淨名玄論 4

English (machine translation) 4

Language: English

4.1

Section Two: Discussing the Central Purport

4.2

There are two parts: first, universally determining the central purport; second, separately explaining the two cognitions.

4.3

First: Universally Determining the Central Purport

The treatise says: Having understood the name, one should recognize the central purport. There are four different explanations of this central purport. Some say: Because this sūtra is named "Inconceivable", it takes the inconceivable as its central purport. Setting forth "Vimalakīrti" describes the person capable of preaching; entitling it "Inconceivable" discerns the purport of the sūtra. Hence Master Sengzhao used four phrases to clarify the root of the inconceivable and four phrases to clarify the traces of the inconceivable; although root and trace differ, the inconceivable is one. Some say: Although this sūtra clarifies inconceivable liberation, it takes cause and fruit as its true central purport. For instance, the initial assembly in the Buddha Land clarifies the cause and fruit of the pure land; from the Chapter on Upāya to the Dharma Gate of Nonduality, it clarifies the cause and fruit of the dharmakāya; and from the Chapter on the Fragrance-Accumulating [Buddha] onward to the end of the sūtra, it repeatedly clarifies the practices of the pure land and the cause and fruit of the dharmakāya. Therefore, it is appropriate to take cause and fruit as the central purport. Some say: This sūtra takes two practices as its central purport: first, the practice of purifying the Buddha lands; second, the practice of maturing sentient beings. The first assembly clarifies the practice of the pure land; the next assembly clarifies the practice of maturing sentient beings; the reconvened assembly in the ten-foot-square room clarifies both practices together; from inquiring about illness to the Dharma Gate of Nonduality, it repeatedly clarifies the practice of maturing sentient beings; the Chapter on the Fragrance-Accumulating [Buddha] repeatedly clarifies the practice of the pure land; the subsequent assembly in the Āmrapālī Grove further clarifies both practices together; the Chapter on Bodhisattva Practice clarifies the practice of maturing sentient beings; and the Chapter on Seeing Akṣobhya Buddha clarifies the practice of purifying the Buddha lands. Hence it takes the two practices as its central purport. After a bodhisattva attains the acceptance of non-arising, there is nothing else to do except purify the Buddha lands and mature sentient beings; therefore, from beginning to end, the whole text clarifies these two essential practices as the central purport of this sūtra. What is explained now does not reject the preceding positions, but what masters and disciples have transmitted takes the two cognitions as its true central purport. Question: On the basis of what textual meaning do we take the two cognitions as the central purport? Answer: In the Chapter on the Offering of the Dharma, the King of the Devas says: "Although I have heard hundreds of thousands of sūtras from the Buddha and Mañjuśrī, I have never before heard this scripture of inconceivable, unhindered supernatural powers and decisive dharmatā." Now, dharmatā is the root of entering the path, and inconceivable supernatural power is the principal means for transforming beings; among phenomena, nothing surpasses these two in utmost essentiality. Manifesting unhindered supernatural powers is the upāya of real wisdom; decisive dharmatā is the real wisdom of upāya. Although it is dharmatā, there are supernatural powers; although they are supernatural powers, there is dharmatā; activity and quiescence are nondual, yet provisional and real remain distinct. This entire scripture extensively discusses this teaching; hence it takes the two cognitions as its central purport. Furthermore, prajñā is the mother of bodhisattvas and upāya is their father; these are Vimalakīrti's parents, and thus serve as the central purport of the Vimalakīrti Sūtra. Again, what occasioned this sūtra arose specifically from an illness: illness is upāya, and upāya derives from reality; hence it takes the two cognitions as the central purport. Furthermore, this scripture is named the Vimalakīrti Sūtra, taking a bodhisattva as the lord of the teaching; one is called a bodhisattva precisely on account of the two cognitions: the real wisdom of upāya distinguishes one from ordinary beings, and the upāya of real wisdom sets one apart from the lesser path. Moreover, the real wisdom of upāya is called a bodhisattva, while the upāya of real wisdom is called a mahāsattva; therefore, the dharma that accomplishes a bodhisattva is taken as the central purport of this bodhisattva scripture. Question: The two cognitions are generated from two cognitive objects; why not combine object and cognition to serve as the central purport of the sūtra? Answer: Although the knowable object (jñeya) is the mother of cognition, it is contemplated in common by the three vehicles; the two cognitions, however, are exclusively the teaching of bodhisattvas. Therefore, prajñā does not belong to the two vehicles or to the Buddha, but belongs solely to bodhisattvas. The skillfulness of prajñā is called upāya; since prajñā does not even belong to the two vehicles, śrāvakas are entirely cut off from upāya. Hence we take cognition as the central purport and do not adopt the object. Question: From the pure land at the beginning down to the offering of the Dharma at the end, though the words of this sūtra differ, the inconceivable is one. Why not use the inconceivable as the central purport? Answer: Although the teachings of the entire text are all difficult to conceive, speaking specifically, it is liberation that is the inconceivable. Thus it is said that the buddhas and bodhisattvas have a liberation named "Inconceivable"; abiding in this liberation, they can manifest all forms and preach all teachings while beings cannot fathom them; hence it is universally named inconceivable liberation, which is none other than the two cognitions. Therefore, we take the two cognitions as the central purport. Question: How is liberation identical to the two cognitions? Answer: The two cognitions are free of encumbrance, and are therefore called liberation. In this liberation, the workings of the mind are severed, so the intellect cannot conceive it; words are extinguished, so the mouth cannot discuss it. Thus we know that the two cognitions are liberation. Question: Liberation is the two cognitions; since the two cognitions are identical to liberation, why not take the two cognitions and liberation together as the essence? Answer: It is precisely the two cognitions that are the essence of liberation, not liberation that is the essence of the two cognitions. How do we know this? The sūtra says: "Wisdom has the liberation of upāya, and upāya has the liberation of wisdom"; it does not say that liberation has upāya, or that liberation has wisdom. Hence we know that the two cognitions are the essence of liberation, and that liberation is not the essence of the two cognitions. Question: If the two cognitions are taken as the essence of liberation, why is it not called the "inconceivable two cognitions", but rather named "inconceivable liberation"? Answer: All Dharma gates comprise two aspects: first, establishing the name; second, discerning the essence. "Inconceivable liberation" is the name of the sūtra, while this liberation takes the two cognitions as its essence. Thus, both name and essence are presented, and the meaning contains much. If "inconceivable" were taken as the name and "inconceivable" were also taken as the essence, then name and essence would overlap each other, and the meaning would encompass little. Question: The asaṃskṛta dharmakāya is fruitional liberation, and uncontaminated cognition is causal liberation; if liberation is taken as the central purport, then cause and fruit are both complete. Now if you take the two cognitions as the essence, you obtain only the causal aspect. Answer: The asaṃskṛta dharmakāya, uncontaminated cognition, and inconceivable liberation have three names, but their essence is not dual. Because no encumbrance remains unexhausted, it is called liberation. Because no object remains unilluminated, it is called wisdom. Because the ultimate truth can serve as a model, it is termed Dharma. Taking Dharma as the body, it is called the dharmakāya. It does not merely encompass both cause and fruit in meaning; its essence is also endowed with the three virtues.

