維摩經略疏垂裕記 7.133

7.133

二、簡別圓真緣不等。「問通教」等者，荊溪云：真既未極故曰斷無，還從智生故云他耳。「機教不同」者，機是鈍根，故教成次第。「別明」下，荊溪云：然復別教應須從容更云二義以申其旨。地前一向以真為他，登地亦容以真為自，但別得名多非登地，是故今文不以為自。又真為自須有二義：一者從理、二者破計。言從理者，智尚本有，況復境耶？故修性合時必從本說，故從本說名為自生，乃至雙非理性本無自他故也。二破計者，還須依理。理非自他，何得計四？前之二教唯有破計，故後二教皆依遠理。

Second, differentiating the inequality of the true and the conditional in the separate and perfect teachings. As for 'Question on the common teaching', and so forth, Jingxi states: 'Since the true is not yet ultimate, it is termed eradication and non-existence; because it is still produced from wisdom, it is called "other".' As for 'Capacities and teachings are not the same', capacity refers to dull faculties, hence the teaching becomes sequential. From 'Specifying the separate' downward, Jingxi states: 'Yet for the separate teaching one must also, with ease and leeway, state two further meanings to express its purport: prior to the stages [of the bhūmis] it unconditionally takes the true as other; upon entering the stages it may also take the true as self. However, the designation of the separate teaching mostly does not refer to entering the stages; therefore the present text does not consider it to be the self. Moreover, for the true to be the self, two meanings are required: first, following principle; second, refuting clinging. As for following principle: wisdom is already fundamentally inherent, how much more so the objective realm? Therefore, when cultivation and original nature merge, it must be spoken from the fundamental; thus speaking from the fundamental is called production from self, and so on up to the double negation, because the nature of principle fundamentally lacks self and other. As for the second, refuting clinging: one must still rely on principle. Since principle is neither self nor other, how could one cling to the four [propositions]? The preceding two teachings only refute clinging; therefore the latter two teachings both rely on the profound principle.'