說無垢稱經疏 1.15

1.15

二、經之宗緒者，此方先德依現所有經論義旨，總立四宗：一立性宗。成立三科法皆有體，薩婆多部是，《迦延》、《雜心》、《婆沙》之類。二破性宗。諸法有相，都無實性。破前立性，《成實論》是。三破相宗。非但性空，諸法相狀亦非實有，《般若》等經，《中》、《百》等是。四顯實宗。明一切法真實道理，隨其所應有空有有，《涅槃》、《花嚴》、《楞伽》等是。若其經論唯有爾許，可定四宗。只如舊《阿含經》云「舍利弗入涅槃時，無色界天淚下，如春細雨。」大眾部經，何宗所攝？《梵網六十二見經》并《舍利弗阿毘曇》，正量部教。《三彌帝論》，上座部論。如是等經論，並非四宗，何得唯言總有四宗？今依新翻經論，總依諸教，教類有三；以理標宗，宗乃有八。教類三者，《解深密經》第二卷中，世尊廣為勝義生菩薩，依遍計所執體相無故，說相無自性性；性依他起上無遍計所執自然生故，說生無自性性；依圓成實上無遍計所執故，說勝義無自性性。說三無性，皆依無於遍計所執。已勝義生、深生領解，廣說世間毘濕縛藥、雜彩畫地、熟蘇虛空諸譬喻已，世尊讚歎善解所說。勝義生菩薩復白佛言：「世尊初於一時，在波羅痆斯仙人墮處施鹿林中，唯為發趣聲聞乘者，以四諦相轉正法輪。雖是甚奇甚為希有，一切世間諸天人等，先無有能如法轉者。而於彼時所轉法輪，有上有容，是未了義，是諸諍論安足處所。世尊在昔第二時中，唯為發趣修大乘者，依一切法皆無自性、無生無滅、本來寂靜、自性涅槃，以隱密相轉正法輪。雖更希奇甚為希有，而於彼時所轉法輪，亦是有上、有所容受，猶未了義，亦諸諍論安足處所。世尊于今第三時中，普為發趣一切乘者，依一切法皆無自性、無生無滅、本來寂靜、自性涅槃、無自性性，以顯了相轉正法輪，第一甚奇、最為希有。于今世尊所轉法輪，無上無容，是真了義，非諸諍論安足處所。」即是《金光明經》中說轉、照、持三種法輪。世尊初說三乘同行四諦有教，名轉法輪，以十二行相獨得轉名。第二時說大乘獨行空理之教，照破有故，名照法輪。第三時說遣所執空、存二性有，三乘之人皆可修持，名持法輪。亦即《涅槃經》中「如有醫師，初令服乳，而除於病。因服乳故，國人多死。別醫諫王，總教斷乳，國人並差。後王有疾，醫人更藥，令和乳服。王責問之，醫人具說，有病宜服乳、有病不宜服，今病宜和乳，故無有失。」亦即瑜伽三時教也。雖知一雨普潤，教實無差，隨對根機遂成隱顯。教既隱顯，偏說空有，非正中道；中道之教，所說有空無隱顯故。雖此引文未別屬教何等，是此三時教也。一唯說法有宗，即《阿含》等初時之教，逗彼小機，破於我執，說無有情我，但有法因故。雖二十部種種異執，初逗小機，唯說法有。二唯說法空宗，即《般若》等第二時教，逗彼大機，破於法執，說一切法本空性故。三雙遮有空執並說有空宗，即《花嚴》、《深密》、《涅槃》、《法花》、《楞伽》、《厚嚴》、《勝鬘》等是。昔執所執我法俱有，有為無為一切皆空；今說所執我法俱無，有為無為二種皆有，故有空雙遮而空有並說。准理配經，二師別引，即第二第三時教也。中百等師多引唯是說空之教。今解不然，正中道教以理據宗，宗乃有八：一、我法俱有宗，謂犢子部等，彼說我法二種俱有，立三聚法，一有為聚、二無為聚、三非二聚，前二聚法、第三聚我。又立五德藏，一過去、二未來、三現在、四無為、五不可說，此即是我，不可說是有為無為故。二、有法無我宗，謂薩婆多等，彼說諸法二種所攝，一名、二色；或四所攝，謂去、來、今及無為法；或五所攝，一心、二心所、三色、四不相應、五無為。故一切法皆悉實有。三、法無去來宗，謂大眾部等，說有現在及無為法，過去未來體用無故。四、現通假實宗，謂說假部等，彼說無去來世，現在世中諸法，在蘊可實、在界處假，隨應諸法假實不定。《成實論》等經部別師，亦即此類。五、俗妄真實宗，謂說出世部等，世俗皆假，以虛妄故；出世法實，非虛妄故。六、諸法但名宗，謂一說部，一切我法唯有假名，都無體故。七、勝義皆空宗，謂清辨等，明說空經以為了義，說一切法世俗可有、勝義皆空。八、應理圓實宗，謂護法等，弘暢《花嚴》、《深密》等經，雖說二諦，隨其所應，具有空理，圓妙無闕，實殊勝故。今此經非前六宗，後二唯是大乘所說，故知通是二宗所攝。若依初大乘清辨等義，此經雖明二諦之義，依勝義諦以空為宗，所以十大弟子皆以空理而對詰之，彼詞皆屈。四大菩薩亦以真如空理而徵，皆云不能對揚理辨。吉祥問疾，先空方丈。又言「諸佛國土一切皆空」，空其分別，真空亦空。又〈觀眾生品〉中，譬如幻師見所幻事，菩薩觀眾生為若此，乃至如無烟之火等。是故此經雖具談二諦，勝義深故以為義主，故以空為宗。