淨名玄論 6.13

6.13

所言有無者，無前性義故，求性有不可得、性無亦不可得。若有有無，可有亦有亦無、非無非非無耳。竟無前二，何有後三？故五句皆不可得也，則五眼不見。昔聽講之日，聞興皇和上述攝嶺大師之言：五眼不見理外眾生及一切法。猶未則信解，久方悟之。如此有所得人法，本無所有，五眼何所見耶？《大品經》每舉我人為喻。又十六知見畢竟無所有，故五眼不見。今有所得性有人法，五眼不見，亦復如是。問：考察此五句不可得，為是真諦之無以不？答：此無是二諦，二部外無，二諦不攝故。一師有二種無，一者有所無故稱無、二者無所有故稱無。有所無故稱無，即是有所得。五句皆畢竟空，是諸佛菩薩所離，故云無也。無所有義明無，此是二諦中實諦無。所以然者，二諦宛然有而無，故名無所有，故稱為無也。二者對無明有。既無如此有得所義，即有諸佛菩薩假名因緣無所得二諦，非有故有、不無故無，如此有無是佛菩薩有無智所行處，故名為境。問：何故明此有無？答：前有無不成，今有無如立，對彼不成故辨成義，所以明此有無。又是接斷見故來。或者本執定性有無，忽聞五句皆不可得，便生斷見，謂無二諦因果等法。為此人故，云乃是無汝所見有無耳，非無因緣有無。如《中論．作者品》云「是業從眾緣，生無有決定」。如汝所說有、如汝所說無，因緣有無也。又對數論等論，謂彼義有因果二諦。聞三論破一切法，便是起斷見，無有因果二諦等法。今明舊義無有因果及二諦耳，今始得有因果及二諦。所以然者，有所得作緣無因果，二諦不成，故成無因果義。今立因果始成，故有因果義也。又先破定性有無，故破其有見。今明因緣有無，故破無見。欲示中道，明有無門。

Regarding what is called existence and non-existence: because the preceding notion of svabhāva is rejected, svabhāva-existence cannot be found, and svabhāva-non-existence cannot be found either. If there were existence and non-existence, there could be both existence and non-existence, and neither non-existence nor non-non-existence. When the first two do not exist at all, how could the latter three exist? Therefore, all five propositions cannot be obtained, and the five eyes do not see them. In former days when I listened to lectures, I heard the Preceptor of Xinghuang quote the words of Great Master of Sheling: 'The five eyes do not see sentient beings or any phenomena outside of principle.' At that time, I did not yet believe and understand it; only after a long time did I realize it. Such persons and dharmas conceived with apprehension are originally non-existent; what would the five eyes see? The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra repeatedly uses the self and person as analogies; furthermore, the sixteen views are utterly non-existent, so the five eyes do not see them. Now, persons and dharmas conceived as svabhāva-existence with apprehension are likewise not seen by the five eyes. Question: When examining these five propositions as unattainable, is this the non-existence of paramārtha-satya or not? Answer: This non-existence is outside the two truths and the two vehicles, because it is not subsumed by the two truths. One master holds two kinds of non-existence: first, it is called non-existence because something is negated; second, it is called non-existence because there is nothing at all. Being called non-existence because something is negated refers to apprehension: the five propositions are all utterly empty, which is what all Buddhas and bodhisattvas renounce; hence it is called non-existence. Explaining non-existence as having nothing at all refers to the non-existence of real truth within the two truths. Why? The two truths are distinctly existent yet non-existent, so they are called having nothing at all, and thus designated non-existence. Second, existence is explained in contrast to non-existence. Since there is no such notion of apprehension, there are the two truths of non-apprehension through nominal designation and causes and conditions of all Buddhas and bodhisattvas: existing because of non-existence, and non-existing because of not-non-existence. Such existence and non-existence are the domain where the cognition of existence and non-existence of Buddhas and bodhisattvas operates; thus it is called the object. Question: Why explain this existence and non-existence? Answer: Because the previous existence and non-existence could not be established, and the present existence and non-existence are established as such; it explains the sense of establishment in contrast to their failure, which is why this existence and non-existence are explained. Furthermore, it comes to guide those with the view of annihilation. Some people originally clung to svabhāva-existence and non-existence, and suddenly hearing that all five propositions are unobtainable, they gave rise to the view of annihilation, claiming that there are no such dharmas as the two truths, cause and effect, and so on. For the sake of such people, it is said that what is negated is merely the existence and non-existence of your views, not the existence and non-existence of causes and conditions. As the Madhyamakaśāstra states in the Chapter on the Agent: 'This action arises from various conditions, and in birth has no definitiveness.' Like the existence and non-existence you describe, it is existence and non-existence of causes and conditions. Furthermore, in response to treatises such as the Abhidharma, they claim that their doctrine possesses cause, effect, and the two truths. Hearing the Three Treatises refute all dharmas, they give rise to the view of annihilation, thinking there are no dharmas such as cause, effect, and the two truths. Now we clarify that the old doctrines merely lack cause, effect, and the two truths, while now cause, effect, and the two truths are first able to exist. Why? When one posits conditions with apprehension, there is neither cause nor effect, and the two truths are not established; hence it results in the meaning of no cause and effect. Now, when cause and effect are established, they first become tenable; therefore, the meaning of cause and effect exists. Furthermore, having previously refuted svabhāva-existence and non-existence, the view of existence was refuted; now, by clarifying the existence and non-existence of causes and conditions, the view of non-existence is refuted. Wishing to reveal the middle way, the gate of existence and non-existence is explained.