the Buddha] incanted with a divine dhāraṇī so that both present and future would meet no hindrance. Subhadra was obstinate, symbolizing those who turn their backs on transformation in the future; sending Ānanda to go and summon him symbolizes propagation and transmission of the Dharma. Therefore, Subhadra came and attained the path, symbolizing that in the future all will attain return to rectitude. Interpreting the text in this way, the meaning of transforming non-Buddhists is accomplished, and propagation is not lost.

33.13

Dividing the text, there are four parts: first, turning to command Ānanda; second, further debating the meaning; third, properly commanding Ānanda; fourth, concurrently transforming Subhadra. The first part has two: first, asking; next, replying. Below this is the question. Wishing to entrust this sūtra and concurrently transform Subhadra, he turned to ask about Ānanda's whereabouts. From "Kauṇḍinya said" below is the second [part], the reply, which has two parts: first, clarifying that the hosts of māras created disorder; next, clarifying that Ānanda suffered the disorder. In the first, the hosts of māras creating disorder, there are two: first, creating disorder through diverse teachings; next, creating disorder through spiritual superknowledges. In the first, diverse teachings, it mentions vyākaraṇa, which refers to treatise literature, also called vyākaraṇa, differing in Indic pronunciation. However, the māras' teachings here fully expounded the correct principles of the Buddha's Dharma and did not expound the perverse teachings of māras. If they had spoken māra doctrines, one would consider that Ānanda could have discerned them. However, having constantly heard what the Tathāgata expounded, the moment he heard different doctrines, he would not faithfully accept them. If so, how did they create disorder? It is explained: they spoke either of the twelve causes and conditions, or of the four conditions, or further of the four noble truths, eight noble truths, and so on, using these to create confusion and disorder. The text's mention of the "three contemplations" has multiple explanations: one says suffering, impermanence, and non-self; another says contemplating the aggregates, sense fields, and realms; it is also said to be contemplating the three poisons. As for the "seven expedient means," the Sarvāstivādins say: contemplation of impurity, general and specific [contemplations of] the four applications of mindfulness, together with the heat, summit, patience, and supreme worldly dharmas. The Tattvasiddhi masters say: first, contemplating the suffering of form; second, contemplating the origin of suffering; third, contemplating the cessation of suffering; fourth, contemplating the path to suffering; fifth, contemplating the fault of suffering; sixth, contemplating the escape from suffering; seventh, contemplating the entry into suffering—applied in this way to all dharmas. From "World-Honoured One, after the monk Ānanda saw these things" below, the second part clarifies Ānanda suffering the disorder. Now, Ānanda had attained the first fruit and was personally the Buddha's attendant, yet now he suddenly suffered disorder caused by the hosts of māras. This has two meanings: first, manifesting this in his traces symbolizes that only the efficacy of the divine dhāraṇī can subdue Māra; second, Ānanda not being in the assembly was intended to prompt the Tathāgata's inquiry, leading to an exchange with Mañjuśrī discussing his virtues and deeds to show he was fit for the entrustment. Hexi explained that there were five reasons why Ānanda was afflicted by Māra: first, Kauṇḍinya was supposed to be the respondent to transform the non-Buddhists, so Ānanda did not come to the assembly; second, regarding Māra as capable of being delivered, he thus manifested there; third, wishing to reveal Ānanda's eight inner virtues; fourth, wishing to have Ānanda go and summon Subhadra; fifth, wishing to break Ānanda's haughtiness.