依後大乘護法等義，雖說二諦，世俗諦有四，通空及有；勝義諦有四，唯有非空，空者無也。遍計所執，唯妄執有，體實空無，故非勝義。二諦皆有四重不同。世俗諦四者：一、世間所成。法體未必有，一切世間共所言說、執之有故，即實我法，瓶盆等是。二、道理所成。世間有情有尋思者，所說道理體用俱有，即蘊處界、有無為法。三、證得所成。世間學者方便修學，除惡務善，證聖果故，即四諦理等。四、真義所成。世間學者既修學已，以此殊妙為所證得，即二空真如。此四之中，初一體空、後三體有。勝義四者：一、世間所成。諸有學者、世間言說，以此為有，即蘊處界、有為無為法。二、道理所成。即諸學者共立道理，四諦理等。三、證得所成。諸有學者，以此方便能證聖果，謂二空如。四、真義所成。諸有學者既修學已，以此深妙為所證得，廢詮談旨。一真法界。論其二諦，並通人法。中智所知名世俗諦、上智所知名勝義諦，又下劣道理名世俗諦、上勝道理名勝義諦。是故二諦各有四重，依人、依法、道理淺深、智境麁細，以分差別。而此經一部，多說初世俗諦，故〈序品〉云「無我造無受者。」〈聲聞品〉云「法無眾生，離眾生垢故。」〈菩薩品〉云「假名是菩提，名字空故。」〈問疾品〉云「又此病起，皆由著我。是故於我不應生著。既知病本，即除我相及眾生想，當起法想。應作是念：但以眾法合成此身，起唯法起、滅唯法滅。乃至廣說，為滅法想，當作是念：此法想者亦是顛倒，顛倒者即是大患，我應離之。云何？離我離我所。」乃至諸品皆為說我法空，初離彼分別。後三世俗，即前三勝義，更不別明。明勝義諦中有四：一因緣法門、二唯識法門、三無相法門、四真如法門。因緣法門者，〈序品〉云「待因緣故諸法立，善惡之業亦不亡。」〈方便品〉云「是四大種所合成身，無常無強。如來法身，無量善法共所集成。乃至欲得如是身者，當發阿耨多羅三藐三菩提心。」〈問疾品〉云「居士！是疾何所因起？維摩詰言：『從癡有愛，即我病生。又以一切眾生病故，是故我病。』」前答病者，生死因緣癡為本故。後答病者，出世因緣以大慈悲而為本故。又「有疾菩薩應作是念：今我此病，皆從前世妄想顛倒諸煩惱生，四大合故假名為身。」如是等文，並說因緣之法。唯識法門者，〈序品〉中云「直心是菩薩淨土，深心大乘心是菩薩淨土。乃至廣說，隨其心淨即佛土淨。」所以心垢故佛土垢、心淨故佛土淨。〈聲聞品〉中，如佛所說「心垢故眾生垢，心淨故眾生淨。」此等諸文，並說唯識之法。無相法門者，〈聲聞品〉中云「法常寂然，滅諸相故。法離於相，無所緣故。謗諸佛、毀於法、不入眾數，終不得滅度。汝若如是，乃可取食。乃至廣說，一切言說不離於相，至於智者不著文字故無所懼。文字性離，無有文字是則解脫。解脫相者，即諸法也。」如是等文，並說無相之法。真如法門者，〈序品〉中云「能善分別諸法相，於第一義而不動。」〈聲聞品〉中云「若能以食平等性入一切法平等性，以一切法平等性入食平等性，乃可取食。」又「無以生滅心行說實相法，諸法畢竟不生不滅是無常義。」〈菩薩品〉中「一切眾生皆如也，一切法亦如也，眾賢聖亦如也，至於彌勒亦如也。夫如者，不一不異。」又〈觀眾生品〉云「又問：顛倒想孰為本？答曰：無住為本。又問：無住孰為本？答曰：無住則無本。從無住本，立一切法。」故知真如最為深極。又〈不二法門品〉中，三十三大士顯不二法門，三十一菩薩說無差別之相，以為入不二法門，皆以無相破於相故，並是第三無相法門，義猶麁著。其妙吉祥，雖以無言無說無示離諸問答，為入不二法門，亦以真如破無言說以詮顯之，猶非深極，依詮顯故，亦即第三無相法門，第三勝義證得所攝。唯有無垢稱默然無言，正智正證真如之妙，是為真如法門，深復深也。如此等文，並說真如法門。因緣事法最為麁顯；唯識理觀，其次細微，說有內心之相狀故；無相通觀無差別相，其次更細，仍有無相當心，未為正證；唯有真如法門最為深妙，心境冥、智神會、達正理、契真智、滅障習，立一切法，故最第一。雖說四門，不相違返，一一法門攝一切盡。且因緣中亦有唯識，唯識亦是因緣法故。亦有無相，所緣無相不離因緣。真如之體亦是因緣，由因緣攝一切法故。乃至真如中，與一切法不一不異，隨應不違前三門義。今隨事相麁細不同，說此四種，非定各別。今此經中顯中世俗諦我法皆空，令不執著。說有因緣之法，斷染取淨，顯其唯識。明妄境非真，證唯心之理、彰無相之旨。斷分別差別之相，說真如之理，令起智證。寄詮說四，事理可殊；廢旨談詮，一切無別。至下經中，當隨別配。此中兩宗俱釋經義。初之大乘，總說二諦；後之大乘，別陳二諦。前以三無性為真、三性為俗；後以三無性為俗、三性為真。宗說有空，理不同故。

