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淨名玄論 1.45

English (machine translation) 1.45

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1.45

Fifth, explaining the compounded catuṣkoṭi. All of the above catuṣkoṭis are named 'existence.' Why is this? Because there is existence, there is nonexistence, there is both existence and nonexistence, and there is neither existence nor nonexistence; hence all are termed 'existence.' As Nāgārjuna said, 'When thought arises within non-existent phenomena, it is termed existence.' Next, transcending this catuṣkoṭi is named 'nonexistence.' Both having the catuṣkoṭi and transcending the catuṣkoṭi is 'both existence and nonexistence.' Neither having the catuṣkoṭi nor having no catuṣkoṭi is 'neither existence nor nonexistence.' Next, explaining the transcendence of this catuṣkoṭi: not having the catuṣkoṭi, not being without the catuṣkoṭi, not being both having the catuṣkoṭi and without the catuṣkoṭi, and not being neither having the catuṣkoṭi nor without the catuṣkoṭi—hence it is named transcending the catuṣkoṭi. Question: Why explain the meaning of this catuṣkoṭi? Answer: When the masters of the various sects establish the tenets of the Mahāyāna, they are merely within the meaning of the two propositions of existence and nonexistence among the double catuṣkoṭi; they do not even qualify for the tenet of the [compounded] catuṣkoṭi, so how could they possess the principle of transcending the catuṣkoṭi? How is this known? The southern [view of the] object of paramārtha-satya and the northern [view of the] amala[-vijñāna] mind both explain transcendence over the catuṣkoṭi of existence and nonexistence, and thus fall into the second proposition. Saṃvṛti-satya and the eight consciousnesses are both within the catuṣkoṭi, which is subsumed under the gate of existence. Therefore we know they both fall within two propositions and lack any discourse on transcending the catuṣkoṭi. Furthermore, as for the compounded catuṣkoṭi, taking the existence of the above single and double catuṣkoṭis as the proposition of existence, the nonexistence of the above single and double catuṣkoṭis as the proposition of nonexistence, up to both existence and nonexistence, and neither existence nor nonexistence—such transcendence of the catuṣkoṭi has an unfathomably profound significance. The tenets of the various masters do not even participate in the meaning within this catuṣkoṭi, so how could they have words transcending the catuṣkoṭi?

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