維摩經義疏 5.3.1

5.3.1

In broad terms, to clarify the intent of the sūtra, there are generally two gates: first, the one who transforms; second, those who are transformed. The chapter "Inconceivable Liberation" discusses the teaching gate of the one who transforms; the chapter "Contemplating Sentient Beings" next clarifies those who are transformed. Furthermore, the chapter "Inconceivable Liberation" mostly clarifies provisional wisdom, and hence there is boundless wondrous function; the chapter "Contemplating Sentient Beings" mostly clarifies real wisdom, meaning that sentient beings are ultimately empty. These two wisdoms are the great cardinal principle of the sūtra, and therefore the various chapters extensively discuss these teachings. Moreover, the preceding chapter "Inquiring after Illness" states: "Because of ignorance there is craving, and thus my illness arises." This clarifies the root of the meaning of the transformer and the transformed. If one does not recognise sentient beings, one does not recognise the illness of sentient beings; if one does not recognise the illness of sentient beings, one also has not comprehended the illness of bodhisattvas. Therefore, one must properly recognise sentient beings, and then one fully understands both meanings; this explicates and develops the intent of the preceding chapter. As for what is called "contemplating sentient beings": "contemplation" is the name for discerning [the nature of] living beings. The phenomena of the five aggregates are called "multitude" (zhòng); they assemble to form a person, hence called "living/being" (shēng). Furthermore, receiving rebirth in multiple places is called "sentient being" (zhòngshēng). However, in explaining sentient beings, there is a difference between inner [Buddhist] and outer [non-Buddhist traditions]. Non-Buddhists maintain that sentient beings truly exist, and there are four views in all. The Sāṃkhyas say: "Sentient beings are identical with the aggregates." The Vaiśeṣikas say: "Sentient beings are different from the aggregates." The Nirgranthas say: "Sentient beings are both identical with and different from the aggregates." The Jñātīputras say: "Sentient beings are neither identical with nor different from the aggregates." Within Buddhist scholarship, there are three masters in all. The Vātsīputrīya school says: "Sentient beings truly exist." The Sarvāstivāda school clarifies that there are no sentient beings. Harivarman's distinction is that they exist in conventional truth, but do not exist in ultimate truth. The Tattvasiddhi-śāstra masters, adopting Harivarman's meaning, next hold three views: for example, Master Tan of Zhaoti Temple and others clarify that sentient beings have substance, have function, and have name. As Kaishan Zhizang states: "Sentient beings have no substance; they only have name and function." Master Guangzhai Fayun says: "They have neither substance nor function; there is only provisional designation." Now, in this chapter's contemplation of sentient beings, both [extremes] are avoided in this meaning: it may agree with the Vātsīputrīyas on real existence, yet also differ from the Sarvāstivādins on total nonexistence, fully as spoken in the text; hence it names the chapter. The chapter opens into two sections: first, Jingming and Mañjuśrī discuss sentient beings; second, the Devī and Śāriputra next discuss sentient beings. The first text has two parts: first, clarifying practice for transforming others; next, clarifying one's own practice. Within the practice for transforming others, first he contemplates sentient beings, and next clarifies the four immeasurables. In the first text: first is the question, next the answer. "At that time Mañjuśrī asked Vimalakīrti: 'How does a bodhisattva contemplate sentient beings?'" As for why Mañjuśrī asked: the preceding inconceivable, boundless wondrous function was merely the method for transforming sentient beings. Listeners might assume there are sentient beings who can be transformed; therefore it is now clarified that if sentient beings truly existed, the inconceivable matter would not be accomplished, and sentient beings also could not be transformed. Now, wishing to establish the transformer and the transformed, he asks about contemplating sentient beings. "Vimalakīrti said: 'Just as a magician sees the person created by magic, so does the bodhisattva contemplate sentient beings.'" This is the second [part], Jingming's answer. There are two kinds of sentient beings: if it is the arbitrary imputation of non-Buddhists, then like a thirteenth sense base or a fire without smoke, such sentient beings are ultimately nonexistent. Second are the conventionally designated sentient beings of causes and conditions; they are not truly existent: though existing, they do not exist; not existing, yet they exist. Therefore he brings up the simile of the magician observing a