金光明最勝王經疏 4.100

4.100

贊曰：此第三明地障。因明十一地障。前問菩提，通佛果故；今亦明佛地之障。此十一障即十一段，此初，即異生性障。文分為三：一牒請機、二出障體、三辨所障。餘十障，文各有二，除所告機。有相我法，即二執之境。相謂相狀，能執之心當情相狀。即同《唯識論》云「起自心相」。或即體相，執著即能執之心。此執著我法皆悉有體。設執法無，還執有無相。是故經云「不應住法，亦不住非法。」非法者，是無法也。若執我無，亦是法執。二執是慧俱無明，強名為無明，是隣近釋。怖畏生死惡趣無明者，此惡趣言非唯三惡道，通八難故。但分別所起不善業及所感果，并所知障所發業果，亦是此攝。毀責之名，總云惡趣。由是此經云「生死惡趣」，非唯三途。言怖畏者，即此惡趣是所怖畏，名為怖畏。此無明發無明品故，名為無明。又《唯識論》云「或說彼利鈍障品俱起二愚。二執無明意說利品，惡趣無明意說鈍品。」俱起無明名惡趣者，亦毀責名。或見等迷理不發惡業，鈍品迷事故發惡業。從果為名，名惡趣雜染愚。愚是本故，竝依主釋。問：《唯識論》云「一執著我法愚」，即是此中異生性障。且異生性障不相應假，依種分位非即種體，云何二執即異生性？答言：異生性雖實通依，與現本識同地能生分別二障，種子上立，從能依法以立障名。或即異生性，從所依執種，名執著我法愚。體不即愚，愚品名愚。如前所引。問：初地能斷分別二執，彼《唯識論》等何不即以二執自體立於障名，或從能所依以立障名耶？答：異生性滅，即二執斷。又異生名，簡異於聖。得聖斷彼，顯故立名。問：入於初地既斷二障，云何《攝論》云十無明是不染污，分別我執是染污故。答：世親《攝論》彼中解云「雖斷二障，二乘亦能斷煩惱障，是共德故。」意約不共所知障說名不染污。又解：彼說不染約修道斷，離十障外說十無明，顯立十地。《成唯識論》、天親《攝論》俱有二解。二十二愚所明體性，與《瑜伽》七十八等同。又準餘文，皆於初地說斷二愚及彼麁重，此略不言麁重，《成唯識論》有其二釋。論云「彼麁重言，顯彼二種或二所起無堪任性。」無堪任性者，《瑜伽》五十八云「謂第八識中不安穩性等。」《唯識論》云「如入二定說斷苦根，所斷善根雖非現種而名麁重。此亦應爾。」愚及麁重餘之十種，皆準此知。解異生性及其麁重，廣如《成唯識義燈》所說。

