金光明最勝王經疏 2.367

2.367

贊曰：明得法身。如如，即自性法身。如如智，即四智品。雖事智品不緣真如，離能所取故、由如如智起故，總名如如智。故次云「是故法如如如如智攝一切佛法。」若唯是如，非攝一切故。又解：化身如前；應身者，通攝自他二受用身；法身唯是自性真如。言如如智者，如實相般若。又《大莊嚴論》及真諦三藏說有四覺：一應覺，即真如；二正覺，即智慧；三覺分，即菩提因；四令覺，即能詮教。諸法體邊名如如，智性邊名如如智故。故下文云「應身從無始來相續不斷，一切諸佛不共之法體攝持故，眾生無盡用亦無盡，是故說常」等，明亦通是自受用身。下云「法身者非是行法，無有異相，是根本故，猶如虛空，是故說常。」既云非行法，明非四智，四智生滅是行法故。又解：二義俱通。准《攝大乘》別解三身及常無常門，即如彼解。准上下文及《攝大乘》等，約通而說，即如前解。今此經中通二義解：若四句等中即自他受用別門而明，不今四句，應非化身是地前身，化身亦應謂住有餘涅槃之身。若自受用非名化故，故自受用同名法身。故此下云「是故法身慧清淨故、滅清淨故，是二清淨，是故法身具足清淨。」若智理二合名法身，即性相合論門。若唯取如名法身者，即性相別論門。若自受用是應身攝，即是假實自他受用二合論門。若應唯是他受用身，即假實別論門。故知諸說義不相違。

Commentary: Explaining the attainment of the dharmakāya. 'Suchness of phenomena' is the svabhāva-dharmakāya. 'The gnosis of suchness' is the mental associates of the four gnoses. Although the category of gnosis of actions does not take tathatā as its cognitive object, because it is free of grāhaka and grāhya and because it arises from the gnosis of suchness, it is collectively named the gnosis of suchness. Therefore it says next: 'Therefore the suchness of phenomena and the gnosis of suchness subsume all buddha-dharmas.' If it were only tathatā, it would not subsume everything. Another interpretation: the transformation body is as before; the response body generally subsumes both svasaṃbhogakāya and parasambhogakāya; and the dharmakāya is solely the tathatā of intrinsic nature. 'The gnosis of suchness' means prajñā as reality. Furthermore, the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra and the Tripiṭaka Master Paramārtha say there are four awakenings: first, the awakening to be attained, which is tathatā; second, the correct awakening, which is wisdom; third, the limbs of awakening, which are the causes of bodhi; fourth, causing awakening, which is the teaching that can express it. With respect to the substance of all phenomena, it is named 'suchness of phenomena'; with respect to the nature of gnosis, it is named 'gnosis of suchness'. Therefore the text below says: 'The response body has been in an unbroken continuum from beginningless time, because it is sustained by the substance of the unshared qualities of all buddhas; because sentient beings are endless, its function is also endless, and therefore it is said to be eternal,' and so forth, showing that it also generally refers to the svasaṃbhogakāya. Below it says: 'The dharmakāya is not a conditioned phenomenon, has no different marks, and because it is the root, it is like empty space, and therefore it is said to be eternal.' Since it says it is not a conditioned phenomenon, it clearly is not the four gnoses, because the arising and ceasing of the four gnoses are conditioned phenomena. Another interpretation: both meanings are valid. Following the She dacheng lun's separate explanations of the three bodies and the category of permanence and impermanence, it is just like that interpretation. Following the context above and below and texts such as the She dacheng lun in speaking generally, it is as the previous interpretation. Now in this sūtra, it is explained through both meanings: if in the four propositions and so forth, svasaṃbhoga and parasambhoga are explained in separate categories; if not in the four propositions, the response body would not be a transformation body and would be a body before the bhūmis, and the transformation body would also mean the body abiding in the nirvāṇa with remainder. Since the svasaṃbhoga is not named transformation, the svasaṃbhoga is equally named dharmakāya. Therefore below it says: 'Therefore, because the dharmakāya is pure in wisdom and pure in cessation, it has these two purities, and therefore the dharmakāya is complete in purity.' If gnosis and principle are combined and called the dharmakāya, that is the approach of discussing nature and characteristic together. If only tathatā is taken as the dharmakāya, that is the approach of discussing nature and characteristic separately. If svasaṃbhoga is subsumed under the response body, that is the approach of discussing nominal and real, self and other enjoyment together. If the response body is only parasambhogakāya, that is the approach of discussing nominal and real separately. Thus we know that these various explanations do not contradict each other.