淨名玄論 6.26

6.26

他但明世諦說、真諦不說。世諦是三假，三假故可說；真諦是四忘，四忘不可說。眾師同此一解，更無異判。今問：世諦唯可說，不可令不可說；真諦不可說，不可令說。豈非定性義耶？彼云：世諦雖可說，即是真不可說。真不可說即俗可說，故非是定性。問：俗即是真，故不可說。此為是俗不可說、為是真不可說？答：還是真不可說耳。問：若爾，俗終二，無不可說義。豈非定性耶？對失明得者，令總觀真俗，具有四句：一世諦說真不說、二真說世不說、三但說、四但不說。此四句有多門，今具敘之。一者世諦說生滅、真諦不說生滅，故云世諦說真諦不說也。二者真諦說不生滅、世諦不說不生滅，故真諦說世諦不說也。三者世諦說生滅、真諦說不生滅，故二諦但說也。四者世諦不說無生滅、真諦不說生滅，故云二諦但不說也。問：此四句出何處？答：釋論初卷云「人等，世諦故有……第一義故有、世諦故無」，即是斯義也。二者明生滅此是世諦說、不生滅是世諦不說，不生不滅是真諦說、非不生非不滅是真諦不說，此是二諦但說、但不說也。三者世諦說、真諦不說，明說生滅、說不生滅，皆是世諦故說，真諦不說生滅亦不說不生不滅，故云世諦說真諦不說也。四者真諦說世諦不說者，世諦雖說生滅不生不滅，實無所說；真諦雖無所說，而無所不說。問：世諦雖說而無所說，無所說即入真諦；真諦雖無所說而無所不說，還是世諦。何處有世諦不說真諦說耶？答。有所得定性義如此耳。世諦自是說，若無所說則屬真諦。真諦自無所說，若有說還屬世諦。如此真俗，皆是障礙法門。今明諸佛菩薩無所得空有因緣無礙故，空是有空、有是空有。是空是有空，雖空而有；有是空有，雖有而空。說是不說說，是說不說。說是不說說故，雖說而不說；不說是說不說故，雖不說而常說。故得世諦不說而真諦說也。

Others merely explain that saṃvṛti-satya is spoken and paramārtha-satya is not spoken. Saṃvṛti-satya is the three designations, and because of the three designations it can be spoken; paramārtha-satya is the four obliterations, and because of the four obliterations it cannot be spoken. The various masters share this single explanation and have no different judgment. Now we ask: Saṃvṛti-satya can only be spoken, and cannot be made inexpressible; paramārtha-satya cannot be spoken, and cannot be made expressible. Is this not a doctrine of fixed nature? They say: Although saṃvṛti-satya can be spoken, it is precisely paramārtha that cannot be spoken. Paramārtha being inexpressible is precisely saṃvṛti being expressible; therefore it is not fixed nature. We ask: Saṃvṛti is precisely paramārtha, hence it cannot be spoken. Is this saṃvṛti being inexpressible, or paramārtha being inexpressible? Answer: It is still just paramārtha being inexpressible. Question: If so, saṃvṛti ultimately remains two, with no meaning of being inexpressible. Is this not fixed nature? Clarifying correctness in contrast to error: one causes the overall contemplation of paramārtha and saṃvṛti to possess four propositions: 1. saṃvṛti-satya is spoken and paramārtha is not spoken; 2. paramārtha is spoken and saṃvṛti is not spoken; 3. both are only spoken; 4. both are only not spoken. These four propositions have multiple approaches, which will now be fully related.
First, saṃvṛti-satya speaks of arising and ceasing, while paramārtha-satya does not speak of arising and ceasing; hence it is said that saṃvṛti-satya is spoken and paramārtha-satya is not spoken.
Second, paramārtha-satya speaks of non-arising and non-ceasing, while saṃvṛti-satya does not speak of non-arising and non-ceasing; hence paramārtha-satya is spoken and saṃvṛti-satya is not spoken.
Third, saṃvṛti-satya speaks of arising and ceasing, and paramārtha-satya speaks of non-arising and non-ceasing; hence both satyas are only spoken.
Fourth, saṃvṛti-satya does not speak of the absence of arising and ceasing, and paramārtha-satya does not speak of arising and ceasing; hence it is said that both satyas are only not spoken.
Question: Where do these four propositions come from?
Answer: The first fascicle of the Dazhidulun says: "Persons and so forth exist on account of saṃvṛti-satya... they exist on account of the primary meaning, and are non-existent on account of saṃvṛti-satya"; this is precisely this meaning.
Second, explaining arising and ceasing is what saṃvṛti-satya speaks, and non-arising and non-ceasing is what saṃvṛti-satya does not speak; neither arising nor ceasing is what paramārtha-satya speaks, and neither non-arising nor non-ceasing is what paramārtha-satya does not speak: this is both satyas being only spoken and only not spoken.
Third, saṃvṛti-satya speaks and paramārtha-satya does not speak: explaining that speaking of arising and ceasing and speaking of non-arising and non-ceasing are both spoken because of saṃvṛti-satya, while paramārtha-satya neither speaks of arising and ceasing nor speaks of non-arising and non-ceasing; hence it is said that saṃvṛti-satya speaks and paramārtha-satya does not speak.
Fourth, paramārtha-satya speaks and saṃvṛti-satya does not speak: although saṃvṛti-satya speaks of arising and ceasing and non-arising and non-ceasing, in reality nothing is spoken; although paramārtha-satya has nothing spoken, there is nothing it does not speak.
Question: Although saṃvṛti-satya speaks, nothing is spoken, and when nothing is spoken it enters paramārtha-satya; although paramārtha-satya has nothing spoken, there is nothing it does not speak, which is still saṃvṛti-satya. Where is there saṃvṛti-satya not speaking and paramārtha-satya speaking?
Answer: It is only like this in the doctrine of fixed nature with apprehension. Saṃvṛti-satya of itself is speaking, and if nothing is spoken, it belongs to paramārtha-satya. Paramārtha-satya of itself has nothing spoken, and if there is speaking, it still belongs to saṃvṛti-satya. Such paramārtha and saṃvṛti are both obstructing Dharma approaches. Now we clarify that because the Buddhas and bodhisattvas have unobstructed emptiness and existence of causes and conditions without apprehension: emptiness is the emptiness of existence, and existence is the existence of emptiness. Emptiness being the emptiness of existence, although empty, it exists; existence being the existence of emptiness, although existent, it is empty. Speaking is the speaking of non-speaking, and non-speaking is the non-speaking of speaking. Because speaking is the speaking of non-speaking, although speaking, nothing is spoken; because non-speaking is the non-speaking of speaking, although not speaking, it constantly speaks. Therefore, saṃvṛti-satya does not speak while paramārtha-satya speaks.