magical illusion: like an illusion, it exists yet does not exist, does not exist yet exists. Question: May one also contemplate conventionally designated sentient beings as ultimately empty like the thirteenth sense base? Answer: Although conventional designations exist, they are ultimately nonexistent; in terms of the meaning of nonexistence, one may also use this as an analogy. However, although sentient beings are ultimately nonexistent, they appear vividly as existent, whereas the simile of the thirteenth sense base cannot be categorized in that way; therefore it is not a complete simile. Since in this chapter the contemplation of sentient beings is like a magical illusion, the preceding inconceivable matters down to the bodhisattva's illness are all likewise like a magical illusion. "'Like a wise person seeing the moon in water; like seeing the reflection of one's face in a mirror; like a mirage in the heat; like the echo of a shout; like clouds in the sky; like foam gathered on water; like bubbles upon water; like the firmness of a plantain tree; like a flash of lightning abiding long; like a fifth great element; like a sixth aggregate; like a seventh sense faculty; like a thirteenth sense base; like a nineteenth realm—so does the bodhisattva contemplate sentient beings.'" Like the image in a mirror, it is neither from itself nor from another, nor does it exist without a cause: if it existed from itself, it should not depend on the mirror; if it existed from another, it would not arise relying on the face; if it were without a cause, it would not rely on mirror or face. If one says it does not exist at all, yet the image appears vividly. The marks of sentient beings are analogous to this. "'Like matter in the formless realm; like the sprout of scorched grain; like the view of self of a srotāpanna; like an anāgāmin entering the womb; like the three poisons of an arhat; like the greed, anger, and violation of precepts of a bodhisattva who has attained forbearance; like the residual defilements of a Buddha; like a blind person seeing sights; like inhalation and exhalation in the absorption of cessation; like the tracks of a bird in the sky; like the child of a barren woman; like the defilements of an emanated person; like that which was seen in a dream after having awakened; like receiving a body after having passed into extinction; like a fire without smoke—so does the bodhisattva contemplate sentient beings.'" These various similes are all of one kind, clarifying emptiness; but because those who cling to existence are numerous, he enumerates them exhaustively. As for "like matter in the formless realm": in the Mahāyāna, the formless realm does have matter, but to speak of "formless" borrows the Hīnayāna meaning as a simile. Moreover, the Mahāyāna clarifies that in the higher realms there is no coarse matter, and borrows the absence of coarse matter as a simile; hence it merely speaks of "formless". According to the Abhidharma, as for "like an anāgāmin entering the womb": although an anāgāmin may experience a temporary regression, they definitely do not pass through rebirth [in the desire realm], and therefore do not enter a womb of the desire realm. As for "like the greed, anger, and violation of precepts of a bodhisattva who has attained forbearance": greed, anger, and violation of precepts are coarse and heavy defilements. The Da zhidu lun states: "When a bodhisattva attains the forbearance of the non-arising of dharmas, their defilements are purified, and there are only residual traces." Now this borrows the absence of active defilements as a simile. As for "like inhalation and exhalation in the absorption of cessation": the mind races and stirs within, and the breath exhales and inhales without; since mental ideation is ceased, the breath has neither exhalation nor inhalation. "Mañjuśrī said: 'If the bodhisattva makes such a contemplation, how is loving-kindness to be practiced?'" This is the second [part], next clarifying the four immeasurables. Earlier, contemplating that sentient beings are empty is wisdom; now, clarifying the four immeasurables is what is called merit. Moreover, the preceding was prajñā, while now he clarifies great compassion: these are the two paths of emptiness and compassion. The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā states: "When a bodhisattva abides in two dharmas, Māra cannot destroy them: first, knowing that all dharmas are empty; second, not abandoning sentient beings." With regard to clarifying the four immeasurables, there are four sections: now first he distinguishes loving-kindness, first questioning, then answering. The intent of the question says: loving-kindness originally gives joy to sentient beings; if there are no sentient beings, on what is the mind of loving-kindness conditioned? Furthermore, since there are no sentient beings, there is also no bodhisattva.