維摩經義疏 1.10

1.10

同異門第六。問曰：義宗已盛談不二，未詳不二是何等法？答：有人言：不二法門即真諦理也（此成實論師所用也）。有人言：不二法門謂實相般若（實相是真諦理，能生般若，故名般若。此智度論師之所立也）。有人言：不二法門，阿梨耶識（此云無沒識。此舊十地論師之所用也）。有人言：不二法門即阿摩羅識（此云無垢識。攝大乘論師真諦三藏之所用也）。四宗之內，初二約境、後兩據心。雖識境義殊，而同超四句，故「釋迦掩室於摩竭、淨名杜口於毘耶，斯皆理為神御，故口以之而默。豈曰無辨？辨所不能言也。」今先總問四宗、次別開十句。眾師既云理不可言，為有不可言之理、為無此理乎？若有斯理，即是有門，何名絕四？若無此理，則智無所會，凡不可隔，聖何由成？極臆論壞。二門之內，謂有理也。又終有此理，而不說其有無。犢子計我有理存焉，竟復何異？（注犢子計我，存第五不可說五藏者，三世為三、無為是四、第五非有為非無為）又若真不可說，俗諦則有言，有言之俗不可無言、無說之真不可令說。即成兩執，何名不二？救曰：蓋是未悉義宗，故興斯問耳。今明俗雖可說，即真不可說；真雖不可說，即俗之可說。故相即義成，不二便立（此成實眾師同作此釋）。難曰：請問相即，為是一體、為二體耳？如其一體，即真俗互同。以俗即真，真絕俗亦絕；以真即俗，俗言真亦言。若真絕俗不絕；即俗不即於真；若俗言真不言，即真不即於俗。以二難互徵，即進退皆屈，斯一體義壞。若真俗異體，便不相即；如其相即，則異體不成。斯乃二路並窮，辭理俱喪。以此詳之，真俗不立。真俗不立，則一切義崩（吉藏謹依龍樹、提婆二大士之難。末學謂非深責者，謗四依人也）。次別開十門，以辨得失。義匠並云：道超四句：故至聖以之沖默。今宜就絕四：詳其是非。第一天竺外道九十六師，略而言之不出四種：第一迦毘羅執有、第二富蘭那計無、第三迦羅鳩馱明亦有亦無、第四長爪梵志立非有非無（迦毘羅翻為金頭仙人。富蘭那是六師之初首。迦羅鳩馱，六師之第五。長爪梵志是舍利弗舅，以勤學不暇剪爪，時人以此目之也）。若爾者，並墮四門，無絕四之義，故無不二之道。二佛滅度後，五百論師諸部異宗，亦不出四句。如犢子計有我有法，名為有見。方廣執無我無法，名為無見。薩婆多謂無我有法，即亦有亦無。訶梨云此俗諦有我有法故非無，真諦無我無法故非有。如此諸部皆墮四門，無絕四之義，故無不二之道。既無不二之道，亦無有二，理教俱失（外國名波麁富羅，此云犢子，佛滅三百年出，執有人法義。薩婆多，翻為一切有，執三世是有，所以為名也。又方廣是大乘經名，以學大乘，從法為名也）。又薩婆多部，不得法空，計有塵有識。二方廣道人，執邪無之義，明無識無塵。三心無之論，計有塵無識（肇公《不真空論》辨之云「心無者，無心於萬物，萬物未嘗無。」肇詳之曰「此得在於神靜，而失在物虛也」）。四唯識之義，執無塵有識。如斯等說，亦墮四門，故無有不二。問：有塵有識，是毘曇執有之見。無塵無識，方廣邪無之說。無識有塵，人師自心，不經聖口。然此三可得彈呵。唯識之義者，蓋是方等之宏宗、折徵之淵致，詎可非之？答：考天親唯識之意者，蓋是借心以忘境、境忘不存心，蕭然無寄，理自玄會，非謂塵為橫計、心是實有。末學不達其旨，須斥之。故咎在門人，非天親之過矣。次復論四句。一者有有有無，名之為有。二者無有無無，目之為無。三者亦有有有無亦無有無無，為亦有亦無。四者非有有有無非無有無無，名非有非無。次明重複四句。總上複明四句，皆名為有。所以然者，有此四句，故悉名為有。次無此四句，名之為無。亦有四句亦無四句，為亦有亦無。非有四句非無四句，為非有非無。次明竪深四句。初階絕單四句，次門絕複四句，第三絕重複四句。雖復次第漸深，而惑者終謂窈冥之內有妙理存焉，則名為有。若無此妙理，則名為無。亦有此理亦無此理，名為亦有亦無。非有此理非無此理，為非有非無。若然者，猶墮四門之內，何有絕四之宗？故知生心動念即便是魔，若壞無所寄方為法爾。所以經云「是法不可示，言辭相寂滅」，淨名所以杜言、釋迦所以掩室者，在斯一門。次明絕四句句。絕四句句者，非理超四句名絕四句，乃明雖復洞絕而宛然四句，故名絕四句矣。問：何故明此義耶？答：稟教之徒聞上理超四句，便謂窈冥洞絕，同瘂法外道。是故今明至道雖復妙絕，而四句宛然。所以經云「不動真際而建立諸法」，豈可妙絕不能言耶？次明四句絕。前明理雖洞絕而宛然四句，今明雖說四句而常是絕言。如天女之詰身子，汝乃知解脫無言，而未悟言即解脫。故教滿十方，即是常絕。次明一句四絕，如一假有絕於四句。所以然者，假有不可定有、假有不可定無、假有不可定亦有亦無、假有不可定非有非無。故此假有絕於四句。問：何故明此義耶？答：或者聞真常無言可得絕四，未知即一假有便具四絕，故次明之。第十絕一假有，依《玄論》可明也。