Second, concerning the main tenets and lineage of the sūtra: past masters of this land established four schools in general, based on the doctrines of the sūtras and treatises then available. First, the school asserting real natures [Lixing Zong], which establishes that the dharmas of the three categories (aggregates, elements, and bases) all possess intrinsic substance; this is the Sarvāstivāda school, exemplified by works such as Kātyāyanīputra's [Jñānaprasthāna], the Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya, and the Mahāvibhāṣā. Second, the school refuting real natures [Poxing Zong], which asserts that although dharmas possess marks, they entirely lack real intrinsic natures, thereby refuting the previous assertion of real natures; this is exemplified by the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra. Third, the school refuting marks [Poxiang Zong], which asserts not only that intrinsic natures are empty, but that the phenomenal marks of all dharmas are likewise not truly existent; this is exemplified by sūtras such as the Prajñāpāramitā and treatises such as the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā and Śata-śāstra. Fourth, the school revealing the real [Xianshi Zong], which elucidates the true principle of all dharmas, showing them to be empty or existent according as appropriate; this is exemplified by works such as the Nirvāṇa, Avataṃsaka, and Laṅkāvatāra sūtras. If sūtras and treatises were limited only to these, then the four schools could indeed be fixed. Yet consider the older Āgama sūtras, which say that when Śāriputra entered nirvāṇa, the devas of the formless realm shed tears like fine spring rain: to which school does this Mahāsāṃghika scripture belong? The *Brahmajāla-sūtra on the Sixty-Two Views and the Śāriputrābhidharma are teachings of the Saṃmatīya school, and the Saṃmitīya-śāstra is a treatise of the Sthavira school. Since such sūtras and treatises are not included among the four schools, how can one claim that there are only four schools in total?