The Commentary says: This third [part] explains the obstacles of the grounds. Consequently, it clarifies the obstacles of the eleven grounds. Because the earlier inquiry concerned bodhi and comprehensively included the fruit of Buddhahood, it now also explains the obstacles of the Buddha ground. These eleven obstacles form eleven sections. This first is the obstacle of the nature of ordinary beings (pṛthagjanatva). The text is divided into three: first, mentioning the addressee who requested [the teaching]; second, presenting the essence of the obstacle; third, distinguishing what is obstructed. The other ten obstacles each have two parts in their text, omitting the addressee spoken to. 'Marks of self and phenomena' are the objects of the two clingings. 'Mark' means the characteristic appearance—the appearance as presented before the clinging mind. This is identical to what the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi says: 'giving rise to marks of its own mind.' Or it is the essential characteristic, while 'clinging' is the clinging mind itself. This clinging [takes] self and phenomena to all have substantial reality. Even if one clings to phenomena as non-existent, one still clings to the mark of non-existence. Therefore the sūtra says: 'One should not abide in phenomena, nor should one abide in non-phenomena.' 'Non-phenomena' means non-existent phenomena. If one clings to the self as non-existent, that too is clinging to phenomena. The two clingings are ignorance associated with wisdom; they are forcefully termed 'ignorance'—this is an interpretation by proximity. As for 'ignorance that dreads the evil destinies of saṃsāra,' this phrase 'evil destinies' does not refer solely to the three evil paths, for it comprehensively includes the eight difficulties. However, unwholesome karma arisen through conceptual discrimination and its consequential fruits, together with the karma and fruits set in motion by the cognitive obscurations (jñeyāvaraṇa), are also subsumed here. As a name of reproach, they are collectively called 'evil destinies.' Thus this sūtra says 'the evil destinies of saṃsāra,' not merely the three paths. 'Dread' means that these evil destinies are what is dreaded, hence termed 'dread.' Because this ignorance produces the category of ignorance, it is called 'ignorance.' Furthermore, the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi says: 'Or it is said that they are two kinds of folly arising together with the sharp and dull categories of obstacles. The ignorance of the two clingings refers to the sharp category; the ignorance of evil destinies refers to the dull category.' The co-arising ignorance being named 'evil destinies' is also an appellation of reproach. Or [it means that] views and the like, being confused about principle, do not set unwholesome karma in motion, whereas the dull category, being confused about concrete phenomena, does set unwholesome karma in motion. Taking its name from its fruit, it is named 'the folly of defilement of the evil destinies.' Because folly is the root, both are determinative compound (tatpuruṣa) interpretations. Question: The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi says, 'first, the folly of clinging to self and phenomena,' which is the obstacle of the nature of ordinary beings here. Now, the obstacle of the nature of ordinary beings is a non-concurrent conditioned factor (cittaviprayuktasasaṃskāra) that is a designation; it is established upon the states of the seeds and is not the substance of the seeds itself—how then can the two clingings be the nature of ordinary beings? Answer: Although the nature of ordinary beings is actually established universally upon the seeds of the two conceptually discriminated obscurations belonging to the same stage as the manifesting fundamental consciousness that can generate them, the name of the obstacle is established from the dependent factor. Or [one may say that] the nature of ordinary beings itself is called 'the folly of clinging to self and phenomena' from the clinging seeds on which it depends. In substance it is not itself folly, but belongs to the category of folly, as cited above. Question: The first ground can sever the two conceptually discriminated clingings; why do that Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi and other texts not establish the name of the obstacle directly from the intrinsic nature of the two clingings, or establish it from that which depends or that upon which it depends? Answer: When the nature of ordinary beings is eliminated, the two clingings are severed. Furthermore, the name 'ordinary being' differentiates them from the noble ones (ārya). Attaining noble status severs them, so the name was established because it is obvious. Question: Since entering the first ground severs the two obscurations, why does the Mahāyānasaṃgraha state that the ten kinds of ignorance are undefiled, given that conceptually discriminated self-clinging is defiled? Answer: In his Mahāyānasaṃgraha-bhāṣya, Vasubandhu explains there: 'Although it severs the two obscurations, the two vehicles can also sever the afflictive obscurations (kleśāvaraṇa), as this is a shared virtue.' The intention is that it is termed 'undefiled' with reference to the unshared cognitive obscurations. Another explanation: its saying 'undefiled' refers to what is severed on the path of cultivation (bhāvanāmārga); setting aside the ten obstacles, it speaks of ten kinds of ignorance to clearly establish the ten grounds. Both the Cheng weishi lun and Vasubandhu's Mahāyānasaṃgraha-bhāṣya have these two explanations. The essential nature explained for the twenty-two follies is identical to that in Yogācārabhūmi fascicle 78 and elsewhere. Furthermore, based on other texts, it is everywhere said that on the first ground one severs the two follies and their crude heavy residue (dauṣṭhulya); here it briefly omits crude heavy residue, for which the Cheng weishi lun offers two explanations. The treatise says: 'That word "crude heavy residue" indicates either of those two kinds [of folly] or the unserviceability generated by the two.' Regarding 'unserviceability,' Yogācārabhūmi fascicle 58 states: 'It refers to the state of instability within the eighth consciousness, and so forth.' The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi states: 'Just as entering the second dhyāna is said to sever the faculty of suffering, and the severed roots of virtue, though neither manifest nor seeds, are termed crude heavy residue; this should also be understood in the same way.' The remaining ten kinds of folly and crude heavy residue are all to be understood following this. The explanation of the nature of ordinary beings and its crude heavy residue is treated at length in the Cheng weishi lun yideng.