Sixth, the section on sameness and difference. Question: The doctrinal traditions have already extensively expounded non-duality, but it is not yet clear what kind of dharma non-duality actually is. Answer: Someone said: "The Dharma gate of non-duality is the principle of ultimate truth" (this is what the masters of the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra maintain). Someone said: "The Dharma gate of non-duality refers to real-mark prajñā" (the real mark is the principle of ultimate truth; because it can produce prajñā, it is named prajñā. This is what the masters of the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa establish). Someone said: "The Dharma gate of non-duality is the ālayavijñāna" (here translated as the "indestructible consciousness." This is what the older masters of the Daśabhūmika-śāstra maintained). Someone said: "The Dharma gate of non-duality is the amalavijñāna" (here translated as the "immaculate consciousness." This is what the masters of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, the Tripiṭaka Master Paramārtha, maintained). Within these four tenets, the first two pertain to the object, and the latter two are based on the mind. Although the meanings of consciousness and object are different, they equally transcend the four propositions; therefore, "Śākyamuni shut himself in his room in Magadha, and Jingming closed his mouth in Vaiśālī. In these cases, it was because principle spiritually guided them that their mouths remained silent because of it. How could one say they had no eloquence? It was that eloquence could not express it!"

Now, I shall first question the four tenets in general, and next separately unfold ten propositions. Since the various masters say that the principle is inexpressible, does this inexpressible principle exist, or does this principle not exist? If this principle exists, that is just the proposition of existence—how could it be called the transcendence of the four? If this principle does not exist, then wisdom has nothing to unite with; the ordinary cannot be distinguished, and how could the noble be accomplished? The theory of the ultimate heart would collapse. Within these two propositions, they maintain that there is a principle. Furthermore, they ultimately hold that this principle exists, yet they do not state whether it exists or does not exist. The Vātsīputrīyas posited that an underlying self-principle existed—in the end, what difference is there? (Note: The Vātsīputrīyas posited a self, positing it in the fifth inexpressible of the five treasuries: the three times make three, the unconditioned is the fourth, and the fifth is neither conditioned nor unconditioned.) Furthermore, if the ultimate is inexpressible while the conventional truth has words, the conventional with words cannot lack words, and the ultimate without expression cannot be made expressible. This results in two attachments—how could it be called non-dual?

They defend it, saying: "It is only because you do not yet understand our doctrinal tenet that you raise this objection. Now we clarify that although the conventional can be spoken of, it is identical to the ultimate which is inexpressible; although the ultimate is inexpressible, it is identical to the conventional which can be spoken of. Therefore, the meaning of mutual identity is established, and non-duality is thereby set up" (the various masters of the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra all make this explanation).