Now, relying on newly translated sūtras and treatises, and taking all teachings comprehensively into account, the classifications of the teaching are three; while distinguishing tenets on the basis of principle, there are eight schools.

Concerning the three classifications of the teaching: in the second fascicle of the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra, the Bhagavat explained extensively to the Bodhisattva Paramārthasamudgata that, because the imputed nature (parikalpita-svabhāva) lacks substantial marks, he taught the non-self-nature of marks (lakṣaṇa-niḥsvabhāvatā); because on the dependent nature (paratantra-svabhāva) there is no spontaneous generation characterized by the imputed nature, he taught the non-self-nature of production (utpatti-niḥsvabhāvatā); and because on the consummate nature (pariniṣpanna-svabhāva) the imputed nature is absent, he taught the ultimate non-self-nature (paramārtha-niḥsvabhāvatā). Teaching the three kinds of non-self-nature is entirely based on the absence of the imputed nature. After Paramārthasamudgata had deeply understood and exhaustively set forth the analogies of the universal medicine (viśva-bhaiṣajya) in the world, the painted surface, clarified butter, and space, the Bhagavat praised his skillful understanding of what had been spoken. Bodhisattva Paramārthasamudgata then further addressed the Buddha, saying: "The Bhagavat, at first during the first period, while dwelling in Vārāṇasī at the Deer Park in Ṛṣipatana, turned the wheel of the true Dharma through the characteristics of the four noble truths solely for those who had set out on the Śrāvaka vehicle. Although this was exceedingly marvelous and most extraordinary—such that previously no one among all the devas, humans, and others in the world was able to turn it in accordance with the Dharma—the wheel of the Dharma turned at that time was surpassable, had room for improvement, was of provisional meaning (neyārtha), and was a ground for disputes. In the past, during the second period, the Bhagavat, solely for those who had set out to practice the Mahāyāna, turned the wheel of the true Dharma through hidden characteristics, relying on the teaching that all dharmas lack self-nature, are without production and without cessation, are fundamentally tranquil, and are inherently in nirvāṇa. Although this was even more marvelous and exceedingly extraordinary, the wheel of the Dharma turned at that time was likewise surpassable, had room for improvement, was still of provisional meaning, and was a ground for disputes. Now, during the third period, the Bhagavat, universally for those who have set out on all vehicles, has turned the wheel of the true Dharma through explicit characteristics, relying on the teaching that all dharmas lack self-nature, are without production and without cessation, are fundamentally tranquil, are inherently in nirvāṇa, and possess the non-self-nature of natures—this is foremost, exceedingly marvelous, and most extraordinary. The wheel of the Dharma turned by the Bhagavat at present is unsurpassable, leaves no room for improvement, is of truly definitive meaning (nītārtha), and is not a ground for disputes."

