金光明最勝王經疏 4.416

4.416

贊曰：通也。有三：初釋不得言一異、次出不得所由、後結。此初。若法界即五蘊，約遍計說，彼是無故，即是斷見。若離五蘊別見法性，即是常見。又法界即五蘊，約依他說。二乘得無餘時法界同斷，即是斷見。或隨有為真如有滅，故說為斷。若離五蘊別見法性，即是常見，以法性體與彼遍計、依他二性非定一異，言定一異，俱是遍計，不離斷常。問：真如非常見為常者，名為常見。真如是常見之為常，稱境而知，何名常見？答：言常無常，此隨言詮，是分別見。談其法體非常無常，如言執常，故是常見。又復正違無分別智，此意欲令離分別執亡相方修，若執為常違此正智，以其法性離有無一異常斷相故，不障後得智離執觀如以為常也。此中即離，應可立量云：法界應有斷，斷者滅義。因云即五蘊故，猶如五蘊。又若離五蘊即是常見者，即難依他應是常名為常見，以蘊非蘊中隨一攝故，猶如法界。然此不為破他，故不立量。復違教過，以教不許五蘊常故，但可顯云應是常見。然觀經文，但明法界與五蘊體非定一異；若定一異，法界體應是斷是常。

Commentary: The clarification. There are three parts: first, explaining why one cannot speak of oneness or difference; second, presenting the reasons why one cannot; third, the conclusion. This is the first. If the dharmadhātu were the five aggregates, speaking in terms of the imagined, since it does not exist, that would be the view of annihilation. If one saw the nature of dharmas separately apart from the five aggregates, that would be the view of permanence. Furthermore, if the dharmadhātu were the five aggregates, speaking in terms of the dependent: when the two vehicles attain [nirvāṇa] without remainder, the dharmadhātu would be annihilated along with them, which would be the view of annihilation. Or, following conditioned things, tathatā would undergo cessation, so it is spoken of as annihilation. If one saw the nature of dharmas separately apart from the five aggregates, that would be the view of permanence; because the entity of the nature of dharmas is not definitely identical to or different from those two natures—the imagined and the dependent—asserting definite identity or difference is in both cases an imagined construction, not free from annihilation or permanence. Question: Seeing tathatā as permanent when it is not permanent is called the view of permanence. Since tathatā is permanent, seeing it as permanent is knowing it in accordance with the object; why is it called the view of permanence? Answer: Speaking of permanence or impermanence follows verbal designation; it is a conceptual view. Speaking of the entity of dharmas, it is neither permanent nor impermanent; clinging to permanence as stated is therefore the view of permanence. Moreover, it directly contradicts non-conceptual wisdom. The intention here is to make one practice only after abandoning conceptual clinging and dissolving characteristics; if one clings to it as permanent, one contradicts this correct wisdom, because the nature of dharmas is free from the characteristics of existence, non-existence, identity, difference, permanence, and annihilation. This does not obstruct subsequent wisdom (pṛṣṭhalabdhajñāna), free from clinging, from contemplating tathatā as permanent. Here, concerning identity and separation, a formal syllogism (prayoga) could be established: 'The dharmadhātu would be subject to annihilation—annihilation meaning cessation. Reason: Because it is identical to the five aggregates, like the five aggregates.' Also: 'If it were separate from the five aggregates, that would be the view of permanence'—this refutes [the opponent by arguing that] the dependent would be permanent, called the view of permanence, because it is subsumed under either aggregate or non-aggregate, like the dharmadhātu. However, this is not for refuting others, so a syllogism is not established. Furthermore, it would have the fault of contradicting scriptural teachings, because scripture does not permit the five aggregates to be permanent; one can only show that it would follow that there is a view of permanence. Looking at the sūtra text, it simply clarifies that the entity of the dharmadhātu and the five aggregates are not definitely identical or different; if they were definitely identical or different, the entity of the dharmadhātu would be subject to annihilation or permanence.