淨名玄論 1.40

1.40

問：義宗乃廣陳不二，未詳不二定何等法？答：有人言不二法門則真諦理也。有人言不二法門謂實相般若。有人言不二法門則性淨涅槃阿梨耶識。有人言不二法門謂阿摩羅識自性清淨心。四宗之中，初二約境，後兩據心。雖識境義殊，而同超四句。故釋迦掩室於摩竭、淨名杜口於毘耶，斯皆理為神御，故口以之默。豈曰無辨？辨所不能言也。今總問眾師，且明其正。次開十門四句，別詳得失。眾師既云理不可言者，為有不可言之理、為無此理耶？答有此不可言理，即名有句，何名絕四？若無此不可言理，則皆無所會，凡不可革，聖何由成？撫臆論情，二關之中雖複絕言，終有絕言之理。既終有此理，終是有見。了何由得道，又終有此理，而不可說其有無者，與犢子部我有何異耶？犢子執我在第五不可說藏，今計真諦理法不可說在第五藏，彼執有我不可說名為我見，今計有真諦理不可說名為法見。若然者，乃具人法二見，不得兩空，何道之有耶？又終有此理以為宗極者，則此經以有為宗極矣。願明識君子可詳而覽焉。又真理不可說，俗理則可說。又真理不可說，無有可說義；世諦是可說，無有不可說義。世諦若不可說則入於真諦，真諦若可說便入於俗諦中。以此詳之，還成二見，何名不二法門？《大品》云「諸有二者，無道無果」，《涅槃》云「明與無明，愚者謂二，智者了達其性無二」。明與無明既爾，真俗亦然，愚者謂二，智者了達其性不二也。問：蓋是未悉義宗，故興是問耳。今明俗雖可說則真不可說，真雖不可說則俗可說，以二諦一體故名不二，即是不二法門，乃是智人所了，豈是愚者謂二耶？答：子亦未領今之難意，故有斯通耳。既言真即俗者，俗既可說，真可說不耶？若俗可說、真亦可說者，便成二負，一違宗負、二失諦負。違宗負者，本立俗諦有三假，三假可說。真理即四忘，四忘不可說，故淨名杜言、釋迦掩室。今真則俗，俗既可說，俗真亦可說。既三假，真亦三假，何有四忘之宗？故名失宗負。二失諦負者，真既即俗，俗可說、真亦可說，即皆是俗，何有真諦？本有真諦，可有俗諦；既無真諦，寧有俗耶？故二諦俱失。真即俗既有二失，俗即真亦招兩過。俗既即真，真不可說，俗亦不可說。真既四忘，則俗非三假，謂失宗負也。二者俗即真，真不可說、俗亦不可說，皆是真諦，有何俗耶？既失俗諦，亦無真諦，故二諦共失。若真即俗，俗自可說、真不可說者，亦有二負：一違教負、二違理負。違教負者，經云「色即是空，空即是色」，若俗自可說、真不可說者，何名即是？違理負者，若俗即真，俗可說、真不可說者，請問可說之法與不可說為一耶、為異耶？既言其一，則互相類。說類不說，相與皆說；不說類說，相與不說。若言可說異不可說，則應色異於空、空異於色，故進退二關俱不可也。問：真俗體一，故俗恒即真、真常即俗，而真義恒非俗義、俗義常非真義，故真不可說而俗則可說。答：俗體既則真體者，俗義為則真體、為不即真體？若俗義即真體，真體不可說，俗義亦不可說。若俗義不即真體者，俗義應非三假。俗義既則是三假，豈不即真耶？又經云既無有一法出於法性，寧言俗義不即真耶？以此推之，則無相即。無相即故，便無不二。若有不二，可有於二；竟無不二，何得有二？故有所得宗，皆是戲論義。今更開十門四句，以詳得失。何以約四句明得失？眾師皆言道超四句，故至聖以之沖默。故宜就四句詳其是非。