These are the three wheels of the Dharma spoken of in the Suvarṇaprabhāsa-sūtra: turning, illuminating, and upholding. When the Bhagavat first spoke the teaching of the existence of the four noble truths practiced in common by the three vehicles, this was called the wheel of turning, as the twelve aspects alone earned the designation of 'turning'. In the second period, he spoke the teaching of the principle of emptiness practiced exclusively by the Mahāyāna, which was called the wheel of illuminating because it illumines and dispels [the clinging to] existence. In the third period, he spoke of eliminating imputed emptiness while preserving the existence of the two natures (dependent and consummate), which persons of all three vehicles can cultivate and uphold; hence it is called the wheel of upholding. This also corresponds to the passage in the Nirvāṇa-sūtra: "It is like a physician who first ordered the drinking of milk to cure an illness. Because they drank milk, many people in the country died. Another physician admonished the king and ordered everyone to stop drinking milk entirely, whereupon the people all recovered. Later, when the king fell ill, the physician changed the medicine and had it taken with milk. When the king questioned him reproachfully, the physician explained in detail that for certain illnesses milk was suitable, while for other illnesses it was unsuitable; since milk was suitable for the current illness, there was no fault." This is also the three periods of teaching according to the Yogācāra. Although we know that a single rain moistens everywhere and the teaching is fundamentally undifferentiated, according to the varying capacities of beings it becomes either hidden or explicit. When a teaching is hidden or explicit, biased toward asserting either emptiness or existence, it is not the true Middle Way; for in the teaching of the Middle Way, its exposition of existence and emptiness is neither hidden nor explicit. Although these cited passages have not yet been categorized into specific doctrines, these are the teachings of the three periods.

First is the school teaching only the existence of dharmas. This is the teaching of the first period, such as the Āgamas, which adapts to those of lesser capacity to break their self-grasping by explaining that there is no personal self (pudgala-ātman) and that only causal dharmas exist. Although the twenty schools have various distinct tenets, in initially adapting to those of lesser capacity, they teach only the existence of dharmas.

Second is the school teaching only the emptiness of dharmas. This is the teaching of the second period, such as the Prajñāpāramitā, which adapts to those of greater capacity to break their grasping at dharmas by explaining that all dharmas are fundamentally empty in nature.

Third is the school both refuting attachment to existence and emptiness and expounding both existence and emptiness. This is exemplified by the Avataṃsaka, Saṃdhinirmocana, Nirvāṇa, Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, Laṅkāvatāra, Ghanavyūha, and Śrīmālādevī sūtras. Formerly, beings clung to both the imputed self and dharmas as existent, and regarded all conditioned and unconditioned dharmas as empty; now it is taught that the imputed self and dharmas are both non-existent, while conditioned and unconditioned dharmas both exist. Thus, existence and emptiness are both negated, yet emptiness and existence are both expounded. Applying these to the sūtras according to principle, the two masters cited them differently—namely, the teachings of the second and third periods. Masters of the Madhyamaka and Śata-śāstras mostly cite only the teachings of emptiness. Our present understanding is not like that: the teaching of the true Middle Way bases its tenets on principle, and thus there are eight schools:

1. The school asserting that both self and dharmas exist, meaning the Vātsīputrīyas and others. They assert that both self and dharmas exist, establishing three aggregates of dharmas: first, the aggregate of conditioned things; second, the aggregate of unconditioned things; and third, the aggregate of that which is neither. The first two aggregates are dharmas, and the third aggregate is the self. They also establish five receptacles of virtue: past, future, present, unconditioned, and ineffable—the ineffable being the self, because it cannot be spoken of as either conditioned or unconditioned.

2. The school asserting that dharmas exist but there is no self, meaning the Sarvāstivādins and others. They say that all dharmas are subsumed under two categories: name and form; or subsumed under four: past, future, present, and unconditioned dharmas; or subsumed under five: mind, mental factors, form, non-concurrent formations, and unconditioned dharmas. Therefore, all dharmas are genuinely existent.

3. The school asserting that dharmas lack past and future, meaning the Mahāsāṃghikas and others. They assert that the present and unconditioned dharmas exist, while past and future lack substance and function.

4. The school asserting that the present contains both provisional and real, meaning the Prajñaptivādins and others. They say that past and future times do not exist; among dharmas in the present time, they can be real within the aggregates, but provisional within the elements and sense bases, being provisionally or substantially real as appropriate to the dharmas. The Sautrāntika masters of the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra and others also belong to this class.

