維摩經略疏垂裕記 9.61

9.61

Second, explaining "sentient beings" has two parts: first, citing the name and briefly indicating it. Jingxi says: "Regarding 'sentient beings' and so forth, the character 'contemplation' points in two directions. Although explaining the character 'contemplation' includes sentient beings, it is merely spoken broadly and generally of the contemplating [subject]. Now this separately explains the two characters 'sentient beings'; sentient beings are precisely the object contemplated." Second, from "The Abhidharma..." downward, recounting the doctrines and explaining the meaning, which has two parts: first, recounting the doctrinal tenets. Jingxi says: "The two characters 'sentient beings' are both explained according to the various Hīnayāna schools; the section belongs to the vaipulya, so it is fitting to follow the lesser tenets. If within the Mahāyāna, one only discusses the differences of contemplation; how would the explanation of the name differ? In the text four schools in all are presented: first, Abhidharma; second, Vātsīputrīya; third, Harivarman's Tattvasiddhi; fourth, the masters of the Fangguang. Among them, the Vātsīputrīya and Fangguang are non-Buddhists attached to the Buddhadharma; relying on their own cleverness in reading the Buddha's sūtras and treatises, they gave rise to a single view. The Vātsīputrīyas read the Śāriputrābhidharma and fabricated their own distinct doctrine, stating: 'The self exists outside the four propositions, within a fifth, ineffable repository.' The masters of the Fangguang read the Buddha's ten similes and formulated their own doctrine, saying: 'Neither arising nor ceasing, like an illusion, like a transformation; emptiness and illusion are the tenet.'" As for "The Abhidharma clarifies produced sentient beings" and so forth, because gathering the five aggregates constitutes a sentient being, the nominal designation of a sentient being is the produced, while the real dharmas of the five aggregates are the producing. As for "the fifth, ineffable repository," the three times and unconditioned dharmas constitute four propositions; the self is separated from these four, hence it is called the fifth. The self is precisely sentient beings; by nominal integration it is called a sentient being, and because of mastery and control it is called a self. Because of mastery and control there is nominal integration, and because of nominal integration there is mastery and control; in reality they are one. As for "The Great Treatise refutes this," it refutes the Fangguang. As for "losing the Mahāyāna intent," Jingxi says: "Because of lacking the three provisionalities. They are Hīnayāna, falsely using Mahāyāna names without the Mahāyāna purport; hence it is said they 'lose' it." Second, from "The present sūtra..." downward, explaining the present interpretation. Jingxi says: "How much more so now, in terms of Mahāyāna, illusion and transformation originally penetrate through; they penetrate through to the Buddha-nature middle way."