維摩義記 2.47

2.47

自下第四約就真性平等義中難破偏得。真性一如，凡聖平等。凡於如中既無所得，彌勒如中何獨有得？文中三番：初之一番難破得記，後之兩番難破得果。難得記中，先明凡聖一切皆如，次破偏得，「所以」下釋。前「一切眾生如」者，凡人如也。如性緣起集成眾生，攝相歸本故眾生如。「法亦如」者，通明凡聖二法如也。如性緣起集成諸法，攝之從本故性亦如。「眾聖乃至彌勒如」者，聖人如也。如性緣起集成眾聖，攝之從本故聖皆如。如水作波，波即是水；如金作器，器還是金，此等亦爾。次就設難。言「若彌勒得受記者」，舉其所取。「一切眾生亦應受記」，將凡類徵。下釋難意。「所以」，徵問。我有何以言「彌勒得眾生亦得」？下對釋之。「如者不二不異」義故。如無彼此故曰不二，如無勝劣故言不異。如不異故，彌勒如中有得受記，眾生如中亦應得記。眾生如中無生得記，彌勒如中有何所得？下破得果，於中先破得菩提義，後破彌勒得涅槃義。前中「彌勒得菩提」者，舉其所立。「一切眾生皆亦應得」，將凡類徵。下釋難意。「所以」，徵問。我有何以言「彌勒得應生亦得」？下對釋之。一切眾生即菩提相，與彌勒同，故彌勒得眾生亦得。菩提體相，如下文說「寂滅是菩提，滅諸相故。不觀是菩提，離諸緣故。不行是菩提，無憶念故。」如是一切此菩提性緣起集成。集成生死眾生，攝緣從實，故一切生即是菩提。彌勒實性即是菩提，彌勒有得；眾生實性即是菩提，亦應有得。眾生實性即是菩提，於菩提中無眾生相、無眾生得；彌勒實性即是菩提，此菩提中何處有得？「彌勒能得」下，破彌勒得涅槃義。言「若彌勒得滅度者」，舉其所取。「一切眾生亦當滅度」，將凡類徵。滅度，外國名為涅槃。下釋難意。「所以」，徵問。我有何以「彌勒得滅眾生亦得」？下對釋之。佛知眾生畢竟寂滅，即涅槃相不復更滅，與彌勒同，故彌勒得眾生亦得。涅槃體相，如上文說。本自不然，今亦不滅，是涅槃義。又復如彼《地經》中說：自性常寂，不滅不生，是涅槃義。又復如彼《涅槃》中說：大般涅槃本自有之，非適今也。非實非虛、非生非作、非一非異、非去來今、非因非果。此亦即是《勝鬘經》中一苦滅諦。經自釋言：非壞法故名為苦滅。言苦滅者，無始無作、無起無盡、離盡常住、自性清淨離一切惱，是其苦滅。此涅槃性，緣起集成生死眾生；泯相即實，故一切生即涅槃相。此是體相，非標相矣。於此法性涅槃之中，從來無有眾生之相可以息滅，是故說言不復更滅。無生可滅是滅之極，故云畢竟。此理常定，唯佛乃覺，故說佛知。此涅槃性，眾生彌勒其理一也。滅既不殊，彌勒有得，眾生同之亦應有得。然此法性涅槃之中，畢竟無生得於涅槃，彌勒同之，何得可在，偏說有得？