5. The school asserting that conventional truth is false and supramundane truth is real, meaning the Lokottaravādins and others. Conventional dharmas are all provisional because they are false; supramundane dharmas are real because they are not false.

6. The school asserting that all dharmas are merely nominal, meaning the Ekavyāvahārikas. All self and dharmas are merely nominal designations, entirely devoid of intrinsic substance.

7. The school asserting that all is empty in ultimate truth, meaning Bhāviveka and others. They elucidate the sūtras teaching emptiness as being of definitive meaning, asserting that all dharmas may exist conventionally, but in the ultimate truth all are empty.

8. The school according with principle, consummate and real, meaning Dharmapāla and others. They propagate and clarify sūtras such as the Avataṃsaka and Saṃdhinirmocana. Although they teach the two truths, as appropriate they fully possess the principle of emptiness; being consummately subtle without omission, it is truly supreme.

Now, this sūtra does not belong to the first six schools, and the latter two are spoken solely within the Mahāyāna; therefore, we know that it is subsumed by both of these two schools. If we follow the doctrine of the first Mahāyāna [school] of Bhāviveka and others, although this sūtra elucidates the meaning of the two truths, it takes emptiness as its core tenet based on ultimate truth. This is why the ten great disciples were all interrogated with the principle of emptiness and their words were all refuted, and the four great Bodhisattvas were also cross-examined with the principle of emptiness in tathatā and all said they were unable to respond with doctrinal eloquence. When Mañjuśrī inquired about the illness, he first emptied the ten-foot-square chamber. Furthermore, it says: "All Buddha-lands are entirely empty"—emptying their conceptual discriminations, such that true emptiness is also empty. Moreover, in the Chapter on Contemplating Sentient Beings, it says: "Just as a magician sees his illusions, so does a bodhisattva contemplate sentient beings," up to "like a fire without smoke," and so on. Therefore, although this sūtra discusses both truths, because the ultimate truth is profound, it is taken as the primary meaning, and thus emptiness is its core tenet.

If we follow the doctrine of the latter Mahāyāna [school] of Dharmapāla and others, although it speaks of the two truths, conventional truth has four tiers, which comprise both emptiness and existence; ultimate truth has four tiers, which are exclusively existent and not empty—empty meaning non-existent. The imputed nature is only grasped as existent through false clinging, while its substance is truly empty and non-existent; hence it is not ultimate truth. Both truths have four distinct tiers.

The four conventional truths are: 1. Conventional truth established by the world: where the substance of the dharma is not necessarily existent, but is spoken of and clung to as existent by the consensus of all worldly people, namely the real self and dharmas, pots, basins, and the like. 2. Conventional truth established by reasoning: where the principles spoken of by reasoning worldly beings possess both substance and function, namely the aggregates, sense bases, elements, and conditioned and unconditioned dharmas. 3. Conventional truth established by attainment: where worldly practitioners cultivate through expedient means, eradicating evil and pursuing good to realize the noble fruit, namely the principle of the four noble truths and so forth. 4. Conventional truth established by true meaning: where worldly practitioners, having cultivated, realize this supreme subtlety as what is attained, namely the tathatā of the two emptinesses. Among these four, the substance of the first is empty, while the substances of the latter three are existent.

The four ultimate truths are: 1. Ultimate truth established by the world: what practitioners and worldly discourse regard as existent, namely the aggregates, sense bases, elements, and conditioned and unconditioned dharmas. 2. Ultimate truth established by reasoning: namely the principles collectively established by practitioners, such as the principle of the four noble truths. 3. Ultimate truth established by attainment: that by which practitioners, through this expedient means, are able to realize the noble fruit, namely the tathatā of the two emptinesses. 4. Ultimate truth established by true meaning: that which practitioners, having cultivated, realize as this profound subtlety, which sets aside verbal explanations to reveal the import, namely the one true dharmadhātu.