Objection: May I ask whether this mutual identity means they are of one substance, or of two substances? If they are of one substance, then the ultimate and the conventional are mutually identical. Taking the conventional as identical to the ultimate, when the ultimate is transcended, the conventional is also transcended; taking the ultimate as identical to the conventional, when the conventional is spoken, the ultimate is also spoken. If the ultimate is transcended but the conventional is not transcended, then the conventional is not identical to the ultimate; if the conventional is spoken but the ultimate is not spoken, then the ultimate is not identical to the conventional. Challenging them mutually with these two objections, they are defeated whether advancing or retreating; thus the doctrine of a single substance collapses. If the ultimate and the conventional are of different substances, then they are not mutually identical; if they are mutually identical, then different substances are not established. Thus both paths are exhausted, and both words and principle are lost. Examining it with this, the ultimate and the conventional cannot be established. If the ultimate and the conventional are not established, then all doctrines collapse. (Jizang respectfully relies on the challenges of the two great beings Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva. Later students who claim these are not profound refutations are slandering the persons of the four refuges.)

Next, ten gates are opened separately to distinguish gains and losses. The master craftsmen of doctrine all say: "The Way transcends the four propositions; therefore the Supreme Sage acted with profound silence." Now we should examine their correctness and error based on the transcendence of the four.

First, the ninety-six non-Buddhist teachers of India, to put it briefly, do not go beyond four kinds: first, Kapila clings to existence; second, Pūraṇa posits non-existence; third, Kakuda clarifies both existence and non-existence; fourth, the Long-nailed Wanderer establishes neither existence nor non-existence. (Kapila translates as the "Golden-Headed Immortal." Pūraṇa is the first of the six teachers. Kakuda is the fifth of the six teachers. The Long-nailed Wanderer is Śāriputra's maternal uncle; because he was so diligent in study he had no leisure to trim his nails, people of the time named him thus.) If that is so, they all fall into the four propositions, lacking the meaning of transcending the four; thus they lack the Way of non-duality.

Second, after the Buddha's parinirvāṇa, the diverse tenets of the five hundred treatise masters and various sects also did not go beyond the four propositions. For instance, the Vātsīputrīyas posited that there is a self and there are dharmas, which is called the view of existence. The Fangguang clung to the non-existence of self and the non-existence of dharmas, which is called the view of non-existence. The Sarvāstivādins maintained that there is no self but there are dharmas, which is both existence and non-existence. Harivarman said that in conventional truth there is a self and there are dharmas, hence it is not non-existent; in ultimate truth there is no self and there are no dharmas, hence it is not existent. Such various sects all fall into the four propositions, lacking the meaning of transcending the four, and thus lack the Way of non-duality. Since they lack the Way of non-duality, neither do they have duality; both principle and teaching are lost. (The foreign name is Vātsīputra, here translated as "Calf-son"; he appeared three hundred years after the Buddha's nirvāṇa, clinging to the doctrine of a person and dharmas. Sarvāstivāda translates as "all exists"; clinging to the three times as existing is the reason for the name. Also, Fangguang is the name of a Mahāyāna sūtra; because they studied Mahāyāna, they took their name from the teaching.)

Furthermore, the Sarvāstivāda school did not attain the emptiness of dharmas, positing that there are dusts [sense objects] and there is consciousness. Second, the Fangguang monks clung to the meaning of perverse non-existence, clarifying that there is neither consciousness nor dusts. Third, the doctrine of mental non-existence posited that there are dusts but no consciousness. (Master Sengzhao, distinguishing it in his Treatise on Emptiness of the Non-Absolute, said: "As for 'mental non-existence,' they have no mind toward the ten thousand things, but the ten thousand things are not non-existent." Master Sengzhao examined it, saying: "This achieves calmness of spirit, but errs regarding the vacuity of things.") Fourth, the doctrine of consciousness-only clings to there being no dusts but having consciousness. Such assertions as these also fall into the four propositions; therefore, they do not have non-duality.

