金光明最勝王經疏 2.197

2.197

贊曰：下四行明四人有障，不得四德，此意即明法身是常樂等。今此中以兔喻法身，常作無常想如依兔求角。為梯天宮者，喻涅槃常德。以無常想梯，悕得入涅槃宮，無有是處。由此故知，無有舍利。準此即明，欲求法身舍利，畢竟不得。此初即除緣覺捨心，由此世尊作無常想，故欲捨心入大涅槃，必定不得，故知法身必無無常。為無常觀如依於兔求角作梯望昇天宮，必定不得。故二乘云得者，是方便說。如《勝鬘經》云「去涅槃界近，言得涅槃，實不得也。」今使觀常修大悲故，除捨心障，能為常因，證佛常德。又依法身觀有無常骨肉舍利，望求供養為法身因，亦必不得。如依於兔求角成梯磴以昇天，故不可得。上約倒觀障自不得法身常德，此約邪觀求佛舍利不得。既無舍利，依何修行能為常因？

Commentary: The following four verses clarify that four types of persons have obstructions and cannot attain the four virtues; this intention specifically clarifies that the dharmakāya is permanent, blissful, and so forth. Here, the rabbit is used as an analogy for the dharmakāya; always conceiving it as impermanent is like seeking horns upon a rabbit. Being a ladder to the celestial palace is an analogy for the virtue of permanence in nirvāṇa. Seeking to enter the palace of nirvāṇa using the ladder of the conception of impermanence is impossible. From this it is known that there are no relics. In accordance with this, it clarifies that seeking relics of the dharmakāya can never succeed.
This first [verse] eliminates the mind of renunciation of the pratyekabuddhas. Because they conceive the World-Honoured One as impermanent and therefore wish with a mind of renunciation to enter mahānirvāṇa, they can never attain it; hence it is known that the dharmakāya is certainly free from impermanence. Engaging in contemplation of impermanence is like relying on a rabbit to seek horns to make a ladder hoping to ascend to the celestial palace, which is certainly unattainable. Thus, when the two vehicles speak of attainment, it is an expedient teaching. As the Śrīmālādevī Sūtra says: "Being close to the realm of nirvāṇa, they say they have attained nirvāṇa, but in truth they have not attained it." Now, by causing them to contemplate permanence and cultivate mahākaruṇā, the obstruction of the mind of renunciation is eliminated, enabling them to act as a cause of permanence and realise the Buddha's virtue of permanence.
Furthermore, relying on the dharmakāya to contemplate whether there are impermanent relics of bone and flesh, hoping to seek offerings to serve as the cause for the dharmakāya, is likewise certainly impossible, just like relying on a rabbit to seek horns to make a flight of stairs to ascend to heaven cannot be achieved. The above concerned the inverted contemplation that obstructs oneself from attaining the dharmakāya's virtue of permanence; this concerns the wrong contemplation that seeks the Buddha's relics and cannot obtain them. Since there are no relics, on what cultivation could one rely to serve as the cause of permanence?