Regarding these two truths, both apply to persons and dharmas. That which is known by medium intelligence is called conventional truth; that which is known by superior intelligence is called ultimate truth. Furthermore, inferior principles are called conventional truth; superior principles are called ultimate truth. Therefore, the two truths each have four tiers, divided according to persons, dharmas, the depth of principle, and the coarseness or subtlety of the cognitive realm.

This entire sūtra largely speaks of the first conventional truth; hence the Introductory Chapter says, "There is no self that acts and no experiencer." The Śrāvaka Chapter says, "Dharmas are without sentient beings, because they are free from the defilement of sentient beings." The Bodhisattva Chapter says, "Bodhi is a provisional name, because names are empty." The Inquiring about Illness Chapter says: "Furthermore, the arising of this illness is entirely due to clinging to a self. Therefore, one should not give rise to clinging to a self. Having understood the root of the illness, one should eradicate the notion of a self and the notion of a sentient being, and should give rise to the notion of dharmas. One should think: 'This body is merely a composite of many dharmas; in arising, only dharmas arise; in ceasing, only dharmas cease.'" Up to the extensive explanation: "To eradicate the notion of dharmas, one should think: 'This notion of dharmas is also a cognitive distortion (viparyāsa); cognitive distortion is a great affliction, and I should abandon it.' How so? By being free from self and free from what belongs to self." Up to the various chapters that all explain the emptiness of self and dharmas in order to initially abandon those discriminations. The latter three conventional truths are identical to the former three ultimate truths, and will not be explained separately.

In explaining the ultimate truth, there are four dharma-gates: 1. the dharma-gate of causes and conditions (hetupratyaya); 2. the dharma-gate of consciousness-only (vijñaptimātra); 3. the dharma-gate of signlessness (animitta); 4. the dharma-gate of tathatā.

As for the dharma-gate of causes and conditions: the Introductory Chapter says, "Because they depend on causes and conditions, all dharmas are established; nor do good and evil karmas perish." The Upāya Chapter says, "This body, composed of the four great elements, is impermanent and frail. The Tathāgata's dharmakāya is aggregated by immeasurable wholesome dharmas... Whoever wishes to attain such a body should give rise to the mind of anuttarā-samyak-saṃbodhi." The Inquiring about Illness Chapter says, "Householder! From what cause does this illness arise? Vimalakīrti said: 'From ignorance there is craving, and thus my illness arises. Furthermore, because all sentient beings are ill, therefore I am ill.'" The former answer concerning illness takes ignorance as the root cause of saṃsāra; the latter answer concerning illness takes great compassion as the root cause of supramundane emergence. Furthermore: "A bodhisattva who is ill should think: 'My present illness arises entirely from false thoughts, cognitive distortions, and defilements of previous lives; it is only provisionally called a body due to the combination of the four great elements.'" Such passages all speak of the dharma of causes and conditions.

As for the dharma-gate of consciousness-only: the Introductory Chapter says, "The direct mind is the Bodhisattva's pure land; the profound mind and the Mahāyāna mind are the Bodhisattva's pure land... In accordance with the purity of their minds, the Buddha-land is purified." Therefore, when the mind is defiled, the Buddha-land is defiled; when the mind is pure, the Buddha-land is pure. In the Śrāvaka Chapter, as the Buddha said, "Because the mind is defiled, sentient beings are defiled; because the mind is pure, sentient beings are pure." Such passages all speak of the dharma of consciousness-only.

As for the dharma-gate of signlessness: the Śrāvaka Chapter says, "Dharmas are constantly quiescent, because they extinguish all marks. Dharmas are free from marks, because they lack cognitive objects. If you slandered the Buddhas, disparaged the Dharma, did not enter the Sangha, and never attained extinction—only if you were like this would you be worthy to take this food." Up to the extensive explanation: "All speech does not depart from marks; yet the wise do not cling to letters, and thus have no fear. Letters are by nature detached; that there are no letters is itself liberation. The mark of liberation is itself all dharmas." Such passages all speak of the dharma of signlessness.

