維摩經略疏垂裕記 10.68

10.68

二、「法華」下，引證簡人，二：初、引經證門。荊溪云：法華云其智慧門等者，理即是門。此門中智，稱理故難，故借開文以顯於難，亦是境智相稱之謂。二、「非但」下，簡能入人，二：初、簡偏顯圓。「唯除」下，剩「諸」字。二、「又圓」下，簡凡顯聖。「通意可爾」者，若論通意，何但相似名入，觀行名字亦得名入。「如人知彼家」等者，荊溪云：此約住前知圓為譬，顯住分真名之為入。「如開示悟入」等者，此證入名唯在分真。「別義若然」者，豈但入名從別，開示悟三亦不通凡。

Second, from 'Lotus Sūtra' below, citing proof to eliminate persons, in two parts: first, citing the sūtra to prove the gate. Jingxi says: 'The Lotus Sūtra says that its gate of wisdom and so forth: principle is indeed the gate. Wisdom within this gate matches principle and is therefore difficult; thus the text on opening is borrowed to reveal the difficulty, which is also the meaning of object and wisdom matching each other.' Second, from 'not only' below, eliminating those who can enter, in two parts: first, eliminating the skewed to reveal the perfect. Below 'only except,' the character 'all' (zhū) is redundant. Second, from 'further, perfect' below, eliminating the ordinary to reveal the noble. As for 'the general intention may be so,' if discussing the general intention, why should only likeness be called entry? Contemplation practice and names and words may also be called entry. As for 'like a person knowing that house' and so forth, Jingxi says: 'This uses knowing the perfect prior to the abidances as an analogy to reveal that partial true [realization] at the abidances is called entry.' As for 'like opening, displaying, awakening, and entering' and so forth, this proves that the name "entry" resides only in partial true [realization]. As for 'if the specific meaning is so,' why should only the name "entry" follow the specific? The three of opening, displaying, and awakening also do not extend to the ordinary.