4.5

Second: Separately Explaining the Two Cognitions, in Eleven Sections: 1. Section on Translating the Names; 2. Section on Explaining the Names; 3. Section on Object and Cognition; 4. Section on Sameness and Difference; 5. Section on Long and Short; 6. Section on the Six Cognitions; 7. Section on Unfolding and Combining; 8. Section on Severing and Subduing; 9. Section on Subsuming Cognition; 10. Section on Permanent and Impermanent; 11. Section on Gains and Losses.

4.6

1. Section on Translating the Names

4.7

Formerly, while in Jiangnan, I composed the *Treatise on the Profound Meaning of the Lotus Sūtra* and briefly explained the two cognitions; however, since this doctrine serves as the mind-contemplation of all sages and the parent of the dharmakāya, it must be thoroughly investigated, and is therefore discussed again. If this doctrine is understood, then the various Vaipulya sūtras will become manifest of themselves without needing explanation. Fully preserved in the Sanskrit text, they should be called *prajñāpāramitā* and *upāyapāramitā*; hence this sūtra says: "Wisdom-crossing is the mother of the bodhisattva, and upāya is the father." Here "wisdom" (*zhi*) is *prajñā*, and "crossing" (*du*) is *pāramitā*. However, translations of *prajñā* have varied: some say *zhihui*, as Dharma Master Sengrui says, "In the language of Qin, it is called *zhihui*." Some translate it as "transcendence" (*yuanli*), which appears in the *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā Sūtra* (*Fangguang jing*) and was used by Shi Dao'an. Some translate it as "crossing of illumination" (*mingdu*), which appears in the *Liu du ji jing*. Some translate it as "purity" (*qingjing*), which appears in the *Large Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra* and was used by Dharma Master Sengrui. Yet *prajñā* fully encompasses the meanings of wisdom, illumination, purity, transcendence, and so on; translators of sūtras simply selected one of these to render it. Because *prajñā* can sever all delusions and transcend the phenomena of names and marks of saṃsāra, it is called "transcendence"; being clear and free of darkness, it is called "illumination"; its essence being devoid of defilement, it is called "purity"; and penetrating, illuminating, understanding, and knowing, it is called "wisdom". Although there are various meanings, "wisdom" (*zhihui*) is mostly used. The single-character and compound terms for wisdom also differ respectively. Sometimes it is called simply *zhi*, as in the *Dazhidulun* and this sūtra where it is called *zhidu* ("wisdom-crossing"). Sometimes it is called simply *hui*, as in the *Dazhidulun* which says, "*Prajñā* in the language of Qin is called *hui*." Sometimes it is fully translated as *zhihui*, as is common in sūtras and treatises. Now, upon carefully integrating these meanings, each has its rationale; speaking broadly, *zhi* is *hui*. Referring to *hui* as *zhi* is merely a difference of expansion and brevity; in essence there is no difference.

4.8

Translating it as *hui* involves four meanings: first, to distinguish the differences among the ten pāramitās; second, to unfold the different senses of emptiness and existence; third, to clarify the distinction between cause and fruit; fourth, to distinguish ordinary beings from sages. As for the differences among the ten pāramitās: the sixth is named *prajñā*, translated here as *hui*; the tenth is named *jñāna*, named here as *zhi*. Question: If *jñāna* is *zhi*, how is *vidyā* translated? Answer: Here it is translated as "illumination" (*ming*), which still belongs to the category of cognitive vision. As for the different senses of emptiness and existence: illuminating emptiness is called *hui*, while examining existence is called *zhi*; hence this sūtra says: "Entering the gate of the single mark gives rise to the activities of *hui*; knowing the mental thoughts of all sentient beings gives rise to the activities of *zhi*." As for the distinction between cause and fruit: the treatise says, "In the cause it is called *prajñā*; transformed in the fruit, it is called *sarvajñā*." *Sarvajñā* means all-knowledge, from which we know that *prajñā* is termed *hui*. Since the designation *hui* is inferior, it is appropriate for the causal stage; *zhi* is definitive and clear, and therefore resides at the stage of fruition. Furthermore, the Buddha illuminates emptiness and existence to the utmost exhaustion, with the addition of "all" (*sarva*); bodhisattvas have not reached the ultimate, and so are only called *hui*. One must not say that it is called *zhi* in the cause and *sarvajñā* in the fruit, nor may one say that it is called *zhihui* in the cause and *sarvajñā* in the fruit; one should only say that it is called *hui* in the cause and *zhi* in the fruit, whereby the meaning of superiority and inferiority between cause and fruit is made evident. As for the difference between ordinary beings and sages: as the *Nirvāṇa [Sūtra]* says, "Regarding *prajñā*, all sentient beings call this *hui*." Since the name *hui* is general, it is possessed by both ordinary beings and sages. For example, among the factors of the ten mahābhūmikas, concentration and wisdom (*hui*), *vipaśyanā* is designated as "view", meaning that all sages clearly see the principle. *Jñāna* is *zhi*, which is penetrating and definitive.