33.14

From "At that time Mañjuśrī said to the Buddha" below, the second [part] further debates the meaning to resolve doubts, which again has two parts: first, questioning; next, replying. The question also has two: first, stating in full that the bodhisattvas themselves are capable of propagation; from "For what cause and condition" below, this asks why Ānanda alone received the inquiry and concern. From "At that time the World-Honoured One addressed Mañjuśrī, saying" below is the second [part], the reply, which has three parts: first, recounting the original circumstances in full; next, praising him directly in person; third, properly answering the two questions. This first part recounts the original circumstances in full; that is, the original circumstances of the Tathāgata in the past seeking an attendant among the Saṅgha (and so forth). From "Mañjuśrī, Ānanda..." below is the second part, praising him directly in person. If Ānanda were present in the assembly, how could he have been so praised? This also has two: first, praising the eight inconceivable matters; next, praising their rarity. Furthermore, it mentions the name of Viśvabhū Buddha among the seven buddhas; this must be an omission in this text—editions with Shefu are incorrect. From "As you have said" below is the third part, properly answering the two questions, clarifying that although the bodhisattvas are capable of propagation, each has the heavy responsibility of taming their own retinue, which is why it was not entrusted to them. Ānanda held a lower fruit, was personally the attendant, and was foremost in hearing much; therefore, it was entrusted to him. At the beginning of the "Chapter on Longevity," it was emphatically clarified that śrāvakas are incapable while bodhisattvas are capable of receiving it; now entrusting it to Ānanda and not to the bodhisattvas has three meanings: First, earlier he rebuked actual practice, hence saying they were incapable; now he clarifies provisionality, hence saying he is capable. Second, for expounding the great Dharma and propagating the profound principle, he would be incapable, but for accepting and retaining the chapter divisions and phrases of the textual teaching, he is capable. The lower text itself says that what Ānanda does not know, the bodhisattva Vastly Broad will expound of his own accord; the profound meanings and correct principles are entrusted to the bodhisattvas. Third, it clarifies that regarding śrāvakas, there is granting and stripping away: stripping away means incapable; granting means capable. As for the text saying "he is my younger brother," he was a paternal cousin, but wishing to speak of closeness, it does not say "cousin," but simply "he is my younger brother." As for "what has not been heard, the bodhisattva Vastly Broad will be able to disseminate," there are three interpretations: First, Yecheng says that among the ten non-Buddhists, he ranked ninth in trace, but was actually a bodhisattva; therefore, the Buddha said the bodhisattva Vastly Broad would be able to disseminate it of his own accord. Second, Zhaoti says: In the Buddha's Dharma, great beings are so numerous, why suddenly take a name identical to a non-Buddhist and claim he could propagate the sūtra? The name "Vastly Broad" does not refer to a single person: whoever can propagate the teaching and benefit others is "vastly broad." Therefore, the Treatise on the Great Perfection of Wisdom in its account of the compilation of the Dharma treasury clarifies this fully: before Ānanda, Kāśyapa brought forth the sūtras and abhidharma, while before Upāli he brought forth the vinaya, which is the Vinaya Piṭaka; if Mañjuśrī, Maitreya, and others, together with Ānanda, brought forth the Mahāyāna Piṭaka, then Mañjuśrī and Maitreya are themselves the bodhisattva Vastly Broad. The third explanation: it is neither a non-Buddhist nor a generic designation, but a distinct bodhisattva named Vastly Broad, belonging to the class of Samantabhadra, Mañjuśrī, and the like.

