淨名玄論 6.21

6.21

有所得有無是理，無所得有無是教。舊云二諦是二理，四絕為真諦理、三假為俗諦理。二理則有佛無佛性相常然，迷之而成六道、悟之而有三乘。今明既是二理則不可改轉，則有無根深、事如盡石。因此決定有無，故起二見。所以然者，既其道理實有有無，而有無二見寧得不生耶？又設有二理生。一異則不成。若二理是一，則俗假真亦假、真絕俗亦絕。若有假有不假，有絕有不絕，則非二理為一也。若二理不一，則色不是空、空亦不是色，相即之言則壞。既立二理名，須受一異之問。又僧佉謂：大有是常、萬法無常，常與無常一體。衛世師謂：大有是常、萬法無常，是故常無常二體。論主直破常無常，一體而異體，而有與萬法自壞。命詳此義，與二諦常無常，豈一體二體，令同為失也。如開善云：真諦是常、萬法無常，常無常一體。龍光云：真諦常、萬法無常，常無常二體。令同二外道義，對失明得。二諦是教，所言教者，以理本不二，而為物說二，故名為教。

The being and non-being of apprehension is principle; the being and non-being of non-apprehension is teaching. The old theories say that the two truths are two principles: the fourfold transcendence is the principle of paramārtha-satya, and the threefold designation is the principle of saṃvṛti-satya. With two principles, whether there is a Buddha or no Buddha, their nature and characteristics are ever so; being deluded about them constitutes the six destinies, and awakening to them yields the three vehicles. Now we explain: since they are two principles, they cannot be changed or reversed, so the roots of being and non-being run deep, solid as stones. Because of this definitive being and non-being, the two views arise. Why is this so? Since in their principle there is truly being and non-being, how could the two views of being and non-being fail to arise? Furthermore, suppose two principles are established: identity and difference cannot be maintained. If the two principles were one, then conventional designation would also make the ultimate designated, and the ultimate transcendence would also make the conventional transcended. If one is designated and one is not designated, or one is transcended and one is not transcended, then the two principles cannot be one. If the two principles are not one, then form is not emptiness and emptiness is not form, and the statement of mutual identity is ruined. Since one establishes the name of two principles, one must face the inquiry into identity and difference. Furthermore, the Sāṃkhya claims: 'The Great Existence is permanent, and the myriad phenomena are impermanent; the permanent and the impermanent are of one substance.' The Vaiśeṣika claims: 'The Great Existence is permanent, and the myriad phenomena are impermanent; therefore the permanent and the impermanent are of two substances.' The treatise master (Nāgārjuna) directly refutes the permanent and impermanent being of one substance or of different substances, and existence and the myriad phenomena are ruined of themselves. We request a detailed examination of this meaning: regarding the two truths as permanent and impermanent, how could their being of one substance or two substances avoid sharing the same failure? For instance, Kaishan (Zhizang) says: 'Paramārtha-satya is permanent, and the myriad phenomena are impermanent; the permanent and impermanent are of one substance.' Longguang (Sengmin) says: 'Paramārtha-satya is permanent, and the myriad phenomena are impermanent; the permanent and impermanent are of two substances.' Making them identical with the doctrines of the two non-Buddhists, we clarify success by contrasting it with failure: the two truths are teaching. What is meant by 'teaching' is that, because the principle is fundamentally nondual, yet for the sake of beings duality is spoken, it is named teaching.