4.9

Next, translating it as *zhi* involves three meanings: first, since the name *hui* is inferior and *zhi* is superior, wishing now to praise *prajñā*, it is called *zhi*. Second, to show euphony of expression, one says *zhidu*; if one were to say *huidu*, the expression would not be felicitous. Third, to clarify that *zhi* is none other than *hui*—the names differ but the essence is identical—hence either one is cited as occasion demands.

4.10

Next, combining them as "wisdom and cognition" (zhìhuì) also possesses three meanings: First, it clarifies that prajñā possesses the illumination of both nonexistence and existence, and therefore encompasses both wisdom and cognition; wisdom illuminates emptiness, and cognition then perceives existence. Second, it shows that prajñā connects both fruit and cause: in the cause, prajñā is wisdom; in the stage of the fruit, prajñā is cognition. Therefore, among the three virtues, there is the virtue of prajñā. Third, it intends to clarify that the meaning of the six pāramitās subsumes the ten: where sūtras explain only the six pāramitās and do not explain the ten, because the name prajñā already encompasses both wisdom and cognition, the tenth, the pāramitā of cognition, is contained within it. Question: Since there are these three names, which is the correct translation? Answer: "Wisdom" (huì) is the correct translation; the others are established according to particular meanings. How do we know this is so? Because of the preponderance of treatises. This sūtra speaks of "wisdom and upāya"; the Dazhidulun speaks of "the path of prajñā and the path of upāya"; the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra states: "As for prajñā, all sentient beings [call this wisdom]." Jñāna is "cognition" and is assigned to the Buddhas and bodhisattvas; thus "cognition" is not prajñā. Furthermore, the sixth [pāramitā] is named wisdom and the tenth is cognition, both possessing their respective names in both languages; hence we know that "wisdom" is the correct one. Moreover, the treatise states: "Prajñā does not belong to the Buddhas, nor does it belong to the two vehicles; it belongs only to the bodhisattvas. Bodhisattvas [have] wisdom of the path and wisdom of the aspects of the path, whereas the Buddha is endowed with all-knowledge and knowledge of all aspects." It also says: "Prajñā is named wisdom of the dharmatā of all dharmas." Passages such as these are not few; therefore, "wisdom" is the correct translation. Question: If "wisdom" is the correct translation, why do the sūtras mostly say "wisdom-cognition" (zhìhuì)? Answer: Sūtras mostly teach the six pāramitās, and therefore mostly say "wisdom-cognition"; they rarely teach the ten pāramitās, and therefore rarely explain [prajñā merely as] "wisdom". Furthermore, among the six pāramitās, there are compound translations—as in "generosity" (bùshī) and so forth, where it is not named simply by the single word "giving" (shī); prajñā is also like this. Although it is indeed "wisdom", in order to match the preceding five it also maintains a compound name, and is thus called "wisdom-cognition".