33.15

From "Mañjuśrī, the monk Ānanda is now in another place" onwards is the third [section], formally commanding Ānanda. The older [commentaries] explained three meanings, but in the text there is only the subjugation of the heavenly Māra. Calling Subhadra should involve the entrustment of the teaching, but because the text was abbreviated, it does not appear. Now, according to the text, there are five [parts]: first, the Buddha commands Mañjuśrī; second, the Tathāgata speaks the dhāraṇī; third, Mañjuśrī obeys the command; fourth, the Māra-king arouses the aspiration [for awakening]; fifth, Ānanda pays homage. First, the Buddha commands Mañjuśrī, telling him to uphold the dhāraṇī to release Ānanda. The text says "great dhāraṇī"; translations of the sound vary, being rendered as "total retention" (zǒngchí) and also as "able to retain" (néngchí). Being able to retain the correct Dharma without losing it, and preventing wrong dharmas from arising, it is called "retention". It is also translated as "eloquence", which is a combined meaning of the Sanskrit phonetic term. The correct translation is "retention", hence the text says "hearing the name of this retention". The requirement that the person holding the dhāraṇī observe five matters, such as abstaining from pungent roots, is entirely as in the text. From "Thereupon the World-Honoured One spoke it" onwards is the second [part], the Tathāgata speaking the dhāraṇī. The name and meaning of the mantra have already been explained above. However, where the mantra says *ruò jié bēi* (若竭裨), the sūtra editions differ: some use the clothing radical, and some use the earth radical; here we take the clothing radical as correct. It has two pronunciations: one, the pronunciation of Xú Ài, says this is the sound *bēi*; now we take it as the fanqie *bǐ-lí*. Yet the form with the earth radical also has two pronunciations. Furthermore, it says *pó lán mí* (婆嵐彌); the character has "wind" under "mountain"—this was originally the character *xié* (攜); if read with the sound *xié*, the character should be written as [山/(几@(上/土))]. The *Shuōwén* says, "From *lán* abbreviated, with *guī* as phonetic." Furthermore, the character *tí* in *lài tí* (賴綈) is read by some as the sound *dì*, but now we take it as the sound *tí*. The *Shuōwén* says, "Thick silk fabric." However, in the *Purification of the Grounds Chapter on Dhāraṇī* of the new *Suvarṇaprabhāsa Sūtra*, the Buddha speaks ten mantras for bodhisattvas of the ten grounds. This single mantra is precisely the tenth one of that sūtra, protecting the tenth ground; this mantra specifically protects bodhisattvas of the tenth ground. If so, one should know that Ānanda's level of practice is exceedingly high: he is none other than a bodhisattva of the tenth ground, and the Tathāgata speaks the mantra to protect him. That sūtra says: "One who attains this mantra does not fear poisonous snakes, lions, tigers, wolves, and the like." Since the Perfect Teaching allows one to surpass and ascend to the tenth ground in a single lifetime, in a physical body one has not yet escaped such fears, hence the mantra protects him. However, even if Ānanda did not first realize it in this lifetime, how could his fundamental trace differ? The intention behind protecting him with the mantra can be understood upon reflection. If not for this, since a bodhisattva has severed afflictions and has no further fear, how could it now be said that only upon obtaining the mantra does he escape fear? Therefore, many people explain: some say that this matter is truly difficult to comprehend, not to be measured by shallow feelings. Yet there is one interpretation: the substance of the dharmakāya has nothing to fear; speaking in terms of the response body, here it should manifest fear. Even when the Tathāgata's path ascended to the awakening of all modes, he still had nine tribulations, how much more so a bodhisattva! All rely on the previous explanation. From "Thereupon Mañjuśrī received the mantra" onwards is the third [part], Mañjuśrī obeying the command. From "The Māra-king, hearing this" onwards is the fourth [part], the host of māras arousing the aspiration [for awakening]. From "Mañjuśrī and Ānanda together" onwards is the fifth [part], explaining Ānanda paying homage. However, the text of mantras has historically not been translated, yet there are five meanings: first, names of the Three Jewels; second, names of the Four Truths; third, names of the realm of emptiness; fourth, names of superior practices; fifth, names of spirits and deities. Comprising these five meanings, it is therefore called "total". Being able to retain goodness without losing it, and holding back evil so that it does not arise, it is therefore called "retention". As for names of the Three Jewels, the *Qǐng Guānyīn* says, "*Namo buddhāya dharmāya saṅghāya*." Yet the names of the Three Jewels vary in diverse ways; this may be such a case, which is why the great makara fish, upon hearing the names of the Three Jewels, immediately closed its mouth. As for names of the Four Truths, in the *Xianyu jing*, a parrot was reborn in heaven upon hearing the names of the Four Truths. As for names of the principle of emptiness, the true realm is nameless yet leaves nothing unnamed; therefore, upon hearing this name of emptiness, one immediately awakens to the path, becomes a noble one, and severs delusions. As for names of superior practices, the *Pañcaviṃśati* says: "Prajñāpāramitā is the great vidyā-mantra, the unexcelled vidyā-mantra." Furthermore, the *Qǐng Guānyīn* explains the six-syllable phrases, which are the six wondrous gates: first, counting; second, following; third, stopping; fourth, observing; fifth, returning; sixth, purifying. As for names of spirits and deities, the first are names of good spirit kings, and the second are names of evil spirit kings.

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大般涅槃經疏 — Classical Chinese