說無垢稱經疏 4.496

4.496

贊曰：七答也。初標答、「所以者何」下釋。空理義者，能分別心，體性不空，可能分別真空之性。能分別心體性本空，何能分別真空之性？故釋之云：空性不可分別為空，能緣所緣俱性空故。前隨執有，且對名空，其實此空非空不空，何可分別？應理義云：執能分別既是所執，亦復體空。不但所執境名之為空，執有能取心亦是空。故有此實能取所取空可分別，分別心亦空，空性誰分別？由此道理，故釋之云：空性不可分別為空。前隨依他真如道理對破執有，且說為空。其此空非空不空，何可分別？

Commentary: This is the seventh answer. First it states the answer; from 'Why is that?' onward it explains. According to the meaning of the Śūnyatā principle, if the mind capable of conceptual discrimination were not empty in intrinsic nature, it might be able to conceptually discriminate the nature of true emptiness. But since the mind capable of conceptual discrimination is fundamentally empty in intrinsic nature, how could it conceptually discriminate the nature of true emptiness? Therefore, he explains it by saying: the nature of emptiness cannot be conceptually discriminated as empty, because both subject and object are intrinsically empty. Previously, following grasping at existence, it was provisionally designated empty in opposition; in reality, this emptiness is neither empty nor non-empty, so how could it be conceptually discriminated? According to the meaning of the Yukti principle: grasping at that which is capable of conceptual discrimination is itself what is grasped, and is likewise empty in essence. Not only is the grasped object called empty, but grasping at the apprehending mind is also empty. Therefore, if there were a real subject and object that were empty and could be conceptually discriminated, the discriminating mind is also empty—so who discriminates the nature of emptiness? By this principle, he explains it by saying: the nature of emptiness cannot be conceptually discriminated as empty. Previously, following the principle of paratantra and tathatā to refute grasping at existence, it was provisionally spoken of as empty. This emptiness is neither empty nor non-empty, so how could it be conceptually discriminated?