4.11

Next, the meaning of translating versus not translating. Some say: Because the name prajñā contains five meanings, it cannot be properly translated, and it is appropriate to use "wisdom" to stand for its name. As the seventy-first fascicle of the Dazhidulun states: "Prajñā determines dharmatā; it is profoundly deep and extremely heavy. Wisdom-cognition is light and shallow, and therefore cannot weigh up to prajñā." This [principle] was employed by Getti. Now I say this is not so: the Dazhidulun clarifies the meaning of "cannot weigh up to" (chēng), not that it cannot be translated (fān). Question: What is the difference between weighing (chēng) and translating (fān)? Answer: Weighing was already clarified in India, whereas translating is accomplished in China. Rendering the other into this involves different stages and distinct doctrinal perspectives. Moreover, the treatise states: "Prajñā determines dharmatā, and is therefore incapable of being weighed;" it does not say that it cannot be weighed because it contains multiple meanings. This explanation is mistaken. Again, some say: That prajñā cannot be weighed means that contemplative wisdom-cognition cannot weigh up to prajñā as dharmatā. Prajñā as dharmatā is eternally abiding in nature and characteristic, whereas contemplative wisdom-cognition only arises upon encountering an object. Therefore, dharmatā is deep and heavy, while contemplative cognition is light and shallow. This is the explanation of the Northerners. This is also not so: the sūtra praises prajñā with five praises, but does not praise dharmatā; how could one say that dharmatā is deep and heavy? Furthermore, it says: "Prajñā determines dharmatā"—thus dharmatā is that which is determined, and prajñā is that which determines. If one says that dharmatā is deep and heavy, can dharmatā in turn determine dharmatā? Again, some say: That wisdom-cognition is light and shallow and cannot weigh up to prajñā refers to mundane wisdom-cognition, the wisdom-cognition that departs from birth, and the wisdom-cognition of the two vehicles being unable to measure the great wisdom-cognition of a bodhisattva. Why? Great wisdom-cognition illuminates the principle of dharmatā and guides all practices to completion; how could the other, shallow wisdom-cognitions ever weigh up to it? This is the explanation of the Southerners. Now I say this is not so: it only says that wisdom-cognition cannot weigh up to prajñā, and does not speak of shallow wisdom being unable to weigh up to deep wisdom. Furthermore, shallow and deep are both called "wisdom", and so both would be light and shallow, and neither would be able to weigh up to prajñā. Now I explain it relying on the treatise. The treatise says: "Because prajñā determines dharmatā, it is deep and heavy, and wisdom-cognition cannot weigh up to it." What is called "determining" is a designation for tallying and encountering. The ten thousand transformations are not without a source, yet that which sources them is the signless, empty source; they are not without tallying, yet that which tallies with them is mindlessness. Therefore, the sage, through wondrous wisdom free of mind, tallies with that signless, empty source; then the internal and external both darken into union, and conditions and cognition are both silenced. "Wisdom-cognition" is a designation for knowing and illuminating; how could it weigh up to prajñā that transcends contemplation? Question: How can prajñā tally and encounter dharmatā? Answer: Because prajñā is generated from dharmatā, prajñā can tally and encounter dharmatā. Question: According to this explanation, it is still a shallow cognition being unable to weigh up to a deep cognition. Answer: The deep transcends both ignorance and cognition, whereas the shallow still possesses knowing and illuminating; thus it is not a case of shallow cognition being unable to weigh up to deep cognition. Question: Since "determining dharmatā" is a designation for tallying and encountering, how does it differ from the ancient explanation of dark tallying? Answer: The words are identical, but the intended meaning differs. However, in explaining dark tallying, there are two masters: One says that the encountering itself is the darkening into union, which is dark because they tally in correspondence. The dark tally does not conflict, and therefore the encountering has no superior or inferior. This is the doctrine of Zhuangyan [Sengmin] and Longguang [Huiguan]. The second says that "encountering" is a name for matching correspondence, while "darkening" has the meaning of blending into one; thus darkening is superior and encountering is inferior. Why? In the cause there are four aspects on account of which there is not yet darkening: first, delusions are not yet exhausted; second, its essence has arising and ceasing; third, cognition is not yet all-round and perfect; fourth, its essence relies on spatial location. Therefore, it is only called "encountering". The fruit of Buddhahood is free from these four aspects, and is thus spoken of as "darkening". When darkening and unarisenness become one, then object and cognition are not divided, and there is no difference between response and illumination; yet unarisenness does not conflict with the conventional, nor does darkening obstruct encountering. The fruit of Buddhahood in its entire essence darkens into union, and in its entire essence encounters: because it encounters, its responsive illumination fills the ten directions; because it darkens into union, all things are completely cut off. Now I ask in general: Since darkening blends into one with the object, does cognition become the object, or does it not make an object? If it does not make an object, how can one speak of unity? If cognition makes an object, then since the object is without knowing, cognition must also be without knowing. Since cognition possesses knowing, the object should also be likewise, because of their unity. If one says that because it is equally