From here below is the fourth [section], which refutes one-sided attainment by drawing upon the meaning of the equality of the true nature. The true nature is a single suchness; ordinary beings and nobles are equal. If ordinary beings have nothing attained within suchness, how could there be attainment uniquely within Maitreya's suchness? Within the text there are three rounds: the first round refutes the attainment of prediction; the later two rounds refute the attainment of the fruition. Within the refutation of the attainment of prediction, it first clarifies that all—ordinary beings and nobles—are suchness, and next refutes one-sided attainment, followed by the explanation beginning with 'why'. 'All sentient beings are suchness' refers to the suchness of ordinary persons. Suchness-nature through dependent origination aggregates into sentient beings; subsuming appearances back to the source, sentient beings are therefore suchness. 'Dharmas are also suchness' universally clarifies that both dharmas of ordinary beings and nobles are suchness. Suchness-nature through dependent origination aggregates into all dharmas; subsuming them back to the source, their nature is therefore also suchness. 'All the noble ones, up to Maitreya, are also suchness' refers to the suchness of noble persons. Suchness-nature through dependent origination aggregates into all the noble ones; subsuming them back to the source, all the noble ones are therefore suchness. Just as water forms waves and the waves are water itself, and just as gold forms vessels and the vessels are still gold, these likewise are thus. Next it presents the objection. The statement, 'If Maitreya receives a prediction,' cites what he grasps. 'All sentient beings should also receive a prediction,' presses him by using ordinary beings as a comparable category. Below it explains the meaning of the objection. 'Why' is an interrogative query: For what reason do I say, 'If Maitreya attains it, sentient beings also attain it'? Below it explains in response: Because of the meaning that 'suchness is neither dual nor different.' Since suchness has no 'this' and 'that', it is said to be non-dual; since suchness has no superiority and inferiority, it is said to be not different. Because suchness is not different, if there is receiving a prediction within Maitreya's suchness, there should also be receiving a prediction within sentient beings' suchness. If within sentient beings' suchness there is no sentient being who receives a prediction, what attainment can there be within Maitreya's suchness? Below, it refutes the attainment of the fruition, wherein it first refutes the meaning of attaining bodhi and later refutes the meaning of Maitreya attaining nirvāṇa. In the former part, 'If Maitreya attains bodhi,' cites what he posits. 'All sentient beings should also attain it,' presses him by using ordinary beings as a comparable category. Below it explains the meaning of the objection. 'Why' is an interrogative query: For what reason do I say, 'If Maitreya attains it, all beings should also attain it'? Below it explains in response: All sentient beings are themselves the mark of bodhi, identical with Maitreya; therefore, if Maitreya attains it, sentient beings also attain it. As for the essential nature and marks of bodhi, as the text below says: 'Quiescence is bodhi, because it extinguishes all marks. Non-contemplation is bodhi, because it is free from all conditions. Non-practice is bodhi, because it is without recollective thinking.' All of these, this nature of bodhi, are aggregated through dependent origination. They aggregate into saṃsāric sentient beings; subsuming conditions into the real, all beings are therefore themselves bodhi. Maitreya's real nature is itself bodhi, and Maitreya has attainment; sentient beings' real nature is itself bodhi, and they should also have attainment. Sentient beings' real nature is itself bodhi, yet within bodhi there is no mark of a sentient being and no attainment by a sentient being; Maitreya's real nature is itself bodhi, so within this bodhi where is there any attainment? Beginning from 'Maitreya can attain', it refutes the meaning of Maitreya attaining nirvāṇa. The statement, 'If Maitreya attains extinction,' cites what he grasps. 'All sentient beings will also attain extinction,' presses him by using ordinary beings as a comparable category. 'Extinction' (mièdù) is called nirvāṇa in foreign languages. Below it explains the meaning of the objection. 'Why' is an interrogative query: For what reason do I say, 'If Maitreya attains extinction, sentient beings also attain it'? Below it explains in response: The Buddha knows that sentient beings are ultimately quiescent; they are themselves the mark of nirvāṇa and do not undergo further extinction, being identical with Maitreya. Therefore, if Maitreya attains it, sentient beings also attain it. As for the essential nature and marks of nirvāṇa, as the text above says: 'Originally it does not burn, and now it does not extinguish; this is the meaning of nirvāṇa.' Furthermore, as it says in the Daśabhūmika Sūtra: 'Its self-nature is constantly quiescent, unextinguished and unarisen; this is the meaning of nirvāṇa.' Furthermore, as it says in the Nirvāṇa Sūtra: 'The great parinirvāṇa originally exists of itself, not just beginning now. It is neither real nor unreal, neither arising nor made, neither one nor different, neither past, future, nor present, neither cause nor fruition.' This is also the single truth of the cessation of suffering in the Śrīmālādevī Sūtra. The sūtra itself explains: 'It is not called the cessation of suffering because of the destruction of dharmas. What is called the cessation of suffering is beginningless, unmade, unarisen, inexhaustible, free from exhaustion and constantly abiding, intrinsically pure and free from all afflictions; this is the cessation of suffering.' This nirvāṇa-nature aggregates through dependent origination into saṃsāric sentient beings; eliminating appearances to identify with the real, all beings are therefore themselves the mark of nirvāṇa. This is the mark of its essence, not an external sign. Within this dharmatā-nirvāṇa, never has there been any mark of a sentient being that could be brought to rest; for this reason, it is said that they 'do not undergo further extinction.' Having no arising that can be extinguished is the culmination of extinction; hence it says 'ultimately.' This principle is constantly fixed, and only a buddha awakens to it; hence it says 'the Buddha knows.' With regard to this nirvāṇa-nature, the principle is one and the same for sentient beings and Maitreya. Since extinction is not different, if Maitreya has attainment, sentient beings, being identical to him, should also have attainment. However, within this dharmatā-nirvāṇa, ultimately no sentient being attains nirvāṇa; Maitreya is identical to them, so how could any attainment remain, such that one could claim a one-sided attainment?