As for the dharma-gate of tathatā: the Introductory Chapter says, "Skillful in distinguishing the marks of all dharmas, yet unmoved in the primary truth." The Śrāvaka Chapter says, "If you can enter the equality of all dharmas through the equality of food, and enter the equality of food through the equality of all dharmas, only then may you take this food." And: "Do not expound the dharma of the real mark with a mind of production and cessation; that all dharmas ultimately neither arise nor cease is the meaning of impermanence." In the Bodhisattva Chapter: "All sentient beings are suchness (tathatā); all dharmas are also suchness; all sages and nobles are also suchness; even Maitreya is also suchness. Now suchness is neither identical nor different." Furthermore, the Chapter on Contemplating Sentient Beings says: "It is asked: 'What is the root of distorted thoughts?' The answer says: 'Non-abiding is the root.' It is asked: 'What is the root of non-abiding?' The answer says: 'Non-abiding has no root. From the root of non-abiding, all dharmas are established.'" Therefore, we know that tathatā is the most profound and ultimate.

Furthermore, in the Chapter on Entering the Dharma-Gate of Non-Duality, thirty-three great beings reveal the dharma-gate of non-duality. Thirty-one bodhisattvas speak of the mark of non-differentiation as entering the dharma-gate of non-duality, all refuting marks by means of signlessness; these all belong to the third dharma-gate of signlessness, whose meaning is still coarse and obvious. As for Mañjuśrī, although he took wordlessness, speechlessness, indicationlessness, and freedom from all questions and answers as entering the dharma-gate of non-duality, he still relied on tathatā to refute speechlessness and reveal it through verbal designation, which is still not the most profound and ultimate; because it is revealed through verbal expression, it also belongs to the third dharma-gate of signlessness, subsumed under the third ultimate truth established by attainment. Only Vimalakīrti's silence without a word, through correct wisdom directly realizing the subtlety of tathatā, constitutes the dharma-gate of tathatā, profound beyond profound. Such passages all speak of the dharma-gate of tathatā.

The concrete dharmas of causes and conditions are the coarsest and most obvious; the contemplation of the principle of consciousness-only is next in subtlety, because it speaks of the characteristics of the internal mind; the general contemplation of signlessness without differentiated marks is still more subtle, yet signlessness is still present in the mind and is not yet direct realization; only the dharma-gate of tathatā is the most profound and subtle, where mind and object merge, wisdom and spirit unite, true principle is penetrated, true wisdom is matched, obstacles and habit-energies are eliminated, and all dharmas are established—hence it is foremost.

Although four gates are taught, they do not contradict one another; each single dharma-gate subsumes all completely. For within causes and conditions there is also consciousness-only, since consciousness-only is also a dharma of causes and conditions. There is also signlessness, for the signless object of cognition is not separate from causes and conditions. The substance of tathatā is also [within] causes and conditions, because causes and conditions subsume all dharmas. Furthermore, within tathatā, it is neither identical nor different from all dharmas, appropriately not conflicting with the meanings of the previous three gates. Now, according to the varying coarseness and subtlety of phenomena, these four are taught, not that they are definitively separate.

Now, in this sūtra, within conventional truth, it reveals that self and dharmas are both empty, causing beings not to cling to them. It teaches the existence of the dharmas of causes and conditions to sever defilement and choose purity, revealing consciousness-only. It elucidates that illusory objects are not real, realizing the principle of mind-only and showing the import of signlessness. It severs the marks of conceptual discrimination and differentiation, and speaks of the principle of tathatā to induce the arising of realization through wisdom. Metaphorically relying on verbal expression to teach the four, phenomena and principle may be distinguished; setting aside verbal expression to discuss the import, all are without distinction. In the sūtra text below, they will be matched accordingly. Here, both schools interpret the meaning of the sūtra. The former Mahāyāna [school] speaks generally of the two truths; the latter Mahāyāna [school] sets forth the two truths specifically. The former takes the three non-self-natures as ultimate and the three natures as conventional; the latter takes the three non-self-natures as conventional and the three natures as ultimate. The tenets assert existence and emptiness, and their principles differ accordingly.