Question: Having dusts and having consciousness is the Sarvāstivādin view of clinging to existence. Lacking dusts and lacking consciousness is the perverse non-existence theory of the Fangguang. Lacking consciousness and having dusts is the human teachers' own minds, not issuing from the mouths of sages. However, these three may indeed be censured. But the doctrine of consciousness-only is the grand tenet of the vaipulya and the profound import of definitive analysis—how could one reject it?

Answer: Examining the intention of Vasubandhu's Consciousness-Only, it is borrowing the mind to forget the object, and once the object is forgotten, the mind is not retained; utterly detached with nothing to depend upon, the principle is spontaneously and mysteriously unified with. It does not mean that the dusts are an arbitrary imputation while the mind is truly existent. Later students do not comprehend this intent and must be refuted. Therefore, the fault lies with the disciples, not with Vasubandhu.

Next, we discuss the four propositions again. First, existence of existence and existence of non-existence is named existence. Second, non-existence of existence and non-existence of non-existence is called non-existence. Third, both existence of existence and existence of non-existence and non-existence of existence and non-existence of non-existence is both existence and non-existence. Fourth, neither existence of existence and existence of non-existence nor non-existence of existence and non-existence of non-existence is named neither existence nor non-existence.

Next, we clarify the duplicated four propositions. Summing up the above re-clarified four propositions, they are all named existence. Why is this so? Because these four propositions exist, they are all called existence. Next, the non-existence of these four propositions is named non-existence. Both having the four propositions and lacking the four propositions is both existence and non-existence. Neither having the four propositions nor lacking the four propositions is neither existence nor non-existence.

Next, we clarify the vertically deepened four propositions. The initial stage transcends the single four propositions; the next stage transcends the compound four propositions; the third transcends the duplicated four propositions. Although the stages gradually deepen, the deluded still ultimately maintain that within the profound and obscure a subtle principle exists, which is named existence. If this subtle principle does not exist, it is named non-existence. Both having this principle and lacking this principle is named both existence and non-existence. Neither having this principle nor lacking this principle is neither existence nor non-existence. If that is so, they still fall within the four propositions—how could there be the tenet of transcending the four? Therefore, know that the arising of a mind or the stirring of a thought is immediately Māra; only when [conceptualization] is broken with nothing to rely upon does it become truly so. Therefore the sūtra says: "This Dharma cannot be demonstrated; the characteristics of words are extinguished." Jingming's silence and Śākyamuni's shutting himself in his room lie precisely in this one gate.

Next, we clarify the proposition that transcends the four propositions. As for the proposition that transcends the four propositions, it is not that the principle transcending the four propositions is called transcending the four propositions; rather, it clarifies that although it is thoroughly transcended, the four propositions are still fully present; thus it is named the proposition that transcends the four propositions. Question: Why clarify this meaning? Answer: When practitioners who receive the teaching hear that the principle above transcends the four propositions, they immediately think of it as profound, obscure, and thoroughly severed, identical to the mute-sheep non-Buddhists. For this reason, we now clarify that although the ultimate Way is subtly transcendent, the four propositions remain fully present. Therefore the sūtra says: "Without stirring from the true limit, one establishes all dharmas." How could subtle transcendence mean one cannot speak?

Next, we clarify the transcendence of the four propositions. The previous clarified that although the principle is thoroughly transcendent, the four propositions are fully present; now we clarify that although one speaks the four propositions, words are constantly transcended. Just as the Devī interrogated Śāriputra: You only know that liberation has no words, but have not realized that words are themselves liberation. Therefore, although the teachings fill the ten directions, words are constantly transcended.

Next, we clarify the fourfold transcendence in a single proposition, just as a single provisional existence transcends the four propositions. Why is this so? Provisional existence cannot be determinately existent, provisional existence cannot be determinately non-existent, provisional existence cannot be determinately both existent and non-existent, and provisional existence cannot be determinately neither existent nor non-existent. Therefore, this provisional existence transcends the four propositions. Question: Why clarify this meaning? Answer: Deluded persons hear that the true and constant lacks words and can transcend the four, but do not know that a single provisional existence already possesses the four transcendences; therefore, we clarify it next. Tenth, transcending a single provisional existence can be understood according to the Profound Treatise.