維摩義記 3.4

3.4

Next is the answer to the third [question]. Therein, it first says, "When the illness of sentient beings is extinguished, my illness will be extinguished," which is a general explanation in response to the question. When sentient beings sever suffering and attain nirvāṇa, this is called "the extinguishing of illness"; and when Vimalakīrti's mind of distress and worry regarding them ceases, this is called "the extinguishing of my illness." Below, it explains this separately. "Why is this?" raises the inquiry: on what basis do I say that when the illness of sentient beings is extinguished, my illness will be extinguished? Below, he explains in reply. Therein, there is first the doctrine, next the simile, and finally the application. In the doctrine, it first says, "The bodhisattva enters saṃsāra for the sake of sentient beings," and so forth, bringing up their arising to make manifest their extinguishing. Wishing to follow all realms of existence is called "entering saṃsāra." Taking on a body for the sake of beings is called "having saṃsāra," and because there is saṃsāra, all sufferings pursue [one], which is called "having illness." If sentient beings attain release, then the bodhisattva is without [illness]—this directly explains [it] in terms of its characteristics. Sentient beings being released, the bodhisattva's compassion ceases and there is no need to take [a body] on for their sake, so there is no longer any illness. Next, the simile illustrates this: "It is like an elder who has only one son: if that son falls ill, the parents also fall ill," which illustrates the earlier [statement about] entering saṃsāra for the sake of sentient beings, and so forth. "If the son's illness is cured, the parents are also cured," which illustrates that when sentient beings attain release, the bodhisattva is without [illness]. Below, the application reveals the doctrine: "The bodhisattva is also like this," which applies to the previous elder. "Loving all sentient beings as an only son," which applies to the single son above. Saying "When sentient beings are ill, the bodhisattva is ill," applies to the son falling ill and the parents also falling ill. "When the illness of sentient beings is cured, the bodhisattva is also cured," applies to the son's illness being cured and the parents also being cured. Below, he answers the initial question: "You also said: 'From what cause does this illness arise?'" repeats the wording of the earlier question. "The bodhisattva's illness arises from great compassion," directly explains in response to the question. The three questions above served to make manifest Vimalakīrti's great compassion and upāya; from here on, Mañjuśrī next asks two questions to make manifest what compassion relies upon. Compassion is fulfilled by relying on emptiness, so he asks about the empty room; compassion arises in following existence, so he asks about having no attendants. Vimalakīrti fully answers both. In the questioning, "Why is the householder's room empty?" is the first question. Saying "and why are there no attendants?" is the second question. In the answers, Vimalakīrti first distinguishes the room's emptiness and afterwards reveals the lack of attendants. In clarifying the room's emptiness, there are fully seven rounds [of exchange] arising naturally from the words and expressions. Vimalakīrti first says, "The buddha lands of all buddhas are also all empty," which answers the earlier question by way of analogy. The buddha lands are all empty, and the room follows the precedent of the lands; how could it not be empty? The intention of the answer is like this. The emptiness of the lands resembles that of the room, which is why he says "also." In the second round, Mañjuśrī inquires again more closely regarding the lands: "again" (you) means anew, and also means repeatedly. "He also asked: 'By what are the buddha lands empty?'"—is it that leaving behind phenomena so that no things exist is called emptiness, or is it that being identical to phenomena, [their] principle is non-existent, which is emptiness? Vimalakīrti answers below: "They are empty by means of emptiness," meaning that he takes the principle's emptiness to be the emptiness of the lands. In the third [round], Mañjuśrī reproaches the room's phenomenal emptiness by means of the lands' emptiness of principle: "He also asked: 'Emptiness...'" repeats the previously answered emptiness of principle of the buddha lands; "'...what use is emptiness?'" reproaches the phenomenal emptiness of the room: since you have said that the emptiness of principle is the emptiness of the buddha lands, what use is emptying out all that is in the room to make it empty? Vimalakīrti answers below, explaining the intention of needing emptiness: precisely because the emptiness of principle is free from conceptual distinctions, one must now empty the room to reveal that emptiness. The emptiness of principle is difficult to understand, and without things to display it so as to make people recognise it, it is termed "free from conceptual distinctions." Emptying the room to display it so that people awaken and understand is called "therefore [made] empty." In the fourth [round], Mañjuśrī pursues the expression according to the principle; hence, "He also asked: 'Can emptiness be conceptually distinguished?'" This asks whether the principle of emptiness can be conceptually distinguished by means of the empty room. Vimalakīrti answers below: "Conceptual distinction is also empty"—these words brush aside the expression to reveal the principle. In the previous round, he established the expression to reveal the principle, and therefore used the room's emptiness to conceptually distinguish the principle's emptiness; now here, turning around to remove and demolish the expression so as to reveal the principle, he therefore answers that conceptual distinction is also empty. What does this mean? For those who do not understand, one must use the empty room to conceptually distinguish the principle's emptiness; but once the principle is attained, looking back, the empty room is fundamentally non-existent—how could one still conceptually distinguish the principle's emptiness? Therefore, he says conceptual distinction is also empty. Because conceptual distinction is empty, the principle, having been expressed and indicated, cannot be conceptually distinguished. In the fifth [round], Mañjuśrī inquires into the locus of emptiness; hence, "He also asked: 'Where should emptiness be sought?'" Vimalakīrti answers: "It should be sought within the sixty-two views." The sixty-two views will be discussed fully later. These views are the ordinary person's deluded sentiments without reality, which is precisely the