cut off along with the dharmatā it is called dark tallying, yet it still differs from the dharmatā, then on the very day of tallying and darkening one would still see object and cognition as two. How then could the sūtra say: "When the bodhisattva's prajñā corresponds, he does not see corresponding and not corresponding, uniting and not uniting"? Furthermore, if it only constitutes darkening because it possesses the four aspects, then according to the prajñā teaching, Buddha-cognition would still have arising and ceasing, and thus could not be called darkening. Because of the meaning of illuminating the peerless dharmatā, there is no meaning of darkening into dharmatā. Question: Why is it called "profoundly deep and extremely heavy"? Answer: What can be weighed is not called extremely heavy. Truly because it is extremely heavy, it cannot be weighed. The author of the treatise wished to explain the sūtra's meaning of "cannot be weighed", and therefore said "deep". Question: It should only have said "heavy"; why did it also say "profoundly deep"? Answer: In order to qualify the meaning of "heavy"—it is not heavy like a heavy physical object, but rather because it is profoundly deep, it is called heavy. Question: It only said "deep and heavy"; why did it also say "extremely"? Answer: The three vehicles share the same contemplation, and all tally with dharmatā. But the two vehicles are like the hare and the horse, failing to reach its depths, and therefore do not obtain the name of prajñā, nor are they called profoundly deep and extremely heavy. Now, wishing to distinguish them from the two vehicles and make clear that the bodhisattva illuminates its depths completely and attains the name of prajñā, it says "profoundly deep and extremely heavy". Question: Why is wisdom-cognition called "light and shallow"? Answer: The essence of prajñā transcends conditions and contemplation, whereas the name "wisdom-cognition" is fixed in contemplation. The essence of prajñā transcends ignorance and cognition, whereas the name "wisdom-cognition" governs knowing and illuminating. The essence of prajñā transcends names and letters, whereas "wisdom-cognition" still involves words and speech. Therefore, in contrast to the heaviness of prajñā, the lightness of wisdom-cognition is clarified; in contrast to the depth of prajñā, the shallowness of wisdom-cognition is distinguished. "Shallow" is equivalent to "thin". Question: The essence of prajñā transcends ignorance and cognition; why is the name "wisdom-cognition" established? Answer: Not knowing how to designate it, one forces the name "wisdom-cognition" upon it. Although the name "wisdom-cognition" is established, in reality it does not weigh up to the essence of prajñā. Question: One should only say that the essence of prajñā is deep and heavy while the name of prajñā is light and shallow, and the essence of wisdom-cognition is deep and heavy while the name of wisdom-cognition is light and shallow; why then does it say that prajñā is deep and heavy while wisdom-cognition is light and shallow? Answer: Now, relying on the Sanskrit text, one would say that the essence of prajñā is deep and heavy, and the name of prajñā is light and shallow. But if one uses this [Chinese] pronunciation, one should say that the essence of wisdom-cognition is deep and heavy, and the name of wisdom-cognition is light and shallow. Fearing that this meaning would be difficult to make apparent, the translator of the sūtra borrowed the indigenous word "wisdom-cognition" as unable to weigh up to the Sanskrit word "prajñā". Question: What is the difference between "cannot be weighed" (chēng) and "cannot be measured" (liáng)? Answer: The sūtra has five praises, namely: arising on account of great matters, arising on account of matters that cannot be weighed, arising on account of matters that cannot be measured, arising on account of matters that are peerless, and arising on account of inconceivable matters. Since there is separately "arising on account of immeasurable matters", weighing is not measuring. "Cannot be measured" takes the meaning of having no boundary. "Cannot be weighed" clarifies profound depth and supreme heaviness. For example, the "Chapter on Praising the Dharma" explains that relics cannot weigh up to the fascicles of the prajñā sūtras; here, the name and meaning of wisdom-cognition cannot weigh up to prajñā that transcends contemplation. Question: The treatise states: "Wisdom-cognition is small, and prajñā is great; therefore it cannot weigh up to it." What are "great" and "small"? Answer: Some say: Dharmatā is great because no dharma fails to be autonomous [within it], whereas wisdom-cognition is small because it is restricted to the mind. Now I say this is not so: previously it clarified that it cannot be weighed in terms of determining dharmatā; now it clarifies that it cannot be weighed in terms of encompassing multiple meanings. The essence of prajñā is neither ignorance nor cognition, yet it can be ignorant and can be cognitive; wisdom-cognition exclusively governs cognition. Therefore prajñā is great, and wisdom-cognition is small. Furthermore, prajñā determines dharmatā; since dharmatā is all-pervasive, prajñā is also great; wisdom-cognition is not like this, and is therefore called small. Question: We already know the meaning of translating versus not translating prajñā. What about upāya? Answer: Sadāprarudita said: "Upāyakauśalya, the Great Master's power of expedient means." Upāya is "expedient means", and kauśalya is named "superior cognition". The skillfulness of prajñā is named upāya. Since its function is superior, it is called superior cognition. The Vimalakīrti takes upāya as the father, drawing upon its capacity to give birth and bring to completion. The Pañcaviṃśati takes upāya as the teacher, clarifying that it possesses the virtue of instruction. Skillfully transforming beings without realizing [the fruition of] the two vehicles are all the power of the Great Master.

