維摩經略疏垂裕記 7.137

7.137

二、約一切法如順並。前唯正報，此兼依報。依正俱空，故得為並。「須類說之」者，應云若國土如，不生不滅不得受記。彌勒如亦然，例初番說之。「何者至佛不授」者，荊溪云：此乃引異而難於同，況復此中且從破說。若從立義無非授記，一切諸法得記何爽？依尚可記，正何所論。淨名今且寄衍權教，以不記法而難於記，純依圓教何所難耶？故圓教中因果依正事理既其不二，理既圓具，記亦何疑？果有因無，無常果耳。「故大經」下，引證者大旨亦然，故亦且從權教以說。

Second, drawing the direct parallel in terms of the thusness of all dharmas. The preceding was solely direct reward; this includes circumstantial reward. Circumstantial and direct [rewards] are both empty; therefore they can serve as parallels. As for 'One must speak of it by analogy': one should say that if the thusness of lands is neither produced nor destroyed, they do not receive prophecy. The thusness of Maitreya is also like this; it should be spoken by analogy with the first round. As for 'Why... up to the Buddha does not confer [prophecy]': Jingxi states: 'This cites difference to challenge sameness; how much more so, in this context, does it proceed from the perspective of refutation. If proceeding from establishing the doctrine, there is nothing that is not a prophecy; how could all dharmas receiving prophecy fail? If circumstantial [rewards] can still receive prophecy, what need is there to speak of direct [rewards]? Jingming now temporarily resorts to the provisional Mahāyāna teaching, using non-prophesied dharmas to challenge prophecy; if relying purely on the perfect teaching, what difficulty could there be? Therefore, in the perfect teaching, since cause and effect, circumstantial and direct, phenomena and principle, are non-dual, and since principle is perfectly complete, what doubt could there be about prophecy? If the effect exists but the cause lacks it, it would merely be an impermanent effect.' As for 'Therefore the Great Sūtra' downward, the quotation of the proof has essentially the same general purport; thus it is also temporarily spoken from the perspective of the provisional teaching.