Question: The doctrines broadly expound nonduality, but it is not yet clear what specific Dharma nonduality definitively is. Answer: Some say that the Dharma gate of nonduality is the principle of paramārtha-satya. Some say that the Dharma gate of nonduality refers to dharmatā-prajñā. Some say that the Dharma gate of nonduality is naturally pure nirvāṇa, the ālayavijñāna. Some say that the Dharma gate of nonduality refers to the amalavijñāna, the intrinsically pure mind. Among these four traditions, the first two are based on the object, while the latter two are based on the mind. Although the meanings of consciousness and object differ, they identically transcend the catuṣkoṭi. Therefore, Śākyamuni closed his chamber in Magadha, and Vimalakīrti stopped his mouth in Vaiśālī; in these cases, the principle guided their spirit, so their mouths were thereby silent. How could one say they had no eloquence? They were eloquent regarding that which cannot be spoken. Now I shall examine the various masters in general and first clarify what is correct. Next, I shall open ten gates of the catuṣkoṭi and examine their merits and faults in detail. Since the various masters say that the principle cannot be spoken, does such an ineffable principle exist, or does this principle not exist? If one answers that this ineffable principle exists, that is termed the 'is' proposition (koṭi); how could it be termed transcending the four? If this ineffable principle does not exist, then there is nothing to converge with at all; the ordinary cannot be transformed, so how could the sage be accomplished? If one searches one's heart and examines the matter, between the two barriers [of speech and silence], although speech is indeed severed, in the end there is a principle that severs speech. Since in the end there is this principle, in the end there is a view of existence. How could one attain the Way through this? Furthermore, if in the end there is this principle, yet its existence or nonexistence cannot be stated, how does this differ from the self of the Vātsīputrīyas? The Vātsīputrīyas cling to the self as being in the fifth, ineffable treasury (piṭaka). Now, you postulate that the Dharma of the principle of paramārtha-satya is ineffable and in the fifth treasury. Their clinging to an ineffable self is called the view of a self; now, your postulating an ineffable principle of paramārtha-satya is called the view of dharmas. If that is so, you possess both the view of persons and the view of dharmas and do not attain the two emptinesses; what Way could there be? Moreover, if in the end there is this principle taken as the ultimate tenet, then this sūtra takes existence as its ultimate tenet. May discerning gentlemen examine and scrutinize this! Furthermore, the real principle (paramārtha) is ineffable, whereas the conventional principle is effable. Again, the real principle is ineffable and has no effable sense; saṃvṛti-satya is effable and has no ineffable sense. If saṃvṛti-satya were ineffable, it would enter paramārtha-satya; if paramārtha-satya were effable, it would enter saṃvṛti-satya. Examining it in this way, it reverts to becoming two views; how could it be called the Dharma gate of nonduality? The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā Sūtra states: 'Wherever there is duality, there is neither Way nor fruit.' The Nirvāṇa Sūtra states: 'Regarding clarity and ignorance, fools consider them to be two, while the wise understand that their nature is not two.' As it is with clarity and ignorance, so it is with the real and conventional: fools consider them two, while the wise understand that their nature is nondual. Question: Perhaps it is because you have not fully understood our doctrinal tenet that you raise this question. Now we explain that although the conventional is effable, the real is ineffable; although the real is ineffable, the conventional is effable. Because the two truths are of one essence, they are called nondual; this is precisely the Dharma gate of nonduality, understood by wise persons. How could it be that fools consider them two? Answer: You also have not grasped the intent of my objection, which is why you give this explanation. Since you say that the real is identical to the conventional, given that the conventional is effable, is the real effable or not? If the conventional is effable and the real is also effable, then two faults result: first, the fault of contradicting your own tenet; second, the fault of losing the truths. The fault of contradicting your tenet is: originally, you established that saṃvṛti-satya possesses three designations, and the three designations can be spoken; the principle of the real is the fourfold oblivion, and the fourfold oblivion cannot be spoken; hence Vimalakīrti stopped his speech and Śākyamuni closed his chamber. Now, if the real is identical to the conventional, and the conventional is effable, then the real is also effable. Since there are three designations, the real also has three designations; how could there be a tenet of fourfold oblivion? Therefore, this is called the fault of losing one's tenet. Second, the fault of losing the truths is: since the real is identical to the conventional, and the conventional is effable while the real is also effable, then all is conventional; how could there be paramārtha-satya? Originally, because there was paramārtha-satya, there could be saṃvṛti-satya; since there is no paramārtha-satya, how could there be the conventional? Therefore, both truths are lost. Just as the real being identical to the conventional has two faults, so too the conventional being identical to the real incurs two errors. If the conventional is identical to the real, and the real is ineffable, then the conventional is also ineffable. Since the real is the fourfold oblivion, the conventional would not be the three designations, which is called the fault of losing one's tenet. Second, if the conventional is identical to the real, and the real is ineffable while the conventional is also ineffable, then all is paramārtha-satya; what conventional could there be? Since saṃvṛti-satya is lost, there is also no paramārtha-satya; therefore, both truths are lost together. If the real is identical to the conventional, but the conventional of itself is effable while the real is ineffable, there are also two faults: first, the fault of contradicting the teaching; second, the fault of contradicting principle. The fault of contradicting the teaching is: the sūtra states, 'Form is emptiness, emptiness is form'; if the conventional of itself were effable while the real were ineffable, how could they be called 'identical'? The fault of contradicting principle is: if the conventional is identical to the real, yet the conventional is effable and the real is ineffable, let me ask: are the effable dharma and the ineffable one, or are they different? If you say they are one, then they must be analogous to each other: if effable is analogous to ineffable, together both are effable; if ineffable is analogous to effable, together both are ineffable. If you say the effable is different from the ineffable, then form should be different from emptiness, and emptiness different from form. Therefore, whether advancing or retreating, both alternatives are untenable. Question: The real and conventional are one in essence, so the conventional is constantly identical to the real, and the real is constantly identical to the conventional; yet the sense of the real is constantly not the sense of the conventional, and the sense of the conventional is constantly not the sense of the real; therefore, the real is ineffable, whereas the conventional is effable. Answer: Since the essence of the conventional is identical to the essence of the real, is the sense of the conventional identical to the essence of the real, or is it not identical to the essence of the real? If the sense of the conventional is identical to the essence of the real, and the essence of the real is ineffable, then the sense of the conventional must also be ineffable. If the sense of the conventional is not identical to the essence of the real, then the sense of the conventional should not be the three designations. Since the sense of the conventional is precisely the three designations, how could it not be identical to the real? Furthermore, the sūtra states that since not a single dharma exceeds dharmatā, how can you say that the sense of the conventional is not identical to the real? Deducing from this, there is no mutual identity. Because there is no mutual identity, there is no nonduality. If there were nonduality, there could be duality; since in the end there is no nonduality, how could there be duality? Therefore, tenets that involve grasping (prāpti) are all conceptual proliferation (prapañca). Now I shall further open ten gates of the catuṣkoṭi to examine their merits and faults in detail. Why clarify merits and faults in terms of the catuṣkoṭi? All masters say that the Way transcends the catuṣkoṭi, and for this reason the Supreme Sage was profoundly silent. Therefore, one should examine right and wrong according to the catuṣkoṭi.