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維摩義記 3.86

維摩義記 3.86

Language
Classical Chinese

3.86

第二人中,初「德守曰」,標人別說。曰猶辭也。下彰所說。「我我所二」,反舉二相。汎解有四:一、凡夫所立我人等性名之為我,五陰諸法是我所有名為我所。二、五陰集成假名眾生名之為我,五陰是其我家所有名為我所。三、眾生內報名之為我,外諸境界說為我所。四、就真法佛性為我,真性三歸我中所有名為我所,故《涅槃》云「知我我所,是人出世。」今此所論,義當前三。自下翻之,以顯不二。於此門中,二相雙遣名為不二,先辨、後結。辨中初言「因有我故便有我所」,反明無二。「若無有我則無我所」,順明不二。經中破法凡有八種:一、推因破。如推五陰破眾生相,推其往因破現常性,如是一切。二、推果破。如推當果破現無因,如是一切。三、推理破。如下文說「色性自空」,如是等也。四、推實破。譬如世人見繩為蛇,推繩破蛇;迷如來藏起於生死,推藏破之,如是一切。五、推名破。如說乳時不得酪名,明知無酪;女不名婦,明無兒性,如是一切。六、推對破。如《地論》說「若有作者則有作事,若無作者則無作事。」又如下說「有縛有解,無縛無解」,如是一切。七、責情破。如經中說「愚癡所盲,貪著於我」,「三界虛妄,但一心作」,如是一切。八,推智破。如說「智者不得有無,明法無、明法無性;牟尼不著,明法無性。」如是一切。破法不同,有此八種。今言無我則無我所,是前第六推對破之。云何無我?分別有三,如上所辨。一、五陰法非是神我,名為無我。二、假眾生中無其我性,故名無我。第三、假名眾生亦無,名為無我。言無所者,誰前無我,亦有三種:一、五陰法非是妄計神我所有,名無我所。第二、假名我所法中無有定性,名無我所。第三、假名我所亦無,無我及所,名為不二。「是為」下結。

Concerning the second person, first, “Deśapāla says,” identifies the person who explains individually. ‘Says’ is just ‘words’. Below, it demonstrates what he explains. “Self and what belongs to self are two,” presents the two marks by way of antithesis. The general explanation has four: 1. The nature of self, person, and so forth established by ordinary beings is called ‘self’, while the various dharmas of the five skandhas belonging to my self are called ‘what belongs to self’. 2. The conventional sentient being assembled from the five skandhas is called ‘self’, while the five skandhas are what is possessed by that home of mine and called ‘what belongs to self’. 3. The internal karmic recompense of sentient beings is called ‘self’, and external perceptual spheres are described as ‘what belongs to self’. 4. In terms of true dharmas, the Buddha-nature is ‘self’, while the true-nature Three Refuges possessed within the self are called ‘what belongs to self’; hence the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] says, “One who knows self and what belongs to self is a person who transcends the world.” What is discussed here corresponds in meaning to the first three. From here down, it is overturned to reveal non-duality. Within this approach, dispatching both characteristics is called non-duality; first he distinguishes it, and then he concludes. In the distinguishing part, it first says, “Because there is a self, there is what belongs to the self,” illustrating non-duality in reverse. “If there is no self, then there is no what belongs to the self,” directly demonstrates non-duality. In the sūtras, the refutation of dharmas generally has eight kinds: 1. Refuting by examining the cause: as when examining the five skandhas to refute the characteristic of a sentient being, or examining past causes to refute present permanence, and so forth. 2. Refuting by examining the result: as when examining future results to refute present causelessness, and so forth. 3. Refuting by examining principle: as when the text below says, “the nature of form is inherently empty,” and so forth. 4. Refuting by examining the real: as when worldly people mistake a rope for a snake, one examines the rope to refute the snake; being deluded about the tathāgatagarbha gives rise to saṃsāra, so one examines the [tathāgata]garbha to refute it, and so forth. 5. Refuting by examining names: as when milk is mentioned, the name of curds cannot be obtained, making it clear that there are no curds; a girl is not called a wife, making it clear that she does not have the nature of [having] children, and so forth. 6. Refuting by examining correlatives: as the Treatise on the [Daśabhūmika] Sūtra says, “If there is an agent, there is action; if there is no agent, there is no action.” Also as stated below, “Where there is bondage there is liberation; where there is no bondage there is no liberation,” and so forth. 7. Refuting by reproving sentiment: as the sūtra says, “blinded by ignorance, they greedily grasp at the self,” and “the three realms are deceptive and false, made merely by the one mind,” and so forth. 8. Refuting by examining wisdom: as it says, “The wise do not apprehend existence or non-existence, clarifying that dharmas are non-existent, that dharmas lack intrinsic nature; the Sage does not cling, clarifying that dharmas lack intrinsic nature,” and so forth. The refutations of dharmas differ and have these eight kinds. Now, saying that if there is no self then there is no what belongs to the self belongs to the sixth: refuting by examining correlatives. How is there no self? In terms of distinction, there are three, as distinguished above: 1. the dharmas of the five skandhas are not a spiritual self, which is called ‘no-self’; 2. within conventional sentient beings, there is no self-nature, hence it is called ‘no-self’; 3. conventional sentient beings are also non-existent, which is called ‘no-self’. As for the absence of what belongs to self, corresponding to the preceding absence of self, there are also three: 1. the dharmas of the five skandhas are not possessed by a falsely conceptualized spiritual self, which is called ‘no what belongs to self’; 2. among the conventional dharmas of what belongs to self, there is no fixed nature, which is called ‘no what belongs to self’; 3. conventional what belongs to self is also non-existent; the absence of both self and what belongs to self is called non-duality. From “This is” onward, he concludes.

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