meaning of emptiness; hence, it should be sought within the sixty-two views. Moreover, these deluded sentiments arise by being confused about emptiness; tracing what they are confused about is precisely the meaning of emptiness, so it should be sought within the sixty-two views. In the sixth [round], Mañjuśrī turns to ask about the locus of the views; hence, he also asks: "Where should the sixty-two views be sought?" Vimalakīrti answers: "They should be sought within the liberation of all buddhas." The buddhas realize the principle of emptiness and attain liberation; ordinary people, in the locus of liberation, become confused and give rise to views; hence, they should be sought within the liberation of all buddhas. In the seventh [round], Mañjuśrī inquires into the locus of liberation; hence, he also asks: "Where should the liberation of all buddhas be sought?" Vimalakīrti answers below: "It should be sought within the mental activities of sentient beings." The mental activities of sentient beings include both confusion and awakening: with confusion there is bondage, and with awakening there is liberation. The liberation of all buddhas all arises from the mind; therefore, it should be sought within the mental activities of sentient beings. It can also be said that all mental activities of sentient beings arise in reliance upon the real, and their essence is precisely the real; therefore, the sūtras proclaim that the two dharmas of birth and death are the tathāgatagarbha, the skandhas are precisely the buddha-nature, the twelve links of dependent origination are precisely the buddha-nature, and so forth. Comprehensively awakening to this nature is true liberation; therefore, it should be sought within the mental activities of sentient beings. Having previously answered regarding the room's emptiness, below he answers regarding having no attendants. "Also, what the Benevolent One asked: 'Why are there no attendants?'" repeats the wording of his question. Below, he explains it: "All Māras and all non-Buddhists are all my attendants," directly explaining in response to the question. All that serves as an attendant has the meaning of providing support and nourishment; the bodhisattva's compassionate practice is nurtured and accomplished by means of them, which is why they are spoken of as attendants. "Why is this?" below explains, in which he first inquires: on what basis do I say that Māras and non-Buddhists are attendants? Below, he explains in reply. "Māras take pleasure in saṃsāra"—the bodhisattva complies with those Māras of saṃsāra without forsaking them, and not forsaking the deeds of Māra is nurtured and accomplished by them, which is why all Māras are spoken of as attendants. "Non-Buddhists take pleasure in views"—the bodhisattva constantly complies with those non-Buddhists of diverse views without forsaking them, which is termed "unmoving." This practice of being unmoving is nurtured and accomplished by them, which is why non-Buddhists are spoken of as attendants. Earlier he said "not forsaking," and here he says "unmoving"; these are just complementary phrasing, not meaning being unmoving by holding fast to orthodox or heterodox views. From here on, Mañjuśrī asks three more questions to make manifest that Vimalakīrti's illness is a response and not real. First, he asks about the characteristics of the illness: "Householder, what kind of characteristics does this illness have?" Vimalakīrti answers below. "My illness is formless and cannot be seen"—because the illness is genuinely non-existent, it has no shape or characteristic that could be seen. Second, Mañjuśrī asks about the location of the illness; hence, he says, "Does this illness unite with the body or unite with the mind?" Vimalakīrti answers below. Saying "It does not unite with the body, for the body's characteristics are separate" means that the response body has no body and the illness has no locus, so it does not unite with the body. Saying "It does not unite with the mind, for the mind is like an illusion" means that the manifested mind is not real, and phenomena are equal to an illusion; an illusion has no fixed reality, and the illness also has no locus, so it does not unite with the mind. Third, Mañjuśrī asks about the essence of the illness, which may also be termed asking about the causes and conditions of the illness: "Among the four great elements, which element's illness is it?" Vimalakīrti answers below. Saying "It is not the earth element, yet it is not separate from earth" makes manifest that the illness is genuinely non-existent. Because the illness is non-existent, it cannot be proclaimed that the illness exists directly as earth, hence it is not the earth element; nor can it be said that there is a separate essence of illness apart from earth, hence he says it is not separate. The remaining elements are also like this. "Yet sentient beings..." below brings up that the illness must exist as a response, establishing the earlier [point that] it is genuinely non-existent. "Yet the illnesses of sentient beings arise from the four great elements"—because they have illnesses, Vimalakīrti manifests illness. The illness is manifested in accord with beings, so it is not real existence. Because it is not real existence, it cannot be proclaimed to exist directly as the four great elements or to exist apart from the four great elements. Alternatively, it can be said that the earlier "not the earth element" and so on makes manifest that the illness is genuinely non-existent, while "not separate" and so on reveals that the illness must exist as a response; and "Yet sentient beings..." below reveals the reason for the earlier "not separate from earth" and so on. Because the illnesses of sentient beings arise from the four great elements and the bodhisattva complies with them, [the illness] is not separate from the elements. The eight questions above extensively make manifest Vimalakīrti's upāya of manifested transformation. From here on, two questions explain the method of curing illness with respect to the persons to be transformed; this is the practice of curing illness among the bodhisattva's five practices. Therein, he first explains the etiquette of consoling and comforting with respect to those persons before the lineage stage who have real illnesses, because they do not yet know the Dharma and require others to console them. "How does a bodhisattva subdue the mind?" below explains the method of subduing with respect to those persons upon the lineage stage who have real illnesses, because they themselves know the Dharma and do not require others to console them, being able to subdue themselves. In the former part, he first asks, "How should one console a sick bodhisattva?"