4.12

Section Two: Explaining the Names

4.13

There are further three sections: first, explaining provisional and real; second, elucidating the great meaning; third, properly establishing the two paths.

4.14

1. Explaining Provisional and Real

4.15

Speaking generally, both cognitions illuminate in accordance with reality, and are together termed 'real'; both possess skillfulness, and are entirely called 'expedient'. Speaking specifically, that prajñā is called 'real' and upāya is called 'expedient' briefly has eight meanings. First, prajñā illuminates the object that is dharmatā; taking its name from that which is illuminated, it is therefore called 'real'. Second, prajñā is born from dharmatā; receiving its name from that which can generate it, it is therefore called 'real'. Third, it illuminates in accordance with reality, so in its very essence it is called 'real'. The treatise says: 'Prajñāpāramitā is real phenomena and is not inverted.' Its essence is free from falsity and is not inverted wisdom; therefore it is called 'real'. Fourth, in contrast to the inverted and unreal wisdom of ordinary persons, prajñā is praised as 'real'. Fifth, in contrast to the two vehicles considering what is not yet real to be real, prajñā is clarified as 'real'. Sixth, in contrast to the function of upāya, with prajñā as the essence, it is therefore called 'real'. Seventh, clarifying the real in contrast to the unreal is not yet the true real; neither unreal nor real is then called the marvelous real. Eighth, the meaning of unreal is dual, while neither unreal nor real is nondual. Both dual and nondual are termed unreal; neither dual nor nondual is then termed 'real'. Therefore the treatise says: 'Observation of thought-marks has already been eliminated, and the phenomena of speech are also extinguished.' Upāya is the name for skillfulness. This meaning has many aspects; here ten pairs are briefly discussed. First, directly illuminating emptiness and existence is called prajñā; practicing emptiness without realizing [its cessation], and engaging existence without attachment, is therefore called upāya. In this illumination and skillfulness there are not two different essences: by means of skillfulness one illuminates, hence it is called 'real'; by means of illumination one is skillful, hence it is called 'expedient'. [An objection] asks: The cognitions that can illuminate are together called real cognition, and the objects that are illuminated are together termed real objects. Within real cognition there is emptiness-cognition and existence-cognition, and within real objects there is the ultimate object and the conventional object; this serves as the parallel. [Question]: Since there are ultimate and conventional, why are both called real objects? [Answer]: Because they are objects of cognition in accordance with reality, they are called real objects, receiving the name from cognition. Furthermore, reality is the ultimate and conventional, not falsely called so; in their very essence they are called real. Second, illuminating emptiness is real, and engaging existence is expedient. As the Dazhidulun says: 'Prajñā brings one into ultimate emptiness; upāya brings one out of ultimate emptiness.' Dharmatā is called 'real'. Prajñā illuminates emptiness, and is therefore called 'real'. Although it illuminates emptiness, it can immediately engage existence; this function being skillful, it is called 'expedient'. [Question]: If so, although it illuminates existence, it can immediately observe emptiness; this function is also skillful, so it should be expedient. [Answer]: Although this illumination is skillful, since real cognition is its essence, its name of 'skillfulness' is concealed and it is given the designation of 'real'. Third, taking internal quiet contemplation as real and external manifestation as provisional. [Question]: How does this meaning differ from the previous one? [Answer]: This clarifies that whether illumination or skillfulness, the meaning of quiet contemplation is entirely called 'real'; because of external manifestation, it is called 'provisional'. Fourth, prajñā is real, and the five pāramitās are expedient. Why is this so? Prajñā is the understanding of emptiness; being the understanding of emptiness, it is called 'real'. The five pāramitās are the practices of existence; being the practices of existence, they are called 'provisional'. [Question]: How does this differ from the above 'illuminating emptiness is real, and engaging existence is provisional'? [Answer]: The former clarified that illuminating emptiness and illuminating existence are both wisdom, and thus distinguished provisional and real by two kinds of understanding. Here, opening the two gates based on understanding and practice, understanding emptiness is real, and the practice of existence is provisional; thus it differs from the above. [Question]: Why are the practices of existence provisional? [Answer]: Although it illuminates emptiness, it can immediately initiate practice. This meaning being skillful, it is called 'provisional'. Fifth, illuminating emptiness is real, and knowing that emptiness is also empty so that one does not realize emptiness is called 'provisional'. Why is this so? The two vehicles do not know that emptiness is also empty, and consider emptiness to be the marvelous culmination; thus it is called mere emptiness, and for this reason they realize emptiness. Bodhisattvas know that emptiness is also empty, which is called unobtainable emptiness; hence they do not realize emptiness and can immediately engage existence; therefore it is called 'provisional'. This clarifies the meaning of repeated emptiness: clarifying the meaning of emptiness is real, and the real meaning is inferior; knowing that emptiness is also empty, one can immediately engage existence, and this function being superior, it is therefore called 'provisional'. Regarding these two wisdoms, there are no different essences. At first, the contemplating mind is not yet marvelous, so it can only illuminate emptiness. Once it becomes increasingly refined and skillful, it then knows that emptiness is also empty. Having known that emptiness is also empty, without destroying conventional designations, it can immediately engage existence. Discussed from beginning to end, it is still a single wisdom; depending on whether it is skillful or not yet skillful, provisional and real are distinguished. Sixth, knowing that the body is suffering, empty, and impermanent is called 'real'; yet not seizing extinction is called 'expedient'. Because the body of saṃsāra is truly a phenomenon of suffering, emptiness, impermanence, and faults, illuminating it in accordance with reality is called 'real'. The two vehicles, knowing this, immediately extinguish it; hence they lack upāya. Bodhisattvas, although knowing it, abide in what ails the body to cultivate themselves and transform others; hence it is expedient. Seventh, directly knowing that bodily illness is neither old nor new is real; yet not being disgusted with and abandoning it is termed 'expedient'. This merely distinguishes provisional and real in terms of the practice of existence. Eighth, Vimalakīrti lodged his trace in Vaiśālī: the unill body is real, and the trace of manifesting illness is provisional. This clarifies provisional and real based on the meaning of unreal and real. Ninth, taking the above illumination of the duality of emptiness and existence as expedient, and illuminating the nonduality of neither emptiness nor existence as real. Neither empty nor existent is the single real truth; illuminating the single real truth is therefore called 'real'. Although neither empty nor existent, emptiness and existence are vividly present; without moving from nonduality, skillfully being able to engage duality is therefore called 'expedient'. Tenth, emptiness and existence are duality, and neither empty nor existent is nonduality; illuminating duality and nonduality are both called 'expedient'. Illuminating neither duality nor nonduality—where Vimalakīrti stopped his words and Śākyamuni shut his room—is then called 'real'. The provisional and the real have many aspects, briefly opened into ten pairs. These ten pairs are a single sequence of pathways, all having support in the sūtras and treatises, and can be applied according to the text.

4.16

Second, explaining the great meaning.

4.17

Question: Why is prajñā called mahā, while upāya is not called mahā? Answer: In general, both can be called great. As was stated above, "Upāyakauśalya is the great master's power of expedient means." Speaking distinctly, there are briefly ten meanings in prajñā being called great. First, dharmatā is vast and boundless, deep and bottomless; there is no single phenomenon outside of dharmatā. Prajñā illuminates dharmatā, and is therefore called great wisdom; upāya, although skillful, does not illuminate dharmatā, and is therefore not called great. Question: The two vehicles also illuminate dharmatā; why are they not called great? Answer: The two vehicles have not reached its limits; the bodhisattva illuminates and exhausts its source and bottom, and it is therefore called great. Second, the real wisdom of the three vehicles is entirely generated from within prajñā. Why is this? Since the dharmatā that is illuminated is one, the prajñā that is able to illuminate has no three[fold diversity]. Yet because dispositions and capacities cannot bear it, within the one prajñā it is opened into the wisdom of the three vehicles. The wisdom of the three vehicles is completely subsumed into the contemplation of prajñā, and it is therefore called great. Question: How does prajñā generate the wisdom of the three vehicles? Answer: Dependent on dharmatā, prajñā is generated; dependent on prajñā, there are bodhisattvas; dependent on bodhisattvas, there are buddhas; dependent on buddhas, there are three vehicles. Thus, prajñā is the root, and therefore it generates the three vehicles; hence it is called great. Question: The three vehicles together contemplate dharmatā, so dharmatā is the root; how can prajñā be the root? Answer: It must be through the buddhas and bodhisattvas realizing and awakening to prajñā, and only then expounding the teachings of the three vehicles, that [all] first come to together contemplate dharmatā; therefore prajñā is the root. Question: If prajñā is the root and generates the three vehicles, it ought to be the shared teaching of the three vehicles. Answer: The Śrīmālā[devī-sūtra] says, "Acceptance of the True Dharma generates the five vehicles, just as the great earth brings forth the four treasuries of jewels"; the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] says, "It is the śrāvaka treasury that generates the śrāvakas, the pratyekabuddha treasury that generates the pratyekabuddhas, and the Mahāyāna treasury that generates the bodhisattvas"—can these be the shared teaching of the three vehicles? Furthermore, just as the Lotus [Sūtra] explains that inside the elder's house there are not only the seven treasures, but also earthen vessels and the like, yet it is called the elder's great house, not a shared house. Prajñā is also like this: although it possesses the wisdom of the three vehicles, it is called the bodhisattva Dharma, not the shared teaching of the three vehicles. Question: If it is not the shared teaching of the three vehicles, why does it exhort the three vehicles to study it together? Answer: It exhorts the people of the three vehicles to together contemplate dharmatā; it does not exhort the people of the three vehicles to together study mahāprajñā. Question: Why is mahāprajñā not something to be studied in common by the three vehicles? Answer: The treatise says, "Prajñā does not belong to the two vehicles; it belongs only to bodhisattvas." Why is this? Since it is called mahāprajñā, it is great wisdom; setting aside the two vehicles, one therefore knows that prajñā is exclusively the bodhisattva Dharma. Moreover, this prajñā is called pāramitā; pāramitā means arriving at the other shore of the Buddha path. The two vehicles do not reach the other shore of the Buddha path, so it is not a pāramitā. Therefore, mahāprajñāpāramitā is exclusively the bodhisattva Dharma, and does not belong to the two vehicles. Question: The sūtra only says, "One who wishes to attain the fruit of a śrāvaka should study prajñā"; how can you say one should study dharmatā-prajñā? Answer: The Dazhidulun makes this determination; consulting the text, it is readily apparent. Deducing it through principle, it definitely does not exhort the people of the two vehicles to study mahāprajñā. Since mahāprajñā is the contemplative cognition of a bodhisattva, how could it make the two vehicles study it? As the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] says, "Because of contemplating with inferior wisdom, one attains śrāvaka bodhi; because of contemplating with superior wisdom, one attains bodhisattva bodhi." This explains that the two vehicles together contemplate the middle way; how could it exhort the intermediate and inferior two wisdoms to study the superior wisdom? Question: Mahāprajñā is exclusively the bodhisattva Dharma, yet in the prajñā teaching it is said that the people of the three vehicles together contemplate dharmatā; thus it is the shared teaching of the three vehicles. Answer: If so, then since the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra says that the people of the three vehicles together contemplate the middle way, should that also be the shared teaching of the three vehicles? Question: If it is not the shared teaching of the three vehicles, why are the people of the two vehicles commanded to expound it? Answer: The elder entrusting the wealth has two intentions overall: first, the desire to openly instruct the bodhisattvas; second, secretly instructing the two vehicles. This is in fact putting an end to the two vehicles so that they together become bodhisattvas; how could one say it is the shared teaching of the three vehicles? Third, prajñā is generated from dharmatā; since dharmatā has nothing on which it relies, prajñā also has no attachment. Because prajñā has no attachment, it can guide and fulfill the multitude of practices so that they also have no attachment; therefore one does not abide in the three realms, does not rest in the two vehicles, and goes directly toward the Buddha path. Because it has the capacity to guide, it is called great. Question: The [other] five pāramitās are fundamentally not perfections; because prajñā guides them, they are called perfections. Should it also be that the five pāramitās are fundamentally not eyes, but because prajñā guides them, they come to have eyes? Answer: In a general sense they are analogous, but distinctly they are not equal. Just as five blind persons, though they follow a sighted person along the road to enter the city and thus obtain the name of having crossed over, in their inherent nature as blind, in the end have no eyes themselves; so the five pāramitās, though following prajñā along the Noble Eightfold Path to the city of the Buddha path, yet the inherent nature of the five pāramitās is ultimately not prajñā. Therefore, the two adornments of merit and wisdom are distinguished, and the intention is made apparent here. Question: The Diamond Prajñā says, "A bodhisattva who gives without abiding in characteristics is like the sunlight illuminating and seeing diverse forms." Why do you say that prajñā guiding the five does not form eyes? Answer: Fundamentally prajñā is the eye, and the five pāramitās are not eyes; it is only that prajñā guides them, causing them to become free of attainment, not abiding in the three realms, not falling into the two vehicles, and proceeding directly toward the Buddha path, and thus they are merely named 'having eyes'. It does not mean they become the eye of prajñā. Question: If non-attainment is the eye among the multitude of practices, should non-attainment also be wisdom? Why distinguish the two adornments of merit and wisdom? Answer: Non-attainment is shared, whereas merit and wisdom are distinct. Taking non-attainment as wisdom also has this meaning, but it is not the wisdom of prajñā. Why is this? Prajñā has non-attainment and also has illumination; the five pāramitās have only non-attainment and do not have illumination, so they are not called wisdom. Fourth, the fifty-two kinds of great worthy and noble ranks are all within the treasury of prajñā, and it is therefore called great. Why is this? When combined, there is only the one prajñā; yet because of differences in brightness and obscurity, it is divided to form the fifty-two ranks. Fifth, one cultivates this great wisdom for three great asaṃkhyeya-kalpas, and it is therefore called great. Sixth, it can sever great delusion, namely fundamental ignorance. Therefore the sūtra says, "The entrenchment of ignorance: its power is the greatest." Although the two vehicles overturn the four entrenchments, they cannot sever it; only when the bodhisattva illuminates and exhausts dharmatā is this great delusion eliminated, and it is therefore called great. Seventh, it can uproot all great suffering inside and outside the three realms, and it is therefore called great. Eighth, it is the Dharma practiced by all great bodhisattvas, and it is therefore called great. Ninth, among the multitude of practices it is the most supreme, without surpass, and it is therefore called great. Tenth, having faith in it brings great merit, and slandering it incurs great sin, and it is therefore called great. These ten meanings: some are comprehensively based on conditions, and some fully encompass the two wisdoms; one may assign them according to their sense. Question: Does prajñā get the name 'great' in dependence on the small, or without dependence on the small? Answer: It has both meanings. First, in dependence on the small wisdom of the two vehicles, it is therefore called great. Question: The two vehicles are small wisdom, and the bodhisattva is great wisdom. The two vehicles have small prajñā, and the bodhisattva has great prajñā. Why is it said that prajñā does not belong to the two vehicles? Is it named the aids to the path in the minds of the two vehicles? Answer: Lecturers do not understand its purport and become stuck upon these words. The treatise says, "Prajñā does not belong to the two vehicles"—this is the mahāprajñā that is the great wisdom of the bodhisattva, so it does not belong to the two vehicles; it does not mean that persons of the two vehicles have no emptiness wisdom. Second, regarding it being called great without dependence on the small: the essential nature of prajñā is great, so it is said to not depend on the small. It is not like the wisdom of the two vehicles, which, compared to ordinary people, is great, but viewed in relation to the bodhisattva, is small. Question: The bodhisattva, compared to the two vehicles, is great, but viewed in relation to the Buddha, prajñā is small; thus in the mind of the Buddha it changes its name to sarvajña. How can you say its essential nature is great? Answer: Prajñā is the culmination in the causal stage, its efficacy residing in the ten stages; therefore it is called great, without being compared to the Buddha. Furthermore, prajñā applies to both cause and fruit; prajñā on the fruit ground is the most supreme and unsurpassable, so its essential nature is great. As Master [Kumāra]jīva said: "Sarvaprajñā is venerable prajñā." Again, speaking of 'greatness transcending relativity': getting the name 'great' in dependence on the small, although transcending the small, still does not transcend the great, and since it can be reached by words and names, it is not genuine greatness; only when both greatness and smallness are transcended is it genuine greatness. Question: What text proves this? Answer: The title says Mahāprajñā: prajñā is so deep and momentous that 'wisdom' cannot adequately name it; likewise mahā is so deep and momentous that 'great' cannot adequately name it. This is precisely the proof. Furthermore, the chapter on 'Illumination' says, "Not making great or small is called mahā"—this again is excellent proof. Question: If both greatness and smallness are transcended, it can be called transcending greatness. Now, being neither great nor small, it is praised as great, which returns to depending on the small; how can it be called transcending relativity? Answer: This 'great' transcends small and transcends great, and is therefore called transcending relativity. Question now: If transcending great and transcending small is called great, then depending on great and depending on small are both called small; this is the mutual relativity of great and small, so how can there be a greatness transcending relativity? Answer: Looked at from the preceding perspective, it is transcendent; observed from the subsequent perspective, it is relative; the meanings do not conflict. Question: What is the difference between the greatness of prajñā and the greatness of nirvāṇa? Answer: Speaking comprehensively, there is no difference. Therefore the treatise says, "If one contemplates the Buddha, prajñā, and nirvāṇa in accord with the Dharma, these three are one single mark." The illumination of nirvāṇa is itself prajñā; the cessation of prajñā is itself nirvāṇa. In nirvāṇa, there being no defilement that is not exhausted is called liberation; there being no object that is not illuminated is called prajñā; the true culmination that can serve as a standard is called the dharmakāya. Therefore, possessing the three virtues, it is called nirvāṇa. Prajñā is itself nirvāṇa, and therefore it also possesses the three virtues. Yet prajñā is merely wisdom, and is thus called distinct; nirvāṇa is also merely the fruit, and the fruit is also distinct. Question: Prajñā is one virtue among the three virtues of nirvāṇa; should it also be that nirvāṇa is one virtue among the three virtues of prajñā? Answer: It can also be taken as analogous. Using the distinctness of prajñā completes nirvāṇa, and taking the distinctness of nirvāṇa also completes prajñā. The distinctness of prajñā is wisdom, and the distinctness of nirvāṇa is called extinction; therefore the fruitional virtue of nirvāṇa and the prajñā of the Buddha ground each possess both the general and the distinct. Question: The three virtues of liberation constitute nirvāṇa; why is it not said that the three virtues constitute prajñā? Answer: Whatever single virtue is adduced, it subsumes all virtues; why would it not be so? But teachings arise, each with its own reason: the arising of the Nirvāṇa [teaching] was specifically to refute the Lesser Vehicle's ash-and-extinction as not possessing the three virtues, and to praise the Great Nirvāṇa as possessing the three virtues. The arising of the prajñā teaching specifically clarifies causal practice, refuting the two vehicles as lacking the two wisdoms, and distinguishing the bodhisattva as possessing the provisional and the real. Question: Why is nirvāṇa based on the fruit, while prajñā is based on the cause? Answer: Nirvāṇa is called extinction and crossing over. 'Extinction and crossing over' means that great afflictions are eternally extinguished and one transcends the four torrents. This name must refer to the ultimate, and is therefore approached from the gate of the fruit. Prajñā is called wisdom; wisdom is not yet completely determined, so it is appropriate to base it on the cause.

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淨